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1 Introduction 
 
“It is difficult, if possible at all, to describe the history of a field of 
knowledge. It consists of many coinciding and mutually influential 
developmental lines of different thoughts, all of which require 
presentation, first, as single, isolated lines and, second, in their 
particular relations. Third, one would have to draw a separate, 
idealized line to depict the average development. Thus writing a 
history resembles giving an accurate, written transcript of a heated 
discussion of several persons, all of whom talked at the same time 
and in whose discussion a common thought slowly crystallized.”
     Ludwik Fleck, 19351  
 
“When the progress of experimental physics goes counter to a theory 
and compels it to be modified or transformed, the purely 
representative part enters nearly whole in the new theory, bringing to 
it the inheritance of all the valuable possessions of the old theory, 
whereas the explanatory part falls out in order to give way to another 
explanation. Thus, by virtue of a continuous tradition, each theory 
passes on to the one that follows it a share of the natural 
classification it was able to construct, as in certain ancient games 
each runner handed on the lighted torch to the courier ahead of him 
and this continuous tradition assures a perpetuity of life and progress 
for science. This continuity of tradition is not visible to the superficial 
observer [sic!] due to the constant breaking-out of explanations which 
arise only to be quelled.”  Pierre Duhem, 1906 
 
 
This dissertation is devoted to the Darwinian2 Revolution, i.e. the transformation of biological 
knowledge after 1859, the year in which Charles Darwin published his seminal Origin of Species.3 It 
pursues a three-dimensional project which is partly historical-epistemological, partly philosophical-
systematic and partly sociological and seeks answers to the following questions:  
Historical-epistemological project: How can the Darwinian revolution be described in 
a manner which accounts for both theoretical discontinuity and empirical continuity? 
                                                            
1  Quoted from (Duhem 1962 [1906]: 32-3), (Fleck 1980 [1935]: 23). The translation of Fleck is my own; it is 
somewhat liberal and more oriented towards clarity than stylistic resemblance. 
2  For a discussion whether it is justified to speak of the “Darwinian” revolution, see section 5.1 viii. 
3  The full title reads “The Origin of Species By Means of Natural Selection or The Preservation of Favoured 
Races in the Struggle for Life”. 
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In what aspects is the Darwinian theory different from preceding and competing 
theories? How much of the revolutionary change is an individual achievement of 
Darwin? 
Philosophical project: How can scientific theories be described in a general 
framework which (i) highlights differences between the theories as well as common 
elements (static perspective) and which (ii) allows for describing historical 
developments of theories (dynamic perspective)? 
Sociological project: How are scientific theories and revolutions of such theories 
perceived by different audiences and how does the depth of reception influence the 
acceptance or dismissal of a theory by these audiences? What is the impact of the 
Darwinian revolution on 19th century biology? 
The arguments on these three projects can be read separately4 but they provide complementary 
perspectives. The historical-epistemological analysis focuses on the innovative elements which 
Darwin achieved towards his predecessors and competitors. The sociological project provides the 
recipient’s perspective in that it asks whether this innovation reached the theory’s audience and 
which impact it ultimately had; for the community of biologists, this is achieved by the first large-
scale analysis of the reception of Darwin’s theory in his discipline. The philosophical project serves as 
the hinge between the other perspectives in that it provides the analytic framework which structures 
both the historical-epistemological analysis and the reception analysis of the sociological project. 
By combining these different perspectives, this dissertation provides an innovative and original 
contribution to existing research. First, it develops novel analytic frameworks for the analysis of 
scientific theories and their reception. Second, it provides the first application of a sophisticated 
model of scientific theories in a thorough, empirically sound historical study of a scientific 
revolution.5 Third, it provides novel insights into the reception of scientific knowledge among 
heterogeneous audiences. Fourth, in combination, these different contributions allow for a much 
more precise description of large transformations in knowledge systems and will contribute to a 
deeper understanding of scientific theories than has hitherto been possible. 
1.1 Historical-epistemological project: understanding Darwin’s revolution 
In the first place, my dissertation aims at integrating the Darwinian revolution into a research 
program which is being pursued at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin: the 
                                                            
4  The historical-epistemological argument is developed in sections 1.1 and 0, applied in chapter 3, 
summarized in section 3.5.6 and discussed in section 5.1. The philosophical-systematic argument is 
developed in sections 1.2 and 2.1, applied in chapter 3 and 2.3 discussed in the annex, section 6. The 
sociological argument is developed in sections 1.3 and 2.2, applied in part 0, summarized in section 4.4 and 
discussed in sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
5  Unfortunately, philosophical-systematic studies tend to model a history which never thus happened, 
simplifying historical events and entities to a point where they are misrepresented. (cf. Thagard 1993) 
There obviously exist excellent studies on the history of biology but I know of none which developed a 
sophisticated framework for the analysis of scientific theories. 
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program of Historical Epistemology.6 Within this research program, scientific revolutions or, more 
neutrally, large transformations of scientific knowledge systems are not understood as a series of 
individual achievements by a few hero scientists. Instead, Historical Epistemology aims at embedding 
these individual contributions in their historical and social context. The goal of this embedding is not 
to deny the role of individuals but to assess how much individuals were rooted in the social context 
of their time and how this context nourished and shaped their contributions. 
Previous studies on early modern mechanical knowledge in the early 17th century and on the 
relativity revolution at the beginning of the 20th century have shown that the work of scientific greats 
as Galileo and Einstein were not the singular achievements as which they are often regarded. Such, 
Matthias Schemmel (2008) has demonstrated how European contemporaries of Galileo have studied 
the problem of falling bodies in very similar ways as Galileo and have drawn comparable conclusions 
– most notably the “English Galileo”, Thomas Harriot. For the relativity revolution in 20th century 
physics similar results were found. (Janssen et al. 2007a; Janssen et al. 2007b; Renn and Schemmel 
2007a; Renn and Schemmel 2007b; Renn and Schemmel 2012) 
Therefore, explanations of structural transformations of knowledge systems need to take into 
account the collective character and historical specificity of the knowledge to be transformed. 
Otherwise our understanding of knowledge transformations in science will remain incomplete and it 
will lead to misconceptions about such problems as scientific progress or scientific truth. In other 
words, without regard for the social (collective) historical character of scientific theories, we will 
remain in the position of Duhem’s “superficial observer” and gain a distorted image of science. 
The research program of Historical Epistemology is organized around a number of concepts which 
allow for the description and explanation of long-term transformations of large systems of 
knowledge. The most important are: (i) multi-layered knowledge systems, (ii) shared knowledge, (iii) 
challenging objects or events, (iv) shared beliefs7 and (v) mental models. (Renn 2008) 
First, scientific systems of knowledge are investigated as multi-layered architectures which comprise 
both, layers of empirical knowledge and more conceptual layers. The latter provide interpretations 
and explanations of the more former ones and aim at world representations beyond the empirically 
accessible. As these layers are interrelated, changes in one layer may affect others. 
Second, large transformations of knowledge systems begin within these very systems, they rest on a 
fundament of shared knowledge, i.e. a collective resource. On such a fundament, historically specific 
reorganizations of knowledge may be suggested and – sometimes – achieved. In describing such 
                                                            
6  There are three strands within this program which focus on histories of epistemic objects, histories 
epistemic concepts and dynamics of long-term scientific developments. My work is part of the third 
program. – An overview over all three strands is provided by (Feest and Sturm 2011). (Renn 2008), 
(Schemmel 2008) as well as (Damerow and Lefèvre 1998) and (Lefèvre 2000) provide outlines of this 
program. – Note that I did not mark quotes from these texts in this introduction in order to improve the 
readability. For an earlier, less detailed historical-epistemological study of the Darwinian revolution, see 
(Lefèvre 2009). 
7  The concept of shared beliefs as a complement and counterpart of shared knowledge is less developed in 
earlier works of Historical Epistemology, often the term ‘knowledge’ is used for both. I attempt to establish 
a clear distinction between both in my model of scientific theories. (see section 2.1) By shared beliefs, I 
denote the following elements of my model: denotation, interpretation, narration, ontological 
implications. I use ‘belief’ not necessarily in a religious sense, although beliefs in scientific theories might 
stem from religious sources. Rather, it is meant to connote something like the term ‘conviction’ connotes. 
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transformations, it is paramount to distinguish the collective fundament of shared knowledge from 
the specific reorganization suggested by one or more scientist(s). 
Third, the specific reorganizations which scientists suggest to their peers are often triggered by 
challenging objects or events, i.e. historically specific material objects, or historically specific events, 
processes or practices which have entered the domain of a system of knowledge but do not fit with 
the system’s conceptual layers, i.e. interpretations and explanations provided by the system. 
Fourth, reorganizations of knowledge systems often imply the alterations of shared beliefs, i.e. 
interpretations and explanations of the shared knowledge as well as their philosophical-ontological 
implications.8 Such alterations may produce tensions and inconsistencies in scientific theories 
(knowledge systems) and may lead to further alterations. Alterations of shard beliefs are the most 
visible part of knowledge reorganizations, particularly when they touch central elements of world 
representations. [JR: OK?] 
Fifth, alterations of shared beliefs are often structured by mental models, i.e. mental representations 
of basal belief structures and/of shared knowledge, often practical or intuitive knowledge. In 
reorganizations of knowledge systems, mental models often play a crucial role in that modifications 
of shared beliefs employ historical (old) mental models, thus putting innovative interpretations and 
explanations in continuity with older epistemological traditions. 9 In such use, mental models may be 
modified but do not give up their basic structure; they are characterized by a remarkable longevity.10  
When transformations of knowledge systems are described in these concepts, both the revolutionary 
(discontinuous) and the conservative (continuous) aspects of such transformations are revealed; in 
their historical and social context the scientific revolutions become collectively achieved 
reorganizations of knowledge. For instance, for the revolution in pre-classical mechanics, Matthias 
Schemmel, Jochen Büttner and Matteo Valleriani demonstrated why parallels between Galileo and 
his predecessors, notably Guidobaldo del Monte, as well as his competitors, notably Thomas Harriot. 
These parallels are not accidental but can be explained by (i) a body of shared knowledge to which 
they all had access – notably the works of the Greeks – as well as (ii) common challenging objects / 
events of mechanics, notably the balance, the pendulum and the trajectories of cannon balls. From 
shared knowledge, shared beliefs about this knowledge and shared challenges to both arose from 
shared research questions, partly structured by shared mental models. Thus, the strictly individual 
                                                            
8  For a specification of the concepts of interpretation and explanation, see sections 2.1.2 to 2.1.4.  
9  In my conclusion, I will identify three central mental models in the Darwinian revolution, two of which are 
very old or have very old components. (See section 5.1 vi) 
10  My use of mental models differs slightly from the typical use within Historical Epistemology. I am not 
considering mental models to shape shared beliefs but rather scientists to employ mental models in their 
formulation of shared beliefs. This, however, is a difference in narrative only. Both explanations are based 
on the observation that specific mental models appear, first, in the history of a discipline and, second, (in 
modified form) in novel scientific theories. I construct this correlation as a human action to employ a 
certain model, whether this action stems from conscious choice or not. Historical Epistemology would 
rather construct it as a mental model shaping a knowledge-reorganization. My explanation employs more 
of a social science narrative, the historical-epistemological one more of a natural science narrative. (see 
section 2.1.4 for narratives in explanation) – Due to my different focus, I am not referring to mental models 
in default logic. See (Johnson-Laird 1980; Garnham, Oakhill, and Johnson-Laird 1982; Johnson-Laird 1983; 
Levinson 2000), for its use in the history of science see (Renn and Damerow 2007). 
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part of the works of Galileo or Harriot is rather limited.11 (cf. Schemmel 2008; Büttner, Damerow, and 
Renn 2001; Büttner et al. 2003; Valleriani 2010) 
In the present dissertation, I undertake such a historical-epistemological reconstruction of the 
transformation of biological knowledge during the Darwinian revolution. I therefore begin my 
dissertation with an analysis of the shared knowledge of biology and shared beliefs about biology at 
the beginning of the 1840s, around twenty years before the publication of the Origin of Species. 
This moment appears like the retarding element12 in the drama of the Darwinian revolution. In the 
previous seventy years, biology had successively tapped the knowledge sources13 on which Darwin 
would construct his theory: biogeography, embryology, morphology and paleontology. (See sections 
2.3 iv and vi.) Moreover, it had produced the kind of challenging objects the Darwinian theory aimed 
to explain.14 On the side of beliefs, the late 18th and early 19th century had seen several 
pronouncements of early evolutionary concepts, notably Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s 1809 Philosophie 
Zoologique, the first full-fledged explanation of evolution.15 The idea that organisms transformed 
over time without direct divine intervention was thus known to both scientists and the public. Yet, it 
was far from a shared belief; particularly, Lamarck’s explanation had been dismissed vehemently. As 
biologists continued to exploit their knowledge sources and piled up more and more objects which 
challenged the dominant beliefs, the tension between the shared knowledge of and the shared 
beliefs about knowledge continued to rise. 
Simultaneously, the 1840s marked a geographical shift in the theoretical discourse on biology. From 
the 1770s to the 1830s, roughly, French scientists had dominated the theoretical debates. 16 Around 
the 1840s, Britain began to take center-stage, a trend which would find its culmination in the 1859 
Origin. In the second part of my dissertation, I will analyze four different accounts and explanations 
of evolution which were published during this time and each enjoyed important reception17: 
 Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation and its sequel Explanations by the 
journalist and amateur-scientist Robert Chambers’ (1844/5) 
                                                            
11  This does not imply that this individual part does not matter, on the contrary. 
12  In drama theory, the retarding element denotes a sequence in a play in which the action has taken a turn 
towards the eventual conclusion but it is not yet achieved. Instead, during the retarding moment, the end 
seems up in the air again and the audience is left in doubt about how it will turn out. In a five-act play, the 
turning point is usually found in the 3rd act, the retarding moment in the 4th act, and the conclusion in the 
5th. 
13  In the two decades from 1840 to 1859 biology, certainly, continued to produce new knowledge, some of 
which would lend precious support to the theory of evolution. It did not, however, integrate a new type of 
knowledge source like biogeography, morphology, paleontology or embryology, all of which had been 
integrated ca. between 1770 and 1840. 
14  That the challenging objects and necessary shared knowledge was already present in the 1840s seems to 
be confirmed by the fact that Darwin’s famous transmutation notebooks date back to 1837. Throughout 
the 1840s he would develop and specify his views but did not dare to publish, deeming his own views too 
speculative and not sufficiently supported by empirical evidence. (Darwin 1958a [1842]; Darwin 1958b 
[1844]) 
15  By the term ‘evolution’ I denote any description of long-term changes of groups of organisms in time. Such 
concepts were also referred to as ‘transmutational’ or ‘developmental’ or ‘derivative’, among others. For 
simplicity, I will refer to all of them as ‘evolutionary’. For an overview on the historical use of the term, see 
(Bowler 1975). 
16  There exited an extensive theoretical discourse in Germany but it was only loosely connected to the shared 
knowledge of biology. Thus, its impact on biologists was very limited. (See Section 2.3 v) 
17  The reception differed by public and country; I will specify both in section 0. 
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 A series of theoretical remarks throughout the works of Richard Owen between 
1848 (On the archetype and homologies of the vertebrate skeleton) and 1868 (On 
the Anatomy of Vertebrates. Volume III: Mammals) 
 Two papers by Alfred Russel Wallace, namely On the Law which Has Regulated the 
Introduction of New Species (1855) and his part of the joint paper On the Tendency 
of Varieties to depart indefinitely from the Original Type by Alfred Russel Wallace 
and Charles Darwin (1858) 
 On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of 
Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life by Charles Darwin (1859-1872) 
My analysis of these texts is content-centered, not people-centered. I do not aim to analyze the 
motivations, values or thought-processes of the authors but the texts they published. There are two 
reasons for this: First, there already exist a number of excellent analyses of the genesis of these texts, 
particularly in Darwin’s case. (Darwin 1960a; Darwin 1960b; Darwin 1960c; Darwin 1960d; Darwin 
1961; Darwin 1967; Gruber 1974;Grinnell 1974; Schweber 1977; Grinnell 1985; Sheets-Pyenson 1981; 
Beatty 1985; Kohn 1985a; Oldroyd 1986; Richards 1987b; Mayr 1991; Kutschera 2003; Hodge 2003; 
Hull 2005; van Wyhe 2007; Hodge 2010; cf. Desmond and Moore 1995; Browne 1995; Browne 2002; 
Browne 2006) It is not my project to extend on these texts. Second, I am interested in science as a 
social phenomenon, not in scientists as psychological subjects. Therefore, motivations or values 
matter only insofar as they were accessibly to the audience of scientific communications.18 For 
instance, it matters little for the reception of Darwin what role Darwin intended to attribute to God 
when recipients based their understanding of his theory on the text of the Origin. This text might 
allow for different readings and, thus, for interpretations which differed from Darwin’s intentions. 
The focal point of this analysis is, evidently, Darwin’s Origin of Species, the book to which the 
Darwinian revolution is usually and rightly traced. During Darwin’s lifetime, the book appeared in six 
editions of 1859, 1860, 1861, 1866, 1869 and 1872.19 My analysis will center on the second edition 
which is differs from the first only in minor editorial changes and, therefore, best allows for analyzing 
the book which Darwin wrote in comparison to his predecessors and competitors; the later editions 
are much more marked by the reception in England. Where adequate, I will emphasize important 
differences between the editions. For Chambers’ Vestiges and Explanations I chose the second 
edition as well; equally, it differs barely from the first. Wallace’s papers did not appear in different 
editions; I am thus analyzing the original papers. With respect to Richard Owen, I am making an 
exception, analyzing writings which span twenty years and partly appeared long after the Origin. I do 
this because Owen’s championed an important and influential account of evolution in Britain which 
he did not dare to express throughout the 1850s and published only after 1859.20 In order to assess 
Darwin’s particular role in the Darwinian revolution, I will take Owen’s writings of the 1860s into 
account.21 
I will carry out my comparative analysis before the background of the shared knowledge and shared 
beliefs of the time, the early and mid-19th century. I will ask how Darwin integrated the shared 
                                                            
18  Ignoring verbal statements, the author’s intentions are only accessible if they are present in text. 
19  For bibliographical details, see section 3.4. 
20  Like Darwin, Owen feared the public controversy. 
21  One might fear that this leads to portraying Owen closer to Darwin than he actually was. Yet, my analysis 
will show, that Owen went out of his way to draw this line himself; he clearly delineated himself from 
Darwin. 
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knowledge in comparison to other authors, which shared beliefs and mental models he incorporated 
in his explanation of the shared knowledge, which ones he dismissed and in what aspects these 
decisions differed from other authors. Thereby, I will identify different lines of thought in the debates 
about evolution, mainly in the works of my four focus authors – Chambers, Owen, Wallace and 
Darwin – but also in the continental debate, notably in France. I will highlight relations between 
these different lines and reveal how they contributed to the emerging evolution theory and, 
consequently, to what we call the Darwinian revolution. (Sections 3.1 - 3.4) 
In a concluding section, I will synthesize these results. (Section 3.5) In the conclusion I undertake a 
historical-epistemological reconstruction: I will identify challenging objects which drove Darwin’s 
search for a reorganization of biological knowledge and the mental models which structured his 
interpretation and explanation of this knowledge. (Section 5.1) 
1.2 Philosophical-systematic project: A model of scientific theories 
Within this historical-epistemological project, I pursue a philosophical (or systematic) one: I will 
suggest a novel model of scientific theories, in order to specify the concept of ‘multi-layered 
knowledge systems’ for the theories Darwin and his contemporaries suggested. My model is inspired 
by both philosophical and sociological considerations. 
In philosophy of science, it has become common sense that scientific theories are more than mere 
aggregations of facts; somehow, they mingle facts, hypotheses, beliefs and values. Still, philosophy of 
science has hitherto been unable to explain how these different elements come together in theories, 
how they interact and how they impact the use and reception of scientific theories in practice. 
Unfortunately, this incapability has fueled the popularization of crude misrepresentations and 
exaggerations by Thomas S. Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, among others.22 Despite their misfit with the 
historical record and common sense, such ideas continue their firm grip on parts of the public and 
philosophical discourse. In other words, the shared beliefs of philosophers about the history of 
science do not yet fit the shared knowledge about this history. I hope that my model contributes to 
bridging this gap as it may be closer to the mental models of philosophers than the historical 
discourse. 
In the 20th century two influential philosophical programs have failed at adequately describing and 
modeling scientific theories: the so-called23 syntactic view of the 1930s and the so-called semantic 
view of the 1960s. The first program started with Rudolf Carnap’s Der Logische Aufbau der Welt 
(1929) and dominated analytic philosophy far into the 1950s. Its main objective was to develop a 
comprehensive model of scientific theories which would construct theories as true representations 
                                                            
22  For instance, Feyerabend claimed that scientific theories are mere belief systems – on par with ideologies 
or religions – because they involve some speculative part. (Feyerabend 1986 [1975]: 385-97) Kuhn 
popularized the idea that cumulative progress throughout scientific revolutions is impossible. (Kuhn 1970 
[1962]: 160-73, 205-7) That such views are actually supported is demonstrated by (Kyburg 1990). For my 
discussion of these questions, see sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
23  As F.A. Muller highlighted, the terms ‘syntactic’ and ‘semantic’ are somewhat misleading. More aptly, the 
syntactic view would be termed ‘linguistic’ and the semantic view ‘non-linguistic’ because the former 
describes theories as sets of statements, i.e. linguistic entities, while the latter describes theories as set-
theoretical entities which are no linguistic entities and have little to do with the way in which scientists 
describe their models and theories. (Muller 2011: 91, 103) 
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of parts of the empirical world and explain how careful empirical observation allows for the 
construction of true theories. Scientific theories were modeled as sets of statements and formalized 
in predicate logic. In the 1950s, the syntactic view encountered a group of formal problems24 and fell 
out of favor with philosophers. Its gravest problem, however, was its incapability to provide a 
satisfactory model of scientific theories; its proponents never got beyond highly distorted, a-historic 
accounts of scientific theories: they modeled theories which had never existed in this form. 
The second program, termed ‘semantic view’ was fueled by two papers by the mathematician Patrick 
Suppes. (Suppes 1960; Suppes 1969) Suppes suggested that philosophers stop treating theories as 
linguistic entities and focus on the mathematical notion of a model instead. This notion describes 
scientific theories as set-theoretical, non-linguistic entities; roughly speaking, a model in Suppes’ 
sense is an assignment of truth-values. Consequently, the objects studied by the semantic view are 
no closer to actual scientific practice than the Carnapian ones.25 Moreover, as one of its supporters 
recapitulated in 2009, the semantic view never explained what a scientific theory is either. (Muller 
2011:87) 
In the late 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, many philosophers have abandoned 
theories and turned to models as their main theoretical objects of studies. Moreover, they re-
approached specific disciplines and increasingly studied models as they are employed by the 
scientists. This strand of research has led to innovative and fruitful insights. (Hartmann 1999; Morgan 
2003a, 2005; de Langhe 2010b; Parker 2010; Frigg, Reiss 2009) While some philosophers still express 
support for the semantic view (Giere 1999), few continue to employ its formal structures, instead, 
most display a pragmatic26 understanding27 of models.28 
While I want to re-enlarge the focus from models to theories, I do see my work in this pragmatic and 
practice-oriented strand of research. In a similar spirit, I have developed a novel framework for 
analyzing scientific models and theories: a model of multi-layered systems in which scientists 
organize knowledge. I will provide a detailed presentation of my model in section 2.1; however, let 
me specify some principles which clarify what the model is intended to provide: 
First, it will be a model of scientific models and theories, no ontology or any kind “essential” 
embodiment of what constitutes a model or theory29; if successful, it displays basic features in the 
                                                            
24  These were the distinction of analytic and synthetic statements, the reduction of theoretical expressions to 
observation statement (as exemplified in the Ramsey-sentence and the Craig theorem) and the problem of 
confirmation holism. For a discussion of these issues with respect to my model, see section 6 ii. 
25  Its most accomplished proponent, Bas van Fraassen, provided the most lucid account of this assignment on 
a fictional example of geometrics, an unempirical discipline. To my knowledge, he never presented a 
detailed account of how the semantic view could be applied to an empirical discipline like physics or 
biology, particularly to a “living” theory. It seems like the semantic view studied mathematical-
philosophical artifacts, no actual scientific theories. 
26  I do refer to the philosophical program of pragmatism, here, but to the common sense use of ‘pragmatic’. 
27  One has to admit though, that this pragmatic understanding is also somewhat vague; I know of no 
satisfying (sufficiently large, sufficiently precise, empirically adequate) definition of the term ‘model’. 
28  For unsuccessful or incomplete attempts to model evolution theory according to the semantic view, see 
(Beatty 1980; Griffiths 1997; Lloyd 1988; Thompson 1989; Thompson 2007). For a pragmatic attempt, see 
(Wilson 1992). 
29  Particularly, I do put models and theories in relation to actual descriptions of observational or experimental 
results, not ideal or idealized observation statements. Thus, I do not follow Rudolf Carnap‘s early intuition 
that the ‘structure’ of observation statements reflects the ‘structure’ of reality. (Carnap 1998 [1929]) 
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form of scientific theories, not their “structure”.30 I aim to show how a scientific theory can be 
described and how its elements are employed, not what it “is”.  
Second, I do not claim that all scientific models and theories display all my model’s features, quite the 
opposite: Exactly as the objects of biological, sociological or psychological models, the models and 
theories I intend to study are much too diverse to resemble each other in a large set of interesting 
properties. Thus, I will present a regular scientific model, i.e. a framework by which one can analyze 
and compare empirical objects, in my case scientific models and theories; it provides a toolbox for 
the analysis of different theories rather than template of the ideal theory. In other words, my model 
is my research design31 and – as any interesting comparison should highlight both, common features 
and differences – my model will reveal interesting differences and interesting common features of 
the theories I compare.32 
Third, my conception of scientific theories and models is centered on empirics. I do not analyze 
models or theories in the non-empirical sciences (logic, mathematics, geometry), where general 
statements (axioms) are assumed as true and more specific ones (theorems) are deduced from them. 
While some branches of empirical science display a strong tendency towards deductive arguments 
and sometimes employ terms like ‘axiom’, these should not be confounded with the axioms of 
mathematics33. The more general statements as well as shared beliefs in the empirical sciences are 
considered true or false / right or wrong / empirically adequate or inadequate in virtue of empirical 
facts and regularities as ascertained in observation and experiment (the shared knowledge) – not by 
virtue of assumptions.34 
Fourth, I will analyze scientific theories as linguistic entities, for two main reasons. First, this reflects 
scientific practice; scientists write their findings and interpretations down or they communicate them 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Beyond the lack of an operational definition of the ominous ‘structure’, I do not see actual descriptions as 
supporting such a view. 
30  In the 20th century, the problem of modeling scientific theories was often referred to as describing the 
“structure” of scientific theories. (Suppe 1979; Lloyd 1988; Thompson 1989; da Costa and French 2000; 
Thompson 1989; da Costa, French 2000) I suggest speaking of the much more neutral ‘form’ which does 
not connote that one seeks a deep, hidden secret or the miraculous workings of a theory but wishes to 
model it. As it is, ‘structure’ seems to have become the new ‘essence’, i.e. a term which is employed as if its 
meaning was clear and well-known and which is applied to virtually any complicated object or form. 
Instead, the only definitions of the term ‘structure’ seem to exist in mathematics and they are clearly not 
applicable to the empirical sciences. 
31  Some philosophers might not consider this a “philosophical” perspective. My ambition is a systematic 
scientific study in the science studies, which may be called philosophical but need not. 
32  For two empirical objects, it is always possible to identify aspects which they share and in which they differ: 
apples and pears are both fruits. Thus, the challenge of a good comparison is to find interesting common 
features and differences. 
33  This impression is fueled by deductive formulations as in Newton’s Principia or the three “axioms” of the 
Rational Choice theory in the social sciences and it is sometimes readily accepted, particularly, by former 
mathematicians and mathematical physicists who turn to philosophy of science. Familiarity with the 
scientific practice in the empirical sciences quickly reveals that such a view is untenable. Moreover, as 
Kenneth Schaffner emphasizes, most theories have never been formulated in such a form. (Schaffner 1996: 
27) Schaffner identifies “middle range” theories in a large part of biology exactly because it does not 
prescribe a fixed form of formulation in universal theories. 
34  This does not imply that beliefs play no role in the acceptance or rejection of such statements. 
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via speech.35 In both cases, they employ languages, be they formal (mathematics, logic) semi-formal 
(nomenclatures, technical languages), or natural. Second, the only way in which I can access the 
knowledge and knowledge systems which I analyze is via text.36 The objects of my study and the 
sources of my research are books and articles, composed of text and a few images. Thus, there is no 
other way to access these theories or models than as linguistic entities.37 
Fifth, in my linguistic analysis, I will distinguish two kinds of meaning in scientific theories. Based on 
works by Gottlob Frege, John Stuart Mill and Ludwig Wittgenstein and, more importantly, modern 
psychological and linguistic research, I will argue that scientific language conveys two very different 
kinds of meaning, roughly, the meaning of truth values in logic and the meaning of metaphors in 
natural languages or literature. While both kinds of meaning are frequently being addressed – the 
former mostly by philosophers, the latter mostly by historians – I see few systematic and thorough 
attempts to cater to both in comparative analyses of scientific theories. I will demonstrate that this 
distinction provides not only philosophical insights, but a clear plus-value for both the historical-
epistemological and the sociological project of my dissertation as it caters to both the logical-
empirical component of theories and their social-cultural component. 
Sixth, my model of scientific theories will distinguish several levels of abstraction, or, multiple layers 
within the knowledge systems we call ‘theories’.38 As the model overall, these levels are analytic 
tools; they do not reflect any ontological, historical or epistemological principles. Particularly, their 
order does not reflect in which order scientific theories are being developed or modified.39 Also, I do 
not claim that all scientific theories display all these models.40 
Seventh, I will present my model as a qualitative one, without equations or numeric values. This is 
due to the context in which I will apply my model – models in 19th century biology were not 
quantitative41 – but no principal feature of it. While my analysis focusses on relations between 
concepts (Begriffe), these could easily been supplemented by a quantitative framework of measured 
values and equations. 
Eight, my model relates to a number of philosophical problems, namely (i) the distinction of analytic 
and synthetic statements, (ii) the explanation of confirmation holism (the Duhem-Quine hypothesis) 
                                                            
35  This does not immediately include physical objects or diagrams serving as models. Such objects, however, 
can only serve as models if it is specified linguistically how they relate to the logical elements of the model. 
(see Zacharias and Lenel forthcoming) 
36  Living scientists may be addressed in direct communication. Also, it is per se possible to access scientific 
knowledge via a reproduction of experiments and observations. For instance, at the Max Planck Institute 
for the History of Science, one of Galileo’s experiments on the law of fall has been reproduced with 
interesting results. However, few historians and philosophers of science do this and the sources of science 
studies are mostly texts – plus some images and artifacts. 
37  Hence, I consider myself closer to the linguistic approach of Carnap than to Suppes’ non-linguistic 
approach, however, only in the very qualified sense I do outline by my principle and in the explication of 
my research design in section 2.1. 
38  The idea of abstraction level seems like a rather intuitive thought. Thus, the fact that Rudolf Carnap but 
also someone like R.I.G. Hughes with respect to models share this idea implies no direct influence nor 
many common points. (cf. Carnap 1998 [1929]; Hughes 2009) 
39  Already from my limited experience I see that there are many different ways in which this can happen. I 
will describe some of them in my historical-epistemological analysis. 
40  For a short normative discussion of what should be called a scientific theory, see section 6 vi. 
41  In the description of observations, however, numbers were frequently found, for instance in the 
description of bone lengths or geographical coordinates in which observations were made.  
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and underdetermination, (iii) a model of scientific explanations, (iv) the theory-ladenness and of 
observations and the supposedly resulting incommensurability, (v) the debate between scientific 
realism and empiricism.42 To me, these problems are predominantly theoretical problems, i.e. 
terminology problems. Hence, they can be solved or softened by a better (more precise) formulation 
of the field in which they appear, usually by the introduction of novel distinctions. In this dissertation, 
I do not have the space to discuss these problems in depth. However, the annex contains a number 
of argument sketches which suggest that problems (i) and (ii) are solved in my model. I will, 
furthermore, suggest concepts for (iii) and (iv). Finally, I will clarify (v) and (vi) in a way which, in my 
opinion, renders them much less of a problem. (See annex, section 6) 
1.3 Sociological project: Darwin’s reception in Victorian Britain 
The aim of my third project is an analysis of the impact of Darwin’s Origin among his contemporary 
recipients in Britain. This reception analysis complements the comparative analysis of the theory 
contents in chapter 3. It investigates (i) which elements of the Darwinian theory were received by its 
recipients, (ii) by which criteria the Darwinian theory was assessed and (iii) which elements of the 
theory were ultimately accepted by its recipients. The underlying assumption in the reception 
analysis is that a scientific theory may change when transmitted from sender to recipient and may 
become quite independent from the text in which it was expressed; it becomes a social entity. 
Therefore, in order to understand the Darwinian revolution and to assess its impact on 19th century 
biology, one has to take into account what happened to the Darwinian theory once it left the pages 
of the Origin of Species and became an object of public and scientific discourse. 
For my case study, this sender-recipient gap is further widened by the fact that the Darwinian was 
the first scientific revolution to be received by a large laymen audience.43 19th century Britain had 
seen the introduction of steam printing machines in 1814, and their widespread use since the 1830s 
had led to a massive increase in printing44 and a decrease in printing cost. This fostered the 
publication of cheap popular books and magazines45 (Secord 2000: 31-2) but also an unprecedented 
popularization of science: 
“Science continued to captivate the Victorians right up to the end of the century … 
through witnessing the spread of dazzling new technologies, through encountering 
exotic animals and plants, [but also] through experiencing heated controversies 
about the validity of novel theories[, such as Darwin’s]. […]These controversies 
                                                            
42  I do address these philosophical problems not for the sake of it but because discussion of my model did 
often give rise to them. The discussion in the annex demonstrates how I took them into account in the 
development of my model. 
43  This effect was even stronger for the Relativity Revolution in early 20th century physics. Milena Wazeck 
(2009) provides an excellent study on the public reactions to Einstein. 
44  Secord reports that the number of titles published per year in London, Oxford, Cambridge, Edinburgh and 
Dublin multiplied by four from 1800 to 1870. (Secord 2000: 31) 
45  Secord highlights that “During the 1830S and 1840s, quarterly periodicals such as the Edinburgh, Quarterly, 
and Westminster reviews – dominant in setting the literary agenda from the early 1800s through the 1820s 
– were supplanted as the most significant sites of debate by the monthlies and weeklies. ‘Magazine day’, 
the first Monday of each month, became a major event on the publishing, bookselling, and Post Office 
calendar.” (Secord 2000: 35) 
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involved scientists like Huxley, John Tyndall, and Thomson [Lord Kelvin], who were 
larger than life public figures.” (Lightman 2007: 3) 
From the start of the century to the 1840s and 1850s, the number of science titles rose fourfold – a 
remarkable rally. (Lightman 2007: 32, 18) Oftentimes, the publishers, not the authors, were the 
“driving force behind the production of scientific works for a popular audience." (Lightman 2007: 16) 
Fittingly, it was a professional publisher who landed one of the first remarkable successes in 
popularized science: Robert Chamber’s Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation was a remarkable 
popular success. (Lightman 2007: 34, 38) 
Due to this public attention and the trend towards popularization, mid-nineteenth century scientists 
like Charles Darwin, geologist Charles Lyell, or physicists John Tyndall and James Clerk Maxwell were 
accessible “to readers without a scientific training. Their texts could be read very much as literary 
texts”: Scientists shared a literary, non-mathematical language with this laymen audience. (Beer 
2009: 4, cf. 47) This shared language, however, forced someone like Darwin to “work with (and 
against) the shared metaphors and preferences of the broader community within which [he lived, 
worked, played and thought].” (Beer 2009: xxv) In other words, while it rendered Darwin’s theory 
accessible to a much wider audience, this lack of separation between scientific and literal language 
held one imminent danger: Darwin could not control the exact meaning of his texts: 
“One of the major questions raised by The Origin is how far metaphors may overturn 
the bounds of meaning assigned to them, sometimes even reversing the overt 
implications of the argument. Seemingly stable terms may come gradually to operate 
as generative metaphors, revealing inherent heterogeneity of meaning and of 
ideology. Darwin's use of the concept of 'struggle' is one well-known example…” 
(Beer 2009: 50) 
“It is the element of obscurity, of metaphors whose peripheries remain undescribed, 
which made The Origin of Species so incendiary – and which allowed it to be 
appropriated by thinkers of so many diverse political persuasions. It encouraged 
onward thought: it offered itself for metaphorical application and its multiple 
discourses encouraged further acts of interpretation. The presence of latent meaning 
made The Origin suggestive, even unstoppable in its action upon minds.“ (Beer 2009: 
92-3) 
In sum, once the Origin reached public discourse it began to lead its own life, quite independent from 
what Darwin said were his intentions46 or what the actual text might say, sometimes contrary to 
them: in some respect, publishing the Origin must have felt like opening Pandora’s Box. 
A theory which receives such wide-spread reception necessarily has a heterogeneous audience; in 
Darwin’s case it comprised biologists, scientists from other disciplines, notably physics and geology, 
but also laymen, educated and uneducated. It does seem intuitive that the reception among such a 
heterogeneous audience is not symmetric; different recipients with different backgrounds received 
different information on the theory and the theory meant different things to them. Moreover, these 
                                                            
46  As I will demonstrate, this independence from the author’s intentions was remarkably strong in Darwin’s 
case. His theory is certainly among the most powerful in the history of science and does not cease to 
inspire scientific, political and popular thought far beyond its original domain, i.e. the explanation of 
variation in animals, plants or their fossil remains. (Beer 2009: xxi-xxiii) 
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different backgrounds – previous knowledge, training, values, world-views – should matter for the 
acceptance and/or dismissal of Darwin’s theory (or elements of his theory). 
This point has first been systematically developed by Ludwik Fleck in his Entstehung und Entwicklung 
einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache (1935) where Fleck discussed how a scientific fact – in his example 
a diphtheria diagnosis – might be communicated to different recipients: a bacteriological specialist, a 
practical doctor without particular knowledge on bacteriology and the mother of an infected child. 
(Fleck 1980 [1935]: 150-152; cf. Fleck 2011) Depending on their background, these recipients 
understand the diagnosis to different depths and are able to react to it to different extents. 
Fleck’s discussion reveals that the same diagnosis is communicated very differently to different 
recipients; it changes in form and level of abstraction within a thought collective (Denkkollektiv)47. 
Fleck, therefore, distinguishes between specialists, who share similar knowledge and a common 
language, and more distant recipients (laymen) whose understanding of the topic decreases with 
distance to the specialist group. He terms the communication within the specialist group ‘esoteric’ 
and communication towards laymen ‘exoteric’. 
In my reception analysis, I suggest a distinction along the lines of Fleck’s model but with a different 
terminology. I will distinguish three recipient groups with three different backgrounds: (i) laymen 
without scientific training: the public, (ii) scientists from other disciplines: the broader scientific 
community48, (iii) biologists49: Darwin’s immediate scientific community.50 I will study to which depth 
                                                            
47  The members of a thought collective are defined by their taking part in the communication within the 
thought collective. Fleck describes it as a community of people who exchange ideas and stand in 
intellectual interaction. (Fleck 1980 [1935]: 54) (This is similar to Niklas Luhmann’s definition of systems via 
communicative acts.) Thought collectives exist only with respect to specific fields of knowledge / 
discourses. For instance, a bacteriologist is a member of the thought collectives of bacteriologists, but may 
be a layman with respect to teleology or football.  
48  I refer to the first two groups as scientific communities. This does not imply that they resembled the 
modern scientific community. In fact, mid-Victorian science was still far from today’s professionalism and 
institutionalization. It comprised a considerable number of amateur-scientists; Darwin himself is a case in 
point. Moreover, today’s relatively clear boundary between science and non-science was far vaguer. (Lynch 
2000b: xiii,: xviii) This is highlighted by the theologians and gentleman-naturalists who engaged in the 
debate on Darwin and were frequently accepted as valid participants. (This merging of, speaking in today’s 
terms, scientific and religious discourse was certainly fostered by the emphasis on religion in academic 
training.) 
49  Note that the term ‘biology’ gained wide-spread acceptance only during the 19th century, particularly after 
Darwin provided a framework in which the different strands of biology could be integrated. Thus, Victorian 
researchers in zoology or botany might or might not have referred to themselves as ‘biologists’. (See 2.3) 
For me, the term summarizes paleontologists, zoologists, botanists etc. 
50  These distinctions are the most precise for which the data and the topic allow. Particularly, I did not 
attempt to identify a subgroup within biology which could have formed a close thought collective in Fleck’s 
sense. While Darwin did have a close group of scientists with whom he shared and debated results, this 
group comprised researchers from different sub-disciplines and from neighboring disciplines. (For instance, 
John Dalton Hooker was a botanist, Huxley a zoologist, Charles Lyell a geologist.) This is not by accident, 
obviously; Darwin’s theory was a unifying theory and did thus apply to all biological sub-disciplines (or was 
supposed to). Therefore, it was discussed by biologists from different fields and research traditions. 
Moreover, Darwin specifically addressed young scientists from different strands in order to test his theory 
against their experience and convictions. 
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these three groups received the Darwinan theory51, by which criteria they judged it and which 
elements of the theory they accepted or rejected. 
The recipient groups are distinguished by the type of publications they typically read: (i) scientific 
papers in biological journals represent the debate in the immediate scientific community, (ii) 
scientific papers from other disciplines or papers with a strong scientific focus from more 
encompassing publications stand in for the debate in the broader scientific community, (iii) general 
newspapers and magazines represent the public debate. The analysis of reception depth will be 
oriented on the abstraction levels which I will develop in my model of scientific theories in section 
2.1.52 The criteria by which the theory was assessed as well as the acceptance and rejection of 
specific elements will be deduced from the lines of criticism which were directed at Darwin. For the 
immediate scientific community, this qualitative approach will be supplemented by a large-scale 
quantitative analysis of British biological journals. 
My hypothesis is, first, that the reception depths in these publications form concentric circles with 
respect to the body of knowledge of 19th century biology: Only biologists had a deep understanding 
of the biological discourse and its empirical implications. Scientists and amateur naturalists from 
other disciplines had but an abstract understanding of biological topics and seldom debated it; 
however, through their training or practical experience they had a fundamental understanding of 
theorizing and empirical work in science and might have checked biological theories against theories 
in their own field.53 The public hardly ever addressed biological topics and had only superficial 
knowledge of scientific practice; still, they could check biological theories against common sense and 
existing world views, notably religious54 convictions.55 (See Figure 1) 
These graded reception depths will show in my analysis. A number of topics in the debate on Darwin 
were received only by the immediate scientific community or only by two scientific audiences. Other 
topics were shared between two or three of the audiences, for instance the descent of Man, the role 
of God in biological explanations and the missing links in Darwin’s classification. However, when 
topics were addressed by different audiences, they were usually discussed in different depths and 
complexities. This becomes particularly visible when one compares articles from authors who wrote 
for different audiences, like Thomas Henry Huxley. 
                                                            
51  I will study but the reception of the Origin, I ignore the few reviews of the joint Darwin-Wallace-paper 
which were written before the publication of the origin, notably (Boyd 1859). For an analysis of such 
reviews, see (England 1997). For the reception of Chambers Vestiges see (Secord 2000; MacPherson 2001; 
Ruse 1979: 98-131; Voss 2007: 73-94; Lynch 2000b; Lynch 2000a; Schwartz 1990; Padian 2007: lxxv-lxxvi; 
Cosans 2009: 37; Brooke 1977). For the reception of Richard Owen, see (Rupke 1995; Rupke 1994; Padian 
2007; Cosans 2009; Richards 1987a; Amundson 2007) 
52  Hence, my reception analysis will demonstrate that the abstraction levels in my model do not merely apply 
to theories as linguistic entities but also to theories in their reception, i.e. as social entities. 
53  With respect to biology, I am part of this group, too. I do not understand empirical work in biology but 
know how to analyze theories. 
54  As Lightman remarked, in Victorian Britain, “Scientific knowledge seemed to offer the magical password – 
the ‘open sesame’ – that unlocked the doors to exhilarating new worlds ... But the fascination with science 
operated at an even deeper level. For some, it provided the basis for making sense of themselves and their 
place in the universe, either in conjunction with revised Christian notions or completely on its own terms.” 
(Lightman 2007: 3-4) 
55  In a small number of cases, practitioners could check biological theories against their practical knowledge, 
e.g. breeders and gardeners. I will address this issue in the reception analysis. 
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Figure 1: Reception depths with three audiences of Darwin's theory 
Second, I suppose that these different levels of reception depth influenced the criteria by which the 
theory was judged as well as the question which elements of the theory were accepted and which 
rejected: Biologist assessed the Darwinian theory by different standards and accepted different 
elements than physicists or laymen. Thus, my analysis will not only provide a classification of 
reception depths but it will demonstrate that these depths explain the criteria by which the 
Darwinian theory was assessed by its recipients and, partly, what elements of the theory were 
accepted. 
As my discussion at the beginning of this section suggests, it is not my goal to classify the reception 
as right (valid) or wrong (invalid). I do not aim to assess whether Darwin’s theory was correctly 
understood and represented by its recipients nor whether the criteria by which recipients judged the 
theory were legitimate nor whether recipients were consistent in their arguments and their 
acceptance or rejection of specific elements of the theory. Rather, I aim to represent the Darwinian 
reception as a social phenomenon, i.e. as a phenomenon which was shaped both by Darwin’s book 
and by the historical context in which it was received.56 
My study covers the period from 1859 to ca. 1875 in Britain57, i.e. the sixteen years following the 
publication of the Origin of Species. The consensus among historians and Darwin’s contemporaries is 
that the Darwinian revolution was achieved by ca. 1868, i.e. in the middle of the covered period. In 
1868, the majority of biologists and the public had accepted58 evolution as a general concept59. 
                                                            
56  For readers interested in contextualization, I will provide some comments from a modern perspective, 
clarifying how biological knowledge has evolved and how issues are seen today. For readers interested in 
the gap between the reception and the text of the Origin, my analysis in 3.4 provides a thorough basis. 
57  For an overview over the European reception, see (Engels and Glick 2008) and (Engels 1995b; Engels 
1995a; di Gregorio 1995; Glick 1988). For a focus on Germany see (Junker 1995; Engels 2000; Montgomery 
1988; Seidlitz 1875; Haeckel 1873; Haeckel 1882; Sandmann 1995; von Kölliker 1864; von Baer 1973 
[1873]), for France see (Farley 1974; Harvey 1995; Flourens 1864; Pictet 1973 [1860]). For the United States 
of America, see Glick 1988; Horenstein 2009; Gray 1860a; Gray 1888a [1860]; Gray 1860b; Gray 1888b 
[1860]; Gray 1888c [1874]; Gray 1888d; Gray 1888e; Agassiz 1860; Agassiz 1973 [1874]). 
58  This is reported in unison by (Ruse 1979: 228-9; Himmelfarb 1959: 252; Bowler 1990: 183) as well as by 
Ellegård who cites the contemporary Spectator, Nature and Athenaeum, Inquirer and the Quarterly Review 
as reporting between 1868 and 1871 that evolution had become the majority opinion among biologists. 
(Ellegård 1958: 58-9) In the same mold, the editor of the Ibis in 1869 (Newton 1869: 216) spoke of “[t]he 
Darwinian school (to which belongs, we believe, the majority of our readers)”. Finally, Darwin himself 
acknowledged his accomplishment when he altered the second sentence of the historical sketch from the 
4th to the 5th edition of the Origin from “The great majority of naturalists believe that species are 
immutable productions, and have been separately created.” to “Until recently the great majority of 
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Moreover, the debate began to fade; most of the controversy had passed by late 1860s. My analysis 
will consist of qualitative and quantitative components and it will be based both on primary and the 
relevant secondary sources. (For the exact research design, see section 2.2.)  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
naturalists believed that species were immutable productions, and had been separately created.” (Darwin 
1866: xiii; Darwin 1869: xv) 
59  My analysis will reveal that this general concept was not necessarily Darwin’s concept of evolution, but a 
evolution in the sense in which one can say that Lamarck, Geoffroy, Chambers, Owen or Wallace all 
forwarded theories or explanations of evolution; they described a gradual development of species without 
constant divine interventions. (cf. section 2.3; part 3) 
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2 Research designs & historical background 
2.1 Research Design for the comparative analysis of multi-layered 
knowledge systems: A four-level model of scientific theories 
In order to compare biological theories on evolution, I have developed a scientific model of scientific 
theories. As I consider scientific theories to include scientific models, my model is both a scientific 
model of scientific theories and of scientific models.60 For terminological clarity, I will refer to my 
model as ‘my model’ or the ‘four-level model of scientific theories’ and to the models which I analyze 
as Darwin’s model, Owen’s model etc. 
My model distinguishes four different degrees of abstraction on which scientific information can be 
expressed and received. These degrees of abstraction may be referred to as ‘levels’ or ‘layers’. (I will 
mostly speak of ‘levels’.) I do distinguish four levels of abstraction which roughly follow three steps of 
abstraction61: from a detailed description to concepts, from concepts to general statements and from 
general statements to their implications for views of the world. I name the four levels as follows: 
Level 1: Description, Level 2: Classification (includes aggregation & static modeling, denotation & 
interpretation), Level 3: Explanation (includes dynamic modeling, narration), Level 4: Ontological 
Implications. Figure 2 provides a first overview of my model. 62  
 
Figure 2: Four levels of a scientific theory 
                                                            
60  This meta-perspective is shared by all science studies and produces no logical problems as long as my 
model complies with itself, i.e. if my model can be described by my model. The following presentation 
should reveal that it does. 
61  These abstraction steps reflect what I find in analyzing scientific theories but also the abstraction levels on 
which scientific theories are received, as they are visible in my reception analysis. (section 0) 
62  Remember that theories need not display all elements of my model. For a normative discussion of what a 
good scientific theory should display, see (section 6 vi) 
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Level two consists of two pairs of components, level three of two components. The division of these 
components separates two kinds of meaning, roughly: logical and literary meaning, i.e. the meaning 
of truth values and logical arguments and the meaning of metaphors and story-telling. Throughout 
this book, I will refer to the logical meaning as ‘denotative’ and to the literary meaning as 
‘connotative’. 
I will argue that scientific theories display both of these kinds of meaning and that the distinction of 
denotative and connotative meaning allows for a much better description of scientific theories as has 
hitherto been possible. Particularly, it allows for describing how scientific theories aggregate 
knowledge and, at the same time, make sense of this knowledge through interpretation and 
explanation it. In other words, my model allows for separating scientific knowledge from the beliefs63 
about this knowledge. 
Below, I will present each level in its components by sketching its theoretical background64, by 
specifying the analytic concepts by which I will analyze these levels (operationalization) and by 
illustrating the application these concepts on two idealized65 explanations from physics and the social 
sciences, namely the explanation Millikan employed in his experiments on the elementary charge 
(Millikan 1911, Millikan 1913)66 and a Rational Choice explanation. On these examples, I will 
demonstrate how I am using the model and I will sketch manners in which the model could be 
extended and modified to apply to theories outside of the realm of my study, i.e. outside of 19th 
century biology. I will devote most space to the second and third level of my model as they contain 
the most innovative concepts and because they are crucial to my historical-epistemological 
argument. 
2.1.1 Level 1: Description67 
In terms of volume, the description of experimental or observational results continues to represent 
by far the largest part of the scientific literature; the sheer number of pages devoted to meticulous 
description of facts far exceeds the space devoted to their interpretation or explanation.68 Therefore, 
in my analysis of these descriptions, I cannot and will not reproduce the complete knowledge which 
                                                            
63  ‘belief’ need not have a religious connotation here; it is meant to imply all kinds of convictions or 
assumptions about scientific knowledge, be they founded on religion or not. 
64  Rather than a theoretical justification, I provide illustrations of my model. The only justification for a model 
should be its power to describe, classify, and explain evidence in an interesting way. 
65  The actual applicability is demonstrated in sections 3.1 to 3.5. 
66  Both of Millikan’s papers describe similar experiments and discuss them similarly. As for the description of 
the experiment, the second paper is a specification of the first. Therefore, I will quote from both papers. 
67  In order to avoid misunderstandings, let me point out that this level is called ‘description’ not 
‘observation’. It does not represent observations (or experiments) as acts of scientific practice but their 
results. I do therefore leave epistemological issues aside and focus on how scientists describe what they 
have observed. – Evidently, I do not know whether scientists actually made the observations they report in 
their descriptions; what is important to my analysis is merely whether these descriptions were considered 
the results of observations by other scientists. This seems to be the case.  – As for the question of theory-
ladenness, I do not assume descriptions of observations to be theory-free but theory-neutral. (See sections 
6 iii, iv) 
68  Still, this part of the scientific literature is mostly neglected by meta-disciplines like the History and 
Philosophy of Science. 
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the scientific theories of Chambers, Owen, Wallace, and Darwin aim to explain. Instead, I will focus 
on major empirical regularities reported by the biologists. 
Why regularities?69 Because they are the more sophisticated results of empirical study and because 
their description seems to mark the beginning of systematic scientific study in most disciplines.70 
Science knows both regularities between objects and events.71 Regularities between events were 
rare in 19th century biology but they existed. For instance, in a famous experiment, chicken broth was 
boiled and then left standing. After a couple of days, life (little organisms) could be observed on the 
broth, a regularity which bewildered scientists for several decades. (See section 0. v) 
However, the biology of the time was predominantly occupied with regularities among objects. I wish 
to distinguish two types of such regularities. On one hand, biologists identified taxonomic (or 
analytic) regularities, i.e. regularities among features of the same object. For instance, Georges 
Cuvier’s discovered if an organism bears hooves it is a herbivore, not a carnivore. These regularities 
could be studied on isolated object classes, virtually independent of space and time, and they were 
produced by the anatomists or morphologists. 
On the other hand, biologists discovered that certain fossils were linked to certain geological layers 
(strata), that certain living organisms correlated to certain geographical regions or that the 
developmental states of embryos of different species closely resembled each other. These 
regularities are regularities in space and time and, thus, synthetic.72 They do not describe regularities 
between features of a single organism, but how such features were correlated to the organism’s 
position in space or time. 
Many more aspects of descriptions could be distinguished but this is not necessary for the level of 
detail of my study. However, for my analysis on level 2 and 3, I need to dissect empirical regularities 
one step further: When describing empirical regularities, scientists usually specify under which 
boundary conditions observations are made. For instance, biological field researchers could report in 
which geographical area at what date they found which specimens. Moreover, when events are 
described, scientists normally specify on what kind of objects the events were made. For instance, in 
                                                            
69  Three remarks: (i) I do not speak of correlations, i.e. quantitative regularities, but only of qualitative 
regularities because these were the most frequent in 19th century biology. However, my model could easily 
be modified to accommodate for correlations as well. (ii) I do not speak of ‘causalities’, although some 
regularities are referred to as causalities by scientists and philosophers alike; I simply do not see how the 
difference between a causal and a non-causal correlation can be empirically determined (operationalized). 
In scientific practice, the term ‘causal’ is typically applied to very stable, long-known regularities which fall 
under some broadly-accepted model or theory. If it means nothing more than this, some of my regularities 
might be considered to be causal. If the term ‘causal’ implies any non-observable features, I am not 
associating with it. – For causality as a psychological category, see for instance (Bruner 1991: 18-9). (iii) 
Avoiding the terminology of causality does not imply that I assume that regularities are observable as such. 
Rather, when presenting two sets of empirical data as linked in an empirical regularity, scientists have 
already chosen one out of (several?) possible patterns in data, namely one which they believe to hold, to 
be more than random. Moreover, by presenting an empirical pattern in an empirical regularity, it is often 
given a direction, for instance from an earlier event to a later one. The choices prior to presenting empirical 
regularities might be (and appear as often) motivated by theoretical considerations. 
70  Primitive empirical study may focus on single objects or events, e.g. describing that lightning is bright or 
that iron feels cold. 
71  The distinction between object features and events is not sharp as a change in the features of an object 
can be interpreted as an event and vice versa. Also, there might be cases in which object features are 
correlated to events (or the opposite) and not events to events and object features to events. 
72  For the distinction of analytic and synthetic regularities (statements), see my discussion in section 6. 
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ethology, one might specify exactly which species or sub-species or variety displayed a certain type of 
behavior. Therefore, I will distinguish four components of descriptions of observations. The ensemble 
of these components, I will call an ‘observation conditional’. Figure 3 provides an overview.  
 
Figure 3: Four elements of an observation conditional 
When comparing the empirical basis of scientific theories – the shared knowledge they aim to 
interpret and explain – I will do so in terms of observation conditionals and with respect to the 
established shared knowledge. Thus, on the first level of my model I will ask: 
 Are empirical regularities being specified in the investigated text?  
 If so, do they extend the established body of knowledge (the shared know-
ledge) to novel kinds of regularities or do they complement or affirm it?73 
Let me provide two non-biological examples for illustrations. First, in a social science experiment, 
scientists may have observed that a subject (Observed Object) regularly chooses product A over 
product B, say ice cream over chocolate, although both are offered at a similar price. (Boundary 
Conditions) The experimenters approach the subject and offer them free ice cream and free 
chocolate and ask him to take one for free. (Event 1) The subject takes the ice cream. (Event 2) The 
results of the experiment can thus be described: If a subject regularly chooses ice cream over 
chocolate, then, when offered both, they will take the ice cream. (Empirical regularity) The observed 
object is the human subject; it could be described, for instance, in his age, gender, income etc. 
Furthermore, the exact experimental setting, i.e. price and brand of products, exact formulation of 
the question asked etc., could be specified. (Boundary Conditions) 
In physics, Millikan’s observation of oil droplets (Observed Objects) can be framed the same way. In a 
first run, he let the drops fall between the plates of an inactivated condenser, then when the 
condenser was activated. (Boundary Conditions) In the first run, Millikan observed single events, 
namely falls of the oil droplets. (Event 1 in 1st run) In the second run, the droplets first fell (Event 1 in 
1st run) but began to rise between the condenser plates (Event 2 in 2nd run). (Millikan 1913: 123-
                                                            
73  I consider an empirical correlation to “extend” the established body of knowledge if it introduces a new 
knowledge source; for instance both biogeography or paleontology were integrated into biology at the 
turn of the 19th century. I consider an empirical correlation to “complement” the shared knowledge if it 
produces novel knowledge from an established knowledge source; an example would be new 
biogeographical information produced after the establishment of biogeography. To ‘affirm’ an empirical 
correlation is to express a correlation which has already been established and is part of the shared 
knowledge. 
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124)74 This empirical regularity is supplemented by Millikan’s very exact descriptions of his observed 
objects, the oil droplets (Millikan 1913: 111) as well as the physical conditions of the experiments 
(pressure, temperature) as well as his experimental equipment, thus specifying the boundary 
conditions of his experiment. (Millikan 1913: 115-123) 
2.1.2 Level 2: Classification: Aggregation & Denotation, Static modeling & Interpretation  
The second level of my model comprises the aggregation and denotation of empirical regularities in 
named sets, namely concepts with natural language concept names. I will therefore, in a first step, 
discuss the distinction of a concept (“Begriff”) and its name, the concept name (“Begriffsname”) as 
well as their respective meaning. 75 In a second step, I will demonstrate how complex arrangements 
of concepts result in hierarchical classifications – which I will term ‘static models’. I will show how 
static modeling usually goes along with high-level interpretations and how such interpretations 
relate to single concept names. 
i. What does a scientific term mean beyond its reference? Concept vs. concept name, 
denotation vs. connotation 
By distinguishing the concept name from the concept, one can distinguish two kinds of meaning, 
namely the meaning of the concept and the meaning of its concept name. This difference has been 
pointed out by John Stuart Mill76, by Gottlob Frege77, and by Ludwig Wittgenstein78, among others79 
and scientifically studied by psycholinguists80 and neurolinguists81. 
                                                            
74  Millikan provided very exact measurements of the speeds and sizes of the droplets and, from these, 
calculated the elementary electrical charge. I do focus on the qualitative aspect and leave the focus of 
Millikan’s experiment – the numbers – aside. 
75  Neither candidate, ‘predicate’, ‘term’ or ‘concept’, connotes quite the same as ‘Begriff’ in German but 
‘concept’ seems to fit it best. I will therefore mostly speak of concepts and concept names but sometimes 
give the German original terms as well for clarification. 
76  In A System of Logic, Mill distinguished the ‘denotation’ and the ‘connotation’ of general and singular 
names. (Mill 1996 [1843]: 24-45, 133-54) 
77  Frege, in Über Sinn und Bedeutung and in his posthumous writings, spoke of the meaning of a Begriff 
(concept) as ‘Bedeutung’ (reference) but referred to the meaning of a Begriffsname (concept name) as 
‘Sinn’ (sense). ( (Frege 1980a [1892b]; Frege 1983: 128-137; cf. Frege 1980b [1892a]) Frege actually speaks 
of both ‘Begriffswort’ and ‘Begriffsname’ but it seems more intuitive to oppose ‘Eigenname’ and 
‘Begriffsname’, one denoting an object (Gegenstand), the other a concept (Begriff). 
78  Wittgenstein spoke of ‘Bedeutung’ or ‘meaning’ in both the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations, 
but it is clear that these are two very different concepts of meaning: the earlier use resembles Mill’s 
denotation and Frege’s Bedeutung while the later resembles connotation and Sinn. (Wittgenstein 1955 
[1917]: 3.203, 3.262, 3.325, 3.326; Wittgenstein 1953: numbers 139, 197-8) 
79  Another important reference is Rudolf Carnap, who apparently coined the pair intension – extension. 
(Carnap 1958a: 118-121; Carnap 1958b) However, in technical terms, Carnap did not advance Frege’s 
distinction of Bedeutung and Sinn, as a non-logical property. Instead, Carnap attempted to address Sinn in 
a modified logic which, to me, seems a fruitless endeavor. (see footnote 85) Bertrand Russell in On 
Denoting (Russell 1905) and Willard Van Orman Quine in On what there is (Quine 1964 [1948]) both remain 
much behind Frege’s clarity and technical accuracy, particularly with respect to Begriffe. 
I do not imply that these three distinctions by Frege, Wittgenstein and Mill are identical. Indeed, the 
connotations conveyed by the respective distinctions and their explications are quite different. Yet, all 
three describe (denote) the same phenomenon, i.e. the difference a concept name (Begriffsname) or a 
proper name (Eigenname) makes for human understanding of concepts. Thus, all three accounts can be 
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In a mixed Frege-Mill terminology82, the relation between a concept and its concept name is this: A 
Begriff (concept) is best imagined as a set83 which aggregates (summarizes) one or more objects84. To 
refer to a concept and its objects, humans employ concept names. These concept names are 
arbitrary signs to logic, they do not mean anything.85 In human communication, however, these 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
read as early accounts of the psycho- and neurolinguistic phenomena of associative networks and 
conversational implicatures. (see following footnotes) 
80  In psycholinguistics, Stephen C. Levinson demonstrated the role of connotations for natural language 
communication in his overview work on generalized conversational implicatures. (Levinson 2000: 4-6; cf. 
Grice 1989) On his account, human speech is a bottleneck in communication; human brain can process 
information much faster than humans are able to utter them. Therefore, Levinson interprets utterances as 
sketches of what a speaker intends to say and identifies hints by which these sketches are decoded, 
namely “the form, the structure, and the pattern of choices within the utterance”. (Levinson 2000: 6) In his 
concept of General Conversational Implicatures, Levinson summarizes three main heuristics in this 
decoding process: rules by which humans interpret connoted meaning. The three heuristics are: (i) Q-
Implicature: What isn’t said, isn’t: „If the utterance is constructed using simple, brief, unmarked forms, this 
signals business as usual, that the described situation has all the expected, stereotypical properties“. (ii) M-
Implicature: What’s said in an abnormal way, isn’t normal: If „the utterance is constructed using marked, 
prolix, or unusual forms, this signals that the described situation is itself unusual or unexpected or has 
special properties“. (iii) I-Implicature: What is simply described is stereotypically exemplified: Any 
properties which are not described in an abnormal way (the remaining properties) are as usual. They can 
be filled with stereotypical values. – Accordingly, communication which is to be decoded through such 
heuristics follows three rules: (i) Evoke the relevant ideas, set the stage. (ii) Specify the extraordinary 
elements (iii) Fill the voids with default values. (Levinson 2000: 31-35) 
81  In neurolinguistics, connotations are studied in the debate on associative and semantic priming. (Lucas 
2000; McRae and Boisvert 1998; Hutchison 2003; Ferrand and New 2003) In this strand of research, a 
specific word (expression) is considered to be embedded in a so-called associative network: a network of 
words which are frequently used with, in place or instead of the original word. Hence, uttering a word 
activates an entire region of an associative network in a human brain. Therefore, when applied to a novel 
referent (object) or in a novel context, a word carries with it the contexts of its previous uses and these 
contexts will mark its new use with recipients. Two remarks: (i) From my limited reading, it seems that the 
distinction between associative and semantic is not clean. I subscribe merely to the phenomenon of 
priming as such. – On a side note, the priming networks described by neurolinguists seem closely related to 
the associations evoked by mental models. (ii) For illustration, an experiment on priming might look this: A 
subject is seated in front of a screen on which sequences of words are displayed. First, a trigger is shown 
for several seconds, the trigger is followed by a second word. The subject has to decide whether the 
second word is a correct word in his native language. He expresses this decision by pressing a button. The 
time between the display of the second word and the pressing of the button is measured. (reaction time) 
The reaction is significantly lowered if in the language concerned if the trigger is regularly used with second 
word in sentences, for instance in the pairs: dog – bite, cat – milk, needle – thread or if the trigger is 
regularly used in place of the trigger (synonyms/antonyms), for instance in the pairs: black – white, hot – 
warm, ship – boat. The effect of lowering the reaction time is called “priming”. – Beyond word pairs, there 
are experiments on priming with entire sentences but also with images. 
82  Frege’s is the most exact formulation of the three and I adapt it, except for the definition of concepts 
(Begriffe). With respect to the meaning of Begriff and Begriffsname, I will, however, employ Mill’s terms 
‘denotation’ and ‘connotation’ because they seem most intuitive. (From my experience, the distinction of 
sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung) is not intuitive to people outside the narrow Frege-community. 
The pair of extension – intension is familiar to mathematicians, logicians and scientists who carry out 
formal work. Beyond, however, mix-ups of ‘intention’ and ‘intension’ are frequent and misleading. 
83  As opposed to Frege’s definition as functions, I present concepts as sets. This should be logically equivalent 
but hopefully is more intuitive. 
84  Objects in this sense may be anything, actual tangible objects, but also acts, other concepts; in scientific 
theories, most concepts aggregate descriptions of observations as I have described on level 1. 
85  I do not wish to associate my work with intensional (modal) logic, as far as it is supposed to clarify or solve 
the problem of denotations and connotations; in my opinion, it does neither. Connotations are 
independent of truth-values; in logic, they are the only aspect in which terms can differ beyond their truth-
values. Figuratively speaking, connotations are invisible to systems of truth-values. Intensional (modal) 
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concept names are no arbitrary signs. Rather, they serve as symbols by connoting (conveying) what 
the named concept might denote. Thus, it serves as a symbolic (coded) reference to the concept’s 
objects, evoking these objects without enumerating them.86 Figure 4 depicts this relation in its ideal 
form. 
 
Figure 4: Concept, concept name, a concept’s objects – aggregation, denotation, connotation 
In scientific practice87, however, this relation is not ideal; particularly the denotation and connotation 
of concept names are often not in unison. Rather, the connotation of a concept name often only 
partly overlaps with its denotation, hiding some of the concept’s objects and connoting some objects 
which are not part of the concept.88 I suppose that this has been experienced first-hand by most 
scientists: When introducing a novel concept or interpreting novel evidence, one often struggles to 
find the appropriate concept name; a term which already conveys an impression of what it denotes, 
works for most of an audience. Conversely, key-word searches seem to always produce numerous 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
logic, however, remains a system of truth-values; it merely has fancier names for its operators. – Ironically, 
intensional (modal) logic succeeds in reproducing the problem of denotation vs. connotation, namely by 
introducing operators which have the same truth-value configurations as operators in regular logic but 
different names. These operators denote the same objects as other operators but their name connotes 
something beyond, namely that they differ from operators in regular logic.) 
86  Some philosophers and logician distinguish two ways of defining a set, by enumerating its elements or by 
enumerating the properties which the elements of the sets satisfy. (see for example Carnap 1958b: 118-
121) I do not see that this distinction holds. If a set is defined by a set of properties instead of the 
elements, one can always ask for a definition of the properties. The definition might then be given either 
by another set of properties or by enumerating all elements which satisfy the property. Thus, if one 
proceeds to ask for the definition of properties the set must eventually be defined by enumeration of its 
elements. (Unless the properties are not defined in which case the set is not defined.) This shows that both 
ways of definition are logically equivalent. Still, this equivalence might be counterintuitive as properties 
seem to express some “essential” or “constitutive” features of a set and are sometimes (often?) treated 
thus by scientists. This, however, is a psychological phenomenon, not a logical one. Rather, the distinction 
of definitions via properties from definition via enumeration reproduces once again the problem of 
denotation vs. connotations: Properties convey more than mere enumerations. (see footnote 80) 
87  There may be some areas of mathematics and formal works in the empirical sciences, where concept 
names seem to be arbitrary. 
88  John Gerring provides an excellent discussion of such problems in the social sciences and develops criteria 
for good concepts which should be applicable beyond these disciplines. (Gerring 1999: 367) 
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hits for which denote something outside the desired scope but fail to reveal much of what would be 
interesting. 89 
Hitherto, philosophers of science considered mainly the logical (denotative) meaning while historians 
of science focused rather on connotative meaning. I believe that, when analyzing the meaning of 
scientific theories, one has to take both denotative and connotative meaning into consideration; 
both influence how scientific theories are understood and, hence, what they mean to recipients. A 
scientific term means neither exclusively its empirical reference (object, Gegenstand) nor merely its 
use in previous historical contexts, it means both. Denotative and connotative meaning, denotations 
and connotations, are two sides of the same coin.90 
ii. Static modeling and interpretative principles: organizing and interpreting scientific concepts 
When scientific concepts aggregate large sets of empirical evidence the divide between denotation 
and connotation becomes more marked. This is visible in complex classificatory systems as biological 
taxonomies where single sets are ordered and hierarchized. 
I will refer to such complex classificatory systems as ‘static models’ and distinguish them from 
dynamic models. (see section 2.1.3) The term ‘static’ accounts for the fact that these models do not 
model empirical regularities in time and/or space (synthetic regularities), i.e. dynamics, but 
regularities on objects within one concept (analytic regularities); they display snap-shots. Classic 
cases of static models are globes or maps but also an atom model in physics or a population tree in 
sociology. Globes and maps aggregate geographical data in a single, coherent framework and display 
relations between features of different places, notably distances. A model of the atom may 
aggregate patterns of electric impulses and display them as electron configurations on atomic orbits. 
A population pyramid visualizes relations between features of age cohorts, namely their absolute 
numbers and their share of the overall population. (For the use of static models within dynamic ones, 
see below.) 
Static modeling may apply to all elements of the description of observations: objects and object 
features, boundary conditions, events but also entire observation conditionals. Biological taxonomies 
classify the objects of biological observations, animals and plants, according to object features.91 
Mechanics may distinguish different kinds of motions, events, for instance simple harmonic motions 
from reciprocating or linear motions. Millikan’s fall is a case of the latter. Rational Choice Theory, 
when applied in game theory, may distinguish different kinds of boundary conditions by 
distinguishing games, for instance, cooperative and non-cooperative, symmetric and asymmetric, 
                                                            
89  Such effects are particularly marked in the social sciences and humanities, where many concept names 
have immediate implications for human world-views and are often subject to debate and struggle. 
Therefore there exist distinctions like the one between Macht (power) in the sense of Max Weber and 
Macht in the sense of Hannah Arendt. (Precisely speaking, it is the denotation of these terms which differs, 
not their connotation (sense).) 
90  By this, I do not imply that scientists consciously did or do distinguish between both kinds of meaning. My 
distinction is a modeling choice, an analytic category. 
91  Very abstract concepts in such classifications, for instance the terms ‘mammals’ or ‘mollusks’, denote large 
sets of observed organisms. More specific concepts as ‘dogs’ denote subsets of such larger sets. Thus, the 
definition of such subsets allows for the formulation of analytic statements like “All dogs are mammals.”. 
(See section 6. ii) 
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simultaneous and zero-sum games.92 When complex, such classifications can be arranged in tree 
schemes, as displayed by Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: A static model (schematic representation) 
The denotation of the single sets within a complex static model is usually no arbitrary venture but a 
quite systematic enterprise. Often it follows some general principles which provide a consistent 
overall interpretation93 of the different sets which are hierarchized in the static model. I will refer to 
such principles as ‘interpretative principles’.94 
In some static models such interpretative principles seem quite metaphysical, in others, they are 
little developed or very pragmatic. Thus, a population pyramid aggregates demographic data in 
standardized columns, separating sexes and summarizing 5-year-cohorts. A map or globe aggregates 
topographic data, presents it in standardized format (colors, hachures) and relate it to a unifying map 
grid. In Rational Choice, one might wonder whether the fact that games are divided into pairs and 
names them by mutually exclusive terms implies some interpretative principles but, overall, in 
Rational Choice Theory or Millikan’s physics, interpretative rules seem less intuitive. Contrarily, in 
biology, interpretative principles are important and there exist frequent debates on them. Thus, in 
the 18th and 19th century, taxonomic classifications95 have been interpreted before the background of 
                                                            
92  A classification of entire observation conditionals is usually a classification of Connectors (see below). A 
case in point would be hierarchies of forces in physics. 
93  I do speak of both, ‘static modeling’ and ‘interpretation’ in order to cater to two debates. First, the 
distinction between static and dynamic models caters to the model community, where it was apparently 
introduced by Hartmann, but not clearly specified. (Hartmann 1996) Second, ‘interpretation’ as opposed to 
‘explanation’ (which I discuss in the following section), reflects the distinction between Verstehen 
(understanding) and Erklären (explaining/explanation). This distinction was introduced in the 19th century 
in Germany and is still sometimes upheld as a dividing feature of the natural sciences and the humanities. 
My distinction denotes the same differences but favors a different connotation with respect to Verstehen. 
Aside from the humanoid undertones, Verstehen is part of the context of discovery, it is a process by which 
knowledge is accessed and gathered. Both, interpretation and explanation are rather part of the context of 
justification. Hence, I find it more intuitive to oppose them. This does not imply that these two concepts 
are more mutually exclusive than the original ones: a scientist may do all three: understand, interpret, and 
explain. (cf. Scholz 2008: 116-121) 
94  As with the denotative and connotative component of a concept name, the distinction between the static 
model and the interpretative principles is an analytic choice within my model. Also, one might find that the 
term static model already implies interpretation and that another term would be suitable to denote the 
hierarchical organization of scientific concepts. 
95  Taxonomic classifications are not the only possible classifications in biology, although they were the most 
important ones in 19th century biology and will be the kind of classification which I address most. 
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the scala naturae, the archetype or common descent, each concept implying different sets of 
interpretative principles.96 
In sum, in order to identify differences in aggregation and denotation as well as static modeling and 
interpretation, I will ask the following questions: 
 How are observations being aggregated and hierarchized? Do static models 
deviate from generally accepted ones? 
 How are sets of observations being denoted; are denotations systematic? Are 
general interpretative principles being introduced to justify denotations?  
2.1.3 Level 3: Explanation – Dynamic Modeling97 
The third level of my model, explanation, is divided into two parts: modeling and narrative. While 
narratives account for what we find intuitive and plausible in explanations (see below), dynamic 
models account for its logical part, namely arguments.98 In logical terms99, I would describe dynamic 
modeling as the formulation of aggregate100 statements over large sets of synthetic101 empirical 
regularities. 
This is also the point in which dynamic models differ from static models. Static models aggregate 
regularities between features of one set of objects (or events) – analytic regularities, for instance the 
fact that animals which bear hooves are herbivores. Dynamic models aggregate regularities between 
different (mutually exclusive) sets of objects (or events) – synthetic regularities, for instance that a 
fossil with properties X is only found in a geological strata with the properties Y (or that an event of 
the class X is regularly followed by an event of the class Y), with X and Y being mutually exclusive. In 
other words, static models model regularities within single sets of data points while dynamic models 
model regularities between different sets of data points. Synthetic relations are usually told as time-
bound processes, i.e. dynamic processes, therefore the term ‘dynamic model’. (For static models 
within dynamic models, see below.) 
Dynamic models may be specified to the same degree as empirical regularities, i.e. in the form of an 
observation conditional which comprises an event sequence or a regularity of object features on two 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Biogeographical and paleontological classifications classify organisms and fossils by the geographical area 
or the geological strata in which they were found. 
96  Modern genetics provided another source of interpretative principles from the 20th century on. An 
example of interpretative principles provides the Linnean binomial system, a nomenclature in which 
concept shares parts of its name with the names of each of its sub-concepts. 
97  For a discussion of how my model relates to the debates on explanation, see section 6 v. 
98  This is a modeling choice again. As social-historical entities, models are not mere logical entities; they 
always convey narrative elements. (see below) I choose to separate models from narratives because it 
allows for novel insights and better explanation. 
99  This does not immediately include physical objects or diagrams serving as models. Such objects, however, 
can only serve as models if it is specified linguistically how they relate to the logical elements of the model. 
(see Zacharias and Lenel forthcoming) 
100  Past discussions have found it difficult to determine a line between theoretical and empirical statements. 
This seems mainly due to the unclear connotations of the term ‘theory’. I avoid it and speak of aggregate or 
statements. The distinction between single and aggregate statements should be an empirical one, i.e. its 
operationalization is not trivial but feasible. 
101  For a formal discussion of the distinction, see section 6 ii. 
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different objects, the objects on which those events or features were observed and the boundary 
conditions under which the observations took place. In order to cater for this complexity, I am 
framing dynamic models in a scheme of five features, four of which correspond to elements of a full-
fledged observation conditional. Figure 6 illustrates this relation. 
 
Figure 6: Five features of dynamic models, corresponding elements in the description of observations102 
Input and Output are probably the most intuitive and the indispensable elements here. They reflect 
the two elements of an observation conditional, i.e. the two events of an event sequence or two 
correlated features of different objects. A dynamic model puts these synthetic103 regularities in a 
timely relation, presenting the Output as the consequence of the Input or, in other words, linking 
two phenomena104 in an effect.105 This need not be suggested by the observed regularity. In the 
experiment on spontaneous generation, chicken broth was first heated and then bacteria were 
observed on it. This is a clear event sequence. In paleontology, however, fossils are correlated to 
certain geological strata and it is a choice whether to interpret successive geological strata as 
                                                            
102  Note that dynamic models overlap with static models (see below), therefore, the upper half of the figure 
overlaps with level 2 of my model. 
103  Notice the difference between the analytic statements which can be formulated about elements of a static 
model (taxonomy) and the synthetic statements in dynamic models. The former relate features of the 
same objects – dogs are mammals – while the latter relate independent events or features of different 
objects, for instance of features of fossils with features of geological strata. For the discussion on the 
distinction see (6 ii). 
104  I consider a phenomenon a “unique event” and an effect the sequence of two events, each of which may 
be a phenomenon. This seems to reflect the typical use of the term as I perceive it. I am unsure whether 
this sequence need be induced by human intervention as Ian Hacking suggests. (Hacking 1983: 224) But 
this is a question of linguistic practice and requires empirical investigation. 
105  It seems to me that the terms ‘phenomenon‘ and ‘effect’ are employed for empirical facts and regularities 
only when these have been named (denoted). Thus, the appearance of an abnormal feature in a group of 
organisms becomes a phenomenon when it is called a ‘variation’.  
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testimony of successive historical periods. By doing so, the modeler brings his model in line with 
geology – a clear advantage – but this remains a choice. 
It is the relating of Input and Output which allows modelers to describe, predict and produce 
empirical effects.106 Therefore, it seems to be the core of modeling, a scientist’s decision which 
empirical facts to relate in her or his account of nature. This relating is somewhat intuitive in 
experimental sciences where one can test empirically whether two events are related, i.e. if one can 
induce the second event by inducing the first. In these sciences, the intellectual accomplishment lies 
more in conceiving the experiments than in their interpretations. In sciences which have no access to 
experiments107 and analyze data ex post – most of the social sciences and humanities, but also 
natural sciences like seismology – modeling consists in finding robust correlations (quantitative 
regularities) in the data. The efforts of 19th century evolutionists display how difficult and creative a 
task this can be. 
Let me illustrate this on my two examples again. Millikan, in his explanation (model), linked the 
descent and ascent of oil drops because he observed the two events in this order. The sociologists 
who observe a person regularly choosing ice cream over chocolate, might refer to such events as 
“revealing a ‘preference’ ” for ice cream over chocolate. Second, they might call the taking of the 
offered ice cream an ‘action’. 
The Connector may be a non-intuitive feature but it is an important element of many dynamic 
models. Logically, it is the name of an assignment (a function); it assigns subsets of the Output (or the 
entire Output) to subsets of the Input (or the entire Output). 108 Therefore, the Connector has no 
direct counterpart in observation109 beyond the empirical regularities which are observed and 
summarized by Input and Output; graphically speaking, it means the operators which link these 
empirical regularities, i.e. the “if…then…” in “if event 1, then event 2.” or “If object feature 1, then 
                                                            
106  I distinguish the capacity to describe, to predict and to produce. The first one is ex post knowledge, the 
latter two constitute ex ante knowledge. Description comprises the description of single events (e.g. 
lightning), or event sequences (a seaquake leading to a tsunami), object features (length of the bone of a 
fossil) and regularities of such object features (only herbivores bear hooves). Prediction and production 
refer only to event sequences or object features; in prediction we cannot control the outcome, in 
production we can. The three concepts are overlapping: what we can produce, we can predict and what we 
can produce or predict, we can describe. 
107  Many disciplines run material simulations, which could be considered experiments on material models. 
However they do produce empirical knowledge about the model, not about the modeled object (target 
object). For a discussion of this see (Zacharias and Lenel forthcoming).  
108  As always there are exceptions, particularly inconsistent or unempirical models. As an analytic tool, 
however, the concept of the Connector is quite useful and may provide some insight into how models are 
built. 
109  This does not imply that we may not study the space between two observations by introducing a third 
observation. Yet, if we do this, between the first and the third observation remains a space and the same is 
true for the third and second observations. Thus, we may minimize the space between data points 
(observations) but we cannot completely overcome it. On the level of models, intermediate observations 
(the third observation) may lead to the dismissal of a Connector but they can never fully satisfy a 
Connector; it keeps a speculative (interpretative component.) This, however, depends on the concept 
name employed for the Connector and the role this name plays in the narrative which is conveyed by the 
model 
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object feature 2.”.110 [Rhetorically, i.e. in terms of connotative meaning, the name of the Connector 
also determines to a large degree what stories a model may convey.111 (See below)]  
Thus, in the Rational Choice model, the assignment of an action to a preference is a rational decision, 
which, in this explanation, denotes exactly the sequence of revealing a preference for ice cream and 
taking the ice cream. Millikan describes the fall of the droplets as “an descent under gravity” and 
their rise as “an ascent under the influence of the [electric] field F”, introducing two different 
Connectors112 for the different outcomes of dropping oil droplet in an activated condenser and in 
inactive one.113 (Millikan 1913: 123) 
The Object Class is supposed to sum up the different types of objects on which regularities have been 
observed and to which the model is supposed to apply. The Situation Type is supposed to summarize 
different sets of boundary conditions under which the regularities were observed. Neither of these 
elements of my model is specified in all dynamic models. Rather, it seems from my limited 
experience that they are only specified if the model covers several types of objects or boundary 
conditions on which different empirical regularities have been observed. In other words, Situation 
Type and Object Class are specified in order to distinguish whether a specific Input-Output relation 
applies or not.  
This does not imply, however, that either is observed independently from Input and Output. For 
instance, Millikan states the ascent of oil-drops only under the influence of an electric field (Situation 
Type), otherwise the drops do not begin to ascend; they require “a vertical electrical and 
gravitational field combined”, respectively. (Millikan 1911: 349-50) Likewise, Millikan distinguishes oil 
drops which become ionized (“ions”) and begin their ascent from those which escape ionization114 
continue in descent. (Object Class) However, Millikan provides no independent empirical data for 
either distinction. The ionization is operationalized by the same Input-Output-relation which is 
supposed to occur on ions: 
                                                            
110  The Connector of a model M is logically equivalent with this conditional statement: “For all object features 
and events summarized by the Input or Output of M: If one object feature or event satisfies the Input of M, 
then at least one other object feature or event satisfies the Output of M.”. In its basic logic form, my model 
is not far from the deductive-nomological scheme (D-N-scheme, covering-law model) which Carl Hempel 
developed in the 1950s and 60s. (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948; Hempel 1962) The basic form of the D-N-
scheme is a syllogism of the form ‘If A and (if A then B.) then B.’ wherein A corresponds to the Input of my 
model, B to my Output and the conditional If A, then B. to my Connector. I extend on this basic form by 
introducing the Situation Type and the Object Class as well as a single name for the conditional: the 
Connector. While this single name denotes the same as the conditional If A, then B. it may connote 
something more, as revealed in my analysis of the link between models and narratives. 
111  The clear distinction which I have suggested between a model as a logical entity and the narrative as a 
psychological-linguistic entity thus hangs on the name of the Connector here. As a metaphor, it feeds the 
narrative. As a term (an arbitrary name) it organizes the model. 
112  To clarify, the gravitational field is active in both the first and second case of Millikan’s experiment, only in 
the second case it is superimposed by the electrical field. (see below) 
113  Visibly, the principal statement of a model: ‘If the Input occurs and the Connector applies then the Output 
occurs.’ is a tautological statement. This seems to be the case with many models; Darwin’s is merely one 
famous example. 
114  Ionization was achieved through Röntgen rays: „The air about the drop p was ionized when desired by 
means of Röntgen rays from X which readily passed through a glass window g [in the brass vessel].”. 
(Millikan 1913: 122-3) 
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„The fact that an ion has been caught, and the exact instant at which the event 
happened is signaled to the observer by the change in the speed of the droplet under 
the influence of the field.“ (Millikan 1911: 353) 
The same is true for the field; we know that the ion is under the influence of the field if and when it 
begins its ascent (or, at least, slows its descent); there is no other empirical means of determining it.  
In Rational Choice explanations, the Situation Type might distinguish a perfect market from an 
imperfect one and the Object Class a homo oeconomicus from a less “rational” agent. Equally, these 
classifications are not empirically accessible beyond the observable Input-Output-relation. Thus, 
when the observed subject behaved according to the model he or she is a homo oeconomicus in a 
perfect market115 - otherwise not. Conversely, the absence of the Input-Output-relation can be 
explained by the absence of either a perfect market or a homo oeconomicus.116 
Finally, how do dynamic models relate to static models? If dynamic models model regularities 
between different sets of data points and static models regularities within a single set of data points, 
then this single set of data points may be of the sets modeled by the dynamic model. Therefore, 
dynamic models might describe changes within static models. Thus, depending on what is modeled 
in a static model – events, objects, boundary conditions – the static model may overlap with the 
dynamic model in the Input and/or Output, the Object Class or the Situation Type.  
Thus, a globe, aggregating topographic data, might be employed in a dynamic model which describes 
the sun’s position towards the earth. Such a model could describe at what time a certain point on 
earth receives sunshine or undergoes a certain season (winter, spring, summer, autumn). A static 
model of the atom which differentiates different electron configurations can be employed in a 
dynamic model of chemical reactions. A population pyramids might be employed in dynamic models 
which describe demographic developments due to wars or the fast decline in birth rates after the 
introduction of the anti-baby pill. 117 In Rational Choice Theory, a political decision might be 
explained by the type of games political actors are playing, for instance zero-sum games, by them 
playing in a specific Situation like a prisoner’s dilemma. In biology, dynamic models of evolution 
model the difference (delta) between different elements of a taxonomic classification (organisms) 
which, themselves, are members of the Object Class. 
As on the other levels, I will ask a number of questions in order to identify dynamic models. My aim is 
to understand how aggregate concepts and statements in a dynamic model relate to the empirical 
regularities which were described on level 1. Therefore, I am asking: 
 Is an Object Class defined to which the Input-Output sequences apply? 
 Is a Situation Type specified in which the Input-Output sequences apply? 
                                                            
115  The market is very simple in my model, obviously. 
116  In sum, it seems to me that Situation Type and Object Class of a model serve, first and foremost, for 
theoretical classification, they allow for distinguishing and organizing sets of empirical regularities. Second, 
they play an important role in immunizing models or theories against contradictory evidence, a 
phenomenon called “confirmation holism” or “Duhem-Quine thesis”. (for a discussion see section 6 iii) 
Third, their concept names are important elements of the possible narratives a model may convey. (see 
section 2.1.4) 
117  My analysis will reveal this distinction as particularly fruitful for the Darwinian revolution. (5.1 iv) 
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 Are two independent sets of observations aggregated and is one set (Output) 
assigned to the other (Input)? Does this assignment mirror synthetic empirical 
regularities? 
 Are such assignments of Input and Output named by particular terms 
(Connectors)? 
2.1.4 Level 3: Explanation – Narration 
Beyond dynamic modeling, however, there is a second dimension to explanations which transcends 
logical arguments. In discussions on scientific explanations, I noticed how much it matters how one 
presents a model in explanation and which terms exactly one employs: explanation is equally a 
logical and118 a rhetorical task. 
This point exceeds connotations and terminology as I have addressed it above. The terms employed 
do indeed matter but, moreover, it matters how one puts them in relation, what points of an 
explanation are stressed and specified what other points are merely sketched or neglected. I suppose 
that most good explainers, like good speakers, acquire this skill through experience, i.e. trial and 
error. They tell an explanation over and over, learn from the feedback and modify small parts until it 
sticks with audiences, until listeners (or readers) find it plausible, intuitive, obvious – in one word: 
explanatory. Thus, explanation reveals a very (inter-)subjective element, one that transcends the 
realm of logic and projects us into a realm of rhetoric, specifically: stories. 
i. Stories in science? 
This personal experience reflects in some strands of the history and philosophy of science. First, in an 
important article on scientific explanations, Philip Kitcher dismissed the logic-wise most precise 
account of scientific explanations – the deductive-nomological model (D-N-model)119 – because it 
allowed for “intuitively non-explanatory” explanations: 
“The covering law model [D-N-model] satisfies neither of these desiderata. Its 
difficulties stem from the fact that, when it is viewed as providing a set of necessary 
and sufficient conditions for explanation, it is far too liberal. Many derivations which 
are intuitively [sic!] non-explanatory meet the conditions of the model. Unable to 
make relatively gross distinctions, the model is quite powerless to adjudicate the 
more subtle considerations about explanatory adequacy which are the focus of 
scientific debate.” (Kitcher 1981: 508) 
While it does not seem that Kitcher draws the same consequence from this observation as I do120, it 
is notable what criterion he introduces in the discourse on explanations: intuition. He disqualifies 
                                                            
118  Let me clarify this from the beginning: I do not argue that scientific explanation is merely a rhetorical task. 
It has both a logical and a rhetorical component.  
119  Kitcher speaks of the “Covering Law Model” but refers to the model which Carl Gustav Hempel 
championed in the 1960s and which Hempel himself referred to as the D-N- model. (Hempel and 
Oppenheim 1948; Hempel 1962) In its most basic form, it presented scientific explanations as syllogisms of 
the following form: If A and (If A, then B.), then B. (For a more detailed discussion see section 6 v.) 
120  In the course of the article, Kitcher does not attempt to grasp this intuitive component by other means 
than logic. 
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certain logically sound and empirically adequate explanations because, intuitively, they are not 
explanatory.121 
Second, and apart from the purely analytic strand of philosophy of science, there exists a tradition of 
historical-philosophical work which link models and explanations to non-logical linguistic entities, 
namely metaphors and stories. Colin Murray Turbayne, Arthur C. Danto, Mary Hesse, and Max Black 
have championed such views in the 1960s, Alan Gibbard and Hal R. Varian in the 1970s. (Turbayne 
1962; Danto 1965; Hesse 1966b; Hesse 1966a; Black 1968; Gibbard and Varian 1978) Unfortunately, 
none of these accounts is very precise in specifying how models relate to stories.122 
Recently, the debate has been revived by the historian Norton Wise and, foremost, philosopher of 
economics Mary Morgan. (Morgan 2001; Morgan 2002; Morgan 2007a; Morgan 2007b; Wise 2008). 
Wise, inspired by Morgan, identified narrative patterns in theoretical physics, an area where one 
would not necessarily expect it: 
“…explanation in significant areas of physics has changed in character, from 
deductive narrative123 to historical narrative... I do not argue, with respect to the 
deductive structure of the PDE's [partial differential equations], that they themselves 
have a narrative form, only that they give a deductive structure to stories associated 
with them and, following [Mary] Morgan, that the resulting narratives are essential in 
relating the mathematical structure to the world. Simulations, however, seem to 
have an inherently [historical] narrative character, in that they generate natural 
histories of events [event sequences] and objects that are grown by – and known by 
– the simulations. The process of growth of these events and objects becomes their 
explanation. Through this change in character, explanation in physics begins to look 
much more like evolutionary biology and even history.” (Wise 2008: 48-49) 
“I stress the narrative aspect because we do not normally think of mathematical 
deductions as narratives. Indeed, Courant and Hilbert do their best to strip their 
mathematical methods of all narrative elements. And yet, the toolbox [of 
mathematical equations] cannot be constructively employed in the world without 
putting the narrative back in.” (Wise 2008: 42) 
                                                            
121  One (once?) famous example of such an “intuitively non-explanatory” explanation involves a flagpole and 
its shade. Among the majority of philosophers, there seems to be a consensus that it is valid to explain the 
length of the shade of a flagpole by the length of a flagpole (and the angle of incidence of the sun’s light 
etc.) but not the inverse. I know of no logical or empirical criterion which justifies this distinction and, as 
Bas van Fraassen, I have never found it intuitive. (In the Scientific Image, van Fraassen went out of his way 
to invent (?) a story which explains the length of a tower by the length of the shade it was supposed to 
throw. (van Fraassen 1980: 132-4)) Anyway, this problem reaffirms that, when justifying or rejecting 
scientific explanations, humans often cite non-logical criteria. 
122  The historian of economics Donald McCloskey goes a step further and, as I find, a step to far. He claims that 
economic models are nothing more than stories, denying their logical component: „Pure theory in 
economics is similar to the literary genre of fantasy. […] Good empirical work in economics, on the other 
hand, is like realistic fiction. Unlike fantasy, it claims to follow all the rules of the world. (Well … all the 
important ones.) But of course it too is fictional.“ (McCloskey 1990: 17; cf. McCloskey 1983) In my opinion, 
this clearly is an exaggeration; McCloskey falls to the fallacy that because models convey stories or are also 
stories, they are nothing but stories. 
123  I do not concur with Wise’s use of the term ‘narrative’ with respect to deductions. 
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The most sophisticated account of the relation of models and stories in explanations seems to be 
provided by Mary Morgan. First, she emphasizes that economic explanations are both124 arguments 
and stories, which do interact. Second, she differentiates between a narrative and a story, pointing 
out that the narrative represents a basic literary form which might be applied to different specific 
situations in specific stories.125 Thus, Morgan speaks of scientists telling specific stories by applying 
certain narratives to specific situation: 
“Modelling involves a style of scientific thinking in which the argument is structured 
by the model, but in which the application is achieved via a narrative [sic!] prompted 
by an external fact, an imagined event or question to be answered. Economists use 
their economic models to explain or to understand the facts of the world by telling 
stories [sic!] about how those facts might have arisen. The stories are neither ‘merely 
heuristic’ nor ‘just rhetoric’ but an essential part of the way models are labelled and 
used.” (Morgan 2001: 361) 
„…we only fully understand our model when we have identified all the specific stories 
that it can encompass or tell about the world.“ (Morgan 2001: 380) 
Therefore, to Morgan,  
„The two explanations, scientific [deductive] and narrative, are clearly 
complementary. The same seems to hold in using economic models. To the extent 
that we make use of general theoretical claims we have embodied in the structure of 
the model, then we make use of theoretical (scientific) explanation, but when we use 
the model to discuss specific cases, we also rely on the complementary explanatory 
power of narrative. […] It is because of the dual nature of a model’s relationship with 
the world that in using models we can call on the explanatory power of more than 
one mode of argument: the theoretical and narrative forms.“( Morgan 2001: 378-9) 
Third, in the literary science, Gillian Beer has made this case for Darwin specifically, arguing that, in 
the Origin, Darwin provides both a logical argument for and a story of evolution for 
“…how Darwin said things was a crucial part of his struggle to think things, not a layer 
that can be skimmed off without loss. It shows how his non-technical language … 
allowed a wide public to read his work and appropriate his terms to a variety of 
meanings (Nature, race, man, struggle, fit, and family would be examples of story-
generating words). My argument demonstrates the degree to which narrative and 
argument share methods; indeed, it enquires what differences can be maintained 
between narrative and argument.” (Beer 2009: xxv) 
                                                            
124  Hence, Morgan emphasizes that the explanation is not exhausted by the story nor the model (structure): 
“…models [are not] just stories. In practical terms, models and stories go hand in hand. I agree with 
Gibbard and Varian when they say that a model is ‘a story with a specified structure’, but the story is not 
wholly given by the structure. The structure constrains and shapes the stories that can be told with a 
model, but the structure itself, like the metaphor in McCloskey’s account, cannot do the work expected of 
a model on its own. Using a model necessarily involves both.” (Morgan 2001: 366) 
125  Thus, the coming-of-age narrative is exemplified by quite different stories in Goethe’s Werther and 
Salinger’s Catcher in the rye. 
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In sum, there are historians, philosophers and literary scholars who suggest analyzing scientific 
models as both arguments and stories, who argue that explanation involves both a logical and 
literary component. Still, does this make sense? Why would scientists – consciously or not126 – 
employ narrative structures in explanations? 
ii. Stories in communication, knowledge procession and decision-making 
I believe that the answer to these questions is a very general one: Humans make sense of their 
experiences by telling stories and they organize their knowledge in the form of narratives. (Bruner 
2002: 7, 28; Bruner 1991: 4) 
This claim is supported by several psychological and psycholinguistic observations. In a 
groundbreaking psychological experiment of the 1940s, Fritz Heider and Marianne Simmel, 
presented arrangements of geometrical shapes to test subjects and successively altered features of 
these shapes or their positions to one another. (Heider and Simmel 1944) When asked to describe 
their observations, most subjects told little stories about what they had just seen, which included 
causal or teleological explanations of the observed actions; it was explained why (causal) or what for 
(teleological) certain changes in the setting had occurred. Figure 7 displays one state in which the 
geometrical shapes were displayed.127 
 
Figure 7: Geometrical shapes in a configuration shown by Heider and Simmel (1944: 244) 
Jerome Bruner, Jacqueline Goodnow and George Austin, in a fascinating experiment on card games, 
revealed the same tendency in the 1950s. (Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin 1990 [1956]) First, they 
                                                            
126  I do not believe that many scientists do so consciously. Like good speakers they notice that certain 
metaphors, stylistic devices, forms of presentation “work”. Actually, one might wonder how much of such 
work can be done consciously for as Bruner still resumed, “we know precious little in any formal sense 
about how to make good stories.” (Bruner 1991: 14; cf. Bruner 2002: 3-4) Such, a story may also be “too 
good to be true”, i.e. too rhetorically sophisticated. (Bruner 2002: 5) 
127  The shapes were a larger triangle, a smaller triangle, a disc, and a large rectangle, of which one corner 
could be “opened”. 
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gave to their subjects a set of cards which displayed geometrical figures which could differ in certain 
properties thus allowing for a fixed numbers of possible combinations and a fixed numbers of 
possible cards. The experiment leader chose one of those configurations and let the subject show 
him cards. For each card he declared whether the card exemplified the chosen configuration. The 
game was over when the subject could correctly describe the chosen configuration. The 
psychologists observed the number of guesses it took a subject to arrive at the correct conclusion 
and the tactics they chose to get to the conclusion.  
 
Figure 8: Geometrical and thematic configurations shown by Bruner et.al. (1990[1956]: 42, 107) 
Second, the same game was played with set of cards which displayed people with different features 
(facial expression, clothing, sex), “thematic” cards. (see figure x for the two types of cards) The 
thematic cards displayed the same number of possible configurations, yet the behavior of the test 
subjects changed considerably: First, subjects were inclined to interpret the images of the cards as 
evocative of “little stories or themes”. Second, many subjects pursued less-efficient strategies and 
took considerably longer to determine the correct configuration. Particularly, they were very hesitant 
to change certain features of the thematic cards, notably of the adult on the right side of the card.128 
(see Figure 8)129 
Yet, stories do not merely shape how we tell and store our knowledge of the world but what 
decisions and actions we take; they serve as powerful heuristics in dealing with a complex 
environment. How much so is reported in a famous paper from 1981 by the economists Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, in which they demonstrate how much decision making depends on 
the formulation, the “framing”, of the decision. (Tversky and Kahneman 1981)130 Nicolas Taleb’s 
                                                            
128  Least often, the sex of the figures was altered.  
129  In more recent works, Kieser, Livingstone, Meldrum report that students find classes more satisfying when 
the content is presented in the form of stories (Kieser, Livingstone, and Meldrum 2008). (Black & Bower 
1980) go a step further and analyze which elements of a story are best remembered by recipients: Agent, 
then Act. 
130  The experiment was not intended to analyze the impact of narrative patterns, Tversky and Kahneman 
referred to their effect as “framing”. Yet, it can easily be interpreted thus; in a neutral description the 
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devoted a chapter of his best-selling The Black Swan to what he calls the “narrative fallacy”: the fact 
that if something sounds plausible, if it is a good story, we tend believe it independently of whether 
we have the empirical information to assess it. (Taleb 2008) Usually we do not even notice that we 
are being told stories.131 As Bruner put it “Only when we suspect we have the wrong story do we 
begin by asking how a narrative may structure (or distort) our view of how things really are.” (Bruner 
2002: 9) 132 
In sum, stories are far more than children’s entertainment or mere ornaments of language. Humans 
employ them to communicate their experiences, to process and store experiences and they employ 
them as heuristics in their decision-making. 
iii. How to identify narratives? – Kenneth Burke’s literary (narrative) pentad  
In order to analyze narratives, I employ a classic framework from the literary studies, Kenneth 
Burke’s literary (narrative) pentad. In his classic Grammar of Motives, introduces narratives in terms 
of human motives. 
“We shall use five terms as generating principle of our investigation. They are: Act, 
Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose. In a rounded statement about motives, you must 
have some word that names the act (names what took place, in thought or deed), 
and another that names the scene (the background of the act, the situation in which 
it occurred); also, you must indicate what person or kind of person (agent) 
performed the act, what means or instruments he used (agency), and the purpose. 
Men may violently disagree about the purposes behind a given act, or about the 
character of the person who did it, or how he did it, or in what kind of situation he 
acted; or they may even insist upon totally different words to name the act itself. But 
be that as it may, any complete statement about motives will offer some kind of 
answers to these five questions: what was done (act), when or where it was done 
(scene), who did it (agent), how he did it (agency), and why (purpose).” (Burke 1969 
[1945]: xv) 
The five expressions – Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose – denote five elements of any story, or – 
better – five questions to which any story should answer: 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
observed phenomena much resemble those observed by Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin. Moreover, the 
boundary conditions of the experiment and the observed choices can easily be interpreted in terms of 
Burke’s literary (narrative) pentad. (see below) 
131  Salmon speaks of narratives as “bewitching the modern mind”, which puts it very well. We may believe 
that our post-enlightened, post-modern society does not fall for cheap tricks of the mind; yet, we consider 
one fictional story to be “truer” than another, one piece of art to depict reality better than another, one 
scientific theory to represent the actual (“causal”) reality while another one is but an approximation. 
(Salmon 2010) 
132  In consequence, it is hard to escape the trap of narratives. Today, marketing departments, motivational 
coaches and even football managers have discovered the power of stories. If you believed what your 
financial advisor told you about investment opportunities in the US house market before 2008, you are also 
inclined to believe a story about why this was wrong, tales about a corrupt banking system, greedy 
financial advisors or a housing bubble. If macroeconomics was unable to predict such a bubble, why should 
we trust their story in how this bubble evolved now? (Granted, among the ten-thousands of professional 
economists, a few who predicted the crisis, but such accidental outliers are to be expected; the discipline 
as a whole got it wrong.) In the end, however, you better also mistrust stories about the dangers of story-
telling. 
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“Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose. Although, over the centuries, men have shown 
great enterprise and inventiveness in pondering matters of human motivation, one 
can simplify the subject by this pentad of key terms, which are understandable 
almost at a glance. They need never be abandoned, since all statements that assign 
motives can be shown to arise out of them and to terminate in them. By examining 
them quizzically, we can range far; yet the terms are always there for us to reclaim, in 
their everyday simplicity, their almost miraculous easiness, thus enabling us 
constantly to begin afresh.” (Burke 1969 [1945]: xv-xvi)133 
In telling stories, the elements of the pentad can be arranged in many different constellations; Burke 
discusses such constellations at length. (Burke 1969 [1945]). Thus, stories do not follow a specific 
outer form134, one story may be told from the Scene another from the Agent. Consequently, the 
pentad’s elements are not supposed to be mutually exclusive, cleanly separated concepts as one 
would expect them in models. Rather, one aspect of a story may specify several elements of the 
pentad and each element may overlap with others in some respect. To Burke, however, this is an 
explicit strength of his framework: 
“…instead of considering it our task to “dispose of” any ambiguity by merely 
disclosing the fact that it is an ambiguity, we rather consider it our task to study and 
clarify the resources of ambiguity. … it is in the areas of ambiguity that 
transformations take place; in fact, without such areas, transformation would be 
impossible. Distinctions, we might say, arise out of a great central molteness, where 
all is merged. […]  
And so with our five terms: certain formal interrelationships prevail among these 
terms, by reason of their role as attributes of a common ground for substance. Their 
participation in a common ground makes for transformability. At every point where 
the field covered by any one of these terms overlaps upon the field covered by any 
other, there is an alchemic opportunity, whereby we can put one philosophy or 
doctrine of motivation into the alembic, make the appropriate passes, and take out 
another. Form the central molteness, where all elements are fused into one 
togetherness, there are thrown forth, in separate crusts, such distinctions as those 
between freedom and necessity, activity and passiveness, cooperation and 
competition, cause and effect, mechanism and teleology.” (Burke 1969 [1945]: xix) 
Moreover, Bruner, developing on Burke, highlights that the molteness of the central concepts is 
crucial in creating the tension required for good story telling: 
“What drives a story is a misfit between the elements of the Pentad: Trouble. It can 
be a misfit between Agent and Action, Goal and Setting [Scene], any of the five 
elements of the Pentad. How could Agamemnon and Clytemnestra share a bed after 
he had sacrificed their daughter Iphigenia, the beloved fruit of her womb?” (Bruner 
2002: 34) 
                                                            
133  On a side note, the schemata employed in narrative research seem linked to both mental models and 
associative networks. It seems as all three concepts analyze a common complex problem from different 
perspectives. 
134  Such ideas were pursued by a research program called ‚story grammar‘. (cf. Andersen and Slator 1990) 
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Before illustrating the pentad on two examples, let me specify three points in which I extend Burke’s 
framework. This is necessary because, in my application to scientific theories, I will consider stories 
which do not center on human actions and human motives. First, I will interpret the Act, very 
generally, as an event, namely the event which the story aims to explain. It need not be the result of 
human action. Second, the Agent need not be a human, just some entity which is considered to be 
able of acting. Third, the Purpose may also be a Cause, thus we may not only ask teleological 
questions (what for?) but also causal ones (why?).135 
Now let me exemplify how the elements of the pentad relate to the questions about stories and how 
stories may answer these questions. Table 1 demonstrates the workings of the pentad on two 
stories, a stereotypical hero tale and the biblical Genesis. 
Five 
elements of 
narratives 
Question 
Example 1: The male 
hero 
Example 2: Genesis 
Scene 
When or where 
was it done?136 
In a dark dungeon… 
First God made heaven and earth. The 
earth was without form and void, and 
darkness was upon the face of the deep; 
and the Spirit of God was moving over 
the face of the waters. 
Agent Who/what did it? …the hero… God 
Agency How was it done? 
…with a concealed 
knife… 
God said, "Let there be light“. 
Act What was done? …breaks his chains… …and there was light. 
Purpose / 
Cause 
What was it done 
for? Why was it 
done? 
… to escape and save 
his beloved one. 
And God saw that the light was good… 
Table 1: Illustration of Burke's pentad on a generic story and on the biblical Genesis 
The comparison of these two small stories reveals an interesting aspect which also mattered in the 
Darwinian revolution: telling stories about God requires much less effort for plausibility and graphic 
imagery than stories about non-divine agents. In the Genesis, neither God’s Purpose nor the means 
by which he act (his Agency) become very clear and the Scene is rather abstract and hard to grasp. 
Still, this story is among the most famous ever told and quite a number of people find it more 
convincing than anything scientists have ever told about the origin of our planet and the life on it. 
This effect seems attached to the powerful metaphor ‘god’; apparently, almighty beings make up for 
some shortcomings in story-telling. 
In sum, Burke’s pentad allows for suggesting a general definition of a narrative and thus to provide 
clear criteria for what I will mean when I speak of narratives and stories137 in my analysis: 
                                                            
135  I am aware that the possible answers to both questions overlap, particularly when purposes are presented 
ex post as the reasons for an act. Non-overlapping concepts are hard to find in natural sciences. 
136  Generally speaking, one may understood the Scene as specifying what one needs to know to process the 
story, connect the dots given by Act, Agent, Agency and Purpose. 
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Definition: A narrative is a presentation of a sequence of events (or sequence of state 
changes), in which these events are put in a spatial and timely context (Scene) in such 
a way that the later event (Act) can be understood as a consequence of the former 
(Agency). This consequence might either be presented as a teleological or a causal 
link, i.e. it might stem from the purposeful acting (Purpose) of an entity (Agent) or 
the existence of an entity might be presented as the consequence’s cause (Cause). 138 
This definition clarifies how observable event sequences, as observed by scientists or interpreted into 
their evidence, may relate to narratives139: They must be set in a Scene and they must be linked to 
the existence or the Purpose of an Agent. As I said above, this Agent need not be a human or even 
tangible entity; it might be wholly abstract or imaginative, as long as it has the power to achieve the 
Act. Let me specify by linking narratives to dynamic models as described above. 
iv. Mapping the elements of dynamic models onto narratives 
First, however, allow me to repeat a point I made about my model (research design) in general. I do 
not expect all models to convey complete and explicit narratives – although some do. Rather, in most 
models, the connotations of the terms used in dynamic modeling convey meaning which satisfies 
only some of the five elements of Burke’s pentad. In other cases, some narrative elements might be 
implied or suggested140 by the context.141 In sum, my claim is not that every model conveys a story. 
Instead, I suggest analyzing those parts of an explanation which exceed logical arguments as 
metaphors and elements of a story. 
From what point could such story-telling start? Given a specified dynamic model, at least three 
elements of the Narrative can be covered. The predicate(s) of the Situation Type describe the Scene. 
The Output will specify the Act. Third, both the Input or an eventual Connector may connote some 
kind of Agency, each own its own or in combination. These three elements being covered, the 
decisive question in my comparative analysis will be whether the respective theories do specify an 
Agent and a Purpose to explain their models. These two elements are crucial; without them, there is 
no narrative. 
It would appear that the Object Class of the model might connote the Agent and, indeed, in the 
social sciences, humans provide for the Object Class in the model and the Agents in the narrative. 
Yet, this type of story-telling is rare in the natural sciences and it was rare during 19th century 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
137  I know of no exact distinction of stories and narratives, therefore, I will use the terms somewhat 
synonymously. Roughly speaking, a narrative can be considered a story-container or story generator. 
138  For a similar definition with a different connotation, see (Wolf 2002: 51). For a discussion of events and 
eventfulness see (Hühn 2009). 
139  Because this question occurred in some discussions of earlier versions of my framework: event sequences 
on the level ‘description’ do not constitute stories or narratives because they lack the specification of an 
Agent or Purpose as required by my definition of a narrative. Event sequences claim that a sequence of 
events occurred but do not put them in a meaningful context as do narratives. 
140  This relates to Levinson’s implicatures, namely the third one. (see footnote 80) A model might be 
presented in the context of a discipline which typically employs a certain type of narratives. When the 
modeler does not specify his deviation from these typical narratives, readers may assume that he accepts 
them and project them onto the model. 
141  Such an array of possibilities is not surprising, considering that few scientists consciously set out to tell a 
story; as with respect to finding the good concept names explanation is a question of experience, of trial 
and error. And as it happens, experience seems to lead towards story-telling. 
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biology.142 In all other cases, where an Agent is specified, it has to be a new, external entity, i.e. one 
which is not already specified in the model. Combinations of several complementary Agents are also 
possible. 
In theories without a dynamic model, the case is more complicated. Changes within a static model 
may account for an Act. All other elements, however, require substantial specification. My analysis 
will show that all theories without dynamic models drew on the biblical narrative and God for this 
specification. In order to identify narratives in both, theories with dynamic models and theories 
without, I will ask the following questions: 
 If there is a dynamic model, does it specify an Output which can be understood as the Act 
of a narrative? If there is a static model, can changes within its framework be understood 
as an Act? 
 Does the text specify an Agent (or several ones) involved in producing the Act? 
 Is a Purpose of this Agent specified or a Reason for which he acts? 
 Is an Agency specified by which the Agent achieves the Act? Does it correspond to the 
Input or Connector of the dynamic model? 
 Is a Scene specified in which the Act takes place? If not, can it be reconstructed from the 
other four elements of the narrative?  
Let me illustrate this on my two idealized examples again. A Rational Choice explanation follows a 
classic anthropocentric narrative; its Agent is the observed object: a human. He undertakes an action 
(Act) within a possibility space (Scene) by making a rational decision (Agency) in order to maximize 
his profit (Purpose/Cause). In retrospect, one may also explain his action causally by stating that the 
Agent undertook an action because he had a preference (Cause) for its outcome. 
In this case, the five narrative elements can be satisfied by the elements of the dynamic model. The 
Scene is filled by the concept name for the Situation Type, the Agent by the name for the Object 
Class, the Act by the Output, the Agency by the Connector and the Cause / Purpose by the Input.143 
Table 2 summarizes these relations.144  
In Millikan’s explanation of falling and rising oil droplets, the case is more complicated. The rise and 
fall, the Output of the model, is the Act of the narrative, too. The Scene is specified by the Situation 
Types in which the experiment takes place, namely a gravitational in the first run and a gravitational 
plus an electromagnetic field in the second run. For the other three elements, however, things are 
different. First, the observed objects are not considered to be Agents, it is not their acting which 
produces their rise. Rather, when we ask what made them rise, Millikan would answer that it was the 
electromagnetic force which superimposed the gravitational force and made the droplets rise. 
(Agents) Second, there is no Purpose by which Millikan would explain the droplets’ rising; he does 
not ascribe a Purpose to either force. Rather, the presence of the force and its acting on the ions is 
                                                            
142  The only model which might be understood to convey such a narrative is Lamarck’s. (see section 2.3 vii) 
143  Additionally, one might mention the Connector, as part of the Cause / Purpose, if one says that the Agent 
acted because he made a rational decision. It seems to me, however, that my version is more frequent. 
144  This assignment is not the only possible one; it could be specified more or shifted semantically. For 
instance, the Scene and Situation Type might be specified by the type of game that is played or 
characterized as a “perfect market”. The human could be described in his preferences, thus creating an 
overlap Object Class and Purpose/Cause. The Purpose might be described as a cause in that the human 
undertakes the Action because his preferences suggested the Action as the most useful option and 
because he makes rational decisions. 
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presented as Cause; it explains why (Cause) and how (Agency) the droplets rose (Act): “the speed of 
the drop is proportional to the force acting upon it”. (Millikan 1911: 354) The Scene is specified by 
the two fields, the electromagnetic one and the gravitational one. 
In this case, there is no one-on-one mapping of the elements of the model. While the Scene is 
satisfied by Situation Type (the fields) and the Act by the Output (the motions), the observed objects 
are not Agents but subject to forces. Consequently, the Input of the bodies, their initial fall between 
the condenser plates, cannot satisfy the Agency or the Purpose / Cause of the narrative. Rather the 
latter is explained by the sheer presence of the forces, the former by their acting upon the observed 
objects. Table 3 specifies the narrative elements in his explanation and how they relate to the 
elements of the model. 
Elements of narratives Rational Choice explanation Assigned elements of model 
Scene 
Where, when? 
Possibility Space Situation Type 
Agent 
Who? What? 
A human Object Class 
Agency 
How? 
Rational decision Connector 
Act 
What? 
Action Output 
Purpose / Cause 
What for? / Why? 
Maximization of Profit / Preference - / Input 
Table 2: Narrative elements in a Rational Choice explanation 
Elements of narratives Millikan’s explanation Assigned elements of model 
Scene 
Where, when? 
Gravitational field,  
Electro-magnetic field 
Situation Type 
Agent 
Who? What? 
Gravitation,  
Electromagnetism (Forces) 
- 
Agency 
How? 
Acting of the force Connector 
Act 
What? 
Motion (descent, ascent) Output 
Purpose / Cause 
What for? / Why? 
- / Presence of Forces - / -  
Table 3: Narrative elements in Millikan's explanation of falling and rising oil droplets 
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2.1.5 Level 4: Ontological Implications (Implications for the world-views)  
Explanatory narratives constitute the link to what I consider the highest level of a scientific theory. 
This level contains a complement to the theory’s narrative which, just as the narrative, conveys 
connotative meaning. It covers what a theory’s narrative implies about the world or, in other words, 
what the world would look like if the narrative were true.  
I refer to this fourth level as containing ‘philosophical implications’ because it expresses an ontology, 
i.e. postulations of entities and relations between these entities. This ontology describes a reality 
behind the observed reality and does thus make sense of thus make sense of the scientific 
knowledge by embedding them in a world-view. Three basic questions allow for identifying possible 
ontological implications: 
 What Agents would exist in the world? 
 What rules would govern the world in which these Agents act? 
 What would be Man’s position and his relation to the Agents?  
As these questions suggest, ontological implications are strongly culture-bound. For instance, in 19th 
century British biology, there existed one undisputed Agent in the world, to which all narratives had 
to relate: God.145 As my analysis will demonstrate, to Darwin and his contemporaries, the question 
was not whether to present God as the principal Agent in Nature, but whether they could introduce 
other Agents besides God. Moreover, with respect to the governing rules, many of Darwin’s 
contemporaries drew parallels between the rules which governed Nature and those which governed 
society. Therefore, these were considered to have social and political implications about the inner 
workings of society. From these two considerations, the generic ontological questions above can be 
specified and, in my analysis of the theories Darwinian revolution, I will ask them in the following 
form: 
 What would be God’s role in the world? What Agents exist besides God? 
 What would the world and society be like if the model’s narrative applied to it? 
 What would be Man’s position and his relation to the Agents, particularly God? 
In other disciplines and cultural contexts, this specification could be much different. For instance, in 
20th and 21st century science, God is no compulsory Agent any more. In the social sciences, the 
dominant (and mostly only) Agent is Man; as far as I see it, his relation to God is no topic. Instead, the 
ontological questions in the social sciences focus on the rules which allegedly govern human 
behavior. Thus, the hottest public social science topic of the last decade was the homo oeconomicus, 
the image of a human who maximizes profit independent of values or morals as it appears implied by 
Rational Choice explanations. This question is discussed in great length in journals and magazines and 
often is the focal point of the critique of macroeconomics.146 Thus, the public debate does not focus 
                                                            
145  This does not imply, however, that the concept of God would be much developed in biological writings. 
Biological texts which mention God contain neither teleological discussions nor criteria for the use of terms 
like ‘divine’ ‘Creator’ etc. ‘God’ serves as a metaphor instead. 
146  There are some strands of Rational Choice modeling which actually include values and morals as part of the 
preferences. Yet, apparently, these differences in modeling do not reach the public as long as actions are 
still explained as the result of “rational” decisions.  
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on modeling but on narration and its implications – as formulated by the axioms147 of Rational Choice 
Theory.148 
In modern physics, God is no part of the explanations anymore. Yet, some physicists do refer to God 
when interpreting their models, for instance in interpretations of the Big Bang or in the hunt of the 
so-called “God-particle”, the Higgs bosom. The narrative of Millikan’s explanation remained within 
the established ontology of natural forces which act upon inanimate matter.149 While the axioms 
which claim the existence of such forces and their mutual relations do indeed postulate indeed an 
ontology – a non-religious one – they implies no novel implications.150 
However, Einstein when popularizing General Relativity made use of little stories 
(Gedankenexperimente) which exemplified what his theory meant for the man on the streets. Thus, 
his story about the twin brothers, one of which travels at the speed of light and remains young and 
one of which lives on earth and ages, brought the relativity principle within the realm of everyday 
culture. The same is true about the two people watching their watches while one leaves a station on 
a train while the other remains on the platform. 
Some words of reserve. First, as ontological implications are implied by narratives, not all models 
evoke such implications; some may not display enough narrative elements to evoke such 
implications. Notably, a model might not postulate a Purpose/Reason or not specify an Agent. 
Second, a narrative may be only loosely connected to the relevant world-views or, as in Millikan’s 
case, largely comply with it. In these cases, ontological implications are difficult to identify or, simply, 
uncontroversial and therefore, historically less interesting. (In my analysis, I will indeed focus on 
points where narratives convey controversial implications.) Third, ontological implications might be 
exemplified by a theory’s author, as is the case for Darwin, Owen and Chambers, but they need not. 
For some models, the ontological implications might come into being only in the reception of a 
model. In such cases, they even might have been not intended by the author but arise when his 
model is translated151 into the language of public discourse.152 Therefore, may be difficult to draw a 
line between implications as addressed by the author and implications as interpreted by a theory’s 
recipients.153  
This should not, however, prevent us from identifying such implications with a theory. The public 
interest in scientific theories is triggered primarily by these implications, be they intended by or not. 
                                                            
147  These axioms postulate humans as decision makers. The describe how a person makes decisions and how 
options in such decisions may relate to the person’s preferences 
148  I discuss the dangers of these asymmetries in sections 5.2 and 5.3. 
149  It also acts upon animate beings but not in the aspects which constitute their being animate. 
150  To give a historic example, the Newtonian axioms in mechanics postulated bodies and forces acting on 
these bodies as functions of a property of the bodies, namely their masses. Then they described these 
masses and forces as triggering motions. Moreover, they specified the model by which to describe (ex 
post) or predict (ex ante) the resulting motions. 
151  I do sketch some dangers of this translation in section 1.3. 
152  Such, it were Galileo Galilei and Giordano Bruno who exemplified those possible ontological implications of 
Copernicus’ astronomical model which led to what we call the Copernican revolution. – One might wonder 
to what point ontological interpretations are legitimate and at what point they become misinterpretations. 
Such a classification however, is of limited value: It provides an interpretation of social-historical events but 
no explanation. 
153  In my examples, the line is quite clear. Thus, I will address the implications as addressed by the authors in 
the comparative analysis (chapter 3) and those implications which arise in reception in my reception 
analysis (chapter 4). 
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When theologians rebuke scientists for contradicting religious truths, when journalists criticize 
scientific theories for their view of Man, when scientists of different disciplines fight for 
supremacy154, we are in the sphere of ontological implications.  
Thus, ontological implications explain how scientific theorizing impacts culture beyond the narrow 
domain of observed empirical phenomena or reproducible effects; they are a cultural product, the 
result of scientific narratives relating to extra-scientific conceptions of the world. I would even go so 
far that we consider an explanation to express a theory if its narrative evokes such ontological 
implications. Explanations which remain in the realm of logical arguments are usually not referred to 
as ‘theories’. Thus, it seems to me, that level four of my model, ontological implications, answers to 
the question what a theory is beyond a model or an explanation? 
2.1.6 Summary, overview 
In sum, my model is a static model of scientific theories. It distinguishes different possible 
components of scientific theories, namely 4 levels, sublevels on two of these levels and different 
concepts which may or may not be satisfied on these levels. Figure 9 provides an overview of the 
different levels and the analytic concepts I have introduced on each level.  
 
Figure 9: Analytic concepts in my four-level model of scientific theories 
As my explanation of the model has shown and as my comparative analysis will show, the four levels 
overlap in certain areas. This is rather obvious with respect to Description, Aggregations and Dynamic 
models, i.e. the denotative part of the model. Events and object features are aggregated and 
classified on level 2 and modeled as Inputs and Outputs on level 3. Equally, the Object Class and the 
Situation Type of level 3 denote sets of boundary conditions and observed objects of level 1. In 
connotative terms, there exists overlap (or close relation) between the concept names used for 
interpretation on level 2 and the Act and Agency on level 3. Equally, the Agent, its Agency and 
Purpose strongly determine the possible ontological implications on level 4. 
                                                            
154  For an example of such a struggle, see the earth-of-the-age debate in (section v). 
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In my analysis, I will apply my static model within a dynamic one, namely the model of Historical 
Epistemology. (see section 5.1) Thus, I aim to transcend interpretation, employing my model as a tool 
for historical explanations. In this enterprise, I employ the distinction between connotative and 
denotative meaning as well as between models on one side and narratives and their ontological 
implications as marking the limit between knowledge and beliefs in a scientific theory. I consider the 
shared body of described observation and correlated observations to represent the shared scientific 
knowledge of a domain. As mere logical entities, static and dynamic models do organize this shared 
knowledge. Conversely, the interpretation of aggregated observations and the narrative explanation 
of observed regularities represent beliefs155 about the shared knowledge which then connect to 
general beliefs about the world (world-views) via ontological implications of narratives. These beliefs 
may be said to make sense of the knowledge. 
  
                                                            
155  These beliefs may or may not be shared. 
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2.2 Research Design for the reception analysis: concentric circles of 
recipients 
In the reception analysis, I am pursuing three guiding questions. First, I wish to investigate the depth 
and extent to which the Darwinian theory was received by the three recipient groups (audiences). 
Second, I wish to understand by what criteria the different audiences assessed the theory. Third, I 
will assess which elements of the theory were ultimately accepted and which were dismissed by its 
recipients. 
2.2.1. Empirical basis 
My reception analysis covers the contemporary British reception, i.e. publications which appeared in 
Britain after 1859 and before ca. 1875, i.e. within sixteen years following the publication of Darwin’s 
Origin of Species. These publications were classified by three groups of recipients to which they were 
addressed and which had access to them: (i) the public: laymen, (ii) the broader scientific community: 
professional and amateur scientists from outside biology, (iii) the immediate scientific community: 
biologists. 
Publications were considered as “public” when they addressed a general readership156 without 
scientific training or particular interest in science and when it covered mostly non-scientific topics, 
for instance literature or politics. As such I count newspapers like Times or Guardian, general or 
literary magazines like The Spectator, MacMillan’s Magazine or Charles Dicken’s All the Year Round, 
Chambers’ Magazine157 but also the Cornhill Magazine or the Examiner. In these magazines, Darwin’s 
theory was usually presented by laymen – although there exist notable exceptions like anatomist and 
Darwin-friend Thomas Henry Huxley’s review for the Times and the review in the Spectator which 
came from the Cambridge geologist Adam Sedgwick. An important and very successful monograph 
addressing the public was The Reign of Law which was authored by the Duke of Argyll, a politician. 
I have classified a publication as addressing the broader scientific community if its debates addressed 
a scientific audience outside biology, be they general publications with a focus on science, general 
science publications or publications from other disciplines. High-quality reviews like Westminster 
Review, Edinburgh Review, Quarterly Review, the North British Review had a strong science section 
and published long articles on science, usually written by scientists. Examples of general scientific 
journals are the Natural History Review, Recreative Science, Nature158, The Zoologist or the printed 
reports of the British Association for the Advancement of Science159. Journals from other disciplines 
                                                            
156  Note that this does not apply to the authors in these publications. For instance, Thomas Henry Huxley, a 
member of the immediate scientific community, wrote reviews for both the Times and MacMillan’s 
Magazine. 
157  Chamber’s journal was edited by Robert Chambers, the (anonymous) author of Vestiges. 
158  As it is today, 19th century Nature was a popular science magazine. While most of its authors were 
renowned scientists, its texts were very short and left out much of what is considered scientific about a 
scientific text, i.e. description of methods and exact observation results, justification of classifications etc. 
159  The British Association for the Advancement of Science which “… was not a purely scientific forum. As its 
audience consisted not only of scientists, but also of scientifically interested laymen, and as, moreover, it 
was recognized that the meetings also served a propagandistic function; papers had to be selected not only 
on the strength of their scientific quality, but also for their appeal to the general public. Above all, the 
discussions arising out of the papers often had another character than the one to be expected in purely 
scientific contexts. This was probably especially true of the Darwinian discussions…” (Ellegård 1958: 92) 
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were, for instance, the British and Foreign Medical-Chirurgical Review or The Geologist. Authors in 
these publications were mostly scientists. The group comprised biologists like John Dalton Hooker, 
Thomas Henry Huxley or Alfred Russel Wallace, geologists like John Philipps, Frederick Wollaston 
Hutton or Charles Lyell – Darwin’s old mentor – and physicists like G.G. Stokes, Peter Guthrie Tait and 
William Thomson (the later Lord Kelvin). Important monographs on the topic were provided by the 
biologists Thomas Henry Huxley and St. George Mivart. Moreover, the three great Victorian 
philosophers of science weighed in on Darwin: William Whewell, John Herschel and John Stuart Mills. 
As biological publications, i.e. publications of the immediate scientific community, I have identified 
six journals: the three journals of the Linnean Society, the transactions of the Zoological Society and 
of the Royal Entomological Society as well as the ornithological journal Ibis. These journals were 
clearly biological publications and addressed biologists.160 
In compliance with my reading of Fleck, I consider the recipient groups to approximately form 
overlapping concentric circles where member of the inner circles tend to be members of the outer 
circles, too, and may communicate with these different groups. For instance, A.R. Wallace, a member 
of Darwin’s immediate scientific community read a biological journal like Transactions of the Linnean 
Society, but also had access to the debates of the broader scientific community in the Quarterly 
Journal of Science and, finally, the debates of the public in the Westminster Review or the Times. 
2.2.2 Reception depth 
The investigation of reception depths is guided by the categories which I have developed in the 
previous section and by which I did denote the four levels of my model of scientific theories: 
description, classification, explanation, ontological implications. (see section 2.1) My question is, 
thus, on which of these four levels of abstraction the different recipient groups received information 
on the Darwinian theory. The criteria for determining whether a text covered these abstraction levels 
where the following: 
 Ontological implications: Did the text raise philosophical, religious, or political issues? Where 
Man’s position towards God and other beings being addressed? 
 Explanation: Was the Darwinian narrative presented as a whole or in its main metaphors, 
notably the Struggle for Existence and Natural Selection? Was the explanation discussed as a 
dynamic model, notably were logical relations between concepts and sub-concepts 
addressed? 
 Classification: Was Darwin’s static model discussed in its logical and/or interpretative part? 
Were classifications of specific specimen (fossils, living organisms) being discussed? 
 Description: Did the text provide detailed and/or extensive descriptions of observations? 
Compared to empirical papers in biological journals, were these descriptions much idealized, 
simplified or biased? 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
In the early 1860s, the British Association attracted attendances of more than two thousand spectators. 
(Hodge 1988: 8) Particular interest was raised by the debates with obvious implications for the Victorian 
conception of Man. (Hodge 1988: 9-10) 
160  Popular journals with a scientific focus were not considered here, notably Nature: a weekly illustrated 
journal of science and The Zoologist. During the period here considered, these journals had a popular 
character and published only very short articles, either scientific results in simplified form or brief notes on 
single observations, regularly by laymen, and very few discussions or systematic works. 
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2.2.3 Criticism and criteria for the assessment of the theory 
Once the reception depths of the three recipient groups are established, I will study the criteria by 
which these groups have assessed the Darwinian theory, i.e. the criteria which guided their accepting 
or rejecting elements of the theory. These criteria will be deduced from the lines of criticism against 
the Darwinian theory as they are visible in reviews and other publications on the topic: I will ask by 
what standards the theory was assessed and I will classify these standards. 
There exists excellent works on the reception among the public and the broader scientific 
community, on which my analysis of reception depths and the criteria for theory assessment in these 
groups can be founded. First, Alvar Ellegård’s seminal Darwin and the General Reader provides an 
excellent analysis of the reception of Darwin in the British Press from 1859 to 1872. (Ellegård 1958) 
His work continues to stand as the most complete and most systematic study on the topic and it is 
specific enough to distinguish between my abstraction levels. Second, for the broader scientific 
community, a number161 of compilations and studies exist. (Himmelfarb 1959; de Beer 1963; 
Vorzimmer 1972; Hull 1973; Ruse 1979; Bowler 1990; Desmond and Moore 1995; Mayr 1991; Mayr 
1984; Ellegård 1958; cf. Kohn 1985b).162 I will complement these existing secondary sources by a 
qualitative analysis of by the 36 British reviews on the Origin.163 
2.2.4 Acceptance of elements of the theory 
For the public and the broader scientific community, the criteria for the theory assessment, 
acceptance will again be deduced from the reviews of the Origin as well as from secondary sources. I 
will identify which elements were not criticized or implicitly accepted as well as explicit statements 
which support elements of the theory. My judgment here will rely, again, on primary and secondary 
sources, both by historians and contemporaries. 
For the biologists themselves, I was able to recur to a more specific resource: digitalized versions of 
the six important biological journals of the time. In order to assess the acceptance of Darwin’s theory 
within his immediate scientific community, I have checked these journals for references or the use of 
Darwinian concepts. For comparison, I have decided to include the Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society of London and the Proceedings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, both of which 
published high-quality articles on biology and clearly addressed a scientific audience but were not, 
strictly speaking, biological journals. 
                                                            
161  Indeed, most philosophical and historical works on Darwin and his reception concentrate on what I call the 
broader scientific community. 
162  The reception among the immediate community is sparsely covered, with the notable exception of 
Frederik Burkhardt’s short analysis of the Proceedings of the British Learned Societies. (Burkhardt 1988) 
163  While reviews are not representative for the reception as a whole they certainly provided the deepest 
source of information on the Origin short of reading the book. – All reviews can be accessed via the Darwin 
Online Project: http://darwin-online.org.uk/reviews.html. I considered all articles there which appeared in 
a British publication and review the Origin. The restriction to British reviews and reviews of earlier 
publications (like Darwin’s Beagle journals) excludes 48 of the 96 reviews listed. 12 articles review later 
publications, namely Variation of animals and plants under domestication (Darwin 1868), Descent of Man 
(Darwin 1871) and The expression of the emotions in man and animals (Darwin 1872b). 
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Overall, 85 volumes of eight journals were analyzed, encompassing 1.916 articles on 34.209 pages. 
These volumes appeared between 1859, the year in which the Origin was published, and ca. 1875; 
they do cover a period of sixteen years and encompass the heated debates of the 1860s and the 
point at which evolution theory had become the majority opinion among biologist, ca. 1868. In sum, 
these volumes should cover the large majority if not all of biological articles published within the 
immediate scientific community in Britain in the period of interest. (see Table 4) 
Journal First 
volume 
Last volume # of 
volumes 
# of 
articles 
# of 
pages 
Transactions of the Zoological Society 
of London 
Vol. IV 
(1862) 
Vol. VIII 
(1874) 
5 84 2.469 
Transactions of the Linnean Society 
Vol. XXI 
(1855) 
Vol. XXIX 
(1875) 
9 173 4.218 
The Journal of the Proceedings of the 
Linnean Society – Botany 
Vol. I (1857) Vol. XIII 
(1873) 
13 219 3.625 
The Journal of the Proceedings of the 
Linnean Society – Zoology 
Vol. I (1857) Vol. XII 
(1876) 
12 191 3.450 
Transactions of the Royal 
Entomological Society 
Vol. III (New 
Series) 1856 
Transactions 
1875 
16 316 7.839 
The Ibis – A quarterly journal of 
ornithology 
Vol. 15 
(1857) 
Vol. 10 2nd 
series (1875) 
17 703 7.842 
Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society of London 
Vol. 146 
(1857) 
Vol. 164 
(1875) 
17 100 4.288 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh 
Vol. III 
(1857) 
Vol. VIII 
(1875) 
6 130 478 
Table 4: Journals of the immediate scientific community for quantitative analysis 
Not all journals appeared in all years or always in the correct timely order and the Transactions of the 
Royal Entomological Society appeared twice in both 1868 and 1869. Thus, the number of volumes 
per year is not constant. Articles were not analyzed individually but as elements of the volume in 
which they appeared.164 Consequently, articles were counted in the year in which they appeared in 
print, not in the year in which they were read (which may have been one or two years earlier). 
Finally, not all journals published a volume in 1875 such that the analyzed period ends between 1873 
and 1876, depending on the journal.165 Were possible166, one or two volumes before 1859 were 
included in the analysis in order to provide a pre-Darwinian baseline.  
All volumes were tested for the use of three concepts: (i) evolution, (ii) natural selection and, for 
comparison, (iii) Richard Owen’s archetype concept including his classificatory concept of 
                                                            
164  This was due to my original research design which aimed at assessing how many articles employed the 
Darwinian concepts, not when exactly they were published or who authored them. A further study could 
provide more precise information here. 
165  I chose the volume which seemed to most adequately cover the aimed period. The botany section of the 
Linnean Society published no volume between 1873 and 1878. 
166  The Transactions of the Zoological Society of London did publish no volumes between 1849 and 1862. 
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homologies. The focus is on the two Darwinian concepts, one representing his static model and its 
interpretation, the other his dynamic model and its narration. The two were tested separately 
because the historians agree that the support for evolution and natural selection differed 
considerably.167 Owen’s concepts archetype and homology were chosen for comparison; they 
stemmed from the same period and country and Owen employed both in his discussion of evolution. 
Concept String Possible keywords 
Evolution Evol* Evolve, evolved, evolution 
Transmut* Transmutes, transmuted, transmutation 
Inherit* Inherit, inherited, inheritance 
Origin* Origin, originates, original, originated 
 Fit* Fitter, survival of the fittest 
 Ancest* Ancestor(s), ancestry 
 Progen* Progenitor(s), progeny 
 Descen* Descendants, descend, descends, descended 
Natural 
Selection 
Select* Selected, selection, select(s) 
Preserv* Preserve(s), preservation, preserved168 
 Struggle Struggle for life, struggle for existence 
Archetype Archetyp* Archetype, archetypal 
 Homolog* Homologue, homologous, homology 
Darwin Darwin* Darwinian(s), Darwin’s theory, Darwin’s explanation 
Table 5: Keystrings and possible keywords for the concepts evolution, natural selection, archetype 
The use of the concepts was tested through full-text searches for groups of keywords associated with 
the concepts, or, more exactly, for letter strings within these keywords. Uses of the term ‘Darwin’ 
were also tracked. For the concept evolution the list is longest because many synonyms were in use 
at the time169. Table 5 specifies the concept and letter strings for each of the concepts.  
As could be expected, the simple keyword search produced many token hits for the two Darwinian 
concepts, i.e. uses of the keywords which were unrelated to the concepts in question. (This occurred 
particularly often for the strings ‘select’, ‘descen’ and ‘orgin’.) Therefore, hits had to be filtered 
                                                            
167  There seems to be a consensus that only a minority of biologists supported both of Darwin’s concepts, 
notably Joseph Dalton Hooker, Alfred Russel Wallace and Henry Walter Bates, all of whom had similar 
research interests as Darwin. Thomas Henry Huxley, one of Darwin’s confidants, did never fully support 
natural selection. (Ellegård 1958: 47-8; Ruse 1979: 230; Young 1985: 109; Desmond and Moore 1995: 663) 
According to Ernst Mayr, hardly any experimental biologist fully supported Natural Selection until the 
1920th and the synthesis of Evolution and Genetics but this is probably too strong a statement. (Mayr 
1991: 45) 
168  The term ‚elimination‘ was not included in the analysis because a pre-test revealed that it was not 
employed in any significant frequency. 
169  Even Darwin did use the term only once in the 1st edition of the Origin. Due to these synonyms, I expected 
that the concept evolution produces hits before the publication of the Origin – unlike natural selection. 
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semantically in order to identify relevant uses. Table 6 illustrates this problem by listing examples of 
relevant and irrelevant uses for each of the key-strings.  
String Relevant Hits: counted Irrelevant hits: not counted 
Evol* Clear references to Darwin's theory: 
how has a species evolved from what 
progenitor/ancestor 
Metaphorical use. Use referring to the 
development within the lifespan (ontogeny) 
Transmut* References to theories of trans-
mutation e.g. by Chambers, Lamarck 
[not applicable] 
Inherit* References to Darwin's theory Inheritances mentioned in obituaries 
Origin* References to the origin of specific 
species, their ancestors / progenitors.  
References to specific specimen, not 
species/varieties: “The original specimen 
was found by the naturalist XY." 
Fit* References to the origin of specific 
species, their ancestors / progenitors.  
General description of an organism’s featu-
res as fitted to its habitat, without reference 
to evolution or natural selection. 
Ancest* References to genealogical relations 
among species 
References to ancestors without discussion 
of genealogical relations: “The ancestors of 
the Maori preserved extinct species.” 
Progen* References to genealogical relations 
over several generations 
Descriptions of how organisms care for their 
very own progeny, e.g. birds for their young 
Descen* References to the concept of common 
descent, e.g. in claims that a certain 
species has descended from another 
Descriptions of morphological structures – 
"descending lobes of the pancreas" – or 
terrains - " a slope descends to the sea" 
Select* Clear references to natural or sexual 
selection, in general or in specific cases 
Explanations of how and why specific 
specimens were selected for preservation. 
Preserv* Clear references to natural or sexual 
selection, in general or in specific cases 
References to specific specimen, by whom 
and where they were/are preserved: by 
naturalist XY, in museum Z, in spirit 
Struggle Clear references to Darwin's theory: 
“Evolution occurs in a struggle for life / 
struggle for existence.” 
Descriptions how captured animals 
struggled against their chains 
Archetyp* References to Richard Owen's concept 
of archetype 
Citations of a paper on archetypes or of 
Owen’s On the Archetype (Owen 1848a) 
Homolog* Uses of the concept in anatomical or 
morphological descriptions. 
Metaphorical use, e.g. the characterization 
of two lines of thoughts as homological. 
Darwin* Clear references to Darwin's theory, i.e. 
evolution, natural selection 
References to other empirical papers by 
Darwin or to species named after Darwin or 
discovered by Darwin. 
Table 6: Relevant and irrelevant hits for the different key-strings 
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In a third step, the filtered hits were classified with respect to the position the article170 (its author) 
took on the concept question. A neutral, a positive and a negative case were distinguished. A mere 
mention of a concept was counted as a neutral use. Explicit approval of a concept or its application to 
specific cases was counted as a positive use. Explicit criticism or disapproval of a concept was 
counted as a negative case. Thus, within the set of semantically relevant hits it could be distinguished 
whether an author merely acknowledged the existence of a Darwinian concept, whether he 
approved of it and/or employed it or whether he rejected it. Finally, the counted hits will be 
classified for each of the concepts, years and journals. Results will be presented and discussed in 
section 4.4. I suppose that they provide for a good indicator of the impact of the Darwinian 
revolution on 19th century biology in Britain.171 
2.2.2. Summary 
The reception analysis which I have described in this section complements my comparative analysis 
of theory contents in that it studies the Darwinian theory as a social object, not as a logical-linguistic 
one. It does not investigate what theory Darwin described in the Origin and how this theory differed 
from other theories of evolution. Instead, it asks (i) which parts of the theory were received, (ii) by 
which criteria these parts were assessed and (iii) which of the elements were ultimately accepted 
and which rejected. These three questions are pursued in a combined qualitative-quantitative study 
for three different audiences: biologists (Darwin’s immediate scientific community), other scientists 
(a broader scientific community), and laymen (the public). The questions will be answered in sections 
4.1 to 4.3. The results will be synthesized and discussed in section 4.4.  
                                                            
170  Note that this classification was done per article, not per hit, i.e. it was assessed what position the article 
displayed in general. 
171  Other, more powerful indicators may exist. I have additionally checked for substantial increases in papers 
on classification or massive modifications of taxonomies after 1859 but I could not observe any such trend. 
In any case, I am convinced that the use of the Darwinian concepts as here measured is a necessary 
condition for Darwin having had any impact on the scientific practice in his discipline.   
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2.3 Historical Background: The shared biological knowledge and the shared 
beliefs about biology up to the 1840s172 
i. Antiquity & Middle Ages: basal mental models about life 
The first biological173 thoughts may be traced back to the Greek philosophers Anaxagoras (ca. 500-
428 BC), Empedocles (495-435 BC), Democritus (ca. 450-404 BC) and to the school of Hippocrates (ca. 
460-370 BC). They expressed some of the first and most basal ideas about the animal world: there 
exist different animals with different features and skills which occupy different places in nature. They 
saw that animals differed with their environment and held some basal ideas about adaption. Plato 
(ca. 424-348 BC) added the idea that such adaption would express a fundamental harmony in nature. 
The first systematic studies of animals can be attributed to Aristotle (ca. 384-322 BC). In his Natural 
History of Animals, he compared animals and discussed criteria for their distinction, mostly based on 
outward features. In hindsight, some of these criteria read as if Aristotle had anticipated 
classificatory criteria which were only established in the 19th century.174 (Perrier 2009 [1884]: 8-13) 
Aristotle, however, never employed them to advance any definite grouping of animals; he suggested 
no hierarchical classification or explicit definitions of the species he distinguished. Besides, Aristotle 
seems to be the first to describe the idea of a struggle in Nature: 
“Animals often fight with each other, particularly those which inhabit the same 
places and eat the same food; for when food becomes scarce, congeners fight 
together. They say that seals which occupy the same locality will fight, the males with 
the males and the females with the females, until one party is either killed or ejected 
by the other, and their cubs also will fight in the same way. All animals also will fight 
with carnivorous creatures, and these will fight with other animals, for they feed 
upon living creatures; for which reason augurs observe the disputes and agreements 
of animals, considering that their disputes betoken war, and their agreements peace 
with each other.”175 
                                                            
172  In this historical introduction, I present mostly established knowledge on the history of biology. My main 
sources are Edmond Perrier’s contemporary The Philosophy of Zoology before Darwin (Perrier 2009 
[1884]), Ernst Mayr’s modern Einführung in die biologische Gedankenwelt (Mayr 1984), and the more 
recent Die Entdeckung der Evolution (Hoßfeld and Junker 2001). For better readability, from these books, I 
have marked quotes only for key statements, general assessments or less-known facts. Primary sources 
and supplementary secondary sources are quoted as usual. 
173  For convenience and clarity, I will speak of ‘biology’ with respect to all fields of research which are today 
included in the discipline biology. As for the term ‘biology’ itself, it seems that it was first used in the 
second half of the 18th century. Lamarck’s and Treviranus’ independent uses of the term in 1802 are the 
most popular, but Peter McLaughlin has demonstrated that the first uses may be traced back at least to the 
1770s. (McLaughlin 2002) The term then gained wide acceptance during the 19th century, particularly after 
Darwin provided a framework in which the different strands of biology could be integrated (at least partly). 
Huxley’s article on “Evolution in Biology” in the Encyclopedia Britannica of 1878 seems to speak for its 
wide-spread use. (Huxley 1893a [1878]; cf. Huxley 1893b) 
174  As with Democritus’ atomic hypothesis, it is difficult to assess to what degree his statements correspond to 
modern thought and to what degree, conversely, such association is supported only by the fact that later 
theorists reused ancient terminology. 
175  This quote is from the 9th book, Chapter II, No. 1; quoted from (Aristotle 1887: 231). 
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His most influential idea probably was the concept of a scala natura, a great step ladder which linked 
the lower organisms to the higher ones in a continuous chain. This scala natura was no 
evolutionary176 concept, however, but a static one; the most Aristotle could imagine was a flowing 
equilibrium. – As will become clear below, ll of these early and basal ideas about and mental models 
of biological objects and processes can be traced throughout biological thinking at least up to 
Darwin. 
First, it was mainly the concept of the Aristotelian scala which had a great impact. During the Middle 
Ages, Aristotle was interpreted and commented in scholarly exercises, particularly the scala was the 
subject of much debate. This implied little empirical work however. Some rare independent minds as 
the German177 bishop Albertus Magnus (1193/1206-1280)178 carried out empirical studies and 
complemented Aristotle’s descriptions but none left the theoretical framework of the Greeks: there 
was unity in the diversity of life, organisms were adapted to conditions and species were constant. 
Overall, biological thinking remained within the framework set by the biblical Genesis: After creating 
heaven, earth, day and night, the firmament, the earth and the sea, God had made, in this order, 
plants each “according to its kind”, the animals of the sea, birds and the land animals and finally 
Man, again, each “according to its kind”. 
ii. The 16th and 17th century: renewed interest and technical innovations 
The Scientific Revolution of the early modern period hit biology a bit later than physics or chemistry. 
A renewed interest in the nature led to larger descriptive and comparative works in the 16th century. 
In zoology, new classifications were suggested but they still mingled mythological beasts among the 
animals actually observed. In botany, a number of Kräuterbücher (herbal books) in southern 
Germany provided systematic illustrated accounts of native plants. (Mayr 1984: 78, 125, 253) From 
the 16th to the 17th century, the number of known plants mulitiplied. (Hoßfeld and Junker 2001: 33) 
Such botanical works were facilitated by an important technical innovation: the herbarium. Luca 
Ghini (1490-1556), an Italian physician and botanist seems to be the first to have dried plants and 
plant parts, a practice which facilitated comparative and systematic botanical research immensely.179 
Ghini also founded the supposedly first botanical garden in Europe, the Orto botanico in Pisa, which 
dates back to 1544. 
At the same time, the first wave of European explorers brought descriptions and exemplars of 
foreign organisms from overseas. The age of royal and private collections dawned, rare specimen 
were collected and presented in European salons and cabinets; books on natural history became 
popular. Overall, the number of known plants and animals grew immensely in these decades and 
marked first biogeographical thoughts as particular animals where linked to particular environments.  
                                                            
176  By the term ‘evolution’ I denote any description of long-term changes of groups of organisms in time. Such 
concepts were also referred to as ‘transmutational’ or ‘developmental’ or ‘derivative’, among others. For 
simplicity, I will refer to all of them as ‘evolutionary’. 
177  For convenience and clarity, I am using modern geographical attributes in my description. I am aware that 
the political entities of 21th century Europe did not exist through most of the early modern and modern 
period. 
178  Albertus’ exact birth date is unknown. 
179  The equivalent for zoology, formalin conservation, was introduced only at the end of the 19th century, i.e. 
after the Darwinian Revolution. 
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The immense growth of empirical knowledge had a flip-side, however: it threatened the status of 
ancient sources such as Aristotle and the biblical account of the genesis and the Flood. The more 
organisms were discovered, the harder it became to imagine how Noah had fitted them onto his 
Arch. Besides, many of the new organisms were to be found neither in the biblical nor in antique 
accounts; they stemmed from totally different floras and faunas. 
The invention of the microscope around 1600 opened new horizons for biology. The Italian 
astronomer Giovanni Battista Hodierna (1597-1660) published a first detailed microscopic study on 
the fly’s eye in 1644, but it was not until the 1660s and 1670s that microscopy became a wide-spread 
technique in biology. In 1676, the Dutch Antoni van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723) discovered red blood 
cells and spermatozoa. 
Besides, microscopy was very important for a debate on a belief that had been held throughout the 
middle ages and would still shape parts of the Darwinian debate. The belief was referred to as 
“spontaneous generation” and it consisted of the idea that God created life spontaneously and 
continuously out of non-living matter. As evidence for such a “vital force” several observations were 
provided, for instance, that maggots grew on meat when left in the open. Microscopy gave rise to a 
series of experiments in which this idea was tested. In 1688, the Italian physician Francesco Redi 
(1626-1697) did this for the maggots and dismissed spontaneous generation in this particular case 
but similar arguments continued to be made in other cases were microorganisms seemingly 
appeared out of nowhere.180 
iii. The enlightenment: from theism to deism 
One prominent place for this argument was Telliamed (1748), a posthumously published book titled 
by its author’s name in reverse. Benoît De Maillet (1656-1738) had developed an interest in natural 
history while traveling overseas as a French diplomat. In Telliamed, he imagined the origin of life as a 
spontaneous generation from an infinite number of germs which were disseminated all over the 
earth’s crust. He believed that God continuously created new organisms from these germs and that 
these germs in term would develop into higher organisms. He hypothesized that primitive sea 
animals had grown more complex and had then moved on land where they continued to develop. 
There were at least three very innovative aspects about de Maillet’s theory. First, de Maillet seems to 
be the first who applied hereditary thinking to questions of natural history. While inheritance was a 
well-known phenomenon and breeders held important knowledge on it, it had hitherto not been 
integrated in the thinking about the origins of life. Second, de Maillet cited fossils to support his 
theory, being one of the first to interpret fossils as remainders of historic animals and clues to the 
development of life – and not as natural artifacts. (see below) Third, while the sequence by which 
animals appeared according to de Maillet complied with the bible and God clearly played a major 
role in de Maillet’s account, he did not describe any divine interventions in the development of one 
living form to another. This was a perfectly natural process and God did not interfere with it. 
                                                            
180  It was not until French chemist Louis Pasteur (1822-1895) demonstrated the emergent growth of bacteria 
that accounts of spontaneous generation would fade. Incidentally, his experiments with swan-neck flasks 
were carried out in 1859, the same year the Origin was published. (cf. Owen 1868: 814) For a lucid and 
simple overview on the debate see  
 http://www.microbiologytext.com/index.php?module=Book&func=displayarticle&art_id=27 
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Thus, de Maillet broke with an important theological tradition: the idea of divine providence or 
theism. Hitherto, God had been conceived of as a personal, intervening agency to which a faithful 
human stood in close contact. In de Maillet’s account, however, he did not intervene directly 
anymore, he did not transform organisms by specific acts but acted through intermediate means. In 
the English debate these means would be referred to as ‘secondary causes’ or, simply, ‘laws’. This 
view of God is usually referred to as ‘deism’.181 
It was no accident that such liberal thinking was first expressed by a Frenchman. While the Age of 
Enlightenment seized all of western and central Europe182, its center certainly was France. Authors 
like Voltaire183 (1694-1778), Montesquieu184 (1689-1755), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712 –1778) or 
Denis Diderot (1713-1784) inspired Europe with their ideas of liberty and free thought. But they did 
not confine themselves to the sphere of politics and society; their common project, the Encyclopédie, 
ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers (1751-1772) carried liberal ideas in the 
realm of science. This impact showed particularly in the role God played in scientific theories; French 
scientists of the later 18th and early 19th century referred much less to divine power in their writings 
than the English, whose natural history was still firmly embedded in natural theology. 185 
iv. Linnaeus & Buffon: classification and biogeography 
The two most important biologists of the 18th century would deliver their most important works in 
this very period, before the outbreak of the French revolution in 1789 and the ensuing period of 
political restauration. (Mayr 1984: 259) Coincidentally, both had been born in 1707, in very different 
corners of Europe. One was the Swedish university professor Carl Nilsson Linnaeus (1707-1778), the 
other the French director of the Jardin des Plantes in Paris, Georges-Louis Leclerc (1707-1788), who 
later became the Comte de Buffon. These two very different characters began their careers on 
opposed missions and while they approached each other’s work over time, their different ways of 
doing biology would shape the discipline. 
Linnaeus, on one hand, laid the ground for modern taxonomy. He devoted his life to large systematic 
classificatory works and, in a strive for precise language, developed the binomial nomenclature, a 
method which allowed for classifying plants in a hierarchical structure of disjunctive sets. The basic 
logic of Linnaeus’ system was to specify an empirical criterion and distinguish those organisms which 
fulfilled it and those which did not. By summarizing groups of such criteria under larger ones, 
aggregate sets could be formed, distinguishing groups of organisms which shared more such criteria 
with members of their group than with non-members. To Linneaus, such classifications were, first of 
all, pragmatic tools which provided simple and transparent rules for the identification of specimen 
with their taxonomic groups, i.e. for placing them in the smallest group to which they belonged. 
Linnaeus distinguished four kinds of such groups in classification: species, genera, orders and classes. 
                                                            
181  The term ‘deism’ came in use in the 17th century and denoted views of the world in which God acted a 
supreme architect or machinist who built the universe but lets it run on its own according to natural laws. 
He does not (or very rarely) intervene directly in it its course. Therefore, deists refused supernatural events 
like miracles which would constitute direct divine intervention. 
182  One of the important trailblazers of the French enlightenment was the German polymath Gottfried Wilhem 
Leibniz (1646-1716). 
183  ‘Voltaire’ is the pen-name of François-Marie Arouet. 
184  Montesquieu’s full name was Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu. 
185  Such, less and less prominent references to god can be found in the works of Geoffroy or Lamarck than in 
those of Lyell, Sedgwick, and Paley.  
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Around 1800, these groups were complemented by the family, a group between the order and the 
genus. (Perrier 2009 [1884]: 32) Linnaeus’ classifications would be developed by new generations but 
remain remarkably stable until today. 
Despite his methodological achievements, Linnaeus’ project was not confined to pragmatics. Instead, 
his classifications were supposed to approach Aristotle’s scala natura; Linnaeus envisaged it to reveal 
the harmony of nature. Such, the classifications in his 1776 Systema naturae aimed at such a natural 
system. The French zoologist Perrier describes Linnaeus’ ambition as follows: 
“Each species in the long series of living forms should fit neatly between two others. 
Scientists should strive to place species in this kind of order, for only then can they be 
confident that their system of classification is definitive. Such a system would not 
necessarily be unique, and it should be referred to as a natural method. Linnaeus 
thought that this could be achieved by setting up a series of procedures of this kind 
and then perfecting them by successive refinements, so that they would gradually 
merge into a more and more definitive system. Thus, each of these tentative systems 
resembles a theory that initially offers only approximate explanations for the 
phenomena it is meant to relate to one another, but with time, progressive 
improvements made it possible to give the relationships firmer cohesion.” (Perrier 
2009 [1884]: 30) 
Linnaeus’ thinking was still deeply rooted in theological convictions – despite the enlightenment 
movement. How much so, was displayed by his concept of species. To Linnaeus, a species was 
formed by all those animals which have come in pairs from the hands of the creator. Thus, they were 
per se invariable and while Linnaeus, as many others, mentioned some kind of struggle in nature, he 
believed in a fundamental equilibrium and harmony. (Perrier 2009 [1884]: 30; Mayr 1984: 207-9) 
Many of these beliefs and assumptions were fundamentally questioned by Buffon in his epic Histoire 
Naturelle which appeared in 35 volumes between 1749 to Buffon’s death in 1788186, covered animals 
and minerals and was read all over Europe. Especially in the early volumes, Buffon dismissed 
systematic concepts and dismissed the systematists’ efforts: He favored holistic descriptions over the 
meticulous study of single aspects and their role for classification. He concentrated on individuals 
instead of groups. He emphasized the continuity in nature and neglected those aspects that 
suggested distinction.187 
Buffon softened his rejection of classifications in his later works, accepting their usefulness in 
description. At the same time, he continued his fundamentally holistic research program and it bore 
fruitful results. First, Buffon became the founder of biogeography, publishing the first systematic 
accounts of how organism types correlated to regions. In a regularity called ‘Buffon’s law’, he pointed 
out that many regions display different animals and plants despite similar physical conditions. 
Second, Buffon was the first to take a dynamic viewpoint on the question of life. He pondered the 
idea of spontaneous generation and speculated that organisms might have emerged by a 
spontaneous clumping of organic molecules. From certain centers of such spontaneous generation, 
                                                            
186  Several additional volumes were published by Buffon’s collaborators after this time. 
187  Buffon expressed this idea by claiming that everything which could exist does indeed exist, an assertation 
which Mayr traces back to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), the German mathematician and 
philosopher. 
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they might, then, have migrated to other parts of the world and transformed into other forms, either 
by “degeneration” or “improvement”. In the fourth volume of his Natural History (1753) and an essay 
on the degeneration of animals (1766) he discussed the implications of such a view and clearly saw 
that if Nature was able to transform one animal in another, then, given enough time, it might be able 
to produce all organisms in this manner. But then, in a turn which continues to bewilder historians, 
Buffon dismissed the idea altogether, stating that it was incompatible with Revelation. (Mayr 1984: 
265; Hoßfeld and Junker 2001: 40-1) 
This dismissal does not seem to have been a precautionary measure, i.e. a concession to religious 
authorities supposed to hide secret evolutionary position. 188 Actually, there was not nearly enough 
empirical support for such a bold break with established explanations. In any case, Buffon introduced 
the question of evolution on the table, establishing it as a possibility and a point of reference for 
future biological thought. 
v. France, Germany and England at the turn of the 19th century 
Buffon’s lasting impact was felt most in France and Germany, less so in England. One immediate 
example is the Latin American expedition (1799-1804) of Aimé Bonpland (1773-1858) and Alexander 
von Humboldt (1769-1859) which followed Buffon’s footsteps and became a milestone of systematic 
biogeography. Another, more durable effect of Buffon’s achievements was the position natural 
history had achieved in France. After the French Revolution, the royal Ménagerie and Buffon’s Jardin 
des Plantes became integrated in a single institution, the Muséum National d’Histoire Naturelle. 
Founded in 1793, it was the first natural history museum of its size and kind and would inspire the 
construction of the Natural History department of the British Museum in London in 1881189 and the 
construction of the Museum für Naturkunde in Berlin in 1889. 
Overall, French biology entered a period of professionalization and it saw three researchers take the 
stage who all would be employed at the Muséum National and, together, would dominate the 
theoretical discourse in Europe until the 1830s. These three naturalists were Jean Baptiste de 
Lamarck190 (1744-1829), Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (1772 –1844), and Georges Cuvier191 (1769-
1832). The former two had close ties to Buffon; Cuvier, however, was much closer to Linnaeus. (see 
below) 
In Germany, Buffon’s ideas were disseminated by the theologian Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-
1803). In his Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784-1791), he interpreted the 
Aristotelian scala natura as a time line and expressed ideas about a struggle for life. Herder, in turn, 
would have a major influence on the German of natural philosophy (Naturphilosophie) and its major 
                                                            
188  On at least two other occasions, Buffon had to write retractions to satisfy religious critics. This, however, 
did not hinder him from continuously expressing a-religious positions. Thus, it seems like he could have 
pursued a similar compromise on the question of evolution. As he did not and as he provided further 
arguments against evolution, it seems reasonable to assume that this reflected his actual position. (Hoßfeld 
and Junker 2001: 41) However, while Buffon’s addressed several topics many times and changed positions 
over time; therefore, it is hard to attribute a definite position to Buffon. 
189  Richard Owen was much involved in this project and would become the museum’s first director. (See 
section 3.2) 
190  His full (or actual) name was Jean-Baptiste Pierre Antoine de Monet, Chevalier de la Marck. 
191  Sources on his full name differ. It might either be Georges Chrétien Léopold Dagobert Cuvier or Jean 
Léopold Nicolas Frédéric Cuvier. 
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proponents Carl Gustav Carus (1789-1869), Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) and 
Lorenz Oken (1779-1851). 
Similar to France, in Germany, natural theology already had given way to less theistic world views. 
Polymath Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) was an early proponent of such views. About a 
century later Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), like Buffon, had speculated on the age of the earth and 
the possibility of evolution and had published a General Natural History and Theory of the Celestial 
Bodies in 1775. Hence, at the turn of the 19th century, scientific explanations in Germany required no 
more direct interventions of God and biological processes were constructed as natural ones. 
These constructions were not without metaphysical overtones, however; they stood under the 
influence of the cultural movement of Romantik. Instead of creation and the divine plan, the natural 
philosophers spoke of Entwicklung (development) and speculated about how organisms might 
develop in naturalistic processes. In the wake of these idealistic natural philosophers, Germany 
developed a lively tradition of naturalistic evolutionary thought.192 In hindsight, it is impressive to 
what extent and in what detail evolutionary ideas were discussed in the late 18th and early 19th 
century in Germany. As Ernst Mayr points out, it makes one wonder why it was no German who 
came up with a solution to the evolution puzzle. (Mayr 1984: 310) 
One explanation seems to be the gap and lack of communication between the evolutionary 
theorizing of natural philosophers and the empirical work of scientists. The German zoologists, 
anatomists and botanists dismissed most of the contemporary philosophy as unempirical and naïve 
speculation. Such, the Baltic-German embryologist Karl Ernst von Baer (1792-1862), in the 1820s, 
rejected the speculative theory of transformation in Germany all the while having an open ear for the 
evolutionary thoughts of Buffon. (Mayr 1984: 309) Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) 
remains an exception in that he was a respected morphologist and anatomist – despite his literary 
and theoretical prowess.193  
Considering Germany and France, it is remarkable how much English biology still felt the firm grip of 
natural theology. Naturalistic explanations were refused point-blank and only one agent was 
accepted in biology: a personal and intervening God. The book which most strikingly symbolized this 
traditional theistic attitude was probably the British best- and long-seller194 Natural Theology, Or, 
Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, Collected from the Appearances of Nature 
(1802) by the British philosopher William Paley (1743-1805).195 Consequently, the British theoretical 
discourse in the natural sciences considerably lagged behind the continent.196 
                                                            
192  Mayr (1984: 309-10) mentions a number of authors who display evolutionary thinking. 
193  In the 1780s, Goethe discovered two unknown intermaxillary bones in mammals and described the 
cranium as composed of vertebrae. He developed the latter discovery in a research program founded on 
the idea that organisms are composed of repeated forms of the same part, only in modified form. (Perrier 
2009 [1884]: 111-3) Goethe’s program showed some resemblance to the structuralist approach of 
Geoffroy (cf. Amundson 2007: xvi-xvii) as well as to Owen’s homologies. (See sections 3.2.2 and2.3 ix) 
194  Remarkably, the book is still on sale today, more than 200 years after its initial publication. 
195  Despite being, at best, a popular science work like Chambers’ Vestiges, Natural Theology was widely 
received, also among scientists. Darwin studied it in during his studies in Cambridge and was much 
impressed by it. Padian sums up Paley’s line of argument as follows: “Paley began his argument by 
imagining that a person crossing a heath was to strike his foot against a stone. He would think nothing of 
finding the stone, a quite natural part of the environment, in that particular place, nor would he require an 
extraordinary explanation of how it had come to be there or how it was made. But, Paley continued, if one 
were to encounter a watch on the same heath, it would be obvious that it was not a natural part of the 
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The times were about to change however. In terms of beliefs, the Scottish Enlightment197 and liberal 
English societies198 spread liberal thought.199 In 1785, the Scottish geologist James Hutton (1726-
1797) expressed a revolutionary, and fully naturalistic, theory of geological change. Erasmus Darwin 
(1731-1802), in his Zoonomia or, The Laws of Organic Life (1794), took up biological ideas from the 
continent and presented them to the British public. The reverend Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-
1834) published his famous Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), the sixth edition (1826) of 
which would later be read by Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace. Moreover and more 
importantly, the British would be at the forefront of a new development in biology which tapped into 
a novel, explosive source of knowledge: fossils.  
While single fossils had been known since the antiquity, for a long time, they had mostly been 
interpreted as natural artifacts, crystallizations or random imprints of the vital force. At the end of 
the 18th century, however, scientists started to reinterpret them as relicts of historic animals. (cf. 
McGowan 2001: 1; Hutton 1860: 293) Suddenly, biologists could combine their study of organisms in 
space, biogeography, with a study of organisms in time. A window to natural history had opened; 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
environment, nor could it have formed spontaneously. It must have been made, because a watch, like any 
living organism, is a machine, and must be purposefully assembled ... So, he argues, the complexity of living 
organisms, with their superbly adapted parts, implies a Creator of all life. To deny this is to embrace 
atheism.” (Padian 2007: lxxxii-lxxxiii) 
196  How far the English discourse had uncoupled from the continental one is exemplified by the preface to the 
German edition of Paley’s Natural Theology (1837) in which the German translators gives a lengthy 
explanation for why Paley still employed theistic explanations, something which had long disappeared from 
the German debate. It is worth quoting the first paragraph in full. In modern German orthography, it reads: 
“In der höheren wissenschaftlichen Auffassung der Natur vermögen wir die, in anderer Beziehung, 
namentlich im poetischen Gefühl uns so nahe stehenden Engländer kaum als unsere Stammesgenossen zu 
erkennen. Deutsche Naturphilosophie ist ein ganz anderes Ding, als was der Engländer ‚natural philosophy‘ 
nennt. Der uns [den Deutschen] innewohnende, durch so manche wunderliche und erhabene 
Geistesschöpfungen beurkundete Triebe, die Natur in letzter Instanz poetisch zu konstruieren, fehlt dem 
sonst so poetischen Inselvolk fast ganz, oder er ist durch seine historische Entwicklung in ihm 
zurückgedrängt worden. Einerseits fasst der Engländer die Naturwissenschaften rein praktisch auf, mit 
Rücksicht auf die der Natur abzugewinnenden Vorteile für Künste und Gewerbe, andererseits bleibt seine 
Philosophie im Kreise der Theologie, auf theologisch-dogmatischem Standpunkt stehen. Durch die starren 
Formen der öffentlichen Erziehung, so wie durch den Umstand, dass die behagliche Muße des höheren 
Klerus dem Naturstudium viele Propheten zuführt, und wirklich England von jeher unter seinen 
bedeutenden Naturforschern sehr viele Geistliche der Hochkirche zählte, mag die Emanzipation der 
Philosophie von der Theologie verhindert worden sein. Dem Deutschen muss in dieser Beziehung der 
Standpunkt des Engländers ein beschränkter erscheinen, und unter diesen Umständen müsste ich 
eigentlich die deutsche Philosophie um Vergebung bitten, dass ich eine jener Abhandlungen über 
natürliche Theologie einführe, deren mühselige Argumente und rhetorische Theodizeen wir längst hinter 
uns zu haben meinen und deren vielseitig bewiesener Gott uns anthromorphistischer erscheint, als der, 
den wir spekulativ selbst machen. Aber ich will auch nicht die englische Philosophie empfehlen, sondern 
ich appelliere mit Paleys Buch einfach an das gemeine Bewusstsein des nicht philosophischen Lesers, der 
bei Betrachtung der organischen Schöpfung mit Freude und Genuss, und als wirksames Mittel der geistigen 
Bildung, seinen eigenen Verstand in den Werken der Natur findet.“ (Paley 1837: iii-iv) 
197  The 18th century saw a stream of intellectual and scientific accomplishments to come out of Scotland, 
particularly from Edinburgh. Among the most famous were the works of philosophers David Hume (1711-
1776) and Thomas Reid (1710-1796), economist Adam Smith (1723-1790), sociologist Adam Ferguson 
(1723-1816), mathematician John Playfair (1748-1819), chemist Joseph Black (1728-1799), and poet Robert 
Burns (1759-1796). 
198  One famous society, the Lunar Society of Birmingham (1765-1813), was a meeting point for entrepreneurs 
and natural philosophers and counted both of Charles Darwin’s grandfathers as his members: Erasmus 
Darwin (1731-1802) and Josiah Wedgwood (1730-1795). (Uglow 2002) 
199  This is all the more remarkable as the 1780s and 1790s considering the climate of political conservatism 
and restoration after the French revolution of 1789 and its ensuing chaos. 
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what Buffon had only dared to speculate upon now moved into the realm of the empirically 
accessible. 
vi. The ascent of geology and paelontology: what time-line for biology? 
As before, this new source of knowledge threatened established religious beliefs – and those beliefs 
reestablished during the political restoration of the 1790s. A first problem for the church was the 
simple fact that the bible knew no extinctions; exemplars of all species had been saved on Noah’s 
arch. How to explain fossils which did not match any of the living creatures? Three possible 
explanations were discussed: (i) the missing species were not extinct but had moved to other parts of 
the earth or sea which had not yet been (re-)discovered, (ii) Man had eradicated them, (iii) they had 
died in the Flood. With increasing knowledge, each of these explanations became more difficult to 
uphold. The discovery of mammoth and mastodon fossils and the fact that many of the extinct 
animals were sea animals complied with neither explanation. The latter would not die in a flood and 
the former were simply too big to go unnoticed, either in their existence or in their eradication by 
Man. 
The second problem was the age of the earth, which the church, based on biblical accounts, 
estimated at about 6.000 years.200 This estimate had already been called into question publicly, for 
instance by Immanuel Kant who, in 1755, speculated about the earth being “thousands, possibly 
millions of centuries” old (Hoßfeld and Junker 2001: 32) or by Buffon who had given an estimate of 
168.000 years201 in his 1779 Époques de la Nature.202  
In 1785, the Scottish geologist James Hutton (1726-1797) held a speech at the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh Concerning the System of the Earth, its Duration and Stability in which he presented a 
model of geological change and suggested that the earth was much older than men could imagine, 
possibly millions of years old. (Repcheck 2007) Despite growing empirical evidence, Hutton’s model 
encountered much resistance203, particularly in Britain, but it would inspire the most important 
geologist of the next generation, Charles Lyell. (see below) 
Now, however, this question became one of empirics not of speculation – and much harder to 
dismiss. Geologists began to systematically study geological formations and interpreted them as 
sediment layers – in geological terms: strata. Layers of 3.000 to 30.000m were discovered and it soon 
became doubtful that these could have formed within less than 6.000 years; presumably, the earth 
was much older. There was, however, no direct evidence for such estimates; scientists had to 
interpret the geological relicts they found. 
The first systematic empirical geological studies were apparently carried out by William Smith (1769-
1839), an English geometer. During the beginning industrial revolution in Britain, he was occupied in 
                                                            
200  No one less than Isaac Newton had provided some of the calculations which supported this estimate. 
(Repcheck 2007: 24) 
201  Buffon seems to have spoken of smaller numbers in earlier publications, too. 
202  Due to pressure by religious authorities, Buffon had to publish a retraction on the topic but he did not 
withdraw the publication. 
203  One important competing model had been published by the Abraham Gottlob Werner (1749-1817), a 
professor at the Bergakadamie in Saxony. In a lecture from 1779, Werner had defended the estimate of 
6.000 years. Werner was supported by Hutton’s Edinburgh rival Robert Jameson (1774-1854), but also by 
the geologists William Buckland (1784-1856) in Oxford and Adam Sedgwick (1785-1873) in Cambridge, the 
latter of whom was Charles Darwin’s geology professor. 
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the construction of channels and had access to mines. From 1791 to 1799, he used his time to study 
the geological strata in England and Wales and published a famous map in 1815.204 In publication, he 
was bypassed by the German paleontologist Ernst Friedrich von Schlotheim (1764-1832) and by one 
of Buffon’s heirs, the French zoologist and paleontologist Georges Cuvier (1769-1832), in 
collaboration Alexandre Brongniart (1770-1847). Schlotheim published on plant fossils in 1804 and 
1813, comparing their morphology with contemporary plants and classifying them according to the 
Linnean system. Cuvier published on the strata of the Paris basin in 1808 and 1811 and claimed that 
the area had been submerged by both, sea water and fresh water, during different historical periods 
– a spectacular interpretation. 
From these studies, two disciplines emerged: the study of sediment layers (strata) in geology: 
stratigraphy, and the study of prehistoric life in biology: paleontology. In an interesting twist in the 
history of science, these young disciplines would align forces in the next decades and grant each 
other mutual legitimacy and plausibility. The reason of this alliance lay in a knowledge source they 
shared: fossils. While the geologists were not much interested in the fossils as biological objects, they 
soon noticed that the sediment types in which fossils were found correlated to the type of fossil; 
certain fossils were found in certain strata, but not in others. This was most clearly demonstrated by 
Cuvier in the Paris basin, subsequently in other parts of Europe, and finally overseas. If strata and 
fossils corresponded, biological and geological history had to be brought in line.205 
Before the great geological discoveries of the turn of the century, it had usually been assumed that 
the geological history of the earth had been one of continuous and regular progression, without any 
major interruptions – except for the biblical Flood. Now, stratigraphy threatened this harmonic 
image by uncovering several sharply distinguished sediment layers, intuitively suggesting a 
discontinuous history of the earth’s crust. This position was indeed taken by Georges Cuvier who, in 
his Discours sur les révolutions du globe (1802), argued that the earth had seen several “révolutions”, 
each of which had extinguished the complete fauna. Given the available evidence and his domain of 
expertise, Cuvier’s seemed the most adequate hypothesis: In the first decade of the 19th century, no 
higher species was found in successive strata. It was, however, disputed by a group of opponents, 
which dismissed the idea of regular révolutions, or catastrophes, as they were often termed. Cuvier’s 
opponents championed uniform geological changes throughout the history of the earth.206 The best-
known representative of this second group was the English geologist Charles Lyell (1797-1875). Lyell 
claimed that throughout history, only those geological forces had been at work which were still 
observable and only at their then-observable intensity. 
                                                            
204  Unfortunately, Smith was mostly overlooked and enjoyed scientific recognition for his pioneering work 
only late in life. 
205  The most poignant expression of this mutual dependency was uttered by Thomas Henry Huxley in his reply 
to the physicist challenge of Darwin’s model on the grounds of geological time: "Biology takes her time 
from Geology. The only reason we have for believing in the slow rate in the change of living forms is the 
fact that they persist through a series of deposits which, geology informs us, have taken a long while to 
make. If the geological clock is wrong, all the naturalist will have to do is to modify his notions of the 
rapidity of change accordingly.” (Huxley 1869: 329; cf. section v) 
206  In 1832, the British philosopher of science William Whewell (1794-1866) would term the opposition 
between both paradigms as “catastrophism” vs. “uniformitarianism”. 
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Within both groups, several factions would differ over the details of their geological models; for 
instance, Lyell believed in a steady state around which the geological phenomena revolved.207 What 
matters for biology, however, is first and foremost the issue of catastrophes. If biological and 
geological history were to be brought in line, the doctrine of catastrophes meant that a biological 
history could only be written between such catastrophes, i.e. over relatively short intervals of 
time.208 Uniformitarianism, however, provided biology which a much more unified account of natural 
history and a much more challenging problem209: to explain the succession of fossils across geological 
strata. While Cuvier had some important disciples, most of the geologists and biologists would look 
for uniform and continuous explanations rather than successive catastrophes. 
vii. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck: evolution & its first dynamic model210 
Among them was the eldest of Buffon’s heirs, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829). He came from an 
impoverished noble family, had fought in the Seven Years War (1756-1763) as a young man, and 
retired from the army with an injury in 1766. For the next decades, he would live of a small pension 
and commissioned literary work. On the side, he developed an interest in natural history and began 
to publish on the topic. Eventually, Buffon employed him as a private tutor for his son and Lamarck 
began working with Buffon, too. In 1788, at the age of forty-four, Buffon arranged for the position of 
an assistant for Lamarck. After the French revolution and the foundation of the Museum National 
d’Histoire Naturelle, Lamarck would finally be appointed a professor of zoology, in 1793. Lamarck 
concentrated on invertebrates, particularly mollusks, and established landmark classifications in his 
field. Together with Cuvier, he established comparative anatomy, enlarging the focus of biologists to 
the inner organization of animals. His interests did not stop there, however. Lamarck ventured in a 
number of fields, publishing on geology, mineralogy and meteorology – sometimes without the 
empirical knowledge to back up his ideas. Like Buffon, Lamarck sought a comprehensive theory of 
natural processes and he had a very imaginative mind. 
Around 1800, first evolutionary thoughts can be found in Lamarck’s lectures. They were probably 
triggered by the study of a collection of fossil mollusks which Lamarck had inherited from a 
collaborator and which displayed remarkable similarities to living ones. (Mayr 1984: 276) Around 
1805, Lamarck had developed these thoughts into an evolutionary theory, including the first dynamic 
model for its explanation. He published his ideas in his Philosophie Zoologique in 1809, the year in 
which Darwin was born. Thus, Lamarck had answered Buffon’s question in the affirmative; there was 
evolution, organisms were indeed transformed one into the other. 
                                                            
207  Assumptions like these make it difficult to assess Lyell’s importance for Darwin. On one hand, Lyell paved 
some of the way for Darwin’s gradual explanation in biology by assuming gradual geological change. On the 
other hand, his steady state geology excluded any irreversible change like Darwin’s. Consequently, Lyell 
vigorously rejected Lamarck and only half-heartedly confessed to evolutionism in the 1860s. 
208  While Cuvier assumed a relatively modest number of catastrophes, some of his followers, would argue for 
more and more catastrophes, cutting biological history in ever thinner slices. The Swiss-born American 
geologist and zoologist Louis Agassiz (1807-1873) is a case in point. 
209  Thus, the choice of the geological paradigm determined what would constitute the challenging objects of 
biology. 
210  I deem it reasonable to draw the line between evolutionary speculations and the first model of evolution 
between Buffon and de Maillet on one hand and Lamarck on the other hand. The former pair had no 
empirical evidence on which to test their ideas, thus they speculated. Lamarck, meanwhile, developed the 
first (scientific) model of evolution on actual empirical evidence (albeit a very limited set). Thus, Lamarck 
modeled actual regularities between features of empirical objects. As for the question whether Buffon’s 
and de Maillet’s speculations might be referred to as ‘theories’, see (sections 6 vi, vii). 
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Lamarck did go substantively beyond Buffon when he actually put the taxonomic classifications on a 
timeline, sorting groups of organisms by complexity. He claimed that taxonomy should not be limited 
to static distinction but should reflect “the true order” by which nature has produced organisms. 
(Lamarck 1873a[1809]: 266-8) Lamarck’s taxonomy deviated from the idea of a static and linear scala 
naturae211 and suggested a branching scheme212. 
At the base of Lamarck’s scheme were the least complex organisms which were created by 
continuous spontaneous generation. (Lamarck 1873a [1809]: 82, 214-5) A number of these less 
complex organisms then gradually develop into more complex ones. In sum, Lamarck’s scheme is 
best characterized as a pyramid; there are many organisms on the lower end of the scheme and few 
on the higher end. Interestingly, Lamarck’s scheme included no extinction. 213 Lower organisms were 
transformed into higher ones or remained as they were but did not become extinct; Lamarck did not 
preconceive any void in nature. (Perrier 2009 [1884]: 66) 
To explain these developments, Lamarck suggested the first dynamic model of evolution. The Object 
Class of Lamarck’s model comprises both animals and plants although he mainly applied it to 
animals. (Lamarck 1873a [1809]: 28) Anatomically, it also applies to Man; as the most complex 
organism, he resembles the primates anatomically. However, he is clearly separated from them by 
his special properties and his direct relationship to God. (Lamarck 1873a [1809]: 25; Perrier 2009 
[1884]: 70) Moreover, Lamarck’s model is centered on individuals.214 (Perrier 2009 [1884]: 66) The 
                                                            
211  In earlier works of the 1770s and 1780s, Lamarck had still clinged to a linear, non-branching line of ascent 
from the less complex to the more complex organisms. (Lefèvre 2001: 185) The Swiss naturalist Charles 
Bonnet (1720-1793) had presented such a scale (“échelle des êtres naturels”) in 1745. Already then, 
Bonnet’s idealized static model did not fit with the available empirics. (Hoßfeld and Junker 2001: 37) 
Consequently, Lamarck dissociates himself from Bonnet’s scale in his Philosophie Zoologique. – For a 
comprehensive overview over static models of evolution before Darwin and Wallace, see Voss (2007: 95-
163). 
212  This branching is regularly depicted by a diverging diagram displaying the relations of large classes of 
animals. (Lefèvre 2001: 186; Perrier 1873 [1809]: 70) (In Perrier’s text, the diagram seems inserted by the 
contemporary editors, McBirney, Cook, and Retallak.) Lamarck, however, did not present such a diagram 
but a set of tables. (Thus, Darwin is probably the first to present an actual diagram of evolutionary 
relations.) In his tables, Lamarck presented 14 classes of animals, sorted by six degrees of complexity 
(Lamarck 1873b [1809]: 273-276). All degrees comprise two classes of animals, except for the fourth, which 
comprises 4 classes. I find it hard to see how this table fits with the idealized schemes provided by Lefèvre 
and McBirney, Cook, Retallak. 
213  On one hand, extinction was not yet an established paleontological fact. On the other hand, Lamarck did 
not cite much empirical evidence to support his views, his work was really rather speculative. 
214  Thus, Lamarck relativizes both the notion of varieties and species in favor of individuals and makes the 
same argument as Wallace and Darwin: varieties and species are somewhat arbitrary sets over individuals. 
He states that: "We know that species do really have but a constancy relative to the circumstances in which 
are found all the individuals which do represent the species. Certain of those individuals varied and do now 
constitute races which differ slightly from their neighbor species. Thus, naturalists chose arbitrarily when 
they declare some of these to be varieties and others species, for instances individuals observed in 
different countries and in different situations. From this follows that the determination of species becomes 
more defective, i.e. more embarrassed and confused, by the day." (My rough translation, his text reads: “ 
En effet, ne sachant pas que les espèces n'ont réellement qu'une constance relative à la durée des 
circonstances dans lesquelles se sont trouvés tous les individus qui les représentent, et que certains de ces 
individus ayant varié constituent des races qui se nuancent avec ceux de quelque autre espèce voisine, les 
naturalistes se décident arbitrairement [sic!], en donnant les uns comme variétés, les autres comme 
espèces, des individus observés en différents pays et dans diverses situations. Il en résulte que la partie du 
travail qui concerne la détermination des espèces, devient de jour en jour plus défectueuse, c'est-à-dire 
plus embarrassée et plus confuse.” (Lamarck 1873a [1809]: 73) 
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transforming development occurs on individuals and “races” are formed by all those individuals 
which are on the same level of development.215 
The Situation in which the development occurs is a gradually changing environment without great 
catastrophes; moreover, it is not a steady state. In line with Buffon and Cuvier, Lamarck supposes a 
high age of the earth. Moreover, Lamarck mentions that organisms compete for resources in order to 
multiply. Lamarck notices that particularly the lower organisms have very high rates of multiplication 
and that only nature keeps them in check, otherwise more numerous races could replace less 
numerous ones. As examples of such checks he mentions the relation of predators and prey and 
speaks of races “going to war” with each other. (Lamarck 1873a [1809]: 112-3; Perrier 2009 [1884]: 
64) 
Transformations are triggered by environmental changes. Lamarck presumes that organisms are 
well-adapted to their environment, a priori. Thus, transformations occur only when the environment 
changes; only then are animals required to adapt further. This delta between the characteristics of 
an organism and the demands of its environment then leads to a modification of the organism in 
question. The organism attempts to lessen the gap between his characteristics and the environment 
by a modified behavior (for animals) or modified inner processes (for plants). Through repetition 
these modified actions and processes lead to inheritable modifications of the organism in question 
and, over time, development in the Lamarckian sense. (Lamarck 1873a [1809]: 23; Perrier 2009 
[1884]: 61)216 Figure 10 provides an overview over Lamarck’s model. 
Yet, Lamarck’s theory would not be complete without its underlying narrative.217 The narrative is 
centered on a metaphor which Lamarck introduced to illustrate the gap between an organism’s 
characteristics and the environment; Lamarck speaks of “besoins” which conveys strong humanoid 
overtones and translates either as ‘desire’, ‘wish’ or ‘need’. (Lamarck 1873a [1809]: 94, 98, 109)218 
This term gives rise to the interpretation that the Agents in Lamarck’s theory are the organisms 
themselves, who, in a gradually changing environment with limited resources (Scene), use or disuse 
certain organs (Agency) to volitionally satisfy their “besoins” (Purpose), improve their adaption and 
develop into higher forms (Act). 
                                                            
215  Wolfgang Lefèvre argues that, in Lamarck’s scheme, two higher organisms need not be genetically related 
to the same lower organisms; their predecessors are of the same kind but need not be the same individual. 
It seems to me that this argument presupposes that the races in Lamarck’s model are populations in the 
modern sense, i.e. groups of organisms which live and breed together in a specific area at a specific time. 
This, however, is not Lamarck’s understanding, to whom a race is a set of all individual organisms on the 
same level of development; members of such a Lamarckian race need not live or breed together. (Lefèvre 
2001: 198, 200) 
216  In a nutshell, Lamarck expresses his theory thus: “Le produit des circonstances comme causes qui amènent 
de nouveaux besoins, celui des besoins, qui fait naître les actions, celui des actions répétées qui crée les 
habitudes et les penchants, les résultats de l'emploi augmenté ou diminué de tel ou tel organe, les moyens 
dont la nature se sert pour conserver et perfectionner tout ce qui a été acquis dans l'organisation, etc., 
sont des objets de la plus grande importance pour la philosophie rationnelle.” (Lamarck 1873a [1809]: 28) 
217  I do disagree with Wolfgang Lefèvre in that the reception of this narrative is a misinterpretation of 
Lamarck. At most, it is a reception of Lamarck’s narrative without the underlying model, something which 
also occurred to Darwin and seems a common phenomenon in the reception of scientific theories. 
Lamarck’s text clearly conveys this narrative – whether Lamarck intended to do so or not. (Lefèvre 2001: 
200) 
218  Mayr (1984: 268-9) points out that the use of ‘besoin’ recalls an essay by Denis Diderot where Lamarck 
might have borrowed the metaphor. 
Sebastian Zacharias: The Darwinian Revolution as a knowledge reorganization 
 
70 
 
Figure 10: Lamarck's dynamic model of evolution 
Certainly, Lamarck’s text contains the usual references to God, who, for instance, instituted the 
natural order (Perrier 2009 [1884]: 68), yet he link God closely enough to the actions which produced 
the modifications. In line with the French mainstream, Lamarck’s God was non-interventionist and 
remained in the narrative’s background. (Lamarck 1873a [1809]: 74)219 Consequently, it is the former 
interpretation220 which shaped the reception of Lamarck’s theory and fueled both its dissemination 
and its rejection: Even if the animals’ needs and wills eventually served God’s will, it was simply 
inacceptable to most of Lamarck’s readers to grant a will or volitional actions to animals. It is not, 
however, that Lamarck was merely opposed for the ontological implications of his narrative. Instead, 
his model was squarely attacked for its shaky empirical grounds, most uncompromisingly by his 
colleague at the Muséum National, Georges Cuvier. 
viii. Cuvier: a static nature, governed by divine will 
Cuvier (1769-1832) had been raised and educated in the countryside and, as a young adult, devoted 
himself to independent studies of natural history. It was only in the spring of 1795 that he moved to 
Paris where he became an assistant in comparative anatomy at the Muséum National. In 1799, he 
                                                            
219  As for Nature, Lamarck explicitly dismissed that it should be considered an Agent: "La Nature, ce mot si 
souvent prononcé comme s'il s'agissait d'un être particulier, ne doit être à nos yeux que l’ensemble 
d’objets qui comprend : 1° tous les corps physiques qui existent; 2° les lois générales et particulières qui 
régissent les changements d'état et de situation que ces corps peuvent éprouver; 3° enfin, le mouvement 
diversement répandu parmi eux , perpétuellement entretenu ou renaissant dans sa source, infiniment 
varié dans ses produits et d'où résulte l'ordre admirable de choses que cet ensemble nous présente." 
(Lamarck 1873b [1809]: 349) 
220  For a prominent such reading, see Thomas Henry Huxley’s 1878 article for the Encyclopedia Britannica. 
(Huxley 1893a [1878]) 
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succeeded Louis-Jean-Marie Daubenton (1716-1799)221 as a professor of natural history at the 
Collège de France. In the first decades of the 19th century he was probably the best-known French 
naturalist and certainly the most respected throughout Europe.222 Cuvier was a founding father of 
both stratigraphy/paleontology (see above) and of comparative anatomy, the latter together with 
Lamarck. 
After initial work on invertebrates Cuvier moved to vertebrates, specializing in mammals. It was here 
that Cuvier had his greatest anatomical achievements. He identified important new regularities, for 
instance that no carnivores have horns and that only herbivores bear hooves. He summed such 
regularities up as the principle of a “correlation of parts” and the knowledge of such regularities 
enabled him to predict much of the overall form of an organism from relatively few parts – a skill 
which much impressed the public. 
More importantly, however, these regularities provided clear criteria for classification. Cuvier was 
working much more in a spirit of Linnaeus than Buffon; his goals were to develop classifications 
which simplified identification and to identify organizing principles behind these classifications: the 
correlation of parts. In identifying numerous such regularities Cuvier advanced zoological taxonomy 
greatly223 and provided many of the principles on which Darwin’s explanation could rely.224 
In line with his catastrophism, Cuvier denied that the geological record displayed anything like 
increasing perfection or increasing complexity, explicitly attacking Lamarck: while some organs of a 
given organism increased in complexity, others decreased; there was no overall trend. Moreover, he 
denied that it was possible to demonstrate continuity even among living organisms. Instead, Cuvier 
distinguished four major embranchements225 and several distinct smaller units and disputed that 
these may be mapped on any kind of continuous scala naturae. Last, he disputed the magnitude of 
biogeographical effects. While well-aware of the existence of variations, Cuvier denied that they 
touched any “essential” attributes of a type; they were limited to superficial features as colour or size 
but did not alter organs or the general proportions of an organism.226  
When Cuvier published a compilation of his empirical studies in 1811, two years after Lamarck’s 
Philosophie Zoologique, he emphasized how “the facts” displayed diversity and difference 
throughout nature and he rejected all speculation about a general unity in nature or evolution. On 
Cuvier’s account, animals were perfectly adapted to their environment or they developed everything 
                                                            
221  Daubenton was an excellent anatomist himself and had worked with Buffon. Moreover, he was an 
important science manager and selected many of the natural history professors who were appointed in the 
1790s in Paris. 
222  Particularly the British were fascinated with Cuvier’s systematic empirical work and his restraint in 
speculation. Unlike Lamarck’s and Geoffroy’s, Cuvier’s work enjoyed an important reception in Britain, 
most notably Animal Kingdom (1817). 
223  Among his many „firsts“, animals which he described for the first time, was the charming red panda which 
Cuvier named Ailurus fulgens, cat with shining coat, and which he considered the “most beautiful 
mammal” on earth. Today, the red panda is an endangered species and the subject of a WWF-campaign 
against its extinction. #saveredpanda 
224  For Botany, a similar feat was accomplished by the German botanist Friedrich Wilhelm Benedikt 
Hofmeister (1824-1877), notably in his Vergleichende Untersuchungen der Keimung, Entfaltung und 
Fruchtbildung höherer Kryptogamen (1851). (Mayr 1984: 174) 
225  These embranchements were mollusks, anthropoids, radiata and vertebrates. 
226  One supposed piece of evidence against variability were the mummified animals Geoffroy had discovered 
in Egypt. (1798) As these animals closely resembled contemporary ones, they seemed to demonstrate the 
immutability of species. 
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they needed to survive from preexistent “germs”. Thus, their structure always satisfied their 
respective “conditions of existence” they were designed for the place they occupied in nature. In 
terms of biological history, the present species had always been what they are; they resemble earlier 
forms only insofar as these had lived in similar environments and there existed neither intermediate 
forms nor modified ancestors. (Hoßfeld and Junker 2001: 57) 
This view of the animal kingdom complied with Cuvier’s overall view of nature as immutable. In-
between the occasional catastrophes, Cuvier’s models of both geology and biology were static. 
Consequently, Cuvier never presented a dynamic model to explain the processes of natural history. 
To him, these processes had nothing unforeseeable and thus displayed nothing which required 
explanation. Organisms simply filled out the slots in the taxonomic system which they were supposed 
to fill. How organisms came into being after the revolutions was no problem he would discuss.227 
In sum, Cuvier’s was the argument from design: God had designed the earth and all the life on it. His 
will was visible in all organisms; their purpose was the perfect adaption to their conditions of 
existence, which, themselves, were a product of divine will. Considering this narrative, it is not 
surprising that the British admired Cuvier. He married meticulous empirical description to a theistic 
understanding of nature. Cuvier’s God was just the same personal and intervening God as the one in 
the British natural theology. In sum, Cuvier’s narrative was much closer to William Paley’s Natural 
Theology than to his Parisian colleagues Lamarck and Geoffroy. 
When Cuvier died in 1832, his legacy as an anatomist was unrivalled and he had gained important 
followers, among them the Swiss-born American Louis Agassiz (1807-1873) and Richard Owen who 
had stayed with Cuvier in 1831. (see section 3) As Owen recalled in retrospect, Cuvier stayed firm in 
his positions to the end. (1868: 780-94) In 1830, the year after Lamarck’s death he reaffirmed that 
there was no serious empirical proof for evolutionary changes. Although Cuvier was aware of the 
evidence which had led Lamarck and, later, Geoffroy (see below) to champion evolution, he 
dismissed the paleontological record as insufficient to support such claims. In 1832, this position was 
still a reasonable one: the most challenging fossils for the Cuvier’s account would appear after his 
death, many important ones only after the publication of the Origin. Still, at Cuvier’s death, evolution 
had become more than an extravagant thought in Buffon’s quiver or an unempirical speculation of 
German philosophers; it had become a serious scientific hypothesis. 
ix. Geoffroy: evolution – in a quieter gown 
A major reason for this gain in credibility was its endorsement by another influential Parisian 
naturalist: Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (1772 –1844). Geoffroy had studied natural philosophy in 
Paris and was appointed one of the twelve professorships at the newly-founded Muséum National 
d'Histoire Naturelle in 1793, at age twenty-one. Geoffroy’s professorship was in zoology and his area 
of expertise was vertebrates. At the same time, Geoffroy was among the pioneers of embryology, 
exploiting the embryonic development and rudimentary organs as biological knowledge sources. 228 
These novel sources would reveal genetic relationships and allow for much more precise taxonomic 
classifications. (Perrier 2009 [1884]: 84) 
                                                            
227  Cuvier also dismissed the hypothesis of spontaneous generation. 
228  The Swiss naturalist Charles Bonnet (1720-1793) and the Estonian-German Karl Ernst Ritter von Baer (1792-
1876) made other important contributions in the generation before and after Geoffroy. 
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Contrary to Cuvier’s focus on distinction and difference, Geoffroy’s ambition was to explain the 
marked resemblances of animals. From 1795 on, Geoffroy championed ideas of unity in nature. In his 
eyes, all living beings followed a “unified plan of composition” and this plan can best be seen on the 
various forms within a class. One indication for the existence of such a plan were rudimentary 
organs. Geoffroy observed that, within taxonomic groups, certain organs rarely disappear but remain 
in the body and occupy the same place in it. To Geoffroy, the body was a system, a set of 
communicating organs and the communication pattern displayed a “unity of type”. 
Geoffroy’s claims of unity stood in direct opposition to Cuvier’s claims about the diversity of living 
forms. Once friends, the two naturalists developed a fierce rivalry throughout the 1820s, which 
culminated in a celebrated series of debates before the Académie Royale des Sciences in Paris. The 
point of debate was the two organizing principles behind Cuvier’s and Geoffroy’s theories, i.e. the 
designed adaption of organisms to their “conditions of existence” versus the “unity of type”. 
Geoffroy stressed the deep resemblance of the internal anatomy of organisms and Cuvier 
emphasized how closely the structure and function of organisms fitted their environment. In the 
public eye, Cuvier’s static view of nature won the battle but an important group of biologists would 
stand with Geoffroy.229 
Parallel to his rivalry with Cuvier and after Cuvier’s unexpected dead in 1832, Geoffroy began to 
develop evolutionary views. In the late 1820s, Geoffroy studied fossil reptiles which showed 
surprising similarities with recent crocodiles. (Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire 1835: 198; cf. Mayr 1984: 288; 
Perrier 2009 [1884]: 83) In his essay Influence du monde ambiant sur les forms animales (1833) he 
sought an explanation for these similarities which would integrate the unity of plan but also 
differences of form and function. Like Lamarck, he came up with an unbroken genetic chain. (Owen 
1868: 767) However, he went further than Lamarck; while Lamarck had postulated that the extinct 
races had been transformed into higher ones, Geoffroy included their extinction in his model. 230 
Geoffroy was well-aware that the paleontological evidence was not yet sufficient to support his 
views.231 However, in his late work Etudes progressives d'un naturaliste (1835) he furthered his claim, 
supposing “a single system of creations that are incessantly reworked, perfected, and integrated with 
previous changes under the all-powerful influence of the external world.” (Perrier 2009: [1884]: 86) 
As Lamarck had twenty-six years earlier, Geoffroy would attempt to provide a dynamic model 
(explanation) of the changes which had brought about his “single system of creations”. 
As in Lamarck’s, the Input of Geoffroy’s model were ecological changes and the Output were 
modifications, or, alterations of form. Geoffroy, however, did not claim the Lamarckian preservation 
of species. Instead, in an anticipation of an important feature of Darwin’s argument, Geoffroy 
distinguished between “favorable” and “fatal” modifications. The former would lead to a better 
adaption to conditions, the latter to the extinction of the type and its replacement by other types. As 
                                                            
229  One of them was Goethe, who avidly followed the Parisian debates and supported views like Geoffroy’s. 
230  The difference is not big, however, maybe just a question of the reference group. In his own words, 
Geoffroy claims that “les races actuelles sont le produit de la même création continuellement successive et 
progressive, et qu’elles sont réellement descendues, par une filiation non interrompue, des anciennes 
races aujourd’hui perdus.” Thus, while the members of the old races have become extinct, some of their 
descendants now form new races. One might consider this a transformation. (Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire 1835: 
117) 
231  The lack of gradual transitions in the paleontological record led him to speculate about more abrupt 
transformations, for instance from lower vertebrates to birds. (Mayr 1984: 289) 
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for the Connector232 of his explanation, Geoffroy did not refer to use or disuse but to respiration. He 
hypothesized that the environment had an influence on the respiration and a modified respiration 
would lead to gradual – small, step-wise – alterations in form. (Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire 1835: 117-9) 
These alterations, however, were not random; they were activations of an inherent, pre-existing 
potential within the realm of the unity of type. (Perrier 2009 [1884]: 83) New material for such 
modifications was provided by continuous spontaneous generation, similar to Lamarck’s model. (See 
Figure 11) 
 
Figure 11: Geoffroy's dynamic model of evolution 
Geoffroy’s model was embedded in a rather naturalistic narrative. He described Nature – with a 
capital ‘n’ – as an “admirable machine” which carries out the biological processes and produces the 
modifications which result in the single system of creations. (Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire 1835: 132) 
Geoffroy clearly mentions God and his creation in the “etudes métaphysiques”-section of his book 
and praises him very explicitly in his conclusion. (Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire 1835: 188-9) Still, this is not 
the theistic discourse of Cuvier or Paley. Geoffroy’s God remains in the background and does not 
intervene directly.233 Thus, either God or Nature can be understood as the Agent in Geoffroy’s 
narrative, a twist which Darwin would employ in the Origin, too.234 The most intuitive reading seems, 
however, to consider God the Agent. The Purpose is, supposedly, God’s Will, the Act are the 
organism’s modifications, the Agency the changes in the environment which trigger the modified 
                                                            
232  Mayr may be understood such that Geoffroy did not postulate a Connector which would mediate between 
environmental changes and the resulting physiological modifications. Such a reading is sometimes termed 
‘Geoffroyism’. It seems inadequate, however, as Geoffroy clearly postulates that the environmental 
changes lead to a modification of the respiration and only the latter, successively, leads to a modification 
of organs. (Mayr 1984: 288-9) 
233  Instead, just as Darwin would, Geoffroy alludes to the physical laws of Kepler and Newton and compares 
his model to theirs. 
234  Darwin seems not to have read the later works of Geoffroy, so there probably exists no direct relation. 
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respiration of the organisms. The Scene is not much specified but Geoffroy believed in a constantly 
changing environment without regular catastrophes and new creations. 
In order to support the Connector he had postulated, Geoffroy carried out experiments on chicken 
embryos, subjecting them to different conditions in order to trigger such modifications. He did not 
find any such proof but he suggested a new research paradigm: the investigation of environmental 
influences on the structure of organisms. (Perrier 2009 [1884]: 85) Thus, in 1835, Geoffroy suggested 
that biologists leave the dissecting room and explore the field. At the same Darwin, aboard the 
Beagle since 1831, was already travelling South America. He was not inspired by Geoffroy, however, 
as he had not read his later works.235 
x. Synthesis: the state of biological knowledge and beliefs around 1840 
A systematic overview of biological knowledge is best provided by distinguishing three kinds of 
empirical regularities236: (i) regularities on and between different organisms, (ii) regularities of 
organisms in space, (iii) regularities of organisms in time. These regularities stem from different 
biological sub-disciplines with different methods: (i) The first kind of regularities was produced by 
anatomy, histology, morphology, osteology and physiology, among others.237 These regularities are 
synthesized in taxonomic classifications which sort organisms by shared anatomical, histological, 
morphological, osteological or physiological features. (ii) The second kind of regularities was 
produced by biogeography which studies the distribution of organisms in space.238 (iii) The third kind 
of regularities was produced by ontogeny and embryology as well as paleontology, both of which 
investigate the development of organisms in time. Ontogeny studies the development of an 
organism during his life-span; embryology focuses on its maturation. Paleontology studies the 
regularities of fossils to geological strata, which are interpreted as indications of the development of 
large groups of organisms over long periods of time. – Another kind of regularities in time were 
principally known to biologists, but not yet integrated in their knowledge: the changes of organisms 
over generations, particularly the laws of inheritance.239 For the most part, these regularities 
remained the knowledge of practitioners, i.e. of breeders and gardeners.240 
In terms of shared beliefs, (i) there were different interpretations of classifications, displaying some 
kind of Aristotelian scale or at least an overarching unity, as in Geoffroy’s unity of type. Others, as 
Cuvier, disputed such ideas. (ii) The regularities of biogeography were interpreted as indicative of an 
adaption of organisms to the environment, which might either indicate underlying principles of 
divine design or stem from environmental influences. With respect to this environment, quite a 
number of authors expressed ideas about a war or struggle in nature, throughout the history of 
                                                            
235  Thus, Geoffroy’s work of the 1830s is still not mentioned in the Historical Sketch of the 3rd edition of the 
Origin of Species. (Darwin 1861: xiii-xix) 
236  They are mentioned in the order in which they were integrated into biology. 
237  Histology studies the microscopic anatomy of cells and tissues of organisms. Morphology studies outward 
appearances like shape, structure, color or pattern as well as the form and structure of the internal organs. 
Osteology studies the structure of bones, skeletal elements, and teeth. Physiology studies the functions of 
organs and entire organisms. 
238  One of the pioneers of the disciplines was the German geologist and paleontologist Christian Leopold von 
Buch (1744-1853) who was one the first to describe the role of isolation in biology. 
239  As for special cases, the German botanist Friedrich Wilhelm Benedikt Hofmeister (1824-1877) established 
the alternation of generations (metagenesis) for plants in 1851. 
240  Mendel’s revealing experimental results would be published but in the late 1860s. (see below) 
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biology, among them Aristotle, Linnaeus, Herder, Lamarck and Geoffroy.241 (iii) As for the regularities 
in time, many biologists held ideas of spontaneous generation, often as a continuous process which 
was still at work; others rather believed in a single or in successive divine creations after major 
catastrophes. In the latter case, the creation usually encompassed all kinds of organisms and implied 
a static view of nature; outside the creations, organisms did not develop from one form into another. 
Those who believed in spontaneous generation where more inclined to hold evolutionary beliefs. The 
most sophisticated evolutionary thinkers, Lamarck and Geoffroy, had suggested dynamic models of 
evolution. Where a narrative supplemented the static or dynamic models of biology, it contained 
God as its core Agent. Lamarck, however, had championed secondary Agents, and Geoffroy could be 
read in the same way, personifying the concept ‘Nature’. 
Each of the three domains of empirical regularities had produced or was producing objects which 
challenged the established beliefs. (i) Throughout the 19th century, more and more novel organisms 
were discovered. It was an immense challenge to taxonomists to integrate this endless flow in a 
pertinent and systematic fashion into existing classifications. Particularly, taxonomists found it 
difficult to develop a system by which to classify. (Voss 2007: 106-7; Hodge 1972: 128) (ii) 
Biogeography revealed that the regularities between the type of organisms and the physical 
environment were not bijective; regions of similar climate and geography sometimes displayed very 
different organisms. Such, if organisms were adapted to their physical environment, they were not 
adapted in the same way.242 (iii) Paleontology produced fossils which did not resemble any living 
creatures and which differed greatly over geological strata. Finally, embryology revealed that 
embryos of different species resembled each other much more than the respective adult organisms. 
In adult organisms, these shared embryonic features were visible in rudimentary organs. 
Table 7 summarizes the shared knowledge and knowledge sources, the shared beliefs and mental 
models as well as the challenging objects, distinguished by types of empirical regularities around 
1840. 
 
Regularities on and 
between organisms 
Regularities in space Regularities in time 
Shared knowledge 
from 
Anatomy, Morphology, 
Osteology, Physiology, 
Histology 
Biogeography Ontogeny (incl. 
embryology), 
Paleontology 
Challenging objects Problems of 
classification of living 
organisms 
Different organisms in 
regions of similar 
climate and geography  
Rudimentary organs, 
Intermediate fossils 
Important beliefs 
(interpretation and 
narrative) 
Scala naturae,  
Unity of type 
Divine design, Adaption 
to the environment 
 
Spontaneous genera-
tion, Repeated catas-
trophes & repeated 
                                                            
241  I will discuss the question, which one of these authors inspired Darwin in section 5.1 vi. My main line of 
argument will be that the concept of struggle does not stem from a single author, but was shared and very 
basal mental model of biology, which Darwin would modify and integrate in his explanation. This goes 
against Desmond’s and Moore’s claim that Darwin borrowed the concept from de Candolle’s 
Organographie Végétale and, possibly, learned of it during a visit to Darwin in 1839. (Desmond and Moore 
1995: 323) 
242  Let me highlight that, in principle, this was already formulated in Buffon’s law. 
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creations OR continuous 
transformation of orga-
nisms and extinctions 
Influential beliefs 
(ontology) 
Agents in Biology: God, Nature, Organisms 
Table 7: Shared knowledge, beliefs, mental models, challenging objects in biology ca. 1840 
xi. The specificities of the scientific and public debate in Britain around 1840 
While the progress of empirical biology accelerated throughout the 1820s and 1830s and 
evolutionary theories were freely and publicly discussed on the continent, Britain remained in the 
firm grip of Natural Theology. Moreover, clerical and conservative scientific forces reaffirmed their 
claims in one famous debate of the 1830s: the Bridgewater Treatises. 
Initiated by the Earl of Bridgewater (1756-1829), on his deathbed, the eight treatises were supposed 
to explore “the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, as manifested in the Creation”.243 The 
treatises were a stern defense of Paley’s Natural Theology against the deistic influences from the 
continent, particularly from France and Germany. (Amundson 2007: xv-xvi) In their theistic world-
views, they combined the argument from design with the idea of divine providence. In the former, 
one inferred from the order and harmony of nature the existence of a benevolent God. It was argued 
that if the human mind was able to conceive the natural order and the laws of nature as purposeful 
then they bore witness to God’s purpose. (Ellegård 1958: 114-5,125) The idea of divine providence 
consisted in the  
“conviction that the world was placed under the watchful guidance of a higher power 
... Without Divine supervision, one held, everything would disintegrate into chaos, for 
only chaos could result if the universe were left to the action of chance and blind, 
inexorable laws. Design and Purpose, the attributes of a Mind, were needed to create 
and sustain a Kosmos.” (Ellegård 1958: 102) 
The overruling goal of the treatises was to demonstrate the applicability of theological thinking to 
science. Consequently, the eight treatises were devoted to biology (human and zoological), physics 
(incl. astronomy and meteorology), chemistry, geology and mineralogy. The two most prominent 
authors were probably the philosopher William Whewell (1794-1866)244 and the geologist William 
Buckland (1784-1856). 245 
                                                            
243  Their exact title says just that, it reads “The Bridgewater Treatises On the Power Wisdom and Goodness of 
God As Manifested in the Creation”. From his large fortune, the Earl of Bridgewater donated 8.000 £ to 
finance the treatises. 
244  Note that the two quotations which faced the title page of the 1859 Origin of Species stemmed from 
Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and William Whewell and that the Whewell quotation came from his 
Bridgewater treatise. 
245  The eight treatises and their authors are these: Treatise I, by Thomas Chalmers: The Adaptation of External 
Nature to the Moral and Intellectual Constitution of Man. Treatise II, by John Kidd, On the Adaptation of 
External Nature to the Physical Condition of Man. Treatise III, by William Whewell. On Astronomy and 
General Physics. Treatise IV, by Charles Bell. The Hand: Its Connector and Vital Endowments as Evincing 
Design. Treatise V, by Peter Mark Roget. Animal and Vegetable Physiology Considered with Reference to 
Natural Theology. Treatise VI, by William Buckland. Geology and Mineralogy Considered with Reference to 
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Buckland, with Adam Sedgwick (1785-1873), Charles Darwin’s geology professor in Cambridge, was 
among those geologists who opposed deistic models as James Hutton’s on religious grounds. To 
these “clergyman-naturalist” (Rupke 1994: 212), the visible earth had been created after the last 
great flood and the living animals were descendants of those which had been saved on Noah’s ark.246 
Man had been created in God’s own image and all other organisms had been designed and placed on 
Earth specifically for the place which they now occupied. 
This practice science directly related to the specifically Mid-Victorian branch of philosophy of science 
championed by William Whewell.247 In this branch, scientific explanation consisted in the 
identification of “real” or “true” causes (verae causae), i.e. causes which could be tracked back to 
God.248 Whewell expresses this very explicitly: 
“In contemplating the series of Causes which are themselves the effects of other 
causes we are necessarily led to assume a Supreme Cause in the Order of Causation, 
as we assume a First Cause in Order of Succession…” (op.cit. Ellegård 1958: 178-9)249 
Those phenomena which could not be explained by verae causae, were explained as direct divine 
interventions and called ‘miracles. In Mid-Victorian science, miracles where fully legitimate 
explanations.250 
Unsurprisingly, this scientific establishment in Britain abhorred the theoretical works from the 
continent. The pious and theory-averse Cuvier, who had died in 1832, was still held in high praise and 
his Animal Kingdom appeared in several English editions throughout the 1840s and 1850s. (cf. Cuvier 
1854) The works of his Parisian colleagues Lamarck and Geoffroy or their great predecessor Buffon, 
however, remained reserved to readers of the original French editions.251 The same is true for the 
German theorizing. When Richard Owen, in 1847, initiated a translation of works by the German 
idealist Lorenz Oken, he caused a public uproar. (Rupke 1994: xiv) 
Consequently, British the natural sciences were decidedly cautious about theorizing and hypothetical 
reasoning of their own:  
“Speculation about unobserved causes was discouraged. Unlike the question of 
species origins, the form function debate concerned observable body parts, not 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Natural Theology. Treatise VII, by William Kirby. On the History Habits and Instincts of Animals. Treatise 
VIII, by William Prout. Chemistry, Meteorology, and the Function of Digestion. 
246  When geological evidence began to contradict the previously held 6.000 years (see above), conservative 
geologists like Sedgwick and Buckland modified their accounts of the geological history since the great 
flood, but they clung to their biblical framework. 
247  The other great British philosophers of the time, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and astronomer-philosopher 
John Herschel (1792-1871), held much more liberal and progressive views. 
248  Considering God an Agent in a scientific theory was quite intuitive to most of Darwin’s contemporaries; 
after all, they had grown up in the spirit of Natural Theology and “had been accustomed to look at their 
study as a parallel to that of theology.“ (Ellegård 1958: 102) To them, Natural Theology was supposed to 
furnish the “empirical grounds for religious belief” (Ellegård 1958: 114). 
249  ‘Supreme Cause’ and ‘First Cause’ are other names for God here. (Ellegård 1958: 178-9, cf. Hull 1973: 56) 
The term ‘First Cause’ dates back at least to Thomas Acquinas (1225-1274) and reflects Aristotle’s concept 
of the unmoved mover, i.e. the ultimate cause of all things. 
250  For instance, in his reception of the Origin of Species, Adam Sedgwick explicitly supports miracles as 
explanations. (Sedgwick 1973[1860]: 161) 
251  As it is in history, one is never sure that something does not exist. I know of no English translations of 
Lamarck, Geoffroy or Buffon nor of any mention of them. Therefore, I suppose that they do not exist. 
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historically remote events. The discovery of law-like generalizations about observable 
bodies was thought to be a more suitable goal for a conscientious scientist than the 
quest for ultimate causes.” (Amundson 2007: xv) 
Such reserve was even more pronounced in biology and geology than in physics. The closer the 
science to Man, the less theorizing seemed adequate. Thus, biology 
“meetings and journals were filled with papers on systematics, notes on sightings of 
rare forms in Britain, and long descriptive accounts of the flora and fauna of exotic 
and domestic locales. These empirical studies were supported by the philosophical 
dicta proclaimed in addresses, prefaces, and debate: since induction was the only 
way to do natural history, no empirical observation was useless; and natural theology 
was the ultimate justification for the close study of nature. ’Through Nature to 
Nature's God’ was not only a common epigraph emblazoned on title pages, it was a 
deep, shared assumption of most gentlemen naturalists.252” (England 1997: 270) 
It is not that this conservative mainstream was not opposed in Britain. The Bridgewater Treatises 
received harsh criticism and some scorn, for instance by Robert Knox (1791-1862), an Edinburgh 
surgeon and morphologist, who referred to them as "Bilgewater Treatises".253 Another remarkable 
opponent was the mathematician and Church of England priest Baden Powell (1796-1860). He was 
an outspoken deist, advocating mechanistic explanations in the sphere of biology and claiming that 
the belief in miracles was atheistic. (Desmond and Moore 1995: 467) Powell publicly expressed 
support for evolution and would defend both Robert Chambers and Charles Lyell in his writings.254 
However, while known to many scientists and parts of the educated public, such opposition did not 
reach the mainstream public, where evolutionary ideas were associated with radical movements and 
ignored. As Richard England puts it, they were 
“rarely found among gentlemen. Just as its proponents - radicals of various stripes - 
transgressed against social codes, so the doctrine of transmutation transgressed 
against the philosophical codes of natural history. Transmutationism255 [evolution] 
was speculative rather than inductive, and promoted a less-than-orthodox view of 
God's creative action.” (England 1997: 270) 
To the less educated, the question was simpler. Evolution, whatever it exactly implied, definitely 
contradicted a literal understanding of the bible: 
                                                            
252  One explanation for the continuous dominance of conservative positions in the British natural sciences 
might be the social composition of its community. British scientists of the time mostly still were gentlemen 
amateur scientists like Charles Darwin. The professionalization of the French or the German sciences would 
reach Britain only in the 1850s and 1860s when men like botanist Henry Walter Bates (1825-1892), 
zoologist Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895) or Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913) climbed the institutional 
ranks of science and occupied important posts despite coming from modest social backgrounds. Richard 
Owen (1804-1892) is an early exception to the rule of the 1830s and 1840s as he made a career just like 
Huxley or Wallace would make two decades later. 
253  Another notable critic was the American writer Edgar Allan Poe (1809-1849). 
254  In his contribution to the orthodox collection Essays and Reviews, in early 1860, Powell would also praise 
Darwin’s Origin. He did not live, however, to experience the Darwinian revolution, dying weeks before the 
1860 meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science with its debate between Huxley 
and the Bishop Samuel Wilberforce (1805-1873). (Desmond and Moore 1995: 365-6) 
255  The term ‘transmutationist’ is one of the several synonyms for views which, today, we call ‘evolutionary’. 
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“Christian or heathen, most people, and above all the uneducated paid much more 
attention to the theory's contradiction of the plain statements of the Scriptures. The 
ordinary religious man [in Britain] hardly accepted the existence of any other religion 
than the revealed religion of the Bible. Abstruse philosophical arguments on final 
causes and supernatural interpositions meant little to him: the Bible meant the 
more.” (Ellegård 1958: 155) 
In the same spirit, both, the educated and the uneducated public, dismissed one possible 
consequence of evolution, namely that Man had descended from the apes instead of Adam. Despite 
the arrival of the first ape specimen in Britain in the 1830s256, such views seemed too improbable. 
(Ellegård 1958: 299, 332, 311-329; Hull 2005: 149) 
In this climate, Robert Chambers and Richard Owen published their first evolutionary works and set 
the tone of the first large controversy in the 1840s. In Wallace’s and Darwin’s work of the late 1850s 
and 1860s, the debate would culminate.  
                                                            
256  Richard Owen published on dissections of an Orang in 1831 and of a chimpanzee in 1835. (Rupke 1993: 
428) 
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3 Comparative analysis of theories: The 
revolution which Darwin suggested 
3.1 Robert Chambers: Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation 
The most popular British book on evolution and the one which might have shaped most the public 
reception of Darwin’s Origin stemmed from a layman or, at best, an amateur scientist. In 1844, the 
publicist Robert Chambers published his Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation and landed an 
immediate and spectacular success. 
Chambers had been born to a middle-class family but his family suffered financial reverses when he 
was still young. To earn a living, Robert and his older brother William started an antiquarian book 
business and went into publishing. First they printed books of general knowledge; however, in 1832 
they established Chamber’s Edinburgh Journal, a successful weekly which had a considerable 
influence on the intellectual life in Edinburgh and Britain.257 (Schwartz 1990: 128-9; Ruse 1979: 99; 
Lynch 2000a: x) 
Chambers was “a self-taught amateur naturalist”258 with an expertise in Scottish history and some in 
geology and biology. (Schwartz 1990: 127-9) He had received no formal training in the sciences259 but 
displayed a profound interest in scientific phenomena, their interpretation and ontological 
implications. He frequently discussed scientific topics and presented rudimentary ideas of evolution 
in his journal. (Schwartz 1999: 343) 
In October 1844, Chambers published Vestiges – anonymously. The book appeared in eleven editions 
from 1844260 to 1860 and in one posthumous edition in 1884, which finally revealed the author’s 
name. It sold more than 28.000 copies, 21.000 of which before the publication of the Origin of 
Species in 1859.261 Additionally, Chambers published six editions [CHECK] of Explanations, a sequel 
which addressed his main criticism and was supposed to provide further explanation and explication 
of his model of evolution and its ontological implications. 
The popularity of both his books was much fueled by the anonymity of its author:  
                                                            
257  Lynch describes the journal as “an eight-page weekly costing three halfpence, [which] reached a circulation 
of approximately 60,000 during its first ten years” and quotes Chambers with the mission of providing “a 
meal of healthful, useful and agreeable mental instruction” for even the “poorest labourer in the country”. 
(Lynch 2000a: x) 
258  As Lynch points out, Chambers did not see himself as a scientist but rather as a natural philosopher; his 
ambition was to “synthesize the writings of the professionals in a manner that was not only novel but in a 
form that would educate the masses”. (Lynch 2000a: xix; cf. Hodge 1972: 132) 
259  Chambers had, however, access to scientific publications and scientists themselves due to his membership 
in learned societies. 
260  Darwin had already written his sketch in 1842 and his essay in 1844, thus his principal ideas were not 
influenced by the Vestiges. 
261  The editions in December 1860 and 1884 still accounted for one fourth of the total sales. 
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“For many readers, the most arresting feature of Vestiges was the lack of an author 
on the title page. More than anything else, this rendered it a sensation. Here was a 
work dealing with the most profound questions of existence, apparently in command 
of a dozen different sciences, but written by an unknown author.” (Secord 2000: 17) 
In Vestiges, Chambers seeks answers to two questions (Hodge 1972: 137; Lynch 2000a: xv): (i) How 
did life originate on earth? (ii) How did the present species develop from these first forms of life? 
Thus, Chambers goes further than his scientific counterparts Darwin and Owen (see below): he seeks 
to explain not only the formation of different species but, generally, the origin of life. From his point 
of view, such an explanation would identify laws governing the living world for “the cosmological 
world has evolved through law, [thus], by analogy it is reasonable to suppose that the organic world 
also evolved through law.” (Ruse 1979: 100)262 
To make his case, Chambers offers a tour de force through a simplified, popularized version of the 
scientific knowledge of his time. (Secord 2000: 10; Lynch 2000b) He begins by describing the 
wonderful harmony in the solar system and citing a Laplacean model to explain how planets could 
have formed from nebulae of matter263: 
“Of nebulous matter in its original state we know too little to enable us to suggest 
how nuclei should be established in it. But, supposing that, from a peculiarity in its 
constitution, nuclei are formed, we know very well how, by virtue of the law of 
gravitation, the process of an aggregation of the neighboring matter to those nuclei 
should proceed, until masses more or less solid should become detached from the 
rest.” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 9) 
Chambers states that “the formation of bodies in space is still at present in progress” and claims that 
the laws governing such formations “are established on a rigidly accurate mathematical basis. 
(Chambers 1845 [1844]: 15) Proportions of numbers and geometrical figures rest at the bottom of 
the whole.” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 16-7) In Chemistry, Chambers identifies the same harmony, 
identifying fifty-five chemical elements. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 21) After an extensive discussion of 
geology and paleontology Chambers proceeds to biology and again identifies a lawful and “general 
progress of organic development throughout the geological ages” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 110) 
which had produced perfect and harmonious unity (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 123). 
Given all this lawfulness and harmony, Chambers argues that there must be a ”First Cause” behind 
those secondary causes discernible by Man, a “Great Being” acting through law (Chambers 1845 
[1844]: 19): 
“The masses of space are formed by law; law makes them in due time theatres of 
existence for plants and animals; sensation, disposition, intellect, are all in like 
manner developed and sustained in action by law. It is most interesting to observe 
into how small a field the whole of the mysteries of nature thus ultimately resolve 
                                                            
262  Hodge identifies this as Chambers core problem: “Given a lawfully formed earth, to get all its life onto it, 
lawfully.” (Hodge 1972: 137) 
263  Chambers here follows the then-fashionable theory that “the solar system was formed from a molten mass 
of matter (a nebula), out of which planets condensed as the mass rotated and cooled. The production of 
the universe from a primordial cloud …” (Lynch 2000a: xvi) When better telescopes dissolved the observed 
nebulae into distinct stars, Chambers weakened the reference to this “nebular hypothesis”. 
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themselves. The inorganic has been thought to have one final comprehensive law, 
GRAVITATION. The organic, the other great department of mundane things, rests in 
like manner, on one law, and that is DEVELOPMENT. Nor may even these be after all 
twain, but only branches of one still more comprehensive law, the expression of a 
unity, flowing immediately from the One who is First and Last.” (Chambers 1845 
[1844]: 251) 
3.1.1 Description: What evidence did Chambers present how? 
Neither in Vestiges nor in Explanations, did Chambers present original or novel evidence. Moreover, 
what he does present is second-hand – except maybe for geology, where he had carried out some 
field research of his own and provides rather detailed descriptions of higher geological strata and the 
traces of organic life found in them. Specifically, he mentions sea plants and corals (Chambers 1845 
[1844]: 39-46), fishes (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 47-55), land plants (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 56-68), 
reptiles & birds (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 69-75), mammals (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 76-84), 
transitional periods in which superior types appear: “a clear progress throughout, from humble to 
superior types of being” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 90) and the present species appear (Chambers 1845 
[1844]: 99-107). 
Chambers mentions a number of scientific theories and models of the time, but this is mostly name-
dropping; he provides few detailed descriptions of concepts such as spontaneous generation or the 
nebular hypothesis and he fails to link them to empirical evidence. Moreover, in their application, 
Chambers committed several serious scientific blunders, most of which, however, would be 
corrected in later editions with the help of sympathizing scientists. (Schwartz 1990: 130, 140) 
3.1.2 Classification: How did Chambers aggregate and denote evidence? 
Considering how superficial and unspecific his descriptions of organisms are, it is not surprising that 
Chambers employed a very much idealized scheme to organize them, namely the ‘quinary’ system of 
the British entomologist William Sharp Macleay. Macleay’s system neatly classified all organisms 
“into sets of five distinct types, each divided into five subsets, and so on…” and had enjoyed a brief 
period of popularity264 among British naturalists. (Ruse 1979: 104; Lynch 2000a: xiv; Chambers 1845 
[1844]: 181)265 
Among these harmonically arranged specimen, Chambers identified a clear progress “from simpler to 
higher forms of organization”; to him “there is no room to doubt of a general advance of 
organization”. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 90, 110, 144; cf. Ruse 1979: 108) As Darwin would a couple of 
years later, Chambers admits that the geological record does still display some “obscure passages”, 
                                                            
264  When Chambers published the Vestiges, however, it was already falling out of favor because less regular 
schemes fit the available evidence better. 
265  References to a botanical scale can be found in (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 65; Chambers 1846 [1845]: 47, 66, 
74), to an animal scale in (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 91, 96, 143, 144, 150, 152, 171, 233, 241, 242, 270; 
Chambers 1846 [1845]: 47, 66, 74) and to a general scale or “scale of creation” in (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 
81, 144, 171-2, 180, 241; Chambers 1846 [1845]: 94, 115, 137, 205). Chambers presents an overview on his 
mapping taxonomic groups on the scale in 1845: 172, in near full compliance to the quinary system. 
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yet these blanks could be filled by “a candid mind”. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 111) Consequently, 
Chambers specifies clear hierarchies among organisms: 
“Amongst plants, we have first sea weeds, afterwards land plants; and amongst these 
the simpler (cellular and cryptogamic) before the more complex. In the department 
of zoology, we see, first, traces all but certain of infusoria; then polypiaria, crinoidea, 
and some humble forms of the articulata and mollusca; afterwards higher forms of 
the mollusca; and it appears that these existed for ages before there were any higher 
types of being. The first step forward gives fishes, the humblest class of the 
vertebrata; and, moreover, the earliest fishes partake of the character of the lower 
sub-kingdom, the articulata. Afterwards come land animals, of which the first are 
reptiles, universally allowed to be the type next in advance from fishes, and to be 
connected with these by the links of an insensible gradation. From reptiles we 
advance to birds, and thence to mammalia, which are commenced by marsupialia, 
acknowledgedly low forms in their class. That there is thus a progress of some kind, 
the most superficial glance at the geological history is sufficient to convince us. 
Indeed the doctrine of the gradation of animal forms has received a remarkable 
support from the discoveries of this science, as several types formerly wanting to a 
completion of the series have been found in a fossil state.” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 
110-1) 
Chambers justifies these hierarchies by anatomical resemblances, particularly in rudimentary organs 
and by resemblances between foetal features of different classes. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 148, 71; 
Hodge 1972: 141) Thus, he highlighted that “various as may be the lengths of the upper part of the 
vertebral column in the mammalia, it always consists of the same parts.” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 
148) Likewise, he emphasized resemblances between embryonic fish and fossils and interpreted 
them as indicative of evolutionary links. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 160)266 
The evolutionary relations among these types and classes, however, he depicted as more complex 
than proponents of a classical scala naturae because he assumed: “…the gradation [in organisms] is 
much less simple and direct than is generally supposed. It certainly does not proceed, at all parts of 
its course at least, upon one line …” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 143; Chambers 1846 [1845]: 69) Thus, 
instead of a single ascending line, Chambers suggests a line with deviations.267 
These deviations are restricted, however. Organisms may deviate from the line of hierarchical ascent 
but such deviations will lead to specific and well-defined classes: 
“The foetus of all the four classes may be supposed to advance in an identical 
condition to the point A. The fish there diverges and passes along a line apart, and 
peculiar to itself, to its mature state at F. The reptile, bird, and mammal, go on 
                                                            
266  In these arguments, Chambers considers classes of organisms as representative of single types and ignores 
their individual differences. Thus, he ignores the empirical evidence on which Darwin and Wallace built 
their models and the Darwinian theory. (cf. Hodge 1972: 146; sections 3.3.1, 3.4.1) 
267  Richards, among others, argues that the form of the diagram was inspired by a diagram which the English 
zoologist William Carpenter employed to depict the embryology of Karl Ernst von Baer, the Estonian 
naturalist and founding father of embryology. (Richards 1987a: 137)) Carpenter’s diagram resembles 
Chambers’ closely with the two exceptions (i) that the deviating lines do not point upwards but deviate in a 
right angle from the main line and (ii) that Carpenter organized the classes differently on the joints. 
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together to C, where the reptile diverges in like manner, and advances by itself to R. 
The bird diverges at D, and goes on to B. The mammal then goes forward in a straight 
line to the highest point of organization at M. This diagram shows only the main 
ramifications, but the reader must suppose minor ones, representing the subordinate 
differences of orders, tribes, families, genera, & if he wishes to extend to the whole 
varieties of being in the animal kingdom.” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 160) 
In the sequel to Vestiges, the 1846 Explanations, specified his scheme and introduced subordinate 
lines268 to the main ones of his original diagrams. (Chambers 1846 [1845]: 70-1; Ruse 1979: 101)  
“…development has not proceeded, as is usually assumed, upon a single line which 
would require all the orders of animals to be placed one after another, but in a 
plurality of lines in which the orders, and even minuter sub-divisions, of each class, 
are ranged side by side.” (Chambers 1846 [1845]: 69; cf. Lynch 2000a: xv) 
Thus, within each class, one may construct other small trees through which the orders, tribes, genera 
etc. are divided. Figure 12 depicts both the original taxonomic scheme from Vestiges and a possible 
visualization of the modified scheme which is described in Explanations. 
 
Figure 12: Chambers' model of evolution in Vestiges (left) and Explanations (right) 269 
Man, being the highest organized mammal, is at the top of Chambers’ diagram. He appeared only 
when “the land and sea had come into their present relations, and [land]… had acquired the 
irregularity of surface necessary for man”. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 113) According to Chambers, Man 
is set apart from the plants and animals by his ability to speak. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 216)  
                                                            
268  Chambers referred to the subordinate lines as ‘stirpes’. (Chambers 1846 [1845]: 70) 
269  The figure on the left is a reproduction of Chambers’ actual diagram in the Vestiges. The letters denote: F – 
fish, R – reptile, B – bird, M – mammal. A, C and D denote generic diverging points. – The right-hand image 
is described in Explanations, but not actually depicted. I attempt to visualize Chambers’ description here 
without fully complying with the quinary system (the number of branches is not dividable by five). I am 
unsure as of how to do this and Chambers did not specify this point in Explanations. 
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Moreover, Chambers employs language as a criterion of distinction among humans. In his view, 
higher races have more complex languages, i.e. more syllables. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 219) Thus, by 
degree of development he distinguishes: 
“1. The Caucasian, or Indo-European, which extends from India into Europe and 
Northern Africa; 2. The Mongolian, which occupies Northern and Eastern Asia; 3. The 
Malayan, which extends from the Ultra-Gangetic Peninsula into the numerous islands 
of the South Seas and Pacific; 4. The Negro, chiefly confined to Africa; 5. The 
aboriginal American.” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 193) 
In sum, Chambers aggregates classes of plants and animals as well as orders tribes, genera etc. in a 
clear-cut hierarchical scheme. He interprets ascents in this scheme as a development from lower to 
higher forms. – How does he model and explain this development? 
3.1.3 Logical explanation: How did Chambers model evolution? 
i. Object Class: groups of organisms, but no individuals 
First of all, the objects of Chambers’ model are species and varieties. He refers to both throughout 
his works, although less to varieties. He does not specifically mention individuals or individual 
differences. (Chambers 1845 [1844]; Chambers 1846 [1845]) In compliance with the static model of 
his theory, Chambers understands his Object Class as the first beings and all their successors. He does 
not describe them in detail nor does he endow them with specific capacities to trigger evolution – 
although he grants them the “inherent qualities” to undergo it. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 251)  
ii. Situation Type: gently developing environment 
Chambers embeds his explanation in a geological framework which holds references to both Cuvier’s 
catastrophism and Lyell’s uniformitarianism, but more to the former. Thus, while Chambers claims 
that “the same laws and conditions of nature now apparent to us have existed throughout the whole 
time”, he does not claim that they operate at the same intensity; instead some of the conditions may 
have “come to a settlement and a close.” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 109) Thus, he is not limited to the 
linear and uniform geological time-frame which Lyell championed. Moreover, Chambers clearly 
supports the idea of an early general “destruction of many forms of organic being previously 
flourishing, particularly of the vegetable kingdom” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 67), and he speculates 
about “a universal submersion” which likely had led to extensive destruction of land animals 
(Chambers 1845 [1844]: 105-6). From this, Chambers concludes that “the creation of our own species 
is a comparatively recent event and one posterior (generally speaking) to all the great natural 
transactions which have been here described.” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 107) 
As for the environment in which the organisms now live, Chambers considers nature to be generally 
stable and well-designed. Therefore, organisms fit their environment, they are “appropriate” to the 
“external physical circumstances”. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 153-4) They are not, however, specifically 
adapted to it. (Ruse 1979: 116) Instead, when one type differs from another one in similar climate or 
geography, one type is more advanced than the other, i.e. higher on the hierarchy of Chambers 
diagram: 
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“Development has not gone on to equal results in the various continents, being most 
advanced in the eastern continent, next in the western, and least in Australia, this 
inequality being perhaps the result of the comparative antiquity of the various 
regions, geologically and geographically.” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 190-1) 
The environment is not static, it undergoes change. It is important, however, that this change is 
lawful. Chambers devotes the first part of Vestiges to present his popularized version of the laws of 
the physical and chemical world and the processes that formed the earth to demonstrate just how 
lawful the physical world “evolves” (sic!); it all follows the divine plan. 
Chambers addresses the idea of a continuous spontaneous generation and the question of the origin 
of life. In Chambers view, the “first step in the creation of life upon this planet was a chemico-electric 
operation by which simple germinal vesicles were produced”. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 154-5) This 
reaction has taken place on different places simultaneously (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 190) and its 
Agent was God: 
“That God created animated the beings, as well as the terraqueous theatre of their 
being, is a fact so powerfully evidenced, and so universally received, that I at once 
take it for granted. […] The ordinary notion may, I think, be described as this,- that 
the Almighty Author produced the progenitors of all existing species by some sort of 
personal or immediate exertion.” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 115) 
Chambers does not exclude further spontaneous generation but limits it to the lower organisms for 
one could only 
“expect to find the life-originating power at work in some very special and 
extraordinary circumstances, and probably only in the inferior and obscurer 
departments of the vegetable and animal kingdoms.” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 132)” 
Thus, Chambers dismisses traditional and religiously motivated explanations in the British context 
which suggested that every novel species occurred by special creation. However, if spontaneous 
generation produced only lower organisms, Chamber had to suggest an explanation of how species 
had evolved from the first living forms into the higher ones. (Ruse 1979: 101) 
iii. Output: evolved lower animals 
Chambers understands the development of organisms as the realization of potentials which were 
already present in the organisms.270 Hence, Chambers sees an analogy between the development of 
a single organism and the development of classes of organisms: the first develop by growing into 
mature beings, the latter by producing a higher type.271 (Ruse 1979: 99; Hodge 1972: 138) 
This led him to borrow the term ‘evolution’ to denote the result of his development.272 (Chambers 
1845 [1844]: 257, 277; Chambers 1846 [1845]: 24, 143, 151) It no longer refers only to development 
within the life-span of a single individual but to the development of classes of individuals over several 
                                                            
270  This much resembles Owen’s claims about laws of development and its modern reception in evolutionary 
developmental biology. (See section 5.2 iv) 
271  Chambers discusses this analogy himself in the autobiographical preface of the 10th edition of Vestiges. 
272  Note that both words have the same linguistic. 
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life-spans. This is a clear case of metábasis, a reinterpretation of an existing concept, and leads 
Chambers to employ ‘evolution’ in the sense in which we employ it today and in which, later, 
Darwin’s theory would be called the “theory of evolution”. 
Consequently, higher organisms can be understood as evolved forms of lower ones, or, in Michael 
Ruse’s terminology, overdeveloped forms: “An overdeveloped fish is hence no longer a fish but a 
reptile, and so on.” (Ruse 1979: 103)273 This transmutation progresses step-wise along the lines of 
Chambers’ diagram: 
“The idea, then, which I form of the progress of organic life upon our earth – and the 
hypothesis is applicable to similar theatres of vital being – is, that the simplest and 
most primitive type, under a law to which that of like-production is subordinate, gave 
birth to the type next above it, that this again produced the next higher, and so on to 
the very highest, the stages of advance being in all cases very small – namely, from 
one species only to another; so that the phenomenon has always been of a simple 
and modest character.” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 170-1; his emphasis) 
The common root of organisms, however, is still visible in the embryo:  
“…in the reproduction of the highest animals, the new being passes through stages in 
which it is successively fish-like and reptile-like. But the resemblance is not to the 
adult fish or the adult reptile, but to the fish and reptile at a certain point in their 
foetal progress…” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 160; cf. Ruse 1979: 103) 
These common features, in return, lead Chambers to stress the continuous relation between higher 
animals and their lower counterparts; all of them are 
“products of the Divine Conception, as well as ourselves. All of them display 
wondrous evidences of his wisdom and benevolence. […]” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 
179) 
This continuity goes so far that Chambers postulates the possibility that an organisms recedes back 
to the type from which it developed. (Chambers (1845: 16) Distinctions, however, are still possible 
and justified, particularly with respect to Man: 
“The leading characters … of the various races of mankind are simply representations 
of particular stages in the development of the highest or Caucasian type.” (Chambers 
1845 [1844]: 214) 
There is one important obstacle to Chamber’s idea of clear saltations, however. The visible 
similarities between organisms do not display clear distinctions. Therefore, Chambers denies the 
validity of such visible similarities:  
“In reality, [similarities between species] are only identical characters demanded by 
common conditions, or resulting from equality of grade in the scale. True affinities – 
                                                            
273  Chambers hardly provides any specific evidence for these saltations. First, he describes cases were oat 
seemingly had regressed into rye. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 166; cf. Ruse 1979: 104) Second, he describes 
how larva of worker bees can be modified to bear a queen, a case of advancement in Chambers’ logic. 
(Chambers 1845 [1844]: 162; Ruse 1979: 104) 
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and these are the affinities of genealogy – are not to be looked for horizontally 
amongst orders, but vertically, from an order in one class to the corresponding order 
in the class next higher.” (Chambers 1846 [1845]: 72-3)274 
One part of the Output, however, is hardly discussed: extinctions. Chambers mentions them several 
times in Vestiges and Explanations, but does not attempt to explain them in any detail. (Chambers 
1845 [1844])  
iv. Input: changing climatic conditions, exhaustion of prolific energy 
It is lawful change which triggers this advancement of organisms through evolution. In the beginning, 
species and the climate all over the earth were uniform. Only with a diversification of the climate did 
species begin to diversify: 
“… the geographical distribution of plants and animals was very different in the 
geological ages from what it is now. Down to a time not long antecedent to man, the 
same vegetation overspread every clime, and a similar uniformity marked the 
zoology.” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 192) 
After the initial “chemico-electric operation”275 advancement occurred “under favor of peculiar 
conditions”276. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 155) Hence,  
“the multitudes of locally peculiar species only came into being after the uniform 
climate had passed away. It may have only been when a varied climate arose, that 
the originally few species branched off into the present extensive variety.” 
(Chambers 1845 [1844]: 192) 
What specifically constitutes such “peculiar conditions”, Chambers did only speculate.277 Moreover, 
some conditions can lead either to an advancement towards a higher type and or the retrogression 
towards a lower one: “Give good conditions, it advances; bad ones, it recedes.” (Chambers 1845 
[1844]: 164)  
With respect to extinctions, Chambers offers only very vague possible triggers. In Explanations, he 
speculates that a species may become extinct when its “prolific energy” is exhausted. (Chambers 
1846 [1845]: 187) However, Chambers does not explain how the term ‘prolific energy’ relates to 
empirical observations. Therefore, I do not consider it part of his model.278 
                                                            
274  This passage reminds of Owen’s homologies but is probably no reception. Owen introduced the concept of 
homology in 1843, but the dissemination within the scientific community began only in the 1850s (section 
4.3.3). An amateur like Chambers would probably have received it still much later. 
275  This is a synonym for ‘spontaneous generation’. 
276  Chambers asks a similar question to the one Darwin would later ask. He argues that there exist “striking 
proofs of the effect of conditions upon organic development. Who is to say where this power of conditions 
has its limit?” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 169) 
277  For instance, he suggested that an increased concentrations of oxygen or light were responsible for the 
advancement from one type to another. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 175) 
278  One might consider it to be part of the narrative but Chambers does not develop his narrative with respect 
to extinctions as a possible Act. Thus the “exhaustion of prolific energy” is not developed as an Agency but 
remains an isolated metaphor. 
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v. Connector: the law of development, longer gestation 
In Chambers’ model, this environmental change triggers the operation of a “law of development in 
the generative system” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 164) and an inherent potential finds its expressions. 
Normally, like produces like but “…sometimes, because of external conditions, the embryonic stage is 
prolonged so that the organism develops … into the embryo of a higher organism, and thus a new 
species is created.” (Ruse 1979: 103; Schwartz 1990: 129; Hodge 972: 142)279  
One might wish to call this process ‘saltational’ because, in Chambers’ logic, there are ‘jumps’280 from 
one type to another without intermediate forms.281 Chambers is rather vague about the process 
supposed to produce these jumps. On the one hand he mentions “slight delays in gestation” which 
may be understood as a reference to Geoffroy’s model. On the other hand “inherent qualities” and 
the “organization” of the organism which are responsible for the transmutation, which sounds more 
like a design idea. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 251; Lynch 2000a: xv) In Explanations, he speaks of 
extinctions being the result of laws. (Chambers 1846 [1845]: 95) 
What Chambers does, however, is introduce the fancy name ‘development’ for his process, an 
analogy from physics: 
“The masses of space are formed by law; law makes them in due time theatres of 
existence for plants and animals; sensation, disposition, intellect, are all in like 
manner developed and sustained in action by law. It is most interesting to observe 
into how small a field the whole of the mysteries of nature thus ultimately resolve 
themselves. The inorganic has been thought to have one final comprehensive law, 
GRAVITATION. The organic, the other great department of mundane things, rests in 
like manner, on one law, and that is DEVELOPMENT. Nor may even these be after all 
twain, but only branches of one still more comprehensive law, the expression of a 
unity, flowing immediately from the One who is First and Last.” (Chambers 1845 
[1844]: 251, his emphasis) 
vi. Summary 
In sum, Chambers presents a clear-cut but incomplete dynamic model: if climate change occurs and 
triggers the law of development (by addressing the inherent qualities of organisms for longer 
gestation), then higher organisms evolve from lower ones in an orderly succession. Extinction, is not 
linked to any discernible empirical Input. The Situation Type is best characterized by spontaneous 
generation and a mixture of uniformitarianism and catastrophism. The Object Class are varieties and 
species. Figure 13 provides an overview over Chambers’ model. 
                                                            
279  This may be a reception of Geoffroy, who describes modified respiration as leading to structural changes. 
(See section 2.3 ix) There is no direct reference to him but Chambers dissociates himself from Lamarck 
(Chambers 1845 [1844]: 176-7) and not from Geoffroy. Assuming that he received both, this is remarkable. 
280  Obviously, the length of the jumps depends on the number of different types and sub-types that are 
distinguished, a matter on which Chambers is not very precise. 
281  These supposed saltations are also one of the rare cases were Chambers provides explicit empirical 
evidence. First, he describes cases were oat was believed to have regressed into rye. (Chambers 1845 
[1844]: 166; cf. Ruse 1979: 104) Second, he describes how larva of worker bees can be modified to bear a 
queen, a case of advancement in Chambers’ logic. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 162; Ruse 1979: 104) 
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Figure 13: Chambers' dynamic model 
3.1.4 Narrative explanation: How did Chambers tell evolution? 
Additionally, Chambers conveys a strong narrative by providing both an Agent and a Purpose to the 
event sequence covered by his dynamic model. 
i. Agent: God 
God is everywhere in Vestiges; to Chambers, any lawful process is divine and any event the outcome 
of divine intention and plan. God is the mindful, thorough and methodical Creator behind everything 
Chambers describes, he is the “divine programmer” analogous to Charles Babbage’s Analytic Engine. 
(Lynch 2000a: xv) 
In this view, God remains the sole Agent, but not in the sense that he constantly intervenes in every 
process but by developing laws which guide all processes to the ends he intends. In this sense, Lynch 
believes that, above all else, “Chambers was attempting to formulate a theodicy and to understand 
the mind of god. Vestiges, far from reflecting atheistic ideology, clearly assumes that a unitary divine 
being was responsible for the natural laws that brought everything into being ...” (Lynch 2000a: xxi) 
Chambers is aware that he thus propagates a novel image of God, which went against the idea of 
divine providence, i.e. the idea that a caring God constantly intervenes and takes care of his 
creatures. (see below) Therefore, Chambers did his best to dissipate such reservations and stressed 
how much more glorious the idea of a lawmaker-God: 
 “It is the narrowest of all views of the Deity and characteristic of an humble class of 
intellects, to suppose him constantly acting in particular ways for particular 
occasions. […] for [i]t lowers him towards the level of our own humble intellects. 
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Much more worthy of him it surely is, to suppose that all things have been 
commissioned by him from the first, though neither is he absent from a particle of 
the current of natural affairs in one sense, seeing that the whole system is 
continually supported by his providence.” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 117-8) 
Chambers’ text provides some minor indications of a possible second author besides God, 
particularly, when he describes that “inherent qualities” in the organisms allow for longer gestation 
and thus evolution. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 251) Such interpretation would point in the direction of 
the popular understanding of the Lamarckian argument. Historians agree, however, that Chambers 
considered the idea untenable that “needs and wishes in the animals” may have dictated the course 
of evolution. (Lynch 2000a: xiv; Hodge 1972: 145) Moreover, Chambers stresses that the very 
“inherent qualities” in the organisms were designed by God. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 251) Thus, the 
literary analysis leaves no room for doubt: the Agent in Chambers’ narrative is God.282 
ii. Scene: Lawfully developing environment 
The Scene in which God acts is the universe, which is subject to him in all its aspects. He is almighty 
and rules the domains of the material world (physics, chemistry, geology) as well as the world of the 
living (biology). Thus, all features of the world bear his mark; everything is lawful and intended 
change, everything displays harmony and design, the world suits its components. 
Such, man did not appear on earth until its physical features allowed to accommodate him:  
 “the land and sea had come into their present relations, and [land]… had acquired 
the irregularity of surface necessary for man”. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 113) 
iii. Agency: climate change, inherent qualities 
The means by which god acts, are his laws, the observable processes are “represented primarily and 
pre-eminently as flowing from commands and expressions of will, not from direct acts.” (Chambers 
1845 [1844]: 117) This is true for both physics and biology: 
“Thus, as one set of laws produced all orbs and their motions and geognostic 
arrangements, so one set of laws overspread them all with life. The whole productive 
or creative arrangements are therefore in perfect unity.” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 
123) 
The laws operating on life, however, are less definite than the laws of mechanics; they can lead to a 
wide range of phenomena and even to negative effects. The sex passion or excessive eating and 
drinking are cases in point. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 253-60) 
                                                            
282  I have also looked for references to a Vital Force in the sense of the German idealist, but those references 
are rare and the Vital Force is always presented as subdued to God. (Chambers 1846 [1845]: 184, 188; 
Chambers 1845 [1844]: 136, 209) 
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iv. Purpose: Design283 
The Purpose behind the observable processes is God‘s will for all of the natural laws “are expressions 
of his will.” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 116) All events on earth (or in the universe) were "devised and 
arranged for beforehand" and display "preconception and forethought". (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 
177) In other words, they are designed (Ruse 1979: 112) and God’s design conveys God’s intent that 
“everything should be very good” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 170-1). 
Overall, “Chambers saw the biological world as evidence for the action of a divine hand and, like 
Whewell, Sedgwick and others, he felt that it was his place to uncover the laws by observing nature 
(albeit in his case, in a largely second-hand fashion).” (Lynch 2000a: xxi) Consequently, the 
advancement to man as the top of the creation is planned as well. (Ruse 1979: 104) 
v. Act: Evolution as mindful and prearranged development  
In the light of this Purpose, evolution appears as a mindfully prearranged process: 
“The whole train of animated beings, from the simplest and oldest up to the highest 
and most recent, are, then, to be regarded as a series of advances of the principle of 
development, which have depended upon external physical circumstances, to which 
the resulting animals are appropriate. I contemplate the whole phenomena as having 
been in the first place arranged in the counsels of Divine Wisdom …” (Chambers 1845 
[1844]: 153-4) 
In return, the production of new forms 
“…has never been anything more than a new stage of progress in gestation, an event 
as simply natural, and attended as little by any circumstances of a wonderful or 
startling kind, as the silent advance of an ordinary mother from one week to another 
of her pregnancy. Yet, be it remembered, the whole phenomena are, in another 
point of view, wonders of the highest kind, in as far as they are direct effects of an 
Almighty will…” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 170-1) 
In sum, the main vehicle of Chambers’ explanation is the Agent: God. Everything in his explanation is 
tailored to God. He acts trough laws and modifies the physical conditions on earth (Agency), 
triggering organism to give birth of more developed organisms (Act) according to a law inscribed in 
them by God (Agency). Neither the Scene nor the Purpose provide much explanatory value; the 
former being little specified and depending from God’s modifications, the latter referring back to 
God’s inscrutable will.  
3.1.5 Implications: What did Chamber’s explanation imply about the world? 
Chambers seems to have been very aware of the possible ontological implications of Vestiges; 
remarkably, he addressed most of them explicitly. On his account, Man remains atop of Nature – 
                                                            
283  This version of design bears little resemblance to modern intelligent design, as championed by Michael 
Behe, for instance. Chambers ‘ design is rather mindfulness and closer to Paley’s ideas. 
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relatively, but possibly also absolutely for it is questionable whether “the human race will ever 
advance far beyond its present position in intellect and morals”. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 268-9) The 
human race might be “of one stock” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 197, cf. 206), but this is still an open 
question as  
“The leading characters, in short, of the various races of mankind, are simply 
representations of particular stages in the development of the highest or Caucasian 
type.” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 214; cf. 207) 
Thus, it is one possible implication of Vestiges that the ancestors of the British gentlemen and ladies 
had lived in the same “barbarian” state as some of the “uncivilized” peoples, even more as 
Chambers’ puts Man in one continuous series with the lower animals, all of which are 
“part products of the Divine Conception, as well as ourselves. All of them display 
wondrous evidences of his wisdom and benevolence. […] Let us regard them in a 
right spirit, as parts of a grand plan which only approaches its perfection in ourselves, 
and we shall see no degradation in the idea of our genetic connection with them, 
but, on the contrary, reason incontestable for treating them in the manner which we 
already feel that a high morality demands.” (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 179) 
“The very faintest notion of there being anything ridiculous or degrading in the 
theory – how absurd does it appear when we remember that every individual 
amongst us actually passes through the characters of the insect, the fish, and reptile 
(to speak nothing of others); before he is permitted to breathe the breath of life!” 
(Chambers 1845 [1844]: 178)  
Hence, Chambers champions a unity of nature and presents this unity as a positive image. 
God clearly is the sole Agent in Chambers’ universe and despite the naturalness of Chambers’ 
evolution and the lack of divine interventions therein, Chambers’ God maintains a close relationship 
with Man: 
“Something in our nature – as it appears to me – tells us that the Author of the 
universe is nearer to us, is in a more familiar and paternal relation to us than would 
seem to be implied by a theory which represents him as only an author of laws.” 
(Chambers 1845 [1844]: 274-5)284 
Since around 1800, ideas of evolutionism had been denounced in Britain as examples of dangerous 
materialism, which undermined natural theology and the argument from design, threatening the 
current moral and social order. In this sense, the dynamic and egalitarian nature of Chambers’ 
Vestiges could be understood as a threat to the stable social order of Victorian Britain (or other 
hierarchical and vastly unequal societies), as both Secord and Lynch point out: 
“[Vestiges] is a book about evolution for the people, and the evolving self-identity of 
‘the people’. […] Reading about evolutionary progress offered common questions to 
bridge divides that threatened the nation's stability. Controversies about class and 
                                                            
284  This much resembles the modern position of the Catholic Church, exemplified for instance by this 
statement of Joseph Ratzinger, the later pope Benedict XVI., in his Schöpfungsglaube und 
Evolutionstheorie. (Ratzinger 1977) 
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gender-among many potentially explosive issues-could thereby be subsumed into 
discussions of nature's progress. Hence the significance of the Vestiges sensation for 
new literary forms such as popular science and the realist novel, and its larger role in 
making "the people" a central category of the industrial order.” (Secord 2000: 5) 
“Chambers, along with Lyell and Darwin, was in the forefront of those who fought against this static 
view of nature, … Chambers' mechanism of rapid saltational (almost revolutional) change no doubt 
directly confronted this viewpoint, despite his belief in distant divine control.” (Lynch 2000a: xvi)  
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3.2 Richard Owen’s accounts of evolution between 1848 and 1868 
Richard Owen was born in 1804, in Lancaster, as one of six children of a merchant. His father, 
however, died when Owen was five years and he had to begin his career from modest means. In 
1820, after grammar school, Owen was apprenticed to a local surgeon and first witnessed post-
mortem dissections. In 1824, he enrolled at Edinburgh University as a medical student but remained 
only half a year, quickly moving to the St. Bartholomew's Hospital in London, where he was 
appointed prosector to the lectures of the eminent surgeon John Abernethy and could specialize in 
anatomy. In 1825, he became a member of the Royal College of Surgeons and one year later, at the 
age of 22 was made assistant curator at the Hunterian Museum, occupied with the preparation of 
the catalogues of the Hunterian collections. In 1831, Owen spent several months with Georges 
Cuvier in Paris, a formative influence. 
Owen would remain employed at the Royal College of Surgeons until 1856 when he was appointed 
Superintendent of the natural history departments of the British Museum. It is during these years at 
the Royal College that Owen built his career and reputation through a never-ending stream of 
publications and lectures. In these, he aimed at elevating the status of his discipline to the heights of 
physics or chemistry, to law-like science. (Padian 2007: lxxxii) 
By the 1840s, he was considered the most eminent British naturalist and, in 1856, the Times declared 
that “[t]han Professor Owen there is not a more distinguished man of science in the country”. (op. 
cit. Rupke 1994: 1) He was admiringly named the “British Cuvier”, no less. Around this time, “Owen 
had become the most publicly visible scientist of the British empire. Seated in the hub of a colonial 
network of specimen supply, he was the keeper and interpreter of the imperial collections. […] The 
tide of his popularity with the public and his patrons had risen higher than ever.” (Rupke 1994: 97) 
Owen employed this power to pursue his second great project besides anatomy: the construction of 
a museum for the British collections of natural history, equivalent to the Muséum National d’Histoire 
Naturelle in Paris. It was largely due to Owen’s incessant campaigns that the natural history 
collections at the British Museum would be devoted their very own museum, a landmark building in 
South Kensington. Owen secured the political endorsement and the funds for this tremendous 
project. At the same time, he changed the public understanding of what a museum should be 
because he regarded the public as its main addressee and he conceived exhibitions as directed at 
interested laymen. Nicolaas A. Rupke, in his landmark biography how much of Owens professional 
career was devoted to these “museum politics”. 285 (Rupke 1994) Owen oversaw the museum’s 
construction and would remain its superintendent for two more years after its opening in 1881. He 
retired in 1883 and died in 1892. 
In the 20th century, Owen was mostly known as a formidable anatomist and an opponent to the 
Darwinian theory of evolution. A more adequate appraisal of his life would focus on his anatomy and 
                                                            
285  Hence, one could make a case that Owen was an underestimated “popularize of science”, a role usually 
ascribed to the likes of Huxley or Spencer. As Rupke argues, “…for the advancement of Owen's museum 
plans it was necessary that he reach a far wider audience – an audience that included not only the scientific 
trustees, but also the politically powerful ex officio ones, and a public whose opinion could be influenced to 
sway that of the politicians. Reaching such an audience could be achieved only by public lectures, so Owen 
combined his curatorial duties and scientific studies with an energetic programme of lecturing.” (Rupke 
1994: 88) 
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museum politics for his opposition to Darwin was but an episode and even during the tumultuous 
early 1860’s it was not the main focus of Owen’s work.286 Thus, considering Owen “eclipsed by 
Darwin” is off-target. The topic of evolution was not Owen’s focus; his “grand strategy was not to 
counter Geoffroy, or, much later, Darwin, but to build the most precious collection of museum 
objects [in order] to force the hands that held the public purse strings.” (Rupke 1994: 75) That Owen 
succeeded in this pursuit there is no question; one result continues to stand tall and proud on South 
Kensington’s Exhibition Road. 
Moreover, throughout his career, Owen published more than 600 papers and books, among them 
many “firsts”, i.e. descriptions of formerly unknown organisms.287 In terms of volume, his body of 
work outclasses all of his contemporaries, including Darwin. When one flips through the British 
journals of the time, the number of Owen’s papers is impressive; in some volumes, he authored 
more than half of the papers. 
Most of Owen’s papers are case studies of single organisms or small groups of organisms. 
Additionally, Owen published several systematic studies of entire classes of organisms; the best-
known are probably his History of British Fossils and his Anatomy of Vertebrates. Owen never wrote a 
major theoretical treatise like Chambers’ Vestiges or Darwin’s Origin. The 1848 On the Archetype and 
Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton and his 1849 On the Nature of Limbs are probably his most 
theory-heavy books and both are long and detailed anatomical studies with a small theoretical 
discussion in the end. 
It is not that Owen had no talent for generalization but he applied it, as Rupke puts it, at a “more 
specific level” than Darwin. (Rupke 1994: 238) Owen’s work focuses on the lower two levels of my 
framework: description and classification. He provided meticulous descriptions of numerous 
organisms and a static model according to which he aggregated and interpreted these descriptions. 
This model, Owen’s archetype, was inspired by one of the great biological debates of the nineteenth 
century – yet not by evolution. Instead, Owen developed the archetype in view of the Cuvier-
Geoffroy debate, the confrontation of functionalism and structuralism. (Amundson 2007: xv, xx-xxi) 
Owen’s aim was to reconcile the two sides. (Rupke 1994: 117) Thus, when he compared the feet of 
the camel and dromedary in his 1849 Nature of Limbs, he saw evidence for both design (function) 
and the unity of plan (structuralism): 
“The comparison of the bones of the extremities is replete with these beautiful 
evidences of design; but our present purpose is to gather the indications of that 
which has been sometimes, but wrongly, regarded as the antithetical principle, viz. 
the unity of plan which lies at the bottom of all the adaptive modifications.” (Owen 
2007 [1849]: 34) 
From Owen’s point of view, both principles need not exclude each other: 
                                                            
286  Actually, (Rupke 1994: 105) points out that Owen’s harsh criticism of Darwin in his 1860 review might also 
be rooted in political conflicts. In mid-1858 “Huxley, Darwin and others had attempted to sabotage Owen’s 
plans” for the Natural History Museum. (Rupke 1994: 97) adds that Owen’s institutional power might have 
fueled the conflict with the Darwinians. It was not merely a struggle over a theoretical concept but 
probably also about politics and power, particularly in the case of Huxley. 
287  Among the most popular are the Dodo, the Gorilla and the Archaeopteryx. 
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“Those physiologists who admit no other principle to have governed the construction 
of living beings than the exclusive and absolute adaptation of every part to its 
function, are apt to object to such remarks as have been offered regarding the 
composition of the skeleton of the whale's fin and of the chick's head, that' nothing is 
made in vain;' and they deem that adage a sufficient refutation of the idea that so 
many apparently superfluous bones and joints should exist in their particular order 
and collocation in subordination to another principle; conceiving, quite gratuitously 
in my opinion, the idea of conformity to type to be opposed to the idea of design.“ 
(Owen 2007 [1849]: 84) 
In sum, Owen’s work integrates in a “program intended to build up a ‘natural system’ out of the 
artificial taxonomic classifications that had been popular in the eighteenth century”, he related his 
work to Cuvier and Geoffroy, not to Lamarck. (Camardi 2001: 482; cf. Amundson 2007: xxii) 
Evolution – or ‘transmutation’ or ‘development’, as he called it – did not take center-stage in Owen’s 
research. Throughout the 1830s, Owen had been an advocate of the creation of species and 
dismissed evolutionary accounts, focusing his critique mainly on Lamarck.288 Yet, the last time Owen 
explicitly stated his support for creation was in 1841, in a report to the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science (BAAS). (Rupke 1994: 221) 
Following the publication of Chambers’ Vestiges289, Owen changed this position; apparently, 
Chambers slowly brought him towards a view of transformation – and not an adaptionist one.290 
(Rupke 1994: 223; Cosans 2009: 30; Richards 1987: 130) This showed when Owen turned down 
several requests to publicly criticize Vestiges. Although he disagreed with specific elements, Owen 
refused to dismiss the entire theory. 
In 1848 and 1849, by then well-established in the British scientific system, Owen dared his first step 
towards evolution, with some cautious passages in On the Archetype and in On the Nature of Limbs. 
(Richards 1987a: 158) However, the establishment’s critical reaction, particularly the warnings of 
some prestigious friends in Oxford and Cambridge, quickly stopped Owen in his tracks. In the 
following years he scattered hints at his position291 over a couple publications but never wrote down 
anything close to a consistent theory. 
These publications appeared between 1848 and 1868. The period begins with Owen’s two important 
publications on the archetype and concludes in 1868, when the Darwinian revolution was essentially 
achieved and Owen hardly published on the topic anymore, instead focusing instead on his 
institutional career. (Rupke 1994: 219) The following important publications fall in this period: 
                                                            
288  For an analysis of Owen‘s position to transmutation in the 1830s, see Desmond (1985) or Richards (1987), 
for a comparative analysis of Darwin and Owen describing and interpreting one and the same fossil in the 
1830s, see (Rachootin 1985). 
289  (Richards 1987: 150) dates Owen’s first transmutational thoughts to around 1837, i.e. after Geoffroy’s 
evolutionary work. In his publications, however, the first clear statements seem to appear in the 1840s 
and, thus, after Vestiges. 
290  (Hall 2007a: xiii) claims that Owen’s view was anti-adaption. I disagree with him, considering how much 
Owen still embedded his understanding of evolution in arguments from design. (see below) 
291  Remember that I will analyze what Owen published on the topic of evolution, hence what could be 
received. I am not analyzing in what he privately thought. For an analysis which takes into account his 
position in private letters see (Richards 1987). 
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1848 On the Archetype of the Vertebrate Skeleton 
1849 On the Nature of Limbs 
1850 On Didornis 
1851 On the Osteology of the Chimpanzees and Orangs 
1858 President’s Address to the BAAS of 1858292  
1859 On the Extinction of Species (the Conclusion of the Fullerian Lectures for 1859) 
1859 On the Orang, Chimpanzee, and Gorilla. With Reference to the 'Transmutation of Species' 
1860 Palaentology 
1862 On the aye-aye 
1866 On the Osteology of the Dodo 
1868 The Anatomy of the Vertebrates 
Table 8: Owen's important publications between 1848 and 1868 
These publications will be supplemented by others where suitable. Obviously, scattered remarks and 
single passages impede giving a consistent account of Owen’s position on evolution; indeed, Owen 
provides no such thing as a coherent theory. Moreover, there is ample discussion on just how close 
Owen’s concept of evolution came to that of Darwin or Wallace.293 The consensus seems to be that 
Owen could agree with much of Chambers’ account but stopped somewhere short of Darwin.294 Let 
me specify this with the help of my framework. 
3.2.1  Description: What evidence did Owen present how? 
Owen was a formidable empirical scientist and published an impressive amount of empirical studies. 
He was not in the position to tap a fully new source of biological knowledge in the sense that Buffon 
had tapped into biogeography, Lamarck and Cuvier into comparative anatomy, Cuvier into 
paleontology, or Geoffroy into embryology. Owen did, however, enlarge the domain of embryology; 
not only did he consider snapshots of young animals but series of development from younger to 
more mature to mature animals. Thus, Owen could not only describe how the young exemplars of a 
species differed from the mature ones but describe the developmental (ontogenic) process which led 
from one to the other. This was a very resourceful field as, in some species, the young and adult 
species differed considerably. (Cosans 2009: 21) 
Moreover, Owen’s institutional position allowed him to access many previously unknown species and 
to describe them for the first time. Some of the most contested “missing links” in the Darwinian 
account of evolution295, had first been described Owen. Among them are the Archaeopteryx, which 
Owen interpreted as a bird and not as a missing link between birds and reptiles (Owen 1863 [1862]), 
as well as the Chimpanzee, Gorilla, Orangutan and Aye-Aye. (Owen 1848b; Owen 1859a; Owen 1865; 
Owen 1862a [1851]; Owen 1866a [1862]). 
                                                            
292  Owen held the speech three months after the publication of the joint Darwin Wallace paper. 
293  See for instance Richards 1987a; Camardi 2001; Brooke 1977; MacLeod 1965; Cosans 1994; Cosans 2009; 
Rupke 1993; Rupke 1994; Amundson 2007; Padian 2007; Ruse 1979; Himmelfarb 1959. 
294  Remember that I am not interested in what Owen privately thought or meant about evolution but what he 
published and what part of his publications was received as relevant for the question of transmutation. 
295  It is important that the Darwinians never contested Owen’s descriptions of these “missing links”, only 
Owen’s interpretations as them belonging to one specific class and not in between two. (See section v;)  
Sebastian Zacharias: The Darwinian Revolution as a knowledge reorganization 
 
100 
The question of apes was particularly important as it touched the self-image of Man. The possible 
relation of Man and the apes was already debated in the mid-1830s when “Western science was 
acquiring some of the first specimens of orangutans and chimpanzees, [and] it was recognized that of 
all animals these species had the greatest similarity to humans.” (Cosans 2009: 15) At the Hunterian 
Museum of the Royal College of Surgeons, Owen had access to ape specimens and published on the 
question from 1837 on. (Cosans 2009: 15) 
He compared humans and apes based on three types of features, first of all, qualitative anatomical 
features of the skull and the brain. In his 1848 article on the Gorilla, Owen identified thirty 
characteristics in which Man and apes differ, most notably that “gorilla has a smaller brain case, 
larger supraorbital ridges …. and ‘much larger and longer canines’”. (Cosans 2009: 36-7) In 1857, in a 
paper read to Linnean society he concentrated on “a peculiar posterior lobe, which is characterized 
by the posterior horn of the lateral ventricle and the hippocampus minor.”296 (Cosans 1994: 142) To 
validate his findings Owen carried out special observations on humans with brain defects and on the 
brains of blacks and compared both to the Apes. (Cosans 2009: 23, 51) 
Owen did not stop there; he underpinned his qualitative findings with quantitative measures: 
“To quantify the differences in brain size between human races and apes, Owen 
presented tables of cranial capacities. He reproduced a chart in which Wyman (1850) 
summarizes data297 collected by Morton, on a total of 464 human skulls ... and in 
another table he showed the cranial capacities of live gorillas, five chimpanzees, and 
three adult orangutans.” (Cosans 1994: 141) 
Moreover, Owen pursued his extension of Geoffroy’s embryology and cited developmental processes 
of the brain. He argued that more than qualitative and quantitative absolute measures on adult 
organisms the dynamics of brain development distinguished apes and humans. 
3.2.2 Classification: How did Owen aggregate and interpret evidence? 
Owen’s longest-lasting contribution was not an empirical but a systematic one and is still in use 
today: He introduced the concept of homologies to systematize certain anatomical similarities. (Hall 
2007a: x; cf. Hall 2007b) By introducing two basic distinctions, Owen distinguished different kinds of 
similarities and clarified in what respects organisms could resemble each other, a point which had 
confused his predecessors, most notably Cuvier and Geoffroy. 
First, Owen distinguished analogous similarities and homologous similarities.298 He defined an 
analogue as a “part or organ in one animal which has the same function as another part or organ in a 
different animal” and a homologue as the “same organ in different animals under every variety of 
form and function”. (op. cit. Amundson 2007: xxii; cf. Ruse 1979: 118-119) These two kinds of 
similarities reflected the two concepts which had clashed in the Cuvier-Geoffroy-debate. Analogues 
were supposed to display a similarity of function and thus Cuvier’s adaption to the conditions of 
                                                            
296  The latter feature would become the target of Huxley’s criticism in 1860 and would trigger the most 
prominent debate of the Darwinian revolution. (See section v) 
297  Owen provided a table with the exact measurements from Wyman, a rarity at the time. 
298  Darwin was unaware of this distinction while composing his essay of 1843 but integrated it in his later 
work, for instance in the Origin. (Amundson 2007: xxiii) 
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existence. Homologues, on the other hand, reflected Geoffroy’s unity of type in that they highlighted 
how much certain organ resembled each other anatomically without independently of their function. 
Second, Owen distinguished three kinds of homologies: homology, special homology and general 
homology. Reflecting his desire to transform biology into a law-like science299, Owen did formulate 
them in laws of homology. (Owen 2007 [1849]: 57; Owen 1848a: 171) They can, however, simply be 
described as empirical regularities between parts of organisms, most notably vertebrates. Such, 
serial homology denotes the similarity of repeated elements in an individual body, for instance 
between the ribs of a rib cage. Special homology is the correspondence between single body parts of 
organisms of different species, for instance between the fins of fishes and the limbs of mammals.300 
General homology is a combination of the former two, denoting the fact that the special homologies 
within the body of one species are also homologous to the special homologies in other species, i.e. 
that the similarities between human ribs exist as well in dogs. Thus, it describes the correspondence 
of special homology relations between bodies of different species. 301 (cf. Amundson 2007: xxv, cf. 
Ruse 1979: 118-119) 
Based on these distinctions, Owen demonstrated “the entire skeletons of vertebrate groups could be 
shown to correspond, bone for bone, with those of other vertebrate groups.” (Amundson 2007: xxiii) 
While previous morphologists had noticed some of these similarities, Owen provided the first large-
scale systematic account.302 Moreover, he took this as a starting point for a substantial renaming 
project in vertebrate anatomy:  
“In The Archetype and Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton (1848), Owen 
catalogued the names by which various vertebrate bones had been designated by the 
specialist anatomists who had named them [… and] tabulated the various names and 
descriptions by which all of the bones were (separately) known. He then assigned the 
corresponding bones the same name, in many cases replacing a long anatomical 
description with a brief name. Plate I in Limbs contains a numbered list of these 
                                                            
299  Owen’s fascination with laws bore somewhat absurd fruit when he reformulated established empirical 
regularities as laws. Such he restated biogeographical knowledge in a “law of special modification and 
adaption … to the exigences and habits and sphere of life of the species” (Owen 1848a: 106), 
paleontological findings in a law “which has governed the successive introduction of specific forms of living 
beings into this planet” (Owen 1848a: 106) or a “law of the more generalized character of extinct species” 
(Owen 1868: 790) or “the progressive departure from general type as exemplified in the series of species 
from their first introduction to the present time” (Owen 1860a: 407) and, finally, embryonic resemblances 
in a “law of closer retention of type in the embryo” (Owen 1868: 768). (cf. Padian 2007: lxxxiv) 
300  The discovery of this homology was a milestone of Owen’s work. (Hall 2007a: x) 
301  Amundson points out that the general homology of a bone “extends in three dimensions: serially in the 
animal's body, especially in its relation to homologues in other vertebrates, and developmentally in the 
centrum's special relation with the notocord during embryogenesis. The complexity of this illustration 
shows the importance of general homology to Owen. It would be central to his thought on species origins.“ 
(Amundson 2007: xxvii) 
302  For instance, Goethe in his „Erster Entwurf einer allgemeinen Einleitung in die vergleichende Anatomie“, 
describes the aspiration of morphology thus: „Die Erfahrung muss uns vorerst die Teile lehren, die allen 
Tieren gemeinsam sind, und worin diese Teile verschieden sind. Die Idee muss über dem Ganzen walten 
und auf eine genetische Weise das allgemeine Bild abziehen“ und weiter „Indem wir jenen Typus aufstellen 
und als eine allgemeine Norm, wonach wir die Knochen der sämtlichen Säugetiere zu beschreiben und zu 
beurteilen haben, … setzen wir in der Natur eine gewisse Konsequenz voraus, wir trauen ihr zu, dass sie in 
allen einzelnen Fällen nach einer gewissen Regel verfahren werde.“ (op.cit. Richter and Wirkner 2012) 
Owen acknowledge Goethe’s work in the Archetype. (Owen 1848a: 8) 
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names, and the numbers are used throughout the book to designate the homologous 
bones in all species under discussion.” (Amundson 2007: xxiii-xxiv) 
Ron Amundson points out an interesting point about this denotative project: Owen carried out his 
renaming “as if it were a simple matter of commonsense pragmatism and British empiricism”. 
(Amundson 2007: xxiv) Owen claimed that  
"To substitute names [of bones] for phrases is not only allowable, but I believe it to 
be indispensable to the right progress of anatomy; but such names must be arbitrary, 
or at least, should have no other signification [sic!] than the homological one, if 
anatomy, as the science of the structure of all animals, is to enjoy the inestimable 
benefit of a steady and universal nomenclature." (Owen 1848a: 3) 
Is this the whole truth? Was Owen’s project a neutral one, consisting in an intuitive and pragmatic 
aggregation? In one sense it was: Owen simply systematized affinities which were visible to other 
observers as well, he aggregated empirical regularities and introduced technical names for these 
regularities providing little interpretation. It is in this sense that the terms ‘homology’ and 
‘homologous’ are still in use today: as nominal (arbitrary) operational definitions.303 
In another sense, however, Owen’s terms conveyed a strong interpretative bias. As Amundson 
stresses,  
“The underlying theoretical assumption of the entire project is that all vertebrates 
are built on a single body plan. Homologies are the elements of this body plan.” 
(Amundson 2007: xxiv) 
Calling two things alike conveys the impression that they are alike. Thus, Owen’s denotation implies a 
fundamental “sameness” beyond anatomical similarities. It conveyed the idea that Owen’s 
denotative project and his homologies were not simply pragmatic aggregations of empirical 
regularities but expressed fundamental relations beyond the realm of empirics. In this sense, the 
concept of homologies had a strong interpretative component and it is in this sense that Owen linked 
it to his static model, the Vertebrate Archetype. 304 (See below) 
Owen first presented his static model, the Archetype, in a report to the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science (BAAS) in September 1846 and elaborated it in his 1848 On the Archetype 
and Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton, where he described it as "an ideal pattern or archetype 
of the vertebrate endoskeleton, as shown in a side view of the series of typical segments or 
'vertebrae' of which it is composed" (Owen 1848a: 176). (Rupke 1993: 233) Owen provided an actual 
graphic scheme of this vertebrate archetype; a drawing supposed to visualize those segments which 
all vertebrates share in the arrangement shared by all vertebrates.305 
Hence, the archetype expressed the same “belief in the fundamental relatedness” as the homologies. 
(Rupke 1994: 188) More precisely, while the homologies are one-word summaries of empirical 
                                                            
303  This does not exclude, however, that this operational definition was interpreted in very different 
theoretical frameworks. Owen himself did not utilize the archetype in his definitions of homologies; he did 
not refer to it during throughout the introductory parts of the Archetype. (Owen 1848a: 1-18) 
304  The implication of this “theory-ladenness” will be addressed in section 6 iv. 
305  This would be the only specific representation of an archetype that Owen ever provided. 
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regularities, the archetype is a one-word summary of the homologies; and as the homologies 
interpret the empirical regularities, the archetype interprets the homologies. On Owen’s view, 
“Just as an individual vertebrate body is a series of variations on the theme of the 
ideal vertebra, distinct species are variations on the Vertebrate Archetype.” 
(Amundson 2007: xxx) 
Owen’s concept has several roots. The term ‘archetype’ was first employed with respect to anatomy 
by the anatomist Joseph Maclise, but in a different sense.306 The scheme by which Owen visualized 
the archetype, was probably inspired by the German natural philosopher Carl Gustav Carus.307 The 
morphological approach itself is closest probably closest to the work of Geoffroy. Actually, it was 
through Owen’s archetype that Britain closed a knowledge gap to the continent.  
The Britons had fancied Cuvier and his “conditions of existence” which complied so well with the 
design of Natural Theology and the ideas of Paley. At the same time, they had ignored the 
morphological research of Geoffroy and the theorizing of German natural philosophers, condemning 
both as speculative.308 Therefore, much of the morphological knowledge acquired on the continent 
was not yet shared by the Britons and it required Owen’s Nature of Limbs to bring  
“mainstream British biology in line with the continent. It did so in part by expressing 
structuralist biology in a conservative way. Owen's conservatism had two aspects. 
The first was dutifully religious: he padded his structuralist conclusions in pious 
rhetoric (though this rhetoric did not dilute his radical conclusions). The second was 
epistemological: Owen did his best to present his views as having been arrived at on 
the basis of good British empiricism and inductivism. He acknowledged the 
continental morphologists for their ideas, but blamed them for their speculative 
excesses and pointed out empirical errors. He admitted that very little morphology 
had been done in Britain (Limbs, 4), but was careful to list the speculative flaws in the 
work of continental morphologists (Limbs, 41, 81). This had to be done in order to 
overcome the principle of the empirical accessibility of function. Owen insists that 
the Vertebrate Archetype and homologies are "no mere transcendentalist dream, but 
true knowledge and legitimate fruit of inductive research" (Limbs, 70). Radicals and 
lesser figures had already argued the point, but it was Owen who brought the 
argument home, and made structuralism palatable to mainstream British science.” 
(Amundson 2007: xx-xxi) 
Considering he was being called the “British Cuvier”, it is interesting how much Owen approached 
Geoffroy here and how much he criticized Cuvier.309 Owen argued that Cuvier’s anatomy and its 
focus on design and the conditions of existence was incomplete: 
"The attempt to explain, by the Cuvierian principles, the facts of special homology on 
the hypothesis of the subserviency of the parts so determined to similar ends in 
                                                            
306  For a discussion, see (Rupke 1993: 251; Rupke 1994: 197). 
307  For Carus’ morphological scheme see Rupke 1993: 241 or Rupke 1994: 195. 
308  As Lamarck, Geoffroy seems not to have been translated to English. Owen’s attempt to translate Oken’s 
Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie caused a scandal. 
309  This reflected the fact that, after his distinction of Cuvier’s analogies and Geoffroy’s homologies, Owen’s 
research focused on the latter. 
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different animals, – to say that the same or answerable bones occur in them because 
they have to perform similar functions – involve many difficulties, and are opposed 
by numerous phaenomena." (Owen 1848a: 73; cf. Ruse 1979: 118) 
Therefore, from Owen’s point of view, one had to consider both, (i) the exigencies of the 
environment in which an organism lived and (ii) the morphological similarities which persisted 
independent from the “conditions of existence”, i.e. Geoffroy’s “unity of type”. Those could be 
described and predicted with the help of Owen’s homologies. (Padian 2007: lxxxi-lxxxii) 
Beyond the conflict between Cuvier and Geoffroy, Owen attempted to integrate his archetype in a 
larger philosophical context by relating it to Platon’s concept of ideas. This led to an interesting volte. 
In his first presentations of the archetype, in 1847 and 1848, Owen presented the archetype as an 
“all-pervading polarizing force” which acted “in antagonism” with a Platonic vital force. (Owen 
1848a: 171; cf. Rupke 1993: 243-5; Amundson 2007: xxxii) )In this conception, the archetype acted as 
a conservative force which preserved the general “unity of type” from too much adaption to Cuvier’s 
“conditions of existence”, which could be understood as the Platonic vital force. Owen argued that a 
body develops by interaction of both forces: "the adaptive or special organizing force" and the 
"general and all-pervading polarizing force". (Owen 1848a: 171-2; cf. Rupke 1993: 243; Rupke 1994: 
198; Amundson 2007: xxxii) 
This antagonism of an organizing force, which preserved the “unity of type”, and a polarizing force 
which fueled the adaption to “conditions of existence” complied well with Owen’s application of the 
archetype to taxonomy. On Owen’s account, there was no specimen who actually corresponded to 
the archetype; he did not identify any actual fossil with the archetype. He argued, however, that by 
tracking higher forms back to more primitive ones, one is approaching the archetype. According to 
Owen, there is a "closer adhesion to the archetype" in lower vertebrates, but a "superior influence of 
the antagonizing power of adaptive modification" in higher ones. (Owen 2007 [1849]: 59) These 
modifications produce the features which taxonomists employ for classification. At his archetype 
figure in the Nature of Limbs, Owen 
“indicated the first steps of those modifications that, depending on kind and degree, 
give the archetype the characters of a class, order, genus, and species. In the same 
plate he presented figures of the full modifications of the archetype that characterize 
fish, reptile, bird, mammal, and human, each the typical skeleton of its respective 
taxonomic group.” (Rupke 1993: 234) 
In his 1849, Nature of Limbs, however, Owen suddenly turned on his heels and presented the 
archetype as a Platonic idea, as a “predetermined pattern, answering to the 'idea' of the Archetypal 
World in the Platonic cosmogony" (Owen 2007 [1849]: 2-3), “a divine forethought, a blueprint of 
design for the formation of animal life” (Rupke 1994: 199). It seems that Owen bowed to political 
pressure powerful Oxbridge scholars and that his friend, the conservative geologist William Daniel 
Conybeare (1787-1857), had advised him on his about-turn. (Rupke 1994: 202; Amundson 2007: 
xxxii) The British scientific mainstream was still too much rooted in theism and Design to embrace a 
concept which opposed all of Cuvierian anatomy and Paleyian design and Platonic idealism.310 If 
                                                            
310  In the 1840s and early 1850s Geoffroy and the German speculative morphologists were still considered 
scandalous. (cf. Rupke 1994: 201) 
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Owen’s archetype was the organizing model behind his anatomy, it better complied with the 
dominant theistic narrative. (see below) 
Owen justified his shift by constructing the archetype not as a basal embodiment of the organizing 
force, but as a possibility space. In the Nature of Limbs, Owen argued that the archetype is something 
like the totality of possible modifications and that these 
“are very far from being exhausted by any of the forms that now inhabit the earth, or 
that are known to have existed here at any period.” (Owen 2007 [1849]: 83; cf. Rupke 
1994: 155) 
It is doubtful, whether this turn-around made much philosophical sense311, however, it allowed to 
restore Man’s place atop of creation and to interpret his anatomical complexity as a product of 
divine providence. All throughout the considered period, from 1848 to 1868, Owen considered Man 
to be clearly separated from the apes. In the early Vertebrate Archetype and the Nature of Limbs, 
Owen regarded man as the highest form, i.e. the one that departs most from the vertebrate 
archetype. (Owen 1848a: 132; Owen 2007 [1849]: 56, 109, 172; cf. Rupke 1993: 243; cf. Rupke 1994: 
155)  
In this early period, Owen still focused on qualitative anatomical differences, notably in the skull, and 
drew quite a sharp line between humans and apes: 
“Humanity was not only the sole species of its genus, it was the only member of the 
Bimanaus ("two-handed") order. In contrast, all the anthropoid apes share the order 
Quadrumana ("four-handed") along with even less human-like simians. Owen 
declares that this implies that the division between human and ape results from 
distinctions as great ‘as those which mark the primary (unguiculate) division of the 
placental subclass of Mammalia’.” (Cosans 2009: 39; cf. Owen 1848b: 414)312 
Quickly, however, Owen moved to the morphological features of the brain which, to Owen, was “at 
the core of what it is to be a mammal”. (Cosans 2009: 53) Moreover, Owen abandoned absolute 
qualitative features and focused on developmental processes and quantitative measures instead. 
Thus, in a 1851 memoir, On the Osteology of the Chimpanzees and Orangs, Owen cited data by 
Wyman and Morton on skull sizes. Concentrating on averages instead of extreme expressions, he 
“concluded that the great gulf between ape and human brains size outweighs any 
difference which may be found between human races. Wyman's chart implies the 
                                                            
311  Rupke remarks that “Whereas a Platonic idea is the highest, most perfect reality, the vertebrate archetype 
represented the opposite, namely the simplest and least perfected conception of a vertebrate. In one 
sense, Owen's archetype was all potentiality, and as such his position more Aristotelian than Platonist, and 
close to the ‘entheism’ of Carus.” (Rupke 1994: 197) – Whether this mattered to Owen is doubtful. He was 
not much of philosopher, as (Rupke 1994: 200) points out: “It is erroneous to believe that Owen was 
directly influenced by any philosopher at all, whether it be Plato, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel or 
Schopenhauer […] Owen simply did not have a philosophical turn of mind. To try and make a coherent 
system of philosophy out of Owen's various theories would be an unjustified and futile undertaking.” 
(Rupke 1994: 200; cf. Ruse 1979: 122) 
312  The strict distinction between humans and apes was not an extreme position. In the 1940s, humans were 
still believed to have diverged from the apes about 8-9 million years ago. Today, the gap is insofar smaller 
as chimpanzees are considered closer related to humans than to any of the other apes. (cf. Keith 1948: 
158-9) 
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mean cranial capacity for Europeans is 91 cubic inches and that of native Australians 
as 75 cubic inches. Because of the scarcity of ape material, Owen compared the 
human averages with record ape brain size. The largest ape capacity is 34 and 112 
cubic inches, found in a male gorilla. Hence, the record ape capacity is less than one 
half the lowest mean for a group of humans. Owen found the larger human brain size 
even more remarkable because the male gorilla has a much larger body than a man.” 
(Cosans 1994: 141) 
A similar arguments is pursued in Owen’s 1858 paper in the Journal of the Linnean Society, On the 
characters, principles of division and primary groups of the class Mammalia (Owen 1858: 1-37) and in 
his 1859 monograph On the Classification and Geographical Distribution of the Mammalia (Owen 
1859b; Owen 1859a: 97, 103), both of which were published in knowledge of the joint paper by 
Darwin and Wallace but before the publication of the Origin of Species. (cf. Fishman 1997: 105ff.) 
Furthermore, in his 1857 paper “On the Characters, Principles of Division, and Primary Groups of the 
Class Mammalia”, Owen analyzed four distinct stages of brain development and argued that they 
provided clear criteria for distinguishing the higher mammals. (Cosans 1994: 141)313 However, Owen 
now lessened his stance on the position of humans, no longer suggesting a progression up to Man. 
(Ruse 1979: 137) This interpretation seems to follow from his anatomical research on novel ape 
specimen which revealed that there is no ape species which is closest to humans with respect to all 
relevant anatomical criteria, but that different species share different features with Man. (Owen 
1859c: 74-5) Thus, man is “no longer the measure of all things” and each taxonomic group is being 
considered in its own right. (Ruse 1979: 137) 
What still sharply distinguished humans from apes were the brain’s psychological and mental power. 
However, this was no absolute boundary; the human intelligence, soma and psyche were merely 
indicators of relatively more developed brain. Owen specifically stressed that the different mental 
capacities of chimpanzees, mentally disabled humans and blacks were not “of a nature so essential 
as to preclude a comparison between them, or as being other than a difference of degree". (Owen 
1857: 20; cf. Cosans 2009: 57-9; Cosans 1994: 144) 
Thus, the more ape and human specimen the anatomists acquired and the more knowledge they 
produced, the less poignant became the differences between both.314 In the end, Owen’s 
classification was not based on absolute anatomical differences but on differences of degree and on 
capacities which supposedly resulted from such differences of degree. This is all the more 
remarkable as Owen never carried out any systematic research on the intelligence of apes, their 
                                                            
313  Cosans summarizes these differences as follows: “While an infant ape's skull has proportions similar to 
those of a human, it loses much of the resemblance as the ape grows larger. In maturing apes, the brain 
ceases its growth and the jaws expand greatly after the first set of teeth develop; in the developing human, 
by contrast, the brain continues to grow larger while the jaws expand only modestly. Consequently, adult 
chimpanzees and orangutans have proportionally smaller brains and larger jaws than those of adult 
humans. Rather than viewing the jaw as an isolated part, Owen considered how it fits into each organism's 
way of life.” (Cosans 2009: 21) 
314  It seems that Owen’s insistence on the distinction of humans and apes was also an argument for the unity 
of the human race and against slavery. Owen opposed classifications which saw non-Western races as 
intermediate between the highly developed Caucasian race and higher apes, opposing Chambers on this 
point. (See section 3.1.2) For a discussion of this point, see (Cosans 2009: 25-28, 51-59) 
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soma or psyche; the first systematic studies on the intelligence of apes would appear only decades 
later.315 As Owen himself uttered it in 1868: 
“How the brain works in producing thought or soul is as much a mystery in Man as 
Brutes is as little known as the way in which ganglions and nerves produce the reflex 
phenomena simulating sensation and volition.” (Owen 1868: 824) 
3.2.3 Logical explanation: How did Owen model evolution? 
Identifying a dynamic model in Owen’s texts is a difficult task as he never described a complete or 
consistent such model, particularly no Connector. In the discussion of evolution, Owen rarely went 
beyond the archetype, particularly, he never presented a coherent dynamic model to explain how 
evolution happened. (Padian 2007: lxviii; Rupke 1994: 238) Instead, Owen embedded his static 
model, the archetype, directly in a narrative explanation, without an intermediate dynamic model.  
Although not suggesting a model of his own, Owen expressed evolutionary views, discussing to what 
extend in what manner groups of organisms might change over time.316 Moreover, he discussed 
several ideas of what might trigger evolution, thus describing different options for the Input. I will 
systematize these ideas in an attempt to grasp what account and explanation of evolution Victorian 
readers might have drawn from Owen’s writings between 1848 and 1868. I will begin by describing 
what Owen understood by evolution, or – as he preferred – ‘development’ or ‘derivation’, describing 
the objects which underwent the process and the results it yielded: the Object Class and Output of 
my model of dynamic models. I will continue by analyzing the different factors (“causes”) he 
considered as being able to trigger evolution, my Input. Finally, I will analyze what kinds of a 
Connector and Situations Owen considered in his writings and what role they played in his 
explanation.  
i. Output: Deviation within limits & extinction 
Owen’s 1848 On the Archetype and Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton is still much centered 
around static modeling and interpretation (level two of my model). Owen’s ambition is to describe 
and interpret the common and distinct features of organisms as well as their variation in space and 
time, i.e. evolution, as variations of the archetype – or a future, more advanced model: 
“To trace the mode and kind and extent of modification of the same elementary 
parts of the typical segment throughout a large, natural series of highly organized 
animals. like the vertebrata; and to be thus led to appreciate how, without complete 
departure from the fundamental type, the species are adapted to their different 
offices in creation, brings us, as it were, into the secret counsels that have directed 
                                                            
315  It seems that the first systematic studies on the topic were carried out in the early 20th century. Two 
notable first works are Intelligenzprüfung bei Menschenaffen (1917/1921) by Wolfgang Köhler of Germany 
and The Mental Life of Monkeys and Apes. A Study of Ideational Behaviour (1916) by the American R.M. 
Yerkes. 
316  As (Rupke 1994: 225) points out, one should not be confounded by passages in which Owen speaks out 
against transmutation (or evolution). While not expressing his own position clearly, Owen considered 
different – “no fewer than half a dozen” – explanations for evolution and dismissed them. This did not 
mean however, that Owen held or expressed creationist views. 
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the organizing forces, and is one of the legitimate courses of inquiry by which we 
may be permitted to gain an insight into the law which has governed the successive 
introduction of specific forms of living beings into this planet." (Owen 1848a, 106; cf. 
Amundson 2007: xxx) 
In this conception evolution was no completely orderly process as Chambers’ but it remained within 
clear boundaries. While Owen clearly suggested that the vertebral archetype allowed for forms 
besides those that had been observed (Owen 1848a: 102; Owen 2007 [1849]: 83; Ruse 1979: 123), he 
clearly did not suggest evolution beyond the archetype. (Hall 2007a: viii) Organisms did not 
transform beyond their type. Particularly, Owen discussed this question with respect to apes and 
humans the same year. (Owen 1848b) There, Owen addressed 
“the often-mooted and lately-revived317 hypothesis of the origination of the species of 
animals by gradual transmutation of specific characters, and that in a progressive or 
ascending direction.” (Owen 1848b: 414) 
He discussed whether gorillas and humans could be changed into one another and argued that the 
results of dog breeding indicated that new forms could only be produced within “the general law of 
development”, i.e. the range of the archetype. (Owen 1848b: 415; cf. Cosans 2009: 38) Instead, he 
claimed that  
“No known cause of change productive of varieties of mammalian species could 
operate in altering the size, the shape and the connections of the premaxillary bones, 
which so remarkably distinguish the great Troglodytes Gorilla, not from Man only, 
but from all other anthropoid apes. We know as little the conditions which protract 
the period of the obliteration of the sutures of the premaxillary bones in the Tr. 
Gorilla [gorilla] beyond the period at which they disappear in the Tr. Niger 
[chimpanzee], as we do those that cause them to disappear in Man earlier than they 
do even in the smaller species of Chimpanzee. There is not, in fact, any other 
character than those founded upon the developments of bone for the attachment of 
muscles, which is known to be subject to change through the operation of external 
causes : nine-tenths therefore of the differences … distinguishing the great 
Chimpanzee from the human species, must stand in contravention of the hypothesis 
of transmutation and progressive development until the supporters of that 
hypothesis are enabled to adduce the facts and cases which demonstrate the 
conditions of the modifications of such characters.” (Owen 1848b: 417; cf. Cosans 
2009: 23) 
An interesting point here is how Owen analyses the question of evolutionary links between the 
gorilla and Man: He does not ask, as Darwin would, whether there might have been a common 
ancestor of which the descendants evolved into both the gorilla and man. Instead, Owen asked 
whether the gorilla was an ancestor of Man. Figuratively speaking, Owen was looking for a line which 
linked Man and gorilla, while to Darwin they were the ends of a fork.  
This asymmetry is observable in Owen’s work from 1837318 to 1868 (see below), and makes most 
sense if one assumes that Owen was thinking in a static model like the one by Chambers, i.e. one of 
                                                            
317  Owen presumably refers to Chambers here. 
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linear progressions. Like Chambers, Owen allowed for a limited branching within one species like 
Man or gorilla (see Figure 15). However, transmutations between species, e.g. the transition from 
gorilla to Man, could consist but in saltational advances along a line of development from lower to 
higher forms. Figure 14 visualizes the asymmetry between Owen’s and Darwin’s and Wallace’s 
approach to the problem of descent. 
In The Nature of Limbs, Owen made a surprising turn, dipping his archetype in transmutational ideas: 
“Just a year after divorcing human and ape, Owen essentially remarried human to 
bat and fish. In the Nature of Limbs, Owen offers reflections on deep anatomical 
similarities that indicate that all vertebrates, be they humans, dogs or even lampreys, 
share some basic developmental laws. He argues that the anatomical structure of all 
vertebrates was derived from a common archetype, key aspects of which can be seen 
by a detailed consideration of the skeletal structure of the limbs. […] In some ways, 
the Nature of Limbs has the feel of a more empirical, technically precise, and 
scientifically rigorous version of the Vestiges, which leads the reader to ponder the 
possibility of evolution from a bone-by-bone consideration of vertebrate limbs and 
skeletons.” (Cosans 2009: 39) 
 
Figure 14: Owen’s and Darwin’s perception of the possible relation between humans and gorillas 
Although Owen preferred to speak of ‘development’, this was clearly an evolutionary position. 
(Owen 2007 [1849]: 82; cf. Cosans 2009: 43) He argued along the lines of Lamarck and Geoffroy: 
organisms were changing over time. Owen claimed, however, that his conversion was not the result 
of French or German speculation but of sober British empirics: 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
318  Cosans argues that, in 1837, Owen discussed whether apes could transmute into humans. “He cites a total 
of twenty-one characters that distinguish the chimpanzee and orangutan from humans. Since they are 
deeply entrenched in development, ‘these differences result from original formation, and are not liable to 
be weakened in any material degree, either, on the one hand, by a degradation of the human species, or, 
on the other, by the highest cultivation of which the anthropoid Apes are susceptible’ (Owen 1835, 370).” 
(Cosans 2009: 22) 
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“It is no mere transcendental dream, but true knowledge and legitimate fruit of 
inductive research, that clear insight into the essential nature of the organ, which is 
acquired by tracing it step by step from the unbranched pectoral ray of the 
lepidosiren to the equally small and slender but bifid pectoral ray of the amphiuma, 
thence to the similar but trifid ray of the proteus, and through the progressively 
superadded structures and perfections in higher reptiles and in mammals. If the 
special homology of each part of the diverging appendage and its supporting arch are 
recognisable from Man to the fish, shall we close the mind's eye to the evidences of 
that higher law of archetypal conformity on which the very power of tracing the 
lower and more special correspondences depend?” (Owen 2007 [1849]: 70) 
Owen imagined the archetype to advance throughout geological history “in slow and stately steps ... 
from the first embodiment of the Vertebrate idea under its old Ichthyic vestment, until it became 
arrayed in the glorious garb of Human form." (Owen 2007 [1849]: 86; Cosans 2009: 45) Over time, 
the archetype branched and diversified to cater to specific environmental niches. 
The concept of an archetypal branching did not imply, however, that Owen had overcome the 
asymmetry to Darwin, he still thought in terms of a step-wise ascension towards more complex 
forms. Thus, in his 1850 paper on didornis, Owen discussed whether this extinct giant bird of New 
Zealand might have given rise to smaller but similar birds which were still indigenous to New Zealand 
of the time. Owen dismissed the “degeneration” hypothesis because fossil remains of the smaller 
birds were found associated with those of the extinct bird. He argued that the appearance of one 
species did not follow from the other; there was no evolutionary link between them: 
“The actual presence, therefore, of small species of animals in countries where larger 
species of the same natural families formerly existed, is not the consequence of any 
gradual diminution of the size of such species, but is the result of circumstances…; 
the smaller and feebler animals have bent and accommodated themselves to 
changes which have destroyed the larger species.” (Owen 1862b[1850]: 15; Rupke 
1994: 233-4)  
It is important to understand what Owen’s argument was here because he would use it several more 
times, also against Darwin. In his understanding of “development” or evolution, one species could 
only develop from another if the former ceased to exist; they could never exist at the same time. In 
other words, a species could not give rise to another one with which it then coexisted with. This is 
clearly linked to the fork asymmetry above (Figure 14); as Owen did not consider species to diverge 
and develop independently at the same time, he could not imagine that exemplars of such a 
diverging line could exist at the same time as the original type or exemplars of another diverging line. 
At the same time, Owen diversified his view, considering independent and continuous evolution in 
different branches of zoology, abandoning ideas of an evolution of all animals towards Man. (Ruse 
1979: 103) Thus, in his 1851 review of Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology, Owen spoke of a 
“succession of animal forms on our planet” or a “successive” and “progressive” development from 
less complex to more complex ones, he clarified that this included supposed lower forms as fish: 
"Palaeontology demonstrates that there has been not only a successive development 
in this class [the class of fish], but, as regards their vertebrate skeleton, a progressive 
one.” (op. cit. Ruse 1979: 137) 
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Thus, he distanced himself from Chambers, on whose account the evolution of lower types could 
only lead to a higher form, not to a novel lower form. 
Within one type, however, Owen still thought in terms of a linear and step-wise ascent. This became 
clear in the late 1850s and early 1860s when Owen answered to the challenge of the 1858 joint 
paper by Darwin and Wallace and the The Origin of Species of 1859. In his 1859 Fullerian Lecture On 
the Extinction of Species, Owen expressed this very clearly. While he spoke of “successive extinction” 
and “introduction of much more numerous, varied, and higher-organised forms” within distinct 
mammal classes (Owen 1859c: 58), he clarified that the earlier forms disappear when they transform 
in the later ones: 
“So far, however, as any general conclusion can be deduced from the large sum of 
evidence above referred to, … Organic remains, traced from their earliest known 
graves, are succeeded, one series by another, to the present period, and never re-
appear when once lost sight of in the ascending search. As well might we expect a 
living Ichthyosaur in the Pacific, as a fossil whale in the Lias319 : the rule governs as 
strongly in the retrospect as the prospect. And not only as respects the Vertebrata, 
but the sum of the animal species at each successive geological period has been 
distinct and peculiar to such period.” (Owen 1859c: 60; cf. Rupke 1994: 237) 
In a paper On the Orang, Chimpanzee, and Gorilla. With Reference to the 'Transmutation of Species' 
of the same year, Owen stated that: 
“The unity of the human species is demonstrated by the constancy of those 
osteological and dental characters to which the attention is more particularly 
directed in the investigation of the corresponding characters in the higher 
Quadrumana. Man is the sole species of his genus, the sole representative of his 
order and subclass. Thus I trust has been furnished the confutation of the notion of a 
transformation of the ape into man, which appears from a favourite old author to 
have been entertained by some in his day.” (Owen 1859a: 103) 
The following year gave Owen the opportunity to answer Darwin’s Origin by a systematic work of his 
own. In Palaentology or A Systematic Summary of Extinct Animals and their Geological Relations, 
repeats his formula of “successive extinction” and “introduction” and provides a table which  
“expresses the sum of the observations at the present date, on the succession, 
appearance and geological relations of the several orders of the Mammalian class” 
(Owen 1860a: 407-8) 
and displays, among others, the principles of the archetype and deviation from the archetype: 
“the law of irrelative or vegetative repetition: the law of unity of plan or relations to 
an archetype: … the progressive departure from general type as exemplified in the 
series of species from their first introduction to the present time.” (Owen 1860a: 
407) 
                                                            
319  Darwin’s model did not exclude such living fossils. (See section 3.4.3 iv) 
Sebastian Zacharias: The Darwinian Revolution as a knowledge reorganization 
 
112 
Figure 15 reproduces Owen’s table and displays how different orders of the mammalian class were 
perceived as neatly separated by Owen.  
These orders may branch to some extent but they do not mix with the neighboring orders. And while 
the branching within one type320 is a slow and steady movement, the evolution from one archetypal 
from to another requires some saltational transmutation, i.e. “considerable and sudden” steps. 
(Owen 1868: 795) Thus,  
“Owen clearly had transmutational thoughts, but these were organized on the 
concept of the archetype, not on descent.” (Richards 1987a: 150)  
Owen interpreted the deviation from the archetype as “perfect adaptations and endowments” for 
“in what have those contrasted limbs, hoofs, paws, fins, and wings, so variously 
formed to obey the behests of volition in denizens of different elements, different 
from the mechanical instruments which we ourselves plan with foresight and 
calculation for analogous uses, save in their greater complexity, in their perfection, 
and in the unity and simplicity of the elements which are modified to constitute 
these several locomotive organs?” (Owen 1860a: 413) 
 
Figure 15: Owen’s “Table of Geological Distribution of Mammalia” (Owen 1860a: 407)321 
At the same time, however, Owen disputed the crucial Input of Wallace’s and Darwin’s models: 
favorable variations. In a discussion of Wallace, Owen seems322 to deny that varieties might be better 
adapted to their environment than their original type: 
                                                            
320  I know of no classification of archetypes by Owen. However, if there is supposed to exist a vertebrate 
archetype, then neither mammals as a class nor any mammalian order can constitute an archetype of their 
own. 
321  I could not obtain a good scan of Owen’s figure, particularly the labels for the geological periods and 
mammalian types were difficult to decipher. Therefore I have reproduced the table without the specific 
labels. The question marks come from Owen. 
322  I am not fully certain whether to read this as a mistaken representation of Wallace or Owen’s critique of 
Wallace but I tend to the latter. 
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“Wallace, assuming that varieties may arise in a wild species, shows how such 
deviations from type may tend to adapt a variety to some changes in surrounding 
conditions, under which it is better calculated to exist, than the type-form from 
which it deviated. No doubt the type-form of every species is that which is best 
adapted to the conditions under which such species at the time exists; and as long as 
those conditions remain unchanged, so long will the type remain; all varieties 
departing therefore being of the same ratio less adapted to the environing conditions 
of existence. But, if those conditions change, then the variety of the species at an 
antecedent date and state of things will become the type-form of the species at a 
later date, and in an altered state of things.” (Owen 1860a: 405)  
Such denial would indeed comply with Owen’s idea of an archetype around which varieties are 
organized and to which they return. For instance, in Figure 15, some of the representations of 
evolution resemble rhombuses in which variations disappear and re-center on the archetype. 
In his publications throughout the 1860s, Owen upheld this idea of an orderly ascension within 
archetypes. Thus, in his 1862 memoir on the Aye-aye, he spoke of a “long succession of organized 
species” and claimed that despite some seemingly random variations within the archetype, forms 
would still evolve in orderly, step-wise manner: 
“The succession of species by continuously operating law is not necessarily a "blind 
operation". Such law, however dimly discerned in the properties and successions of 
natural objects, intimates, nevertheless, a preconceived progress. Organisms may be 
evolved in orderly succession stage after stage…” (Owen 1866a [1862]: 91, cf. 95-6) 
This orderly, step-wise evolution, he refers to as a “progressive departure from a general to a special 
type”. (Owen 1866a [1862]: 95-6)323 
Owen reaffirmed his position in the third volume of his On the Anatomy of Vertebrates, in 1868, 
when the Darwinian theory had already become the mainstream biological theory. While he agreed 
with the Darwinians on the fact that species evolved, he disagreed on the extent of this evolution. 
Referring to his stay in Paris with Cuvier, Owen recollects how Cuvier had denied that “existing 
[species] are modifications of extinct species” for lack of fossil evidence. Owen then admits that this 
evidence has since been provided: 
“The progress of Palaeontology since 1830 has brought to light many missing links 
unknown to the founder of the science. My own share in the labour led me, after a 
few years' research, to discern what I believed, and still hold, to be a tendency to a 
more generalised, or less specialised, organisation as species recede in date of 
existence from the present time.” (Owen 1868: 790) 
However, Owen is somewhat selective as to what evidence he counts as supportive of evolution. 
There is no mention of the Archaeopteryx which had been discovered in 1861 and described by 
                                                            
323  In this characterization of genealogical relations, Owen was much closer to Chambers notion of 
‘development’ than to Darwin’s ‘common descent’. 
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Owen in 1862, although it was susceptible to threaten Owen’s evolution within the archetype.324 
Instead, Owen provides a lengthy discussion of the series of horse types from Palaeotherium, 
Paloplotherium, Anchitherium, Hipparion, and Equus, which he can easily interpret as a series of 
evolutionary steps within a common archetype: 
“One cannot doubt, also, that every well-marked species of these genera paired 
within itself, and that they exemplified respectively the character of a 'group of 
individuals descended from common parents, or from such as resembled them as 
closely as they resembled each other.' They did not, however, exist as species, during 
the same periods of time, far less so from the beginning of things.' The single-hoofed 
Horse- family cannot be traced further back than the pliocene tertiary period : the 
tridactyle equine species have not been found in strata earlier than miocene, and 
disappear in the upper eocene : the heavier-bodied shorter-legged species with three 
functional hoofs to each foot belong to upper and middle eocenes. Furthermore, in 
the oldest eocene (London clay, super-cretaceous Conglomerates and Plastic clay at 
Meudon, Paris), we get evidence of Ungulates (Pliolophus, Hyracotherium, 
Coryphodori), in which the perisso- and artio-dactyle characters were less 
differentiated than in Palaeotherium and Anoplotlierium, affording additional 
significant evidence of progressive departure from generalized type. Thus, the 
succession in time accords with the gradational modifications by which 
Palaeotherium is linked on to Equus.” (Owen 1868: 792-3) 
Moreover, Owen repeated his assessment that varieties could only be better adapted than their 
original type if and after physical change has occurred. He implies that under the same conditions, 
variations could not be favorable in the sense of Darwin’s and Wallace’s model and could not 
successively replace their patent-type. (Owen 1868: 793) Furthermore, deviations from the 
archetype325 would be “sudden and considerable”. (Richards 1987a: 146; cf. Owen 1868: 795)  
In sum, Owen had now approached Chamber’s account of evolution very much. There were 
independent lines of development (types) which branched within a narrow range but could develop 
into other forms only by “sudden and considerable” deviations from their parent-type. 
ii. Object Class: Varieties and species, but no individuals 
Throughout his works Owen highlights that his domain of expertise are vertebrates, particularly 
higher vertebrates, mammals, apes. (cf. Owen 1859c: 60) Thus, his evolutionary statements and his 
restraint from such statements should be understood in light of this Object Class – an important 
reservation considering that Lamarck and Geoffroy developed their evolutionary views on mollusks 
and reptiles respectively. 
Beyond this, I can find only one important restriction of the Object Class by Owen. In his 1859 
Fullerian Lecture On the Extinction of Species, he restricts his statements about extinction to land 
animals: 
                                                            
324  While the Darwinians interpreted the Archaeopteryx as a link between reptiles and birds, Owen had 
classified it as a bird. Owen mentions it several times in the main body of text but not in the conclusion. 
(Owen 1868: 13, 38, 74, 586) 
325  Direct references to the Archetype did decrease, however, in Owen’s works in the mid- and late 1860s. In 
volume III of his Anatomy of Vertebrates, I count 7 references on ca. 800 pages. (Owen 1868) 
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“On the problem of the extinction of species I have little to say; and of the more 
mysterious subject of their coming into being, nothing profitable or to the purpose. 
As a cause of extinction in times anterior to man, it is most reasonable to assign the 
chief weight to those gradual changes in the conditions affecting a due supply of 
sustenance to animals in a state of nature which must have accompanied the slow 
alternations of land and sea brought about in the aeons of geological time. Yet this 
reasoning is applicable only to land-animals; for it is scarcely conceivable that such 
operations can have affected sea-fishes.” (Owen 1859c: 55-6) 
He seems to have given up this position in 1868, when he discussed the coral species of the red sea 
and claimed that most of them would “exist under the same conditions”, thus implying that the 
environmental changes might, in principle, apply to sea animals as well. 
However, the most important difference to Wallace and Darwin but also to Lamarck and Geoffroy is 
this: Owen never discussed individuals or small groups beneath varieties. His evolutionary claims 
were always supposed to apply to larger groups as varieties, species or classes. 
iii. Input: Climatic change and isolation 
By frequently side-stepped dynamic modeling and directly embedded his static model in his 
narrative, Owen often discussed what Agent might produce evolution326, but much less often and 
less clearly, what events might precede it and might be employed to explain it. This should not, 
however, obscure that Owen was clearly aware of what preceded evolutionary change. Owen knew 
that organisms changed in space and time and he mentioned the empirical regularities of 
biogeography and paleontology. In my analysis of potential Inputs in Owen’s explanations, I will 
identify these regularities, but I will also demonstrate how Owen avoided presenting their first parts 
as Inputs of a dynamic model, opting instead to solely embed them in an explanatory narrative. 
In 1850, in his discussion of Didornis, an extinct giant bird of New Zealand, Owen discussed whether 
this species could become extinct if they failed to adapt to their circumstances. (Owen 1862b [1850]: 
15) A couple of pages later Owen gave some examples of what he understood by “circumstances”. 
Moreover, he used a metaphor not unlike Darwin’s struggle for life: a “contest against surrounding 
agencies”. Owen argued that, in this contest, species would become extinct if they did not adapt to 
environmental changes as climate change or the introduction of enemies, i.e. the end of isolation327. 
This was particularly true for larger organisms: 
“…the difficulty of the contest which, as a living organized whole, the individual of 
such species has to maintain against the surrounding agencies that are ever tending 
to dissolve the vital bond, and subjugate the living matter to the ordinary chemical 
and physical forces. Any changes, therefore, in such external agencies as a species 
may have been originally adapted to exist in, will militate against that existence in a 
degree proportionate, perhaps in a geometrical ratio, to the bulk of the species. If a 
dry season be gradually prolonged, the large Mammal will suffer from the drought 
                                                            
326  For instance, “In the 1835 and 1848 papers on apes, he explicitly attacks the doctrine that transmutation 
could be caused by external forces, but says nothing about whether species could change as a result of 
some process that involved the internal dynamics.” (Cosans 2009: 39) 
327  The introduction of enemies is the opposition of what Darwin refers to as ‘isolation’; I will refer to it as the 
‘end of isolation’. 
Sebastian Zacharias: The Darwinian Revolution as a knowledge reorganization 
 
116 
sooner than the small one if such alteration of climate affect the quantity of 
vegetable food, the bulky Herbivore will first feel the effects of stinted nourishment : 
if new enemies are introduced, the large and conspicuous quadruped or bird will fall 
a prey, whilst the smaller species conceal themselves and escape. Smaller animals 
are usually, also, more prolific than larger ones. The actual presence, therefore, of 
small species of animals in countries where larger species of the same natural 
families formerly existed, is not the consequence of any gradual diminution of the 
size of such species, but is the result of circumstances, which may be illustrated by 
the fable of the 'oak and the reed'; the smaller and feebler animals have bent and 
accommodated themselves to changes which have destroyed the larger species.” 
(Owen 1862b [1850]: 1-20) 
Thus, Owen dropped his resistance to employ environmental changes in his explanation of evolution. 
Moreover, Owen began to measure organisms by “the efficiency with which [they] specialize and 
adapt themselves to their own particular niches.” The same holds for his address to the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science of 1858. There, Owen referred favourably to the joint 
paper three months earlier seeing them support his own claim that environmental changes caused 
extinction; he even cited a generic example of Darwin. He warned, however, from going too far in 
speculations about how much organisms could change, how high their degree plasticity was. He 
stated that he himself had always refrained such speculations and that one should instead continue 
the empirical work under the concept of the archetype in order to “discover the ‘ante-types’ from 
which varieties might have originated”. (op. cit. Rupke 1994: 236-7) 
In his 1859 paper On the Orang, Chimpanzee, and Gorilla. With Reference to the 'Transmutation of 
Species', Owen reaffirmed his stance, stating that he would not speculate on Inputs or Connectors to 
explain evolution: 
“No known cause of change productive of varieties of mammalian species could 
operate in altering the size, the shape, or the connexions of the premaxillary bones, 
which so remarkably distinguish the Troglodytes gorilla, not from man only, but from 
all other anthropoid apes. We know as little the conditions which protract the period 
of the obliteration of the sutures of the premaxillary bones in the Tr. gorilla beyond 
the period at which they disappear in the Tr. niger, as we do those that cause them 
to disappear in man earlier than they do even in the smaller species of chimpanzee. 
There is not, in fact, any other character than those founded upon the developments 
of bone for the attachment of muscles, which is known to be subject to change 
through the operation of external causes; nine-tenths, therefore, of the differences, 
especially those very striking ones … must stand in contravention of the hypothesis of 
transmutation and progressive development, until the supporters of that hypothesis 
are enabled to adduce the facts and cases which demonstrate the conditions of the 
modifications of such characters.” (Owen 1859a: 102)328 
In his Fullerian Lecture On the Extinction of Species of the same year, he did speculate a trifle – but 
only on extinctions. He cited geological changes as a likely Input, dismissing Cuvierian catastrophes: 
                                                            
328  This argument shows that Owen is aware of what a scientific explanation of evolution should look like: a 
dynamic model. He just does not suggest one. 
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“On the problem of the extinction of species I have little to say; and of the more 
mysterious subject of their coming into being, nothing profitable or to the purpose. 
As a cause of extinction in times anterior to man, it is most reasonable to assign the 
chief weight to those gradual changes in the conditions affecting a due supply of 
sustenance to animals in a state of nature which must have accompanied the slow 
alternations of land and sea brought about in the aeons of geological time. Yet this 
reasoning is applicable only to land-animals; for it is scarcely conceivable that such 
operations can have affected sea-fishes.” (Owen 1859c: 55-6) 
“Not that the extinction of such forms or species was sudden or simultaneous: the 
evidences so interpreted have been but local: over the wider field of life at any given 
epoch, the change has been gradual; and, as it would, seem, obedient to some 
general, but as yet, ill-comprehended law. In regard to animal life, and its assigned 
work on this planet, there has, however, plainly been 'an ascent and progress in the 
main’.” (Owen 1859c: 60; cf. Rupke 1994: 237)” 
Still, a couple of pages later he weakened this acknowledgement and retreated to his ominous notion 
of “laws”: 
“That species should become extinct appears, from the abundant evidence of the 
fact of extinction, to be a law of their existence; whether, however, it be inherent in 
their own nature, or be relative and dependent on inevitable changes in the 
conditions and theatre of their existence, is the main subject for consideration. But, 
admitting extinction as a natural law which has operated from the beginning of life 
on this planet, it might be expected that some evidence of it should occur in our own 
time, or within the historical period. Reference has been made to several instances of 
the extirpation of species, certainly, probably, or possibly, due to the direct agency of 
man; but this cause avails not in the question of the extinction of species at periods 
prior to any evidence of human existence; it does not help us in the explanation of 
the majority of extinctions as of the races of aquatic invertebrate which have 
successively passed away.” (Owen 1859c: 56-7) 
Moreover, he dismissed the explanation which Wallace and Darwin had sketched the year before, 
and he did so asking for a purpose in this explanation, i.e. a narrative component: 
“As to the successions, or coming in, of new species, one might speculate on the 
gradual modifiability of the individual; on the tendency of certain varieties to survive 
local changes, and thus progressively diverge from an older type; on the production 
and fertility of monstrous offspring; on the possibility, e.g. of a variety of auk being 
occasionally hatched with a somewhat longer winglet, and a dwarfed stature; on the 
probability of such a variety better adapting itself to the changing climate or other 
conditions than the old type of such an origin of Alca torda, e. g. ; but to what 
purpose? Past experience of the chance aims of human fancy, unchecked and 
unguided by observed facts, shows how widely they have ever glanced away from 
the gold centre of truth.” (Owen 1859c: 58) 
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Owen stuck to this line in his 1860 Paleontology. He refrained from providing his own dynamic model 
of evolution but dismissed Darwin, Lamarck for theirs. Particularly, with respect to the higher 
organism Owen refuses such speculation. (Owen 1860a: 404) 
“As to the successive appearance of new species in the course of geological time, it is 
first requisite to avoid the common mistake of confounding the propositions, of 
species being the result of a continuously operating secondary cause, and of the 
mode of operation of such creative cause. Biologists329 may entertain the first 
without accepting any current hypothesis as to the second." (Owen 1860a: 403)  
Owen’s alternative is the “axiom of the continuous operation of the ordained becoming of living 
things.” (Owen 1860a: 3)  
Moreover, Owen now seemed to publicly support the doctrine of spontaneous generation. In his 
review of the Origin of Species, he argued that 
“The monad that by 'natural selection' has ultimately become man, dates from the 
farthest point in the remote past, upon which our feigners of developmental 
hypotheses can draw with unlimited credit: the monad which by its superficial 
vibratile cilia darted across the field of the micro-scope we were looking through this 
morning, is the result of the collocation of particles which, without 'sudden flash,' 
took place under the operation of the heterogeneous organising force of yesterday. “ 
(Owen 1860b [1860]: 195; Cosans 2009: 101-2) 
In his BAAS speech on the aye-aye, Owen affirmed his support for evolution in general but refused to 
adopt either the Darwinian or Chambers’ explanation, instead embedding it in a divine narrative. 
Owen thrice points out, that he does not consider the random variations in Darwin’s model an 
acceptable explanation: 
“So neither would the phenomena of the long succession of organized species justify 
the notion, nor do I believe they would suggest, that they were the result of blind 
chance [sic!], if it should be demonstrated that they, too, are the result of secondary 
influences operating through long ages. It may be true that many of the aims of 
derivative tendencies miss their end: but myriads of germs never reach perfection; 
and the proportion of such short-coming is much greater in the phenomena of 
human life. These serve to exemplify abundantly in how small a degree the doings of 
the highest created agent here square with the ideal of the aim and end of his 
existence: yet he is not, therefore, argued to be a thing of chance [sic!]. The 
succession of species by continuously operating law is not necessarily a "blind 
operation" [sic!]. Such law, however dimly discerned in the properties and 
successions of natural objects, intimates, nevertheless, a preconceived progress. 
Organisms may be evolved in orderly succession stage after stage, towards a 
foreseen goal; and the broad features of the course may still show the unmistakeable 
impress of divine volition” (Owen 1866a [1862]: 91) 
                                                            
329  Note that Owen here speaks of ‘biology’ as a discipline. This use became frequent in the 1860s. 
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Moreover, Owen specifies his concept of spontaneous generation and guided evolution afterwards. 
Yet, he specifies no specific Input to trigger evolutionary change, again refraining from a dynamic 
model of evolution: 
“What I have termed the ' derivative hypothesis ' of organisms, for example, holds 
that these are coming into being, by aggregation of organic atoms, at all times and in 
all places, under their simplest unicellular condition ; with differences of character as 
many as are the various circumstances, conditions, and combinations of the causes 
educing them,—one form appearing in mud at the bottom of the ocean, another in 
the pond on the heath, a third in the sawdust of the cellar, a fourth on the surface of 
the mountain rock, &c., but all by combination and arrangement of organic atoms 
through forces and conditions acting according to predetermined law. The 
disposition to vary in form and structure, according to variation of surrounding 
conditions, is greatest in these first-formed beings; and from them, or such as them, 
are and have been derived all other and higher forms of organisms on this planet. 
And thus it is that we now find energizing in fair proportions every grade of 
organization from Man to the Monad. Each organism, as such, also propagates its 
own form for a time under such similitude as to be called its kind. Specific characters 
are those that have been recognized in individuals of successive generations, 
propagating similar individuals, as far back as observation has reached; and which 
characters, not being artificially produced, are ascribed to nature. Instead of referring 
such characters to an originally distinct creation, the derivative hypothesis, whilst 
admitting their transmissibility and their maintenance for an unknown period 
through generative powers obstructive of departure from such characters, holds that 
observation has not yet reached the actual beginning of such species, nor the point 
at which variation stops.” (Owen 1866a [1862]: 92) 
Owen then discusses different possible explanations from Buffon to Lamarck to Darwin. He dismisses 
all of them; in the case of Darwin he admits that the explanation of the joint paper is plausible but 
warns that the “varieties of condition of the human mind are manifold” and not supported by fact. In 
the case of the aye-aye, no evidence existed for a shortage of food or other selective pressures. 
(Rupke 1994: 235-6) Therefore, he champions his own explanation based on the archetype which he 
terms “creation by law” but still falls short of a dynamic model: 
“…is the more probable, from the kind and degree of similitude between the species 
that succeeds and the species that disappears, never to return as such; the similitude 
being, in the main, of a nature expressed by the terms of “progressive departure 
from a general to a special type". Creation by law is suggested by the many instances 
of retention of structures in palaeozoic species which are embryonal and transitory in 
later species of the same order or class; and the suggestion acquires force by 
considering the analogies which the transitory embryonal stages in a higher species 
bear to the mature forms of lower species. (Owen 1866a [1862]: 95-6) 
In the first Volume of the Anatomy of Vertebrates, Owen repeats the allusion from his Fullerian 
lecture that environmental changes might indeed trigger extinction (but not transmutation): 
“Concomitant changes of climate, and other conditions of a country affecting the 
sustenance or well-being of its indigenous animals, may lead not only to their 
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modification but to their destruction. I have, in another work, pointed out the 
characters in the animals themselves calculated to render them most obnoxious to 
such extirpating influences ; and have applied the remarks to the explanation of so 
many of the larger species of particular groups of animals having become extinct, 
whilst smaller species of equal antiquity have remained.” (Owen 1866b: xxxiii-xxxiv) 
In the third volume, two years later, Owen specified this point, although in different terminology and, 
again, dismissed catastrophes as an explanatory Input: 
“Each successive parcel of geological truth has tended to dissipate the belief in the 
unusually sudden and violent nature of the changes recognisable in the earth's 
surface. In specially directing my attention to this moot point, whilst engaged in 
investigations of fossil remains, and in the reconstruction of the species to which 
they belonged, I was, at length, led to recognise one cause of extinction as being due 
to defeat in the ‘contest330 which as a living organised whole, the individual of each 
species had to maintain against the surrounding agencies which might militate 
against its existence’.” (Owen 1868: 798) 
Moreover, he renewed his support for continuous spontaneous generation331, which he opposed to 
the “doctrine of primary life by miracle” allegedly held by Darwin. (Owen 1868: 714) Owen’s 
argument here was that Darwin refused to explain the origin of life, limiting himself to evolutionary 
change among living organisms. Owen thus argued that Darwin had to suppose a miraculous first 
creation of life, while he, Richard Owen, attempted to explain both the origin of life and the origin of 
species (evolution) by natural laws. 
With respect to transmutations, however Owen disputed the model of Darwin and Wallace. He 
claimed that deviations from the archetype would be ‘sudden and considerable’, i.e. saltational. He 
illustrated this on the relation of the modern horse to two of his ancestors, the Hipparion and the 
Paleotherium. (Richards 1987a: 146; cf. Owen 1868: 795) Owen highlighted how some modern 
horses were sometimes born with an additional hoof, just like their ancestors. From this Owen 
concludes that evolutionary change was 
“sudden and considerable : it opposes the idea that species are transmuted by 
minute and slow degrees. It also shows that a species might originate independently 
of the operation of any external influence ; that change of structure would precede 
that of use and habit ; that appetency, impulse, ambient medium, fortuitous fitness 
of surrounding circumstances, or a personified 'selecting Nature,' would have had no 
share in the transmutative act.” (Owen 1868: 795) 
A couple of pages later, he points out how many variations occur independent of environmental 
changes, which he considers evidence for his “sudden and considerable” change: 
“‘The majority of species, originating in uncalled-for, unstimulated, unselected 
departures from parental structure, establish themselves and flourish independently 
of external influences. All classes of animals exemplify this independence: the 
                                                            
330  For a discussion of Owen’s “contest”, see below. 
331  Owen specifically addressed Pasteur’s experiments on spontaneous generation and discussed possible 
shortcomings. (Owen 1868: 814-5) 
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Cetaceans, under an extraordinary and likely graduated range of generic and specific 
modifications; and the same may be said of most Fishes.  
So, being unable to accept the [Lamarckian] volitional hypothesis, or that of impulse 
from within, or the selective force exerted by outward circumstances [Darwinian 
natural selection], I deem an innate tendency [sic!] to deviate from parental type 
operating through periods of adequate duration, to be the most probable nature, or 
way of operation, of the secondary law, whereby species have been derived one 
from the other.’ (Owen 1868: 807; cf. Richards 1987a: 146) 
Thus, Owen rejects the Darwinian model with reference to Darwin’s accidental variations. On Owen’s 
account, however, this is no contradiction as these variations are not accidental but evidence of “a 
secondary law”. Moreover, as they often precede environmental changes they cannot be triggered 
by environmental changes332: 
“Of the 120 kinds of coral enumerated by Ehrenberg in the Red Sea, 100, at least, 
exist under the same conditions. The majority of species, originating in uncalled-for, 
unstimulated, unselected departures from parental structure, establish themselves 
and flourish independently of external influences. All classes of animals exemplify 
this independence: the Cetaceans, under an extraordinary and nicely graduated 
range of generic and specific modifications ; and the same may be said of most 
Fishes.   
So, being unable to accept the volitional hypothesis, or that of impulse from within, 
or the selective force exerted by outward circumstances, I deem an innate tendency 
to deviate from parental type, operating through periods of adequate duration, to be 
the most probable nature, or way of operation, of the secondary law, whereby 
species have been derived one from the other.” (Owen 1868: 807) 
In sum, while Owen had refrained from providing a dynamic model of evolution in the 1840s and 
1850s, he devoted most of his testimonials in the 1860s to challenge the Inputs of Darwin’s and 
Wallace’s model: environmental changes and accidental variations. 
iv. Situation Type: Weak metaphors only 
The Situation Type never occupied an important place in his dynamic model and he never developed 
it systematically. I do not even find a clear and continuous support of uniformitarianism or 
spontaneous generation in his writings. However, some of his accounts of nature can be read in the 
sense of a constant struggle as I have already identified it with Aristotle, Linnaeus, or Geoffroy.333 
(See section 2.3 x) 
The earliest mention of such an idea can be found in the fourth part of a memoir on the giant bird 
Didornis which was published in the Transactions of the Zoological Society in 1862 but had already 
been presented by Owen in 1850. Here Owen speaks of a 
                                                            
332  This point was very important to Owen, who “traced development to regular and interrelated processes. In 
contrast to Geoffroy, he held that these processes were internal to the organism and could not be altered 
by external conditions.” (Cosans 2009: 22) 
333  In the joint Darwin-Wallace paper, Darwin would point to De Candolle, W. Herbert, and Lyell. (Darwin 
1858b [1857]: 51) 
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“…the difficulty of the contest which, as a living organized whole, the individual of 
such species has to maintain against the surrounding agencies that are ever tending 
to dissolve the vital bond, and subjugate the living matter to the ordinary chemical 
and physical forces.” (Owen 1862b [1850]: 1-20) 
Owen repeated similar formulations in his 1859 Fullerian Lecture On the Extinction of Species, 
speaking of “the contest which the animal has to maintain against the surrounding agencies that” 
(Owen 1859c: 56) He repeated a similar formulation in the Preface of the first Volume of his Anatomy 
of Vertebrates. (Owen 1866b: xxxiv) but began shifting his wording towards a more Darwinian 
metaphor and spoke of of a “contest for existence” or a “battle for life” (Owen 1869 [1866]: 80; 
Owen 1866b: xxxiv, 183) This switch was interpreted by reviewers as at least a partial adoption of the 
Darwinian theory. However, Owen was quick to point out his using a similar expression in 1850 and 
denied any such allegations in a 1867 dictionary article as well as the conclusion of the third volume 
of the Anatomy of Vertebrates. (Owen 1868: 798-9; Rupke 1994: 247-8)334  
Second, Owen emphasized that such “contest” could only be explanatory in the case of extinctions, 
not for the emergence of new species: 
“Each successive parcel of geological truth has tended to dissipate the belief in the 
unusually sudden and violent nature of the changes recognisable in the earth's 
surface. In specially directing my attention to this moot point, whilst engaged in 
investigations of fossil remains, and in the reconstruction of the species to which 
they belonged, I was, at length, led to recognise one cause of extinction as being due 
to defeat in the 'contest which as a living organised whole, the individual of principle 
has received a large and most instructive accession of illustrations from the extensive 
knowledge and devoted labours of Charles Darwin each species had to maintain 
against the surrounding agencies which might militate against its existence.' This 
principle has received a large and most instructive accession of illustrations from the 
extensive knowledge and devoted labours of Charles Darwin : but he aims to apply it 
not only to the extinction but the origin of species. Although I fail to recognise proof 
of the latter bearing of the 'battle of life,' the concurrence of so much evidence in 
favour of extinction by law is, in like measure, corroborative of the truth of the 
ascription of the origin of species to a secondary cause.” Owen 1868: 797-8; cf. 
Rupke 1994: 247-8) 
This distinction is justified. First, the “contest” or “struggle” as he describes it, is not a constant 
background-regularity as in Darwin’s and Wallace’s model. (See sections 3.3.3, 3.4.3) It is closer to an 
Input. Second, the term did not have a discernible empirical referent; it remains unclear what it 
might refer to. In sum, the role of Owen’s “contest” or remains very limited and it does not provide 
for much in Owen’s dynamic model. 
                                                            
334  The discussion is to be found in the lengthy footnote which starts on page 798. 
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v. Connector: Laws of development  
None of the dynamic models his contemporaries suggested satisfied Owen. By his own account, he 
had considered – “no fewer than half a dozen” – different explanations for evolution (Rupke 1994: 
225) yet he would dismiss all of them as speculative, be it Lamarck’s, Geoffroy’s or Darwins.335 
Owen himself preferred not to speculate or not to express himself clearly, neither in On the 
Archetype nor in The Nature of Limbs.336 In the Archetype, Owen suggested two forces to produce 
evolution. These two forces represented the conservative force of Geoffroy’s “unity of type” and the 
progressive force of Cuvier’s adaption to “conditions of existence” (cf. Ruse 1979: 121), i.e. the two 
concepts which molded Owen’s early work. 
In the Nature of Limbs book, he suggests an analogy from mechanics to the laws governing biology 
only to not spell it out: 
“The naturalist and anatomist, in digesting the knowledge which the astronomer has 
been able to furnish regarding the planets and the mechanism of the satellites for 
illuminating the night-season of the distant orbs that revolve round our common sun, 
can hardly avoid speculating on the organic mechanism that may exist to profit by 
such sources of light and which must exist, if the only conceivable purpose' of those 
beneficent arrangements is to be fulfilled. But the laws of light, as of gravitation, 
being the same in Jupiter as here, the eyes of such creatures as may disport in the 
soft reflected beams of its moons will probably be organized on the same dioptric 
principles as those of the animals of a like grade of organization on this earth. And 
the inference as to the possibility of the vertebrate type being the basis of the 
organization of some of the inhabitants of other planets will not appear so 
hazardous, when it is remembered that the orbits or protective cavities of the eyes of 
the Vertebrata of this planet are constructed of modified vertebrate. Our thoughts 
are free to soar as far as any legitimate analogy may seem to guide them rightly in 
the boundless ocean of unknown truth. And if censure be merited for here indulging, 
even for a moment, in pure speculation, it may, perhaps, be disarmed by the 
reflection that the discovery of the vertebrate archetype could not fail to suggest to 
the Anatomist many possible modifications of it beyond those that we know to have 
been realized in this little orb of ours.   
The inspired Writer, the Poet and the Artist alone have been privileged to depict 
such.” (Owen 2007 [1849]: 83-4) 
When, in 1860, Darwin’s Connector and its powerfully connotative name ‘Natural Selection’ became 
the subject of intense public debate, Owen still refused to suggest an alternative, particularly with 
respect to higher organisms (Owen 1860a: 404): 
“As to the successive appearance of new species in the course of geological time, it is 
first requisite to avoid the common mistake of confounding the propositions, of 
species being the result of a continuously operating secondary cause, and of the 
                                                            
335  Particularly, he did not speak out for either metagenesis, the alternation of generations in reproduction. 
336  Cosans traces this position back to Owen’s 1837 Hunterian Lectures. (Cosans 2009: 45) 
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mode of operation of such creative cause. Biologists may entertain the first without 
accepting any current hypothesis as to the second." (Owen 1860a: 403) 
Only in the second half of the 1860s did Owen soften his stance. In his 1866 On the Osteology of the 
Dodo and the third volume of the Anatomy of Vertebrates he employed an evolutionary Connector in 
explanation. Interestingly, he did borrow from Lamarck, not from Darwin337: 
“If the great Ground-dove of the Mauritius gradually gained bulk in the long course of 
successive generations in that uninhabited thickly-wooded island, and, exempt from 
the attacks of any enemy, with food enough scattered over the ground, ceased to 
exert the wings to raise the heavy trunk, then, on Lamarck's principle, the disused 
members would atrophy, while the hind limbs, through the increased exercise by 
habitual motion on land, with increasing weight to support, would hypertrophy.” 
(Owen 1869 [1866]: 70; cf. Rupke 1994: 247  
“The Dodo exemplifies Buffon's idea' of the origin of species through departure from 
and the known consequences of the a more perfect original type by degeneration ; 
disuse of one locomotive organ and extra use of another indicate the nature of the 
secondary causes that may have operated in the creation of this species of bird, 
agreeably with Lamarck's philosophical conception of the influence of such 
physiological conditions of atrophy and hypertrophy, as small as in the Dodo : and 
the most intelligible conception of its mode of origin is that to which I have alluded in 
the description The young of all Doves are hatched with wings that species retained 
the immature character. The main condition making possible the production and 
continuance of such a species in the island of Mauritius was the absence of any 
animal that could kill a great bird incapable of flight. The introduction of such a 
destroyer became fatal to the species which had lost such means of escape. The 
Mauritian Doves … that retained their powers of flight continue to exist there.” 
(Owen 1869 [1866]: 80-1) 
“All these muscles of the human external ear exemplify the Lamarckian law of 
degeneration from disuse, In the primitive men of the stone-period,' they probably 
existed in normal size and force.” (Owen 1868: 245) 
As with his “contest for existence”, it seems that Owen consider disuse to explain only the 
degeneration of species, and in the long run, their extinction. In the first Volume of the Anatomy of 
Vertebrates, Owen denied that neither a Darwinian nor a Lamarckian Connector could account for 
the emergence of new species (transmutation): 
“The Tadpole … affords a significant example of the transmutation of a natatory to a 
saltatory type of hind-limb, irrespective of efforts and exercises through successive 
generations producing and accumulating small changes, and independently of any 
selection by nature of such generations as were enabled, through the accidental 
variety of a slightly lengthened hind-limb, to conquer in the battle of life, and to 
transmit the tendency towards such disproportion to their posterity.” (Owen 1866b: 
182-3, cf. xxxiii) 
                                                            
337  Darwin also employed use and disuse in his dynamic model the Origin (section 3.4.3 v), but both clearly 
stem from Lamarck. 
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In sum, Owen never championed a overarching Connector to explain evolution. Until the mid-1860s 
he refused to speculate on the topic and when he employed Lamarckian disuse he did so only with 
respect to extinction, not evolution (development). This is not fully surprising as he did not have any 
empirical Input which would trigger such a Connector. 
vi. Synthesis338 
First, Owen’s Object Class are varieties and species, no individuals – a deviation from his 
predecessors Geoffroy and Lamarck, but also from Wallace and Darwin. Like all important 
evolutionists before him, Owen supported spontaneous generation and uniformitarianism as part of 
the Situation Type. Although he employed the metaphor of a struggle or contest, he never developed 
it into a Situation Type, i.e. an empirically discernible observation in the background of the modeled 
regularities. Moreover, he only mentioned it with extinctions only, not with the emergence of new 
species.  
The same is true for the Connector and, partly, the Input: Owen developed a full-fledged dynamic 
model only with respect to extinctions. Ecological change, which comprises changes with respect to 
climate or isolation, trigger evolution, possibly through disuses; they do not trigger the emergence of 
new species. For such emergence, Owen named no Input but only provided a name for the 
Connector which would lead to such events: laws of development. – Figure 16 provides an overview 
over Owen’s model. 
 
Figure 16: Owen's dynamic model of evolution 
                                                            
338  With Owen, it is most difficult to summarize his model of evolution; he changed positions too often and his 
writing was generally of limited clarity. Of Owen’s many statements and positions, I will select those which 
are closest to Darwin because they are most informative for the questions which I pursue. Admittedly, this 
renders my synthesis something of a collage with Darwin as its focal point. 
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3.2.4 Narrative explanation: How did Owen tell evolution? 
In contrast to his various sketches of a dynamic model, the basic form of Owen’s narrative is much 
easier to grasp and describe. Over time, it remained pretty much constant in its key elements, the 
Agent and Purpose. What changed with the model were Agency, Act and Scene but these carried 
much less explanatory burden than for instance in Darwin’s narrative. (See section 3.4.4) In its basic 
form, Owen’s narrative was very close to Chambers’. It was centered around God and God’s will. 
Therefore, in Owen’s explanations, it is always clear that there is but one agent in Nature and that 
Nature expresses but one purpose: God’s will, foresight and benevolence. 
i. Agent and Purpose: God & his will 
These views can be traced in his Hunterian Lectures, where he claims that the organization of 
organisms follows 
"determinate laws, which manifest in the highest degree the wisdom and design of 
the Law-giver; – the Great First Cause" (Owen 1992 [1837]: 221; cf. Cosans 2009: 27). 
In the Archetype, he links his concept directly to God, claiming that the “archetypal ideal” had existed 
“in the mind of the Creator” (Padian 2007: lxxxvi; Rupke 1995: 218) and citing the Argument from 
Design: 
“The beneficent Author of all, who has created other revolving orbs, with relations to 
the central source of heat and light like our own, may have willed that these also 
should be the seat of sentient beings, suited to all the Conditions of animal 
enjoyment existing in such planets; basking, perhaps, in the solar beams by day, or 
disporting in the soft reflected light of their earth's satellites by night. The eyes of 
such creatures, the laws of light being the same, would doubtless be organized on 
the same dioptric principles as ours; and. if the vertebral column should there, as 
here, have been adopted as the basis of the higher animal forms, it may be subject to 
modifications issuing in forms such as this planet has never witnessed, and which can 
only be conceived by him who has penetrated the mystery of the vertebrate 
archetype, and recognised the kind and mode and extent of its modifications here.” 
(Owen 1848a: 102) 
“With regard to the ‘adaptive force,' whatever may be the expressions by which its 
nature and relations, when better understood, may be attempted to be explained, its 
effects must ever impress the rightly constituted mind with the conviction, that in 
every species co ends are obtained and the interests of the animal promoted, in a 
way that indicates superior design, intelligence and foresight; but a design, 
intelligence and foresight in which the judgement and reflection of the animal never 
were concerned; and which, therefore, with Virgil, and with other studious observers 
of nature, we must ascribe to the Sovereign of the universe, in whom we live, and 
move, and have our being.” (Owen 1848a: 172)339 
                                                            
339  In the same passage, Owen opposes his views to narratives centered around a “vital force” as they were 
championed by the German idealists. (Owen 1848a: 172) I find few explicit references to a vital force 
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“The satisfaction felt by the rightly constituted mind must ever be great in 
recognising the fitness of parts for their appropriate functions; but when this. fitness 
is gained, as in the great toe of the foot of man and the ostrich, by a structure which 
at the same time manifests a harmonious concord with a common type, the power of 
the One Great Cause of all organization is appreciated as fully, perhaps, as it is 
possible to be by our limited intelligence.” (Owen 1848a: 197) 
Thus, according to Owen, nature works indeed according to a Plan “the Plan is one of organization, 
not of optimality of function.” (Padian 2007: lxxxiv) In the Nature of Limbs, Owen claimed that  
“the recognition of an ideal Exemplar for the Vertebrated animals proves that the 
knowledge of such a being as Man must have existed before Man appeared. For the 
Divine mind which planned the Archetype also foreknew all its modifications.  
The Archetypal idea was manifested in the flesh, under divers such modifications, 
upon this planet, long prior to the existence of those animal species that actually 
exemplify it.” (Owen 2007 [1849]: 85-6) 
Thus, he “demonstrated the pre-existence of the archetypal ideal in the mind of the Creator and thus 
refuted the argument of the old Pantheists and atheists that mind did not precede matter" (Richards 
1987a: 165; cf. Padian 2007: lxxvi; Rupke 1994: 220) The Archetype virtually displays the Divine 
Purpose. 
In his 1858 address to the BAAS, after the publication of the joint Darwin-Wallace paper, he argued in 
favor of retaining the idea which “we call ‘creation’, viz. that the process of [spontaneous generation] 
was ordained and had originated from an all-wise and powerful First Cause of all things.” (op. cit. 
Rupke 1994: 236) In the Fullerian Lectures of 1859 expressed his hope that he had  
“fulfilled one object which I had in view, viz. to set forth the beneficence and 
intelligence of the Creative Power.  
If I have been able to demonstrate a uniform plan pervading the osteological 
structure of so many diversified animated beings, I must have enforced, were that 
necessary, as strong a conviction of the unity of the Creative Cause.  
If, in all the striking changes of form and proportion which have passed under review, 
we could discern only the results of minor modifications of the same few osseous 
elements, surely we must be the more strikingly impressed with the wisdom and 
power of that Cause which could produce so much variety, and at the same time 
such perfect adaptations and endowments, out of means so simple.[…]  
Everywhere in organic nature we see the means not only subservient to an end, but 
that end accomplished by the simplest means. Hence we are compelled to regard the 
Great Cause of all, not like certain philosophic ancients, as a uniform and quiescent 
mind, as an all pervading anima mundi, but as an active and anticipating 
intelligence.” (Owen 1859c: 62) 
He even specifies that he will not accept a second Agent besides God, i.e. no Natural Selection, for 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
afterwards, one exception being the third volume of The Anatomy of Vertebrates. (Owen 1868: 315, 514, 
809, 817, 819, 823)  
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“the highest generalizations in the science of organic bodies, like the Newtonian laws 
of universal matter, lead to the unequivocal conviction of a great First Cause, which is 
certainly not mechanical.” (Owen 1859c: 63) 
In Palaeontology, Owen ascribes the geographical distribution to God, claiming that  
“the creative force has not deserted the earth during any of the epochs of geological 
time that have succeeded to the first manifestation of such force; and that, in respect 
to no one class of animals, has the operation of creative force been limited to one 
geological epoch; and perhaps the most important and significant result of 
paleontological research has been the establishment of the axiom of the continuous 
operation of the ordained becoming of living things.” (Owen 1860a: 3) 
His intent was to “set forth the beneficence and intelligence of the Creative Power” (Owen 1860a: 
412) for  
“Everywhere in organic nature we see the means not only subservient to an end, but 
that end accomplished by the simplest means. Hence we are compelled to regard the 
Great Cause of all, not like certain philosophic ancients, as a uniform and quiescent 
mind, as an all-pervading anima mundi, but as an active and anticipating intelligence. 
By applying the laws of comparative anatomy to the relics of extinct races of animals 
contained in and characterizing the different strata of the earth's crust, and 
corresponding with as many epochs in the earth's history, we make an important 
step in advance of all preceding philosophies, and are able to demonstrate that the 
same pervading, active, and beneficent intelligence which manifests His power in our 
times, has also manifested His power in times long anterior to the records of our 
existence.” (Owen 1860a: 413) 
He then repeated the dismissal of mechanical explanations in biology from the Fullerian Lectures. 
(Owen 1860a: 414) 
In the memoir on the Aye-aye, Owen continued on the same teleological course: 
“The succession of species by continuously operating law is not necessarily a "blind 
operation." Such law, however dimly discerned in the properties and successions of 
natural objects, intimates, nevertheless, a pre- conceived progress. Organisms may 
be evolved in orderly succession stage after stage, towards a foreseen goal; and the 
broad features of the course may still show the unmistakeable impress of divine 
volition.” (Owen 1866a [1862]: 91) 
“So, also, conditions of existence have a creative cause, as well as the animals related 
to those conditions. Constructed as we find them, animals are necessarily so related, 
and must be affected by every change in such conditions. But if we can conceive such 
conditions to change agreeably with the laws of their being,—the crust of the earth, 
e. g., having been created to move up and down, affecting its relations to water, air, 
temperature, and other circumstances influencing living beings, —these beings and 
their dwelling-place having been created as they are, with such interdependencies, 
the changes are necessary, may be called fatalistic, and yet are not the less a 
preordained result of the Creator of the arrangements, foreseeing the consequences 
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of a long-continued series of operations and influences, educing new adjustments 
and developments out of efforts and exercises of organs stimulated by surrounding 
changes, or out of slight departures from parental form; which change of organs by 
change of exercise, and which congenital deviations or varieties, were equally a 
foreordained property of the living species.” (Owen 1866a [1862]: 90) 
The same view is reflected by his 1867 dictionary entry where “evolution was a teleological process, 
a movement towards a pre-ordained goal; and mutations were not randomly useful or useless, but a 
logical embroidering of the archetype.” (Rupke 1994: 249; cf. 250) Finally, in The Anatomy of 
Vertebrates, Owen’s teleological position came to maybe its bluntest expression. Owen was not far 
from the crudest supporters of Design when he claimed that it was no accident that the modern 
horse had appeared at about the time as the human race was no coincidence:  
“No one can enter the 'saddling ground' at Epsom, before the start for the 'Derby', 
without feeling that the glossy-coated, proudly stepping creatures led out before him 
are the most perfect and beautiful quadrupeds. As such, I believe the horse to have 
been predestined and prepared for Man. It may be weakness; but, if so, it is a 
glorious one, to discern, however dimly, across our finite prison wall, evidence of the 
'Divinity that shapes our ends’, abuse the means as we may.” (Owen 1868: 769; 
Rupke 1994: 249-50) 
Thus, despite his struggles with his model, Owen’s narrative displayed an obvious and unambiguous 
Agent and Purpose throughout: evolution was carried out by God and according to his will. “On 
Owen's view, god created the laws responsible for the generation of life forms at the same time as 
he created the laws of physics.” (Cosans 2009: 102) 
ii. Agency and Act: Secondary causes and laws materialize the archetype 
Given this analogy to physics, it is no surprise then, what Owen considered the means by which God 
achieved evolution. He did not act through direct intervention but through “natural laws” 340, i.e. 
“secondary causes” or “forces”. This idea can be seen in On the Archetype, where Owen speaks of a 
"law that the Archetype is progressively departed from as the organization is more and more 
modified in adaptation to higher and more varied powers and actions" (Owen 2007 [1849]: 49) and 
opposes two antagonistic forces 
“The platonic idea or specific organizing principle or force would seem to be in 
antagonism with the general polarizing force, and to subdue and mould it in 
subserviency to the exigences of the resulting specific form.   
The extent to which the operation of the polarizing or vegetative-repetition-force is 
so subdued in the organization of a specific animal form becomes the index of the 
grade of such species, and is directly as its ascent in the scale of being. The 
lineaments of the common archetype are obscured in the same degree: but even in 
Man, where the specific organizing force has exerted its highest power in controlling 
                                                            
340  Padian remarks that Owen’s talk of the “law-like operation of secondary causes, bizarre as it must have 
sounded to many in his audience, was intended to ensure that Owen could bring biology into the same 
realm of predictability that physics and chemistry enjoy. In the same spirit, he attacks the notion that 
"nothing is made in vain," the hyperadaptive claim of the Design advocates; nature works according to a 
Plan, but the Plan is one of organization, not of optimality of function.” (Padian 2007: lxxxiv)  
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the tendency to type and in modifying each part in adaptive subserviency to, or 
combination of power with, another part, the extent to which the vegetative 
repetition of segments and the archetypal features are traceable indicates the 
degree in which the general polarizing force may have operated in the arrangement 
of the parts of the developing frame: and it is not without interest or devoid of 
significance that such evidence should tie mainly manifested in the system of organs 
in whose tissue the inorganic earthy salts most predominate.” (Owen 1848a: 172)341 
In The Nature of Limbs where Owen cautiously suggests considering “the existence of such ministers” 
for the explanation of evolution: 
„To what natural laws or secondary causes the orderly succession and progression of 
such organic phenomena may have been committed we as yet are ignorant. But if, 
without derogation of the Divine power, we may conceive the existence of such 
ministers, and personify them by the term 'Nature'342, we learn from the past history 
of our globe that she has advanced with slow and stately steps, guided by the 
archetypal light, amidst the wreck of worlds, from the first embodiment of the 
Vertebrate idea under its old Ichthyic vestment, until it became arrayed in the 
glorious garb of the Human form.” (Owen 2007[1849]: 86; cf. Rupke 1994: 231-2; 
Amundson 2007: xxx) 
Thus, although Owen aimed for “the same realm of predictability that physics and chemistry 
enjoy[ed]”. (Padian 2007: lxxxiv; Richards 1987a: 151), he “couched his evolutionary ideas as being 
compatible with a natural law theology” (Cosans 2009: 43), thus preserving the teleological nature of 
his evolutionary account. 
After his transitional retreat, Owen reaffirmed this view in the Fullerian lectures, where he employed 
the design implications to delineate himself from the Darwin-Wallace paper. Owen stressed that a 
mere mechanistic explanation could not produce evolution. Instead, 
“the highest generalizations in the science of organic bodies, like the Newtonian laws 
of universal matter, lead to the unequivocal conviction of a great First Cause, which is 
certainly not mechanical.” (Owen 1859c: 63) 
Thus, Owen insisted that laws were secondary causes, i.e. divine means; God acted through them. 
(MacLeod 1965: 270) This allowed him to bestow an air of purpose and design even on extinction 
and death; they were means to achieving a higher goal 
“Palaentology further teaches, that not only the individual, but the species perishes; 
that as death is balanced by generation, so extinction has been concomitant with the 
                                                            
341  Owen embeds the adaptive, i.e. Cuvierian forcie in a clear divine narrative; the passage continues: “With 
regard to the ‘adaptive force,' whatever may be the expressions by which its nature and relations, when 
better understood, may be attempted to be explained, its effects must ever impress the rightly constituted 
mind with the conviction, that in every species co ends are obtained and the interests of the animal 
promoted, in a way that indicates superior design, intelligence and foresight; but a design, intelligence and 
foresight in which the judgement and reflection of the animal never were concerned; and which, therefore, 
with Virgil, and with other studious observers of nature, we must ascribe to the Sovereign of the universe, 
in whom we live, and move, and have our being.” (Owen 1848a: 172) 
342  Note that Darwin drew on this very personification in the joint paper and the Origin (sections 3.3.4, 3.4.4). 
Geoffroy had also employed it. (See section 2.3 ix) 
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creative power which has continued to provide a succession of species; and 
furthermore, that, as regards the various forms of life which this planet has 
supported, there has been ‘an advance and progress in the main’.” (Owen 1860a: 3) 
The point is repeated in the memoir on the Aye-aye, extending it to Darwin’s “injurious” variations: 
“So neither would the phenomena of the long succession of organized species justify 
the notion, nor do I believe they would suggest, that they were the result of blind 
chance, if it should be demonstrated that they, too, are the result of secondary 
influences operating through long ages. It may be true that many of the aims of 
derivative tendencies miss their end : but myriads of germs never reach perfection ; 
and the proportion of such short-coming is much greater in the phenomena of 
human life. These serve to exemplify abundantly in how small a degree the doings of 
the highest created agent here square with the ideal of the aim and end of his 
existence : yet he is not, therefore, argued to be a thing of chance. The succession of 
species by continuously operating law is not necessarily a "blind operation." Such 
law, however dimly discerned in the properties and successions of natural objects, 
intimates, nevertheless, a preconceived progress. Organisms may be evolved in 
orderly succession stage after stage, towards a foreseen goal; and the broad features 
of the course may still show the unmistakeable impress of divine volition.” (Owen 
1866a [1862]: 91) 
In the Anatomy of Vertebrates, finally, Owen explicitly opposed the two alternatives: evolution with 
design or without it, positioning himself as the design alternative to Darwin: 
“‘Natural Selection’ leaves the subsequent origin and succession of species to the 
fortuitous concurrence of outward conditions: ‘Derivation’ recognises a purpose in 
the defined and preordained course, due to innate capacity or power of change, by 
which nomogenously343-created protozoa have risen to the higher forms of plants 
and animals.” (Owen 1868: 809)344 
Moreover, the construction of laws as divine means of intervention allowed Owen to preserve the 
idea of divine providence: although God does not interfere directly in the course of organic things his 
laws keep him in touch: 
“Thus we learn, that the creative force has not deserted the earth during any of the 
epochs of geological time that have succeeded to the first manifestation of such 
force; and that, in respect to no one class of animals, has the operation of creative 
force been limited to one geological epoch; and perhaps the most important and 
significant result of paleontological research has been the establishment of the axiom 
of the continuous operation of the ordained becoming of living things.” (Owen 
1860a: 3) 
                                                            
343  The term ‘nomogeny’ is a synonym for spontaneous generation. 
344  Note how the dualism here presented by Owen still reflects the fundamental divide of the debates 
between Cuvier and Geoffroy: structure versus environment. 
Sebastian Zacharias: The Darwinian Revolution as a knowledge reorganization 
 
132 
iii. Scene: A pre-ordained universe 
As with Chambers, the Scene in which evolution occurred did not play much of a role in Owen’s 
narrative and the reasons are the same: If God is almighty, everything is subject to him, he rules the 
domains of the material world (physics, chemistry, geology) as well as the world of the living 
(biology). Thus, in Owen’s teleological narrative, all features of the world bear God’s mark; 
everything is lawful and intended change, everything displays harmony and design, the world suits its 
components. This becomes very clear in a passage from the Aye-aye memoir: 
“So, also, conditions of existence have a creative cause, as well as the animals related 
to those conditions. Constructed as we find them, animals are necessarily so related, 
and must be affected by every change in such conditions. But if we can conceive such 
conditions to change agreeably with the laws of their being,—the crust of the earth, 
e. g., having been created to move up and down, affecting its relations to water, air, 
temperature, and other circumstances influencing living beings, —these beings and 
their dwelling-place having been created as they are, with such interdependencies, 
the changes are necessary, may be called fatalistic, and yet are not the less a 
preordained result of the Creator of the arrangements, foreseeing the consequences 
of a long-continued series of operations and influences, educing new adjustments 
and developments out of efforts and exercises of organs stimulated by surrounding 
changes, or out of slight departures from parental form; which change of organs by 
change of exercise, and which congenital deviations or varieties, were equally a 
foreordained property of the living species.” (Owen 1866a [1862]: 90) 
In sum, despite his constant tinkering with his model, Owen’s texts convey a constant and 
straightforward narrative. From the Archetype (1848) to his Anatomy of Vertebrates (1868), all 
accounts of evolution are embedded in a religious narrative in which God (Agent) takes center stage 
in a world which is subject to his will (Scene). He acts through various laws (Agency) according to his 
plan or will (Purpose/Reason) to achieve the kind of evolution Owen championed (Act). 
3.2.5 Implications: What did Owen’s explanation imply about the world? 
Owen first hesitated to publicly join Chambers but later never went beyond the narrative already 
popularized and established by Chambers. Thus, over time, the possible ontological implications of 
Owen’s narrative did not exceed those of Chambers. Thus, Owen’s narrative settled somewhere 
between Paley and Darwin, clearly surpassing the theism of the former but stopping short of the 
materialism of the latter. 
On Owen’s account, Man remains in a class of his own, unified in his many races, and atop of 
creation – despite some anatomical resemblances to the apes. He maintains his special relationship 
to God and enjoys divine providence. God remains the central and dominant Agent in the world, 
acting in foresight and benevolence. With respect to society and politics, Owen propagated a world 
of limited and pre-ordained changes, of controlled dynamics, thus championing the utmost stability 
still compatible with the paleontological and biogeographical record. Thus,  
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“Owen’s archetypal theory resolved the teleological problem of the explanation of 
structural similarities between organs and organism which do not serve the similar 
functions, and his ‘conserving reforms’ came to the aid of natural theology and the 
social order in a period when they were both under considerable stress. “ (Richards 
1987a: 157) 
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3.3 Alfred Russel Wallace: two papers from 1855 and 1858 
Alfred Russel Wallace is most famous as the co-author of Evolution theory and natural selection; this, 
however, was but a short episode of his life – and a rather early one. Wallace was born in 1823 in the 
county Monmouthshire in south east Wales. He came from a humble background. He had to leave 
school early, at fourteen, and briefly worked in a carpenter shop in London and, from 1837 on, as 
land surveyor during the railway boom. Walking the countryside, he developed an interest in natural 
history and began to study and identify plants. In stark opposition to Owen, he would remain a field 
researcher throughout his career, never witnessing an anatomical dissection until he was fifty. 
(Pantin 1959: 66-8; Ruse 1979: 155-6) 
Wallace read Chamber’s Vestiges and by 1845 he considered himself an evolutionist although he was 
not satisfied with the explanation Chambers provided. In 1848, at the age of 25, he ventured on his 
first great field trip to the Amazonas. He was accompanied by the Henry Bates, two years his junior 
and from a similar background.345 Bates and Wallace spent nearly four years collecting specimen in 
South America. Unfortunately, on the return trip in 1852, Wallace’s ship caught fire. He lost all his 
possessions and collections and barely survived. (Pantin 1959: 68; Ruse 1979: 156-7) 
After two years in London, he left for another, even longer field trip: the next eight years he would 
spend on the Malay Archipelago (modern Indonesia) and there he would make the discoveries that 
eventually led to his two evolutionary papers of 1855 and 1858. When Wallace returned to England 
in 1862, he was well-known, respected and had acquired some financial reserves through the sale of 
rare specimen. (Pantin 1959: 68; Himmelfarb 1959: 202-3; Ruse 1979: 158-9) 
Unfortunately, bad investments would lead to financial troubles in the late 1860s and 1870s. Wallace 
had to earn a living through publications, lectures and editing work. In the 1870s, he engaged in 
social movements and published on social topics. Still, he continued his biological work, publishing 
for instance The Geographical Distribution of Animals in 1876, a seminal work in biogeography. In 
1881, Wallace was granted a pension. He publishes a collection of his contributions to evolution 
theory in the book 1889 Darwinism. Wallace died in 1913 and a commemorative plaque was installed 
near Darwin’ grave in Westminster Abbey. 
Wallace published his pre-Origin position on evolution in two papers. In September 1855, On the Law 
Which Has Regulated the Introduction of New Species appeared in the Annals and Magazine of the 
Natural History. (Wallace 1870a [1855]) Nearly three years later, On the Tendency of Varieties to 
depart indefinitely from the Original Type was part of the famous joint Darwin-Wallace paper in the 
Proceedings of the Linnean Society for Zoology. (Wallace 1858) 346 
In the first paper, Wallace discussed the problem of geographical distribution and presented a new 
taxonomy, a branching tree, and thus a new account of what evolution was. In this first paper, 
however, Wallace would not attempt to explain his taxonomy or the process which had produced 
it.347 This paper was brought to Darwin’s notice by Lyell in April 1856. Darwin recognized how close 
                                                            
345  Bates would later give the first account of mimicry as an instance of adaption in animals and, thus, support 
natural selection. 
346  It is unclear how much Darwin was motivated by the wish to secure priority for work. 
347  I would like to emphasize how much Wallace’s two papers of 1855 and 1858 are complementary. In the 
Darwin literature the former is usually considered a first step of Wallace towards Darwin’s model, 
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Wallace came to his own thoughts, as documented in his Sketch of 1842 and his Essay of 1844, the 
latter of which had, at the time, been read by the geologist Charles Lyell and the botanist John Dalton 
Hooker. (Beddall 1988) 
In May 1856 and on Lyell’s advice, Darwin began his voluminous Natural Selection, a book intended 
to provide a comprehensive and empirically founded presentation of his views on the “species 
problem”. By the end of March 1857 Darwin received a first letter by Wallace. In his response in May, 
he expressed his agreement with Wallace’s views and encouraged him to go further. In early 
September 1857, however, Darwin wrote a letter to the American botanist Asa Gray in which he 
summarized and updated his views and producing a third independent witness for his priority. 
(Beddall 1988) 
Wallace, in the meantime, had his very own Malthus moment. Lying down with fever, Wallace 
reflected about the checks which keep populations from expanding and, just like Darwin, 
remembered Malthus’s essay which he had read a couple of years earlier. This finally led him to an 
explanation for evolution. Wallace wrote it down in a short paper and sent it Darwin with the request 
to publish it, if Darwin deemed it worthy. (Beddall 1988; Himmelfarb 1959) 
On June 18 1858, Darwin received this paper and, noticing the obvious similarities between Wallace’s 
and his explanation, consulted with Hooker and Lyell on what to do.348 Lyell suggested to submit a 
joint paper to the Linnean Society thus acknowledging both Wallace’s and Darwin’s independent 
originality but reserve priority for Darwin. The 1858 joint paper included extracts from Darwin’s Essay 
of 1844, which had been read by Lyell and Hooker, as well as his 1857 letter to Asa Gray providing an 
updated version of Darwin’s argument but also displaying the continuity of his thoughts. The 18-page 
joint paper contains a two-page introduction, seven-and-a-half pages of Darwin’s two contributions 
and eight-and-a-half pages for Wallace’s part. 
In the following analysis, I will compare Darwin’s and Wallace’s parts of the paper. I will focus on 
Wallace, however, as a Darwin’s part is already very close to the Origin which I will address in the 
next section. 
3.3.1 Description: What evidence did Wallace and Darwin present and how? 
In comparing the Wallace’s two papers with Darwin’s contributions to the joint paper according to 
my framework, Wallace’s papers are much more empirical, mainly due to the 1855 paper. Darwin 
does not provide but two explanatory sketches.349 Wallace’s first paper begins with a description of 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
something of an immature idea of his model to come. This is inadequate, however. In the first paper 
Wallace presents the static model which his 1858 paper aims to explain by a dynamic model, the former is 
the empirical basis to the second, its point of reference. My four-level model makes this connection much 
clearer and my analysis will show how much both papers are linked. I believe that historical and 
philosophical analysis should take these links into consideration and regard the second paper in context 
with the first. 
348  For an excellent and precise historical account of the events between Wallace’s 1855 paper and the 
publication of the 1858 joint paper, see (Beddall 1988). 
349  18 month later, in the Origin Darwin would supply some of these empirics. However, he never presented 
an amount of empirical material comparable to Owen, not even in the Origin. He seemed to have planned 
this in his unpublished “big book” Natural Selection but he never came to deliver the specification of his 
sketch. 
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geological findings and proceeds with a presentation of nine empirical regularities which link 
geography and geology to biology, the condensed shared empirical knowledge of biogeography (1-4) 
and paleontology (5-9): 
“1. Large groups, such as classes and orders, are generally spread over the whole 
earth, while smaller ones, such as families and genera, are frequently confined to one 
portion, often to a very limited district.  
2. In widely distributed families the genera are often limited in range; in widely 
distributed genera, well-marked groups of species are peculiar to each geographical 
district. 
3. When a group is confined to one district, and is rich in species, it is almost 
invariably the case that the most closely allied species are found in the same locality 
or in closely adjoining localities, and that therefore the natural sequence of the 
species by affinity is also geographical.  
4. In countries of a similar climate, but separated by a wide sea or lofty mountains, 
the families, genera and species of the one are often represented by closely allied 
families, genera and species peculiar to the other.  
5. The distribution of the organic world in time is very similar to its present 
distribution in space.  
6. Most of the larger and some small groups extend through several geological 
periods.  
7. In each period, however, there are peculiar groups, found nowhere else, and 
extending through one or several formations.   
8. Species of one genus, or genera of one family occurring in the same geological 
time are more closely allied than those separated in time.  
9. As generally in geography no species or genus occurs in two very distant localities 
without being also found in intermediate places, so in geology the life of a species or 
genus has not been interrupted. In other words, no group or species has come into 
existence twice.” (Wallace 1870a [1855]: 4-5) 
These nine regularities350 Wallace summarizes by a “law” which he covers them: “Every species has 
come into existence coincident both in space and time with a pre-existing closely allied species.” 
(Wallace 1870a [1855]: 5) Thus, Wallace, formulates a general statement which set fossils and living 
organisms in relation to each other in function of the geographical area (space) and geological layer 
(time) in which they were observed as well as the anatomical features by which species were 
classified in the first place. To Wallace, this “law” “agrees with, explains and illustrates all the facts 
connected with” the natural affinities (similarities) among organisms, the distribution of plants and 
animals in space and time as well as rudimentary organs. (Wallace 1870a [1855]: 6) Wallace then 
demonstrates how his law covers such facts on several generic and specific examples. 
In comparison, the joint paper of 1858 contains very little empirics. This is not surprising if one 
considers its restricted length; these are three explanatory sketches, not more. Darwin, in the 
excerpt from his 1844 Essay, explicitly mentions two empirical regularities. First, he notes that animal 
populations remain constant despite the “enormous multiplying power inherent and annually in 
action in all animals [… and] the countless seeds scattered” each year by plants. (Darwin 1858a 
                                                            
350  (Ruse 1979: 158) calls these regularities, „in the philosopher’s terminology”, ‘phenomenal laws’. 
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[1844]: 48) Thus, organisms produce much more progeny than can possibly survive. Second, in his 
letter to Gray, Darwin explains that the “same spot will support more life if occupied by very diverse 
forms.” (Darwin 1858a [1844]: 52) 
In his part of the joint paper, Wallace (1858: 57) takes up Darwin’s first regularity: “Even the least 
prolific of animals would increase rapidly if unchecked, whereas it is evident that the animal 
population of the globe must be stationary, or perhaps, through the influence of man, decreasing.” 
(Wallace 1858: 54) Second, he mentions that “Domestic varieties, when turned wild, must return to 
something near the type of the original wild stock, or become altogether extinct.” (Wallace 1858: 60) 
Third, Wallace refers to his law from the 1855 by claiming that there is “progression and continued 
divergence” among organisms such that “there is a tendency in nature to the continued progression 
of certain classes of varieties further and further from the original type there appears no reason to 
assign any definite limits” (Wallace 1858: 59, 62)  
3.3.2 Classification: How did Wallace & Darwin denote and aggregate evidence? 
Based on his law that “[e]very species has come into existence coincident both in space and time 
with a pre-existing closely allied species”, Wallace discusses a true system of Classification. He 
explicitly denies a “direct succession in a straight line”351 but also “all those systems of classification 
which arrange species or groups in circles, as well as those which fix a definite number for the 
divisions of each group” as the quinary system Chambers had fancied; such system simply do not 
hold empirically. (Wallace 1870a [1855]: 6, 8) Therefore, Wallace suggests a novel type of taxonomy, 
a classification “as intricate as the twigs of a gnarled oak or the vascular system of the human body. 
“Wallace 1870a [1855]: 7-8)352 
When Darwin read Wallace’s 1855 paper he wrote on the margin “uses my simile of a tree”, 
recognizing a representation which he had been pondering for years353 (Beddall 1988: 19; cf. 17), and 
which he presented anew in his letter to Gray: “… organic beings always seem to branch and sub-
branch like the limbs of a tree from a common trunk, the flourishing and diverging twigs destroying 
the less vigorous —the dead and lost branches rudely representing extinct genera and families.” 
(Darwin 1858b [1857]: 53) 
Neither author provided a diagram of that taxonomic tree. Nevertheless, compared to Chambers’ or 
Owen’s taxonomy, it is much less orderly and systematic. There are no boundaries between orders, 
classes, species nor orderly steps in which organisms proceed from lower to higher forms. 
Particularly, it is not clear how Man relates to the animals; he is simply not mentioned in the paper.  
                                                            
351  This can be read as a reference to Lamarck’s static model. (See section 2.3 vii) 
352  For an overview over static models of evolution prior to Darwin and Wallace, see (Voss 2007: 95-163). 
353  As Darwin did not mention the ‘tree’ concept in his Essay of 1844 but only in the 1857 letter to Gray, one 
might wonder if he took it from Wallace. Yet, Darwin clearly sketched his tree diagram in 1837 in his first 
transmutation notebook. 
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In Darwin’s part of the joint paper I see no explicit justification for the classificatory tree, Darwin 
focuses on justifying his explanation.354 Wallace does address the question in his 1858 paper in the 
same way Darwin would in the Origin (section 3.4.2): 
“Which is the variety and which the original species, there is generally no means of 
determining, except in those rare cases in which the one race has been known to 
produce an offspring unlike itself and resembling the other. This, however, would 
seem quite incompatible with the "permanent invariability of species," but the 
difficulty is overcome by assuming that such varieties have strict limits, and can never 
again vary further from the original type, although they may return to it…“ (Wallace 
1858: 53) 
This justification aims at the exact point, where Wallace’s and Darwin’s aggregation deviates from 
many former classifications; it denies that the branches of the tree are neatly separated, or that the 
forks come in regular intervals. Both champion evolution without boundaries and argue against sharp 
distinctions between species and varieties, just like Lamarck nearly fifty years earlier.355 Their 
argument eases taxonomy from a theoretical burden like Owen’s, however, it allowed for less 
powerful statements about future variations or fossils. The days of Cuvier claiming he could describe 
an animal from a single bone were certainly coming to an end.  
3.3.3 Logical explanation: How did Wallace and Darwin model evolution? 
In his 1855 paper, Wallace does not explain his taxonomy, he merely describes it. The text does give 
a little hint in what direction to think when Wallace cites “the modified physical conditions” and 
“altered conditions” as a possible reason why old species replace new ones but it provides nothing 
close to an explanation, not even a sketch of how evolution is produced. (Wallace 1870a [1855]:14-6) 
I will therefore ignore it in the following section. 
 The three parts of the joint paper, however, provide detailed and explicit dynamic models of 
evolution; they satisfy four to five elements of my framework. 
i. Situation Type: Growth with Reproduction & Struggle for Life 
A straightforward case is the Situation in which their models apply. It constitutes the first paragraph 
of Darwin’s 1844 essay which begins such: 
“De Candolle, in an eloquent passage, has declared that all nature is at war, one 
organism with another, or with external nature. Seeing the contented face of nature, 
this may at first well be doubted; but reflection will inevitably prove it to be true. The 
war, however, is not constant, but recurrent in a slight degree at short periods, and 
more severely at occasional more distant periods; and hence its effects are easily 
                                                            
354  From Darwin’s use of the Object Class of his dynamic model, however, it becomes clear that Darwin shared 
Wallace’s position on this point. Darwin’s concentration on intra-species variation can be traced back to his 
1836 research diary and the article on the Galapagos finches which appeared in the New York Times in 
1837. (cf. Repcheck 2007: 218)  
355  Remember how Lamarck relativized both the notion of varieties and species in favor of individuals and 
argued that varieties and species are somewhat arbitrary sets over individuals. (Lamarck 1873a [1809]: 73) 
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overlooked. It is the doctrine of Malthus applied in most cases with tenfold force.” 
(Darwin 1858a [1844]: 46-7) 
This struggle, Darwin says, occurs between species but also between individuals. (Darwin 1858a 
[1844]: 48) Besides, he defines what ‘struggle’ denotes: the fact that organic populations are largely 
constant in number although they produce so much progeny each year that their numbers should 
grow very quickly if all these progeny would reproduce. 
“But for animals without artificial means, the amount of food for each species must, 
on an average, be constant, whereas the increase of all organisms tends to be 
geometrical, and in a vast majority of cases at an enormous ratio. Suppose in a 
certain spot there are eight pairs of birds, and that only four pairs of them annually 
(including double hatches) rear only four young, and that these go on rearing their 
young at the same rate, then at the end of seven years (a short life, excluding violent 
deaths, for any bird) there will be 2048 birds, instead of the original sixteen. As this 
increase is quite impossible, we must conclude either that birds do not rear nearly 
half their young, or that the average life of a bird is, from accident, not nearly seven 
years. Both checks probably concur. The same kind of calculation applied to all plants 
and animals affords results more or less striking…” (Darwin 1858a [1844]: 47) 
In the joint paper, Darwin repeats: 
“The elder De Candolle, W. Herbert, and Lyell have written excellently on the struggle 
for life; but even they have not written strongly enough. […] Only a few of those 
annually born can live to propagate their kind.” (Darwin 1858b [1857]: 51) 
Thus, the term ‘struggle’ denotes a conditional statement, namely a sequence of two observations: 
(i) Growth with reproduction (overproduction): On average, organisms produce a number of 
offspring which surpasses the number of their parent generation, and (ii) Constancy of Populations: 
Despite the Growth with Reproduction, populations do not grow over the long term. 
Wallace concurs with Darwin in all these points. He mentions the struggle, both between species and 
individuals: 
“The life of wild animals is a struggle for existence. The full exertion of all their 
faculties and all their energies is required to preserve their own existence and 
provide for that of their infant offspring. The possibility of procuring food during the 
least favourable seasons, and of escaping the attacks of their most dangerous 
enemies, are the primary conditions which determine the existence both of 
individuals and of entire species.“ (Wallace 1858: 54) 
“Now it is clear that what takes place among the individuals of a species must also 
occur among the several allied species of a group,—viz. that those which are best 
adapted to obtain a regular supply of food, and to defend themselves against the 
attacks of their enemies and the vicissitudes of the seasons, must necessarily obtain 
and preserve a superiority in population…” (Wallace 1858: 57) 
and provides the same operationalization for it as Darwin, denoting the same conditional statement 
of Growth with Reproduction (overproduction) and a constancy of populations: 
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“The greater or less fecundity of an animal is often considered to be one of the chief 
causes of its abundance or scarcity; but a consideration of the facts will show us that 
it really has little or nothing to do with the matter. Even the least prolific of animals 
would increase rapidly if unchecked, whereas it is evident that the animal population 
of the globe must be stationary, or perhaps, through the influence of man, 
decreasing. Fluctuations there may be; but permanent increase, except in restricted 
localities, is almost impossible.” (Wallace 1858: 55) 
In sum, both Darwin and Wallace describe the Situation by the predicate ‘struggle’ which has the 
same connotation and denotes the same observable phenomena for both of them.356 
ii. Object Class: Species, Varieties – and Individuals? 
Through their classifications, Wallace357 and Darwin claim that evolution transcends the boundaries 
of species and even Owen’s archetype. Their first challenge is thus to reconstruct the Object Class 
and to demonstrate (i) that Natural Selection applies to individuals, varieties and species alike, and 
(ii) that it is potentially unlimited, unrestricted by boundaries. Thus, within their understanding of 
evolution, it made no sense for Darwin or Wallace, to uphold the sharp distinctions between species 
or individuals. 
Darwin, unlike in the Origin, does not address the problem explicitly in his parts of the joint paper. 
Yet, he does imply his position by mention both varieties and species as equals when speaking of 
evolutionary change. (Darwin 1858b [1857]: 53) Moreover, Darwin blurs the distinction of 
individuals, varieties and species by referring to all three in a single argument:  
“I cannot doubt that during millions of generations individuals of a species will be 
occasionally born with some slight variation, profitable to some part of their 
economy. Such individuals will have a better chance of surviving, and of propagating 
their new and slightly different structure ; and the modification may be slowly 
increased by the accumulative action of natural selection to any profitable extent. 
The variety thus formed will either coexist with, or, more commonly, will exterminate 
its parent form.” (Darwin 1858b [1857]: 52) 
Wallace addresses this problem right at the beginning of his paper:  
“Which is the variety and which the original species, there is generally no means of 
determining, except in those rare cases in which the one race has been known to 
produce an offspring unlike itself and resembling the other.“ (Wallace 1858: 53) 
Despite these obvious equivalences, there is some debate on whether Darwin’s and Wallace’s 
models are really equivalent. Most of these objections concern the Object Class: 
                                                            
356  Kutschera claims that Wallace did not mention the importance of time for his argument. (Kutschera 2003: 
351) It is true, that Wallace makes no explicit point about it in the 1858 paper, but he does in his earlier 
paper, discussing geological time throughout the text. (Wallace 1870a [1855]) Besides, it seems somewhat 
obvious that somebody speaking of palaentology and the origin of species is aware of the timescales in 
which such change occurs. Hence, I do not consider this a relevant difference. 
357  In his first paper, Wallace mentioned varieties only twice, and never variation. He does not discuss the 
distinction between varieties and species or the operationalization of either topic, albeit this would be his 
Archimedean point in 1858. (Wallace 1870a [1855]: 18) 
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First, Wallace does not mention them explicitly here and generally emphasizes struggle within and 
selection upon varieties and species, it is sometimes asked whether Wallace implies individuals. (cf. 
Ruse 1979: 159, Lynch 2001: xxvi-xxvi; Bowler 1990; Bowler 1992 [1988]: 43-46; Kutschera 2003: 351) 
Had he not, he could not have spoken about a struggle between individuals of the same variety or 
species nor could he have applied natural selection to individuals. A close reading brings me to the 
conclusion that such claims are unjustified. On one hand, Wallace infers all claims about natural 
selection acting on different species from its action on individuals of the same species. (Wallace 
1858: 57; cf. Ruse 1979: 159) Thus, he must assume a struggle for life within species. On the other 
hand, before speaking about varieties, Wallace states clearly that individuals which have undergone 
variation may become variations, later he mixes both expressions. (Wallace 1858: 57, 59) Thus, I see 
no reason to assume that Wallace’s Object Class excludes individuals. 
A second claim is made by Kutschera who points out that, in 1858, Wallace speaks only of animals 
not of plants, while Darwin mentions both. (Kutschera 2003: 351) To me this seems to witness more 
of carelessness than a difference in their arguments. First, Wallace spoke of both, animals and plants, 
in his 1855 article. Second, he makes no explicit statement that he would exclude plants from his 
argument and naturalists of the time addressed the “species question” on either, animals and plants. 
Third, the introduction of the joint paper claims that both explanations by Wallace and Darwin are 
supposed to be equivalent; this should include the scope of their models. As I am unaware of any 
reference to this difference in the reception, I suggest to ignore it and assume that Wallace included 
all types of organisms. 
A third argument focuses on the fact that Wallace explicitly denies that domesticated animals are 
informative for evolution in the wild: 
"We see, then, that no inferences as to varieties in a state of nature can be deduced 
from the observation of those occurring among domestic animals. The two are so 
much opposed to each other in every circumstance of their existence, that what 
applies to the one is almost sure not to apply to the other.” (Wallace 1858: 61; cf. 
Kutschera 2003: 347, 350) 
Darwin, on the other hand, draws the analogy of breeders and artificial selection to introduce the 
concept of natural selection in both his letter to Asa Gray and, later in the Origin. (Darwin 1858b 
[1857]: 501; section 3.4.4) However, his analogy is no part of Darwin’s model but a rhetorical device, 
namely a suggestive category shift (metábasis). Therefore, this difference between Wallace and 
Darwin does not constitute a difference between their models but a difference in the manner in 
which they introduce them. 
In sum, I consider the Object Classes of both models equivalent; they include individuals, varieties 
and species. And there is a final, virtually invisible common feature. Neither author attempts define 
the term ‘species’.358 
                                                            
358  While Darwin would continue this practice in the Origin and never attempt a theoretical definition, Wallace 
provided at least three theoretical definitions, one of which comes quite close to modern definitions of 
populations. (Kutschera 2003: 352) 
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iii. Output: survival of individual variations, rise and fall of varieties, emergence and extinction of 
species 
Both yearn to explain the Output of previous models of evolution: the emergence and extinction of 
species and varieties, the fact that species “come into existence coincident both in space and time 
with a pre-existing closely allied species” (Wallace 1870a [1855]: 5) – whatever one wants to call 
these moves on the taxonomic trees. It occurs on all three levels of objects, on which the Struggle for 
Life is fought, i.e. individuals, varieties and species. All three parts of the joint paper are very clear on 
this, Darwin’s Essay of 1844: 
“Each new variety or species, when formed, will generally take the place of, and thus 
exterminate its less well-fitted parent. This I believe to be the origin of the 
classification and affinities of organic beings at all times; for organic beings always 
seem to branch and sub-branch like the limbs of a tree from a common trunk, the 
flourishing and diverging twigs destroying the less vigorous—the dead and lost 
branches rudely representing extinct genera and families.“ (Darwin 1858a [1844]: 53) 
Darwin’s letter to Asa Gray: 
“…during millions of generations individuals of a species will be occasionally born 
with some slight variation, profitable to some part of their economy. Such individuals 
will have a better chance of surviving, and of propagating their new and slightly 
different structure; and the modification may be slowly increased by the 
accumulative action of natural selection to any profitable extent. The variety thus 
formed will either coexist with, or, more commonly, will exterminate its parent form. 
An organic being, like the woodpecker or misseltoe, may thus come to be adapted to 
a score of contingences—natural selection accumulating those slight variations in all 
parts of its structure, which are in any way useful to it during any part of its life.” 
Darwin 1858b [1857]: 52) 
and Wallace’s part of the paper in which an individual variation is preserved to grow into a variety 
and this variety replaces  
“the species, of which it would be a more perfectly developed and more highly 
organized form. It would be in all respects better adapted to secure its safety, and to 
prolong its individual existence and that of the race. Such a variety could not return 
to the original form; for that form is an inferior one, and could never compete with it 
for existence.” (Wallace 1858: 58) 
This process never stops for  
“this new, improved, and populous race might itself, in course of time, give rise to 
new varieties, exhibiting several diverging modifications of form, any of which, 
tending to increase the facilities for preserving existence, must, by the same general 
law, in their turn become predominant. Here, then, we have progression and 
continued divergence359 deduced from the general laws which regulate the existence 
                                                            
359  This seems to be a reference to the law specified in Wallace’s 1855 paper although he does not use the 
exact same terms. 
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of animals in a state of nature, and from the undisputed fact that varieties do 
frequently occur.” (Wallace 1858: 59) 
In sum, there are six basic cases: an individual variation might survive and reproduce itself, a 
variety may rise or fall in frequency with respect to its parent species and a species might 
emerge or become extinct. And these three cases are sufficient to explain the intricate 
branching of the taxonomic tree: 
“We believe we have now shown that there is a tendency in nature to the continued 
progression of certain classes of varieties further and further from the original type—
a progression to which there appears no reason to assign any definite limits—and 
that the same principle which produces this result in a state of nature will also 
explain why domestic varieties have a tendency to revert to the original type. This 
progression, by minute steps, in various directions, but always checked and balanced 
by the necessary conditions, subject to which alone existence can be preserved, may, 
it is believed, be followed out so as to agree with all the phenomena presented by 
organized beings, their extinction and succession in past ages, and all the 
extraordinary modifications of form, instinct, and habits which they exhibit.” 
(Wallace 1858: 62; cf. Darwin 1858b [1857]: 53) 
iv. Input: physical changes and changes of other organisms 
Previous models already included physical changes as triggers of evolution; Wallace and Darwin 
concur. (Wallace 1870a [1855]: 14-16; Wallace 1858: 58; Darwin 1858a [1844]: 48-49; Darwin 1858b 
[1857]: 51-52) Yet, both go beyond their predecessors by developing their argument from individual 
variations as the germs of varieties.360 If one organism varies and gains an advantage in the struggle 
for life, he changes the conditions of life of other organisms. This follows directly from the struggle 
for life within the same species and is described by both.361 
                                                            
360  In doing so, Wallace explicitly denies any relation to Lamarckian explanations: “The hypothesis of 
Lamarck—that progressive changes in species have been produced by the attempts of animals to increase 
the development of their own organs, and thus modify their structure and habits—has been repeatedly 
and easily refuted […]; but the view here developed renders such an hypothesis quite unnecessary, by 
showing that similar results must be produced by the action of principles constantly at work in nature. […] 
Neither did the giraffe acquire its long neck by desiring to reach the foliage of the more lofty shrubs, and 
constantly stretching its neck for the purpose, but because any varieties which occurred among its 
antitypes with a longer neck than usual at once secured a fresh range of pasture over the same ground as 
their shorter-necked companions, and on the first scarcity of food were thereby enabled to outlive them.” 
(Wallace 1858: 61) – Darwin does not dissociate himself from Lamarck in the joint paper. (He used Lamarck 
as a reference in his notebooks but dismissed Lamarck’s work in private letters. (Grinnell 1985: 51-5) 
361  (Bowler 1992 [1988]: 43) cites Nicholson to argue that Wallace does put less emphasis on the variations of 
other organisms than Darwin, claiming that Darwin’s organisms struggle against both other organisms and 
their physical environment while Wallace’s organisms struggle mostly against the environment. (Lynch 
2001) and (Kutschera 2003) make similar points. In my opinion, a close reading of the joint paper does not 
support such a claim. Considering how both authors emphasize the struggle within the same species, I 
cannot imagine how one can understand the cited passages from Wallace differently. Moreover, in the 
joint paper, Darwin is not more explicit than Wallace; he never explicitly states that the variations of 
organism X may trigger the evolution of some other organism Y. Therefore, either one grants the point to 
both authors or to none. I consider the former more adequate, as both authors definitely go beyond their 
predecessors in the type of Input they consider to trigger evolution. 
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Wallace considers as triggers of evolution “any change in fact tending to render existence more 
difficult to the species in question, and tasking its utmost powers to avoid complete extermination”. 
(Wallace 1858: 58) As instances he cites changes of colour, greater or less development of hair, 
increases in the power or dimensions of the limbs or any external organs, the mode of procuring 
food or the range of their Lebensraum (Wallace 1858: 57-8), and argues that such variations might 
lead to advantages in the struggle with other species but also with members of the same species, 
namely when a variety obtains and keeps “a numerical superiority” to its parent species. (Wallace 
1858: 58) 
Darwin expresses the same point, arguing that “any minute variation in structure, habits, or 
instincts” might lead to “a better chance of surviving; and those of its offspring which inherited the 
variation, be it ever so slight, would also have a better chance”. (Darwin 1858a [1844]: 49) Such, “the 
smallest grain in the balance, in the long run, must tell on which death shall fall, and which shall 
survive”. (Darwin 1858a [1844]: 49) This holds between species but also within species:  
“Considering the infinitely various methods which living beings follow to obtain food 
by struggling with other organisms, to escape danger at various times of life, to have 
their eggs or seeds disseminated, &c. &c., I cannot doubt that during millions of 
generations individuals of a species will be occasionally born with some slight 
variation, profitable to some part of their economy. Such individuals will have a 
better chance of surviving, and of propagating their new and slightly different 
structure; and the modification may be slowly increased by the accumulative action 
of natural selection to any profitable extent. The variety thus formed will either 
coexist with, or, more commonly, will exterminate its parent form.” (Darwin 1858b 
[1857]: 52)362 
Thus, both authors go beyond previous attempts to model evolution; they introduce a whole new 
kind of trigger in the environment: variations of other organisms. They do not provide an 
operationalization for this Input, however. 
v. Connector: Natural Selection and – a blank 
What links the Input to the Output is a Connector which Darwin famously called “natural selection”. 
In both parts of the joint paper he introduces it via an analogy to the artificial selection carried out by 
a breeder. He borrows the term from the domain in which it was originally termed, domestic races 
and their breeders, and applies it to a new domain, the wild life, thus transferring parts of the 
connotation of the term ‘selection’ upon natural phenomena. This category shift (metábasis) is very 
transparent in his Essay of 1844, where speaks twice of ‘selection’ but in the two different uses: 
“Yearly more are bred than can survive; the smallest grain in the balance in the long 
run, must tell on which death shall fall, and which shall survive. Let this work of 
[natural] selection on the one hand, and death on the other, go on for a thousand 
generations, who will pretend to affirm that it would produce no effect, when we 
                                                            
362  Actually, Darwin’s expression ‘parent form’ is intuitive but misleading, for the biological parent is already 
dead, it does not struggle against its descendant of a couple of generations later (when selection has 
accumulated variations). The variety will exterminate members of the same species which have not 
undergone the same variation. 
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remember what, in a few years, Bakewell effected in cattle, and Western in sheep, by 
this identical principle of [artificial] selection ?” (Darwin 1858a [1844]: 49) 
In the letter to Asa Gray he spends his first paragraph speaking about artificial selection. Then he 
carries out the very same category shift as in his earlier paper363:  
“Now suppose there were a being who did not judge by mere external appearances, 
but who could study the whole internal organization, who was never capricious, and 
should go on selecting for one object during millions of generations; who will say 
what he might not effect? [… Indeed] there is such an unerring power at work in 
Natural Selection … which selects exclusively for the good of each organic being.” 
(Darwin 1858b [1857]: 51) 
‘Natural Selection’ is thus the term (or name) Darwin employs to denote the succession of (1) a 
variation or a change of physical conditions and (2) evolution in its different expressions for 
individuals and varieties and, ultimately, the emergence of new species. 
One of the interesting points about the joint paper is the fact that Wallace describes the same 
sequence of Input and Output in his model, but does not provide a name for it: 
“If, on the other hand, any species should produce a variety having slightly increased 
powers of preserving existence, that variety must inevitably in time acquire a 
superiority in numbers. These results must follow as surely as old age, intemperance, 
or scarcity of food produce an increased mortality. In both cases there may be many 
individual exceptions; but on the average the rule will invariably be found to hold 
good.” (Wallace 1858: 58) 
and, in more detail: 
“Now, let some alteration of physical conditions occur in the district—a long period 
of drought, a destruction of vegetation by locusts, the irruption of some new 
carnivorous animal seeking ‘pastures new’ —any change in fact tending to render 
existence more difficult to the species in question, and tasking its utmost powers to 
avoid complete extermination; it is evident that, of all the individuals composing the 
species, those forming the least numerous and most feebly organized variety would 
suffer first, and, were the pressure severe, must soon become extinct. The same 
causes continuing in action, the parent species would next suffer, would gradually 
diminish in numbers, and with a recurrence of similar unfavourable conditions might 
also become extinct. The superior variety would then alone remain, and on a return 
to favourable circumstances would rapidly increase in numbers and occupy the place 
of the extinct species and variety.” (Wallace 1858: 58) 
Besides Natural Selection, Darwin mentions Sexual Selection once as “the struggle of the males for 
the females“ and refers to it as a “second agency” 364 (Darwin 1858a [1844]: 50) In my analysis of the 
Origin, I will argue that Sexual Selection is a sub-case of Natural Selection in Darwin’s model, that the 
                                                            
363  He would do the same in the Origin. (See section 3.4.4) 
364  It is not implied in narrative terms because the selecting organisms become supplementary Agents in the 
narrative. (See section 3.4.4) 
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latter implies the former logically. (See section 3.4.2) In the joint paper, however, this does not 
become clear. Actually, Darwin’s introducing it as a second agency suggests that it is an independent 
Connector. Wallace does not mention sexual selection. (cf. Kutschera 2003: 351) 
In sum, Wallace’s model lacks a conditional predicate or a Connector; he does not interpret what 
leads from the Input to the Output of his model. Beyond, however, Situation Type, Object Class, 
Input and Output are clearly defined. Figure 17 provides an overview. 
 
Figure 17: Wallace's dynamic model of evolution 
Darwin, goes one step further and presents an explicit Connector by introducing a conditional 
predicate to denote the sequence of Input and Output: natural selection. This conditional predicate 
connotes its original use in the domain of breeders and breeding, i.e. artificial selection, and suggests 
that there exists an agency which selects organisms according to certain criteria. This suggestion is 
the basis for his narrative. 
3.3.4 Narrative explanation: How did Wallace and Darwin tell evolution? 
Just as it misses a Connector, Wallace’s 1858 text contains single metaphors, as the Struggle for Life, 
which might serve as narrative elements, but it conveys nothing close to a complete narrative. 
Rather, Wallace attempts to sidestep narrative implications by employing verbs and verb forms 
which require no specification of an Agent. Thus, he speaks of the “perishing” of species instead of 
their elimination or of “preserving existence” without specifying who or what may preserve it. His 
1855 text displays some narrative hints; it contained a language “sufficiently ambiguous that one 
could almost read it in a creationist sense”. (Ruse 1979: 158) For instance, he speaks rather neutrally 
of species “coming into existence coincident … with closely-allied species” (Wallace 1870a [1855]: 5) 
but also of species being “created” (Wallace 1870a [1855]: 6). I do not consider his text to convey an 
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autonomous narrative but it may be understood as alluding to the dominant narrative of the time: 
continued creation. Thus, I do not consider Wallace to suggest a new narrative, i.e. an alternative to 
the existing ones. 
In the excerpt of Darwin’s Essay of 1844 I find no complete narrative either, it lacks a specification of 
Purpose and Agent. The letter to Asa Gray is a different case. As his Connector and the category shift 
from artificial selection suggest, it contained passages which can fill both elements. As I said above, 
Darwin’s letter begins with a description of artificial selection by breeders and continues with an 
explicit category shift from the breeder to a different kind of Agent: “Now suppose there were a 
being who did not judge by mere external appearances, but who could study the whole internal 
organization, who was never capricious, and should go on selecting for one object during millions of 
generations; who will say what he might not effect?” (Darwin 1858b [1857]: 51) He then answers his 
own rhetorical question in the affirmative: “there is such an unerring power at work in Natural 
Selection”. (Darwin 1858b [1857]: 51) Its Purpose is also specified, it is the betterment of the 
organisms for Natural Selection “selects exclusively for the good of each organic being.” (Darwin 
1858b [1857]: 51)365  
Given Agent and Purpose, it is easy to fill the Agency and the Scene. The struggle for life makes for a 
perfect Scene and Darwin’s Connector, Natural Selection, is clearly the means by which his Agent 
acts; it is the Agency.366 The Narrative is thus complete: Organisms live in a ferocious Struggle for Life 
(Scene) but there is a power or being (Agent) which selects (Agency) for the good of each organism 
(Purpose) and produces evolution/transmutation (Act). - Darwin explains evolution by telling a story 
about it. 
In comparison to previous narratives (or narratives skeletons), two points are remarkable: First, 
Darwin does not explicitly name God as its agent, leaving the Agent in his narrative rather obscure 
and vague. The terms ‘power’ or ‘being’ might be understood to refer to God but this is no necessary 
conclusion, particularly as Darwin does not employ the typical capitals as in ‘His Actions’. Second, 
Darwin’s narrative draws much of its narrative power from the model’s Situation Type, the Struggle 
for Life, and its Connector, Natural Selection. This insofar remarkable, as both Chambers and Owen 
drew mainly upon the connotation of ‘god’ and the Input of their models for their explanation. (see 
sections 3.1.4 i, 3.2.4 i) The explanation for this may be that Darwin had not many other possibilities 
to create a strong narrative; he and Wallace described variations as random and Darwin does not 
draw upon God.367 
In contrast to the Origin, however, Darwin’s narrative still appears somewhat sub-threshold. Darwin 
mentions the Agent two or three times and the Purpose maybe once or twice and he addresses none 
of the ontological implications this narrative was determined to raise. Moreover, the one part of the 
                                                            
365  One might therefore wonder whether Darwin meant to imply a teleological view of evolution. However, as 
I have stated in the beginning, I am not analyzing what opinions Darwin held privately but what his 
published texts convey and the statement is very straightforward in this sense. Moreover, the other four 
elements of a narrative being specified, I suppose a reader of his text to look for some kind of Purpose. 
Therefore, it is safe to assume that Darwin’s text could be thus read and the reception analysis will show 
that it was indeed read like this. (See sections 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.2.1 v)  
366  It is, moreover, the only means; there are no indications in the text that the Variations can be understood 
as part of the Agency – the “power” or “being” – is never mentioned to act through Variation. Thus, there 
is no indication that the organism could be Agents here. 
367  This does not imply that Darwin held no religious views at the time; he became an agnostic only after the 
publication of the Origin. 
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joint paper which did convey a narrative was sandwiched by two parts which did not. Hence, it could 
still be overlooked or ignored as some misplaced choice of words. Thus, Richard England is generally 
right when he claims that  
“…the natural selection of the Darwin-Wallace papers was not the natural selection 
of Darwin's best-known work. Certainly the basic process described is the same, but 
in the Origin natural selection was the driving mechanism behind a radical, 
evolutionary revision of the phenomena of life. In the Linnean Society papers, it was 
a process that principally described the relationship between varieties and species; 
the larger evolutionary implications were only hinted at.” (England 1997: 268)368 
3.3.5 Implications: What did Wallace’s & Darwin’s explanation imply about the world? 
Consequently, the joint paper, as it was, conveyed no important ontological implications. Neither 
Man nor God was mentioned by either of the authors. Two parts of the paper contained no narrative 
at all and, in the third, Darwin did not even hint at whether he intended to include either in his model 
or narrative. 
The same seems true for its social and political implications. While one could wonder how the image 
of a “struggle for life” related to established conceptions of divine providence and social stability. Did 
God not provide for all of his creatures? However, Wallace and Darwin did not introduce a 
completely new idea in the debate, here; Darwin’s references explicit trace the concept of a struggle 
back to de Candolle and Malthus, other sources may have been known by the recipients. Moreover, 
if Darwin’s narrative did not even apply to Man, what implications should it have for human culture?  
In sum, the possible ontological implications of the joint paper were neither obvious nor explicated.  
                                                            
368  England remarks that, when Darwin worked on the Origin, “he expressed no surprise that the Linnean 
Society papers had caused so little stir.” (England 1997: 279) With respect to Wallace, Bowler stressed that 
„Even if we accept that Wallace's 1858 paper had the potential to be worked up into a comprehensive 
theory of evolution by natural selection, it would have taken Wallace years to develop that potential on his 
own.“ (Bowler 1992 [1988]: 45)  
This also explains why Thomas Bell, the then-president of the Linnean Society did not deem the joint paper 
worthy for consideration when he looked back at 1858 and claimed that "it has not, indeed, been marked 
by any of the striking discoveries which at once revolutionize, so to speak, the department of science on 
which they bear; it is only at remote intervals that we can reasonably expect any sudden and brilliant 
innovation which shall produce a marked and permanent impress on the character of any branch of 
knowledge, or confer a lasting and important service to mankind." (Bell 1860 [1859]: viii-ix) 
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3.4 Charles Darwin: The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection 
Charles Robert Darwin was born in Shrewsbury, England, in 1809, the year in which Lamarck 
published his Philosophie Zoologique. His family was of independent means and Darwin would have a 
much smoother path into science than his English competitors Owen or Wallace. In 1825, Darwin 
enrolled in Edinburgh for medicine but Darwin showed little passion and skill and soon turned to 
more general studies of nature. Upon pressure from his father, he switched to Cambridge obtaining 
his bachelor in theology in 1831. In Cambridge, Darwin was much under the influence of traditional 
British natural theology. He studied Paley’s Natural Theology and listened geologist Adam Sedgwick 
(1785-1873) and botanist John Steven Henslow (1796-1861), among others.369 With the latter, he 
would undertake long walks in the countryside and learn the specifics of fieldwork. 
It was on Henslow’s initiative too that Darwin embarked on his famous voyage on the Beatle, the 
fundament of his scientific career. The Beagle expedition would lead Darwin from South America to 
Australia to Southern Asia and South Africa; it lasted from 1831 to 1836. Darwin collected 
innumerable botanical and zoological specimen, but also studied geology and biogeography, 
occasionally also paleontological evidence. On the side, he read Lyell’s Principles of Geology, making 
himself familiar with uniformitarianism. Throughout the expedition, Darwin sent geological papers to 
England which Henslow forwarded to other naturalists. Thus, upon his return, Darwin was already 
well-known and held in high esteem by scientists. Moreover, his father and later the fortune of his 
wife provided the means for a life as a self-funded scientist. 
Darwin quickly connected to the scientific circles in London and Oxbridge and was introduced to 
Richard Owen, among others. With Lyell’s backing, he became elected to the council of the 
Geological Society and to the Royal Society and he began working on his travel journals, which would 
appear as Journal and Remarks (1839) and as two volumes of the multi-volume Zoology of the 
Voyage of H.M.S. Beagle (1838-1843). In early 1837, Darwin had his influential encounter with the 
ornithologist John Gould who classified a group of birds from the Galapagos Islands as a series of 
closely related finches and mockingbirds. Still in the spring 1837, he began his famous notebooks on 
transmutation, speculating that one species might change into another. In mid-July he drew the first 
evolutionary tree and, in October 1838, Darwin Malthus’ Essay on the Principle of Population, which 
would take a fundamental place in his theory. The public, however, would have to wait for Darwins 
ideas; he would not publish them but twenty years later. (see below) 
In the meantime, Darwin published three books on geology (1844-1849) and four large empirical 
studies on barnacles (1851-1854), seeking the evidence to support his theoretical speculations. The 
work on barnacles contributed to his receiving the Royal Medal of the Royal Society in 1853. In his 
private life, he married (1839) and moved to London in the same year. In 1842 he settled in Down, 
where he would spend the rest of his life. From the 1830s on, Darwin suffered from a chronic illness 
which significantly restricted his lifestyle and ability to work. 
Darwin was fifty when the Origin of Species finally appeared, bringing Darwin not only scientific but 
public fame. In the years after its initial publication, Darwin worked on orchids, climbing plants and 
domesticated animals and plants (1862-68), hardly intervening in the public debate on evolution but 
                                                            
369  Darwin also studied Lamarck and the works of his grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, yet, neither impressed him 
much. 
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concentrating on its empirical foundation.370 He published on the Descent of Man (1871) and on 
emotions in Man and animals (1872) only when the public debate had already quieted. His last 
scientific publications would be on botanical questions of relevance to evolution. Darwin died in 1882 
in Down. He was honored by a ceremonial burial in Westminister Abbey, close to philosopher John 
Herschel and physicist Isaac Newton. 
The publication of the Origin of Species, in 1859, was the culmination of a two-decade process. 
Darwin had begun his work on evolution after his return from the Beagle, in 1837. In 1842, he had 
summed up his thoughts in a first Sketch. (Darwin 1958a [1842]) Two years later, months before the 
publication of Vestiges, he had expanded them to a 230 page Essay. (Darwin 1958b [1844]) By the 
mid-1850s he was working on his voluminous Natural Selection, a book intended to provide a 
comprehensive and empirically founded presentation of his views on the “species problem” – a book 
Darwin would never finish.371 
After Wallace’s independent work rushed Darwin into the publication of the joint paper in 1858, 
Darwin set out to write an abstract of the supposedly upcoming Natural Selection which Darwin 
intended to call An abstract of an Essay on the Origin of Species and Varieties through natural 
selection.372 His editor, John Murray, convinced him of dropping the essay- and the abstract-part and 
in November 1859 the book appeared under its now-famous title: On the Origin of Species by Means 
of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. As the Origin 
immediately sold out its first edition of 1.250 copies, a second edition of 3.000 copies followed in 
January 1860, a third one in 1861. Overall, Darwin would see six British editions373 in his lifetime: 
edition Publication Date copies 
1
st
 November 1859 1.250 
2
nd
 January 1860 3.000 
3
rd
 April 1861 2.000 
4
th
 June 1866 1.500 
5
th
 February 1869 2.000 
6
th
 February 1872 3.000 
Table 9: Editions of the Origin of Species during Darwin's lifetime 
The first two editions are virtually identical with only editorial changes and minor changes in 
content.374 From the 3rd one on (1861), however, each edition knew considerable changes which 
                                                            
370  In his 1868 The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, Darwin unsuccessfully attempted to 
explain heredity by pangenesis, a Connector which, again, implied the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics as it had been championed by Lamarck at the beginning of the century. (Darwin 1868) 
371  The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication from 1868 constitutes the first part of the 
intended volume. 
372  All dates are from the Darwin Online Project. For a more detailed bibliographical account, see 
http://darwin-online.org.uk/EditorialIntroductions/Freeman_OntheOriginofSpecies.html 
373  A 1876 printing of the 6th edition displays some minor changes but is usually not considered an 
autonomous edition. For the different editions, see (Darwin 1859; Darwin 1860; Darwin 1861; Darwin 
1866; Darwin 1869; Darwin 1872a; Darwin 1876 
374  For instance, after the first reviews, Darwin diluted the story of the bear becoming a whale, which had 
been received in misleading fashion. ( Darwin 1859: 184; Darwin 1860: 184) 
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were tracked in a table of differences. Also in the 3rd edition, Darwin inserted a historical sketch in 
which he mentions important predecessors and competitors who had an impact on the emergence 
of the book. Darwin mentions Lamarck, Geoffroy, Chambers, Owen and Wallace, among many 
others. (Darwin 1861: xiii-xix) In the 5th edition, the lengthy title of the book was reduced to “On the 
Origin of Species”, in the 6th edition even to “The Origin of Species”. 
3.4.1 Description: What evidence did Darwin present and how? 
Darwin’s text is stacked with reference and with examples; he cites biological authorities and 
numerous single studies. Moreover, Darwin complements the body of scientific knowledge by 
practitioners, frequently citing the expertise of breeders, horticulturalists and gardeners for instance 
on cattle, pigeons, gooseberries, or pears. (Darwin 1860: 8-44)375 
Most of his descriptions of observations are embedded in explanatory sketches. Therefore, they are 
often partly formulated in the terminology of his model, a particularity which seems due to the 
pyramidal structure of Darwin’s text. As opposed to typical scientific articles but also monographs 
like Owen’s, the Origin begins with the introduction of – what I will below demonstrate to be – his 
model. In the very short introductory section, Darwin mentions his core concepts and sketches how 
these concepts are linked in the explanation of evolution (Darwin 1860: 4-5): He describes that all 
organisms are in a constant Struggle for Existence. In this struggle, the Variation of organisms or an 
Ecological Change376 might lead to a slight advantage for certain organisms. Consequently, Natural 
Selection sets in, preserves these fitter organisms and, in the long run, leads to a Divergence of 
Character in the original species. Conversely, the now less fit organisms face the danger of Extinction.  
Thus, most observations mentioned in the text are put in relation to the previously introduced 
theoretical concepts (or their sub-concepts) and/or presented in particular chapters as evidence for 
particular aspects of his model. This allows Darwin, while not presenting much novel empirics to 
relate his theory to large areas of the contemporary body of biological knowledge. 
3.4.2 Classification: How did Darwin denote and aggregate evidence? 
With respect to the aggregation and classification of organisms, Darwin stresses one major point 
which he and Wallace had already made in the joint paper: 
„No one can draw any clear distinction between individual differences and 
slight varieties; or between more plainly marked varieties and sub-species, 
and species.“ (Darwin 1860: 469) 
                                                            
375  James A. Secord provides an interesting overview over this relation. He reveals how Darwin systematically 
approached breeders in order to complement the methodologically gathered knowledge of scientists by 
the practical knowledge of practitioners. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger and Peter McLaughlin discuss the role of 
this relation for the development of Darwin’s theory. (Secord 1985; Rheinberger and McLaughlin 1984) 
376  Darwin does not use the expression ‘ecological change’. Instead, he speaks, for instance, of the adaption of 
organic beings to „physical conditions of life“ which presume either that these physical conditions have 
recently changed or that the organisms concerned have entered into a new territory. (Darwin 1860: 4, 44, 
63, 80, 109, 175, 466, 477) 
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This is a point to which Darwin stresses throughout the Origin, but particularly in the first pages of 
the chapter II, Variation under Nature (Darwin 1860: 44-52), where he emphasized the continuous 
relations between the main distinctions of species, sub-species, varieties and individuals: 
“No one supposes that all the individuals of the same species are cast in the very 
same mould. These individual differences are highly important for us, as they afford 
the materials for natural selection to accumulate...“ (Darwin 1860: 45) 
“The term ’variety’ is almost equally difficult to define; but here community of 
descent is almost universally implied, though it can rarely be proved. We have also 
what are called monstrosities; but they graduate into varieties. By a monstrosity I 
presume is meant some considerable deviation of structure in one part, either 
injurious to or not useful to the species, and not generally propagated. Some authors 
use the term Variation’ in a technical sense, as implying a modification directly due to 
the physical conditions of life; and ‘variations’ in this sense are supposed not to be 
inherited: but who can say that the dwarfed condition of shells in the brackish waters 
of the Baltic, or dwarfed plants on Alpine summits, or the thicker fur of an animal 
from far northwards, would not in some cases be inherited for at least some few 
generations? And in this case I presume that the form would be called a variety.” 
(Darwin 1860: 44-45)  
“But cases of great difficulty, which I will not here enumerate, sometimes occur in 
deciding whether or not to rank one form as a variety of another, even when they 
are closely connected by intermediate links; nor will the commonly-assumed hybrid 
nature of the intermediate links always remove the difficulty. In very many cases, 
however, one form is ranked as a variety of another, not because the intermediate 
links have actually been found, but because analogy leads the observer to suppose 
either that they do now somewhere exist, or may formerly have existed; and here a 
wide door for the entry of doubt and conjecture is opened . 
Hence, in determining whether a form should be ranked as a species or a variety, the 
opinion of naturalists having sound judgment and wide experience seems the only 
guide to follow. We must, however, in many cases, decide by a majority of 
naturalists, for few well-marked and well-known varieties can be named which have 
not been ranked as species by at least some competent judges.” (Darwin 1860: 47) 
“Certainly no clear line of demarcation has as yet been drawn between species and 
sub-species —that is, the forms which in the opinion of some naturalists come very 
near to, but do not quite arrive at the rank of species; or, again, between sub-species 
and well-marked varieties, or between lesser varieties and individual differences. 
These differences blend into each other in an insensible series…” (Darwin 1860: 51) 
“From these remarks it will be seen that I look at the term species as one arbitrarily 
given for the sake of convenience to a set of individuals closely resembling each 
other, and that it does not essentially differ from the term variety, which is given to 
less distinct and more fluctuating forms. The term variety, again, in comparison with 
mere individual differences, is also applied arbitrarily, and for mere convenience’s 
sake.” (Darwin 1860: 52) 
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As in the joint paper, this disenchantment of the elements of taxonomic schemes leads to a 
disenchantment of the taxonomy itself. Darwin reduces the common patterns of taxonomic 
classifications from a divine blueprint of development to mere inherited structural patterns; turning 
Owen’s archetype in a mere progenitor and en passant appropriating Owen’s concept: 
“If we suppose that the ancient progenitor, the archetype as it may be called, of all 
mammals, had its limbs constructed on the existing general pattern, for whatever 
purpose they served, we can at once perceive the plain signification of the 
homologous construction of the limbs throughout the whole class. So with the 
mouths of insects, we have only to suppose that their common progenitor had an 
upper lip, mandibles, and two pair of maxillæ, these parts being perhaps very simple 
in form; and then natural selection will account for the infinite diversity in structure 
and function of the mouths of insects.” (Darwin 1860: 435; Darwin 1859: 435-6; 
Darwin 1861: 467, cf. xvi; Darwin 1866: 514, cf. xvii; Darwin 1869: 517, cf. xix; Darwin 
1872a: 383, cf. xvii) 
The taxonomy itself is than introduced as a diagram – Darwin does not speak of a tree377 – which 
depicts an irregularly branching scheme but according to Darwin is still much too regular and simple. 
(Darwin 1860: 118, 331) the interval between its horizontal lines “may represent each a thousand 
generations” or even “a million or hundred million generations”. (Darwin 1860: 117, 124) Thus, the 
diagram really is a scheme for the interpretation of taxonomic relations, not an actual depiction of 
taxonomic classifications – and, contrarily to ideas of a scala naturae or Owen’s archetype, it brings 
little378 metaphysical import only. Hence, Darwin’s stressing that 
“The terms used by naturalists of affinity, relationship, community of type, paternity, 
morphology, adaptive characters, rudimentary and aborted organs, etc., will cease to 
be metaphorical, and will have plain significance. (Darwin 1860: 486)  
only highlights how much less philosophically sophisticated the concept of common descent is, 
compared to the scala or the archetype. Figure 18 displays Darwin’s static model. 
                                                            
377  Darwin does neither speak of a coral which Horst Bredekamp saw in Darwin’s scheme. (Bredekamp 2005) 
For a comprehensive overview of the culture of visualization in 19th century biology, see (Voss 2007). 
378  Gillian Beer nonetheless emphasizes the interpretative power of the tree metaphor and stresses how it 
serves both as a classificatory device and an interpretative scheme for Darwin, bringing into line its 
denotative and its connotative meaning: “The polysemism of metaphor means that it is hard to control its 
implications: it may be argued, for example, that Darwin's metaphor of the tree is a formal analogy whose 
function is purely diagrammatic, describing a shape not an experience. Its initial value for Darwin lay 
undoubtedly in the fact that the diagram declared itself as tree, rather than being foreknowingly designed 
to represent a tree-like shape for descent. On the page, however, it could as well be interpreted by the eye 
as shrub, branching coral, or seaweed. But Darwin saw not only the explanatory but the mythic potentiality 
of this diagram, its congruity with past orders of descent, and extended these in a form which is 
experimental rather than formal at the conclusion of the same chapter 'Natural Selection'. The tree 
discovered in the diagram is not only Arbor Vitae but the Arbor Scientiae. Darwin establishes so close a 
connection between representation and actuality that he can claim 'truth' for it. The prose succession 
imitates the order it describes, branching out into further and further similitudes…” (Beer 2009: 85-6) – 
This private perspective, however, was not available to contemporary recipients. 
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Figure 18: Darwin's static model: the tree (Darwin 1860: 117) 
3.4.3 Logical explanation: How did Darwin model evolution? 
i. Object Class: Individuals, Varieties, Species 
The Object Class of Darwin’s dynamic model comprises living specimen or fossils of organisms. They 
include both plants and animals, with the exception of humans. He refers to a broad range of species 
from domestic cattle (Darwin 1860: 13-4), to wolves (Darwin 1860: 90-1) and squirrels (Darwin 1860: 
180-1) to rare species as the Apteryx or Ornithorhynchus (Darwin 1860: 182, 416). Also, the number 
of organisms in his examples varies; he refers to single individuals, entire species or sub-groups of 
these species, namely varieties.379 However, in several of his examples the distinctions between 
these different reference groups are blurred, for instance in the following passage: 
“Now, if any slight innate change of habit or of structure benefited an 
individual wolf, it would have the best chance of surviving and of leaving 
offspring. Some of its young would probably inherit the same habits or 
structure, and by the repetition of this process, a new variety might be 
formed which would either supplant or coexist with the parent form of wolf. 
Or, again, the wolves inhabiting a mountainous district, and those 
frequenting the lowlands, would naturally be forced to hunt different prey; 
and from the continued preservation of the individuals best fitted for the two 
                                                            
379  Darwin distinguishes at least two types of sub-groups to species: sub-species and varieties. (e.g. Darwin 
1860: 23, 25, 27, 51, 52, 60, 166, 469) For simplification and in order to better compare his dynamic model 
to those of his predecessors, I will only speak of varieties as a sub-group. This should not pose a problem 
because Darwin refers to sub-species much less than to varieties and did not develop an independent 
argument for sub-species as opposed to varieties. 
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sites. Two varieties might slowly be formed. […] I may add, that, according to 
Mr Pierce, there are two varieties of the wolf inhabiting the Catskill 
Mountains in the United States, one with a light greyhound-like form, which 
pursues deer, and the other more bulky, with shorter legs, which more 
frequently attacks the shepherd’s flocks.“ (Darwin 1860: 91) 
This blurring380 complies with Darwin’s main argument on species and the one that framed his static 
model: the differences between species and varieties as well as between individual differences and 
varieties are fluid.381 Moreover, this blurring leads to an interesting consequence in Darwin’s dynamic 
model: the same empirical regularity can be described as an Input-Output sequence for two or even 
three of the members of his Object Class. Thus, the survival of a single individual may also be part of 
the conservation of a species or variety and the growth and spread of a variety may be part of the 
emergence of a new species. As species, varieties and individuals overlap in the individuals, the event 
sequences which touch individuals, do also concern varieties and species – though in decreasing 
magnitude.382 
ii. Situation Type: Uniformitarianism and the Struggle for Life 
Like most of his predecessors, Darwin clearly subscribed to Lyell’s uniformitarianism, i.e. a slowly and 
steadily changing surrounding world and, thus, an equally slow and steady development of life on 
earth. (Darwin 1860: 269; Darwin 1869: 110) The innovative and remarkably more spectacular part, 
however, was the Struggle for Life or Struggle for Existence. The metaphor of a struggle itself is no 
                                                            
380  Gillian Beer claims that “The blurring of the distinction between ontogeny – individual development – and 
phylogeny – species development – in the single term 'evolution' proved to be one of the most fruitful 
disturbances of meaning in the literature of the ensuing hundred years, and is a striking example of the 
multivalency of evolutionary concepts.” (Beer 2009: 12) For its emergence with respect to struggle, see 
(Herbert 1971; Sober 1985). 
381  This view of species was heavily criticized in the 20th century, notably by Theodosius Dobzhansky and Ernst 
Mayr. (See Mallet 2010; Mayr 1996; Beatty 1982; Wilson 2007) The main difference between the 
Darwinian notion of species and modern accounts may be described, in my model, as a shift from an 
analytic concept to a synthetic one: For Darwin, a species was a set over objects and their outward 
(phenotypic) features and as such it figured in his dynamic model. The empirical criterion for evolution was 
an observable change in these very features, i.e. in the features used for determining the species. 
Many modern biologists, however, uncoupled the species concept from these phenotypic features. They 
defined species as “reproductively isolated populations” and operationalized the term ‘reproductive 
isolation’ either via separated gene pools and/or via geographically isolated of existence (Lebensräume). 
(see Mayr 1996: 268-75) Thus, in the modern terminology, a change in the outwards (phenotypic) features 
is an evolutionary change only if it happened within a population which displays an isolated gene pool or 
lives in geographical isolation from similar populations. (In my model, the first criterion would figure in the 
Object Class, the second in the Situation Type (with the Struggle for Life). Therefore, a modern dynamic 
model of evolution would further specify the Object Class and the Situation Type, i.e. it would restrict both 
sets and, consequently, the set of empirical regularities covered by the model.) 
Darwin had no access to genetics but to geographical isolation, which he discussed at length in the Origin. 
One might thus ask why he did not employ the criterion of geographical isolation for the definition of 
‘species’. I wonder, however, whether this additional criterion would have made an empirical difference 
for him, i.e. whether adding geographical isolation to the Situation Type of his model would have led to a 
substantial restriction of the set of empirical regularities. I suppose that this was not the case and that, 
therefore, it made no sense (there was no empirical reason) for Darwin to switch from an analytic concept 
of species to a synthetic one. 
382  This overlap is the case for Darwin’s concept of species, at least.  
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novel idea383, yet Darwin provided an operationalization for it and did thus transform it into the 
name of a background regularity: 
„A struggle for existence inevitably follows from the high rate at which all organic 
beings tend to increase. Every being, which during its natural lifetime produces 
several eggs or seeds, must suffer destruction during some period of its life, and 
during some season or occasional year, otherwise, on the principle of geometrical 
increase its numbers would quickly become so inordinately great that no country 
could support the product. Hence, as more individuals are produced than can 
possibly [better: do] survive, there must in every case be a struggle for existence, 
either one individual with another of the same species, or with the individuals of 
distinct species, or with the physical conditions of life. It is the doctrine of Malthus 
applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms; for in this 
case there can be no artificial increase of food, and no prudential restraint from 
marriage.“ (Darwin 1860: 63) 
Darwin provides several examples of how quickly populations can grow in exceptional circumstances: 
of cattle and horses in South America and America, of introduced plants in India (Darwin 1860: 64-5) 
and concludes that 
„There is no exception to the rule that every organic being naturally increases at so 
high a rate, that if not destroyed, the earth would soon be covered by the progeny of 
a single pair. Even slow-breeding man has doubled in twenty-five years, and at this 
rate, in a few thousand years, there would literally not be standing room for his 
progeny. Linnaeus has calculated that if an annual plant produced only two seeds—
and there is no plant so unproductive as this—and their seedlings next year produced 
two, and so on, then in twenty years there would be a million plants. […] (Darwin 
1860: 64) 
As this geometrical increase does not occur and populations remain constant increase, there must be 
a fierce struggle for life. Hence, Darwin’s term ‘struggle for life’ sums up two simultaneous 
observations: (i) organisms reproduce at a rate which would allow them to grow exponentially 
(“Growth with Reproduction”) and (ii) populations remain constant. 
 
Darwin specifies several modes of the struggle, i.e. manners in which populations are checked 
despite the Growth with Reproduction (overproduction). First, organisms may be destroyed due to 
changes in their ecology: 
“Two canine animals in a time of dearth, may be truly said to struggle with each 
other which shall get food and live. But a plant on the edge of a desert is said to 
struggle for life against the drought, though more properly it should be said to be 
dependent on the moisture. A plant which annually produces a thousand seeds, of 
which on an average only one comes to maturity, may be more truly said to struggle 
with the plants of the same and other kinds which already clothe the ground. The 
mistletoe is dependent on the apple and a few other trees, but can only in a far-
fetched sense be said to struggle with these trees, for if too many of these parasites 
                                                            
383  It can be found with many biologists prior to Darwin but also with Wallace. (See sections 2.3 x, 3.4.4) 
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grow on the same tree, it will languish and die. But several seedling mistletoes, 
growing close together on the same branch, may more truly be said to struggle with 
each other. As the mistletoe is disseminated by birds, its existence depends on birds; 
and it may metaphorically be said to struggle with other fruit-bearing plants, in order 
to tempt birds to devour and thus disseminate its seeds rather than those of other 
plants. In these several senses, which pass into each other, I use for convenience’ 
sake the general term of struggle for existence.“ (Darwin 1860: 62-3) 
This is especially true early in life because 
“Eggs or very young animals seem generally to suffer most, but this is not invariably 
the case. With plants there is a vast destruction of seeds, but, from some 
observations which I have made, I believe that it is the seedlings which suffer most 
from germinating in ground already thickly stocked with other plants. Seedlings, also, 
are destroyed in vast numbers by various enemies; for instance, on a piece of ground 
three feet long and two wide, dug and cleared, and where there could be no choking 
from other plants, I marked all the seedlings of our native weeds as they came up, 
and out of the 357 no less than 295 were destroyed, chiefly by slugs and insects. If 
turf which has long been mown, and the case would be the same with turf closely 
browsed by quadrupeds, be let to grow, the more vigorous plants gradually kill the 
less vigorous, though fully grown, plants: thus out of twenty species growing on a 
little plot of turf (three feet by four) nine species perished from the other species 
being allowed to grow up freely.” (Darwin 1860: 67-8) 
Second, organisms may fall prey to other organisms, notably animals to other animals: 
“The amount of food for each species; of course gives the extreme limit to which 
each can increase; but very frequently it is not the obtaining food, but the serving as 
prey to other animals, which determines the average numbers of a species.” (Darwin 
1860: 68) 
Third, Darwin specifies that the struggle consists not only in shortening of life but also in hindering 
organisms to reproduce: 
„I should premise that I use the term Struggle for Existence in a large and 
metaphorical sense, including dependence of one being on another, and including 
(which is more important) not only the life of the individual, but success in leaving 
progeny.” (Darwin 1860: 62) 
Albeit in the beginning of the relevant chapter, Darwin mentions the “success in leaving progeny” 
only once as explicitly. Therefore, Michael Ruse is right in pointing out that, connotation-wise, it 
would have been more fitting to speak of 'the struggle for reproduction' because the struggle for 
existence is basically a struggle to survive long enough to reproduce, that is, to leave offspring. (Ruse 
1971: 316-7) 
iii. Input: individual variations, climate, isolation and variations of other organisms 
Of all theories of evolution here analyzed, Darwin distinguishes the most expressions of Input. In his 
dynamic model, evolution may be triggered by ecological change but also by inheritable variations of 
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individual organisms. Although Darwin openly admits that he is ignorant of the “laws” of 
inheritance384, he stresses that he only considers inheritable variations, for only those can be passed 
on to the next generation. 
„Any variation which is not inherited is unimportant for us. But the number and 
diversity of inheritable deviations of structure, both those of slight and those of 
considerable physiological importance, is endless." (Darwin 1860: 13) 
„A large amount of inheritable and diversified variability is favourable [for the 
production of new species], but I believe mere individual differences suffice for the 
work.385 A large number of individuals, by giving a better chance for the appearance 
within any given period of profitable variations, will compensate for a lesser amount 
of variability in each individual, and is, I believe, an extremely important element of 
success.“ (Darwin 1860: 102) 
Such inheritable individual variations may consist in changes of habit, including mental qualities386: 
„Habit is hereditary with plants, as in the period of flowering, in the amount of rain 
requisite for seeds to germinate, in the time of sleep, etc., and this leads me to say a 
few words on acclimatisation. As it is extremely common for species of the same 
genus to inhabit very hot and very cold countries, and as I believe that all the species 
of the same genus have descended from a single parent, if this view be correct, 
acclimatisation must be readily effected during long continued descent. […] But the 
degree of adaptation of species to the climates under which they live is often 
overrated. We may infer this from our frequent inability to predict whether or not an 
                                                            
384  Darwin does, however, discuss the conditions of variability: „… plants low in the scale of organisation are 
generally much more widely diffused than plants higher in the scale; and here again there is no close 
relation to the size of the genera. […]From looking at species as only strongly-marked and well-defined 
varieties, I was led to anticipate that the species of the larger genera in each country would oftener 
present varieties, than the species of the smaller genera […] To test the truth of this anticipation I have 
arranged the plants of twelve countries, and the coleopterous insects of two districts, into two nearly equal 
masses, the species of the larger genera on one side, and those of the smaller genera on the other side, 
and it has invariably proved to be the case that a larger proportion of the species on the side of the larger 
genera present varieties, than on the side of the smaller genera. Moreover, the species of the large genera 
which present any varieties, invariably present a larger average number of varieties than do the species of 
the small genera. Both these results follow when another division is made, and when all the smallest 
genera, with from only one to four species, are absolutely excluded from the tables. These facts are of 
plain signification on the view that species are only strongly-marked and permanent varieties…”(Darwin 
1860: 55-5) 
“We have, also, seen that it is the most flourishing or dominant species of the larger genera which on an 
average vary most; and varieties, as we shall hereafter see, tend to become converted into new and 
distinct species of the larger genera thus tend to become larger; and throughout nature the forms of life 
which are now dominant end to become still more dominant by leaving many modified and dominant 
descendants.” (Darwin 1860: 59) 
 “…rare species will be less quickly modified or improved within any given period, and they will conse-
quently be beaten in the race for life by the modified descendants of the commoner species. From these 
several considerations I think it inevitably follows, that as new species in the course of time are formed 
through natural l selection, others will become rarer and rarer, and finally extinct.” (Darwin 1860: 110) 
385  In this, Darwin follows Lamarck’s early focus on individual differences for the explanation of evolution. 
(Lamarck 1873a[1809]: 73) 
386  The question of mental qualities would be a key topic in the reception as the mental qualities of Man were 
supposed not to be producible by Natural Selection. (See sections 4.1.2, v) 
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imported plant will endure our climate, and from the number of plants and animals 
brought from warmer countries which here enjoy good health. We have reason to 
believe that species in a state of nature are limited in their ranges by the competition 
of other organic beings quite as much as, or more than, by adaptation to particular 
climates.“ (Darwin 1860: 139-40) 
„…the mental qualities of our domestic animals vary, and that the variations are 
inherited. Still more briefly I have attempted to show that instincts vary slightly in a 
state of nature. No one will dispute that instincts are of the highest importance to 
each animal. Therefore I can see no difficulty, under changing conditions of life, in 
natural selection accumulating slight modifications of instinct to any extent in any 
useful direction.” (Darwin 1860: 242-3) 
Alternatively387, individual variation may consist in – as Darwin calls it – “deviations of structure” – a 
concept he describes metaphorically because he is ignorant of the “laws of inheritance”, and can 
only speculate on its workings: 
“The laws governing inheritance are quite unknown; no one can say why a peculiarity 
in different individuals of the same species, or in individuals of different species, is 
sometimes inherited and sometimes not so; why the child often reverts in certain 
characters to its grandfather or grandmother or other more remote ancestor; why a 
peculiarity is often transmitted from one sex to both sexes, or to one sex alone, more 
commonly but not exclusively to the like sex.“ (Darwin 1860: 13) 
 “Some authors believe it to be as much the function of the reproductive system to 
produce individual differences [sic!], or very slight deviations of structure, as to make 
the child like its parents. But the much greater variability, as well as the greater 
frequency of monstrosities, under domestication or cultivation, than under nature, 
leads me to believe that deviations of structure are in some way due to the nature of 
the conditions of life, to which the parents and their more remote ancestors have 
been exposed during several generations. […] But why, because the reproductive 
system is disturbed, this or that part should vary more or less, we are profoundly 
ignorant. Nevertheless, we can here and there dimly catch a faint ray of light, and we 
may feel sure that there must be some cause for each deviation of structure, 
however slight.“ (Darwin 1860: 131-2)  
„Our ignorance of the laws of variation is profound. Not in one case-out of a hundred 
can we pretend to assign any reason why this or that part differs, more or less, from 
the same part in the parents. But whenever we have the means of instituting a 
comparison, the same laws appear to have acted in producing the lesser differences 
                                                            
387  Whether these are true alternatives, Darwin is unsure of: „How much of the acclimatisation of species to 
any peculiar climate is due to mere habit, and how much to the natural selection of varieties having 
different innate constitutions [sic!], and how much to both means combined, is a very obscure question. 
That habit or custom has some influence I must believe, both from analogy, and from the incessant advice 
given in agricultural works… On the other hand, I can see no reason to doubt that natural selection will 
continually tend to preserve those individuals which are born with constitutions best adapted to their 
native countries.“ (Darwin 1860: 141-2) - „…it is difficult to tell and immaterial for us, whether habits 
generally change first and structure afterwards; or whether slight modifications of structure lead to 
changed habits; both probably often change almost simultaneously.“ (Darwin 1860: 183) 
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between varieties of the same species, and the greater differences between species 
of the same genus.“ (Darwin 1860: 167-8) 
However, he stresses that while he sometimes refers to inheritable variations as being accidental 
(Darwin 1860: 93, 94, 142, 144, 189, 209, 213, 242), this does not imply that they need be the result 
of chance processes:  
„I have hitherto sometimes spoken as if the variations – so common and multiform in 
organic beings under domestication, and in a lesser degree in those in a state of 
nature – had been due to chance. This, of course, is a wholly incorrect expression, 
but it serves to acknowledge plainly our ignorance of the cause of each particular 
variation.“ (Darwin 1860: 131) 
The second major trigger of evolution in Darwin’s dynamic model is ecological change. It may consist 
in climate change: 
“Climate plays an important part in determining the average numbers of a species, 
and periodical seasons of extreme cold or drought; I believe it to be the most 
effective of all checks. I estimated that the winter of 1854-55 destroyed four-fifths of 
the birds in my own grounds; and this is a tremendous destruction …. The action of 
climate seems at first sight to be quite independent of the struggle for existence; but 
in so far as climate chiefly acts in reducing food, it brings on the most severe struggle 
between the individuals, whether of the same or of distinct species, which subsist on 
the same kind of food.” (Darwin 1860: 68) 
“When we reach the Arctic regions, or snow-capped summits, or absolute deserts, 
the struggle for life is almost exclusively with the elements. That climate acts in 
main part indirectly by favouring other species, we may clearly see in the prodigious 
number of plants in our gardens which can perfectly well endure our climate, but 
which never become naturalized, for they cannot compete with our native plants nor 
resist destruction by our native animals.” (Darwin 1860: 69) 
“We shall best understand the probable course of natural selection by taking the 
case of a country undergoing some physical change, for instance, of climate. The 
proportional numbers of its inhabitants would almost immediately undergo a 
change, and some species might become extinct. We may conclude, from what we 
have seen of the intimate and complex manner in which the inhabitants of each 
country are bound together, that any change in the numerical proportions of some of 
the inhabitants, independently of the change of climate itself, would seriously affect 
many of the others.” (Darwin 1860: 81) 
in isolation or the end of isolation: 
„Isolation, also, is an important element in the process of natural selection. In a 
confined or isolated area, if not very large, the organic and inorganic conditions of 
life will generally be in a great degree uniform; so that natural selection will tend to 
modify all the individuals of a varying species throughout the area in the same 
manner in relation to the same conditions. Intercrosses, also, with the individuals of 
the same species, which otherwise would have inhabited the surrounding and 
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differently circumstanced districts, will be prevented. But isolation probably acts 
more efficiently in checking the immigration of better adapted organisms, after any 
physical change, such as of climate or elevation of the land, etc.; and thus new places 
in the natural economy of the country are left open for the old inhabitants to 
struggle for, and become adapted to, through modifications in their structure [sic!] 
and constitution. Lastly isolation, by checking immigration and consequently 
competition, will give time or any new variety to be slowly improved; and this may 
sometimes be of importance in the production of new species. If, however, an 
isolated area be very small, either from being surrounded by barriers or from having 
very peculiar physical conditions, the total number of the individuals supported on it 
will necessarily be very small; and fewness of individuals will greatly retard the 
production of new species through natural selection, by decreasing the chance of the 
appearance of favourable variations.“ (Darwin 1860: 105-6) 
“Many cases are on record showing how complex and unexpected are the checks and 
relations between organic beings which have to struggle together in the same 
country. I will give only a single instance, which, though a simple one, has interested 
me. In Staffordshire, on the estate of a relation, where I had ample means of 
investigation, there was a large and extremely barren heath, which had never been 
touched by the band of man; but several hundred acres of exactly the same nature 
had been enclosed twenty-five years previously and planted with Scotch fir. The 
change in the native vegetation of the planted part of the heath was most 
remarkable, more than is generally seen in passing from one quite different soil to 
another: not only lie proportional numbers of the heath-plants were wholly changed. 
But twelve species of plants (not counting grasses and carices) flourished in the 
plantations, which could not be found on the heath.” (Darwin 1860: 71) 
or in inheritable variations of other organisms, notably closely allied ones with which the organisms 
in question compete for resources in the Struggle for Life: 
“Let it also be borne in mind how infinitely complex and close-fitting are the mutual 
relations of all organic beings to each other and to their physical conditions of life; 
and consequently what infinitely varied diversities of structure might be of use to 
each being under changing conditions of life.” (Darwin 1860: 62) 
“…variations, however slight, and from whatever cause proceeding, if they be in any 
degree profitable to the individuals of a species, in their infinitely complex relations 
to other organic beings and to their physical conditions of life, will tend to the 
preservation of such individuals, and will generally be inherited by the offspring.” 
(Darwin 1860: 49, cf. 137) 
“…the conditions of life are infinitely complex from the large number of already 
existing species; and if some of these many species become modified and improved, 
others will have to be improved in a corresponding degree or they will be 
exterminated.” (Darwin 1860: 83) 
Of these three kinds of ecological change – climate change, isolation or the end of isolation and 
inheritable variations of other organisms – only the latter is a novel kind of Input. Both climate 
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change and isolation (or the end of it) had been employed as Input before: Climate change had been 
an explaining phenomenon of evolution since Lamarck; Owen and Wallace had already mentioned 
isolation. Isolation had been established fact of biogeography before 1830s, for instance due to the 
work of Christian Leopold von Buch (1744-1853). 
Aside from distinguishing types of ecological change and separating it from inheritable variations, 
Darwin classifies variations as either favorable (useful) or injurious; these labels can be found 
throughout the Origin. Their introduction is one of the most important innovations in Darwin’s 
explanation and matters for both his dynamic model and his narrative. (see below)  
Moreover, Darwin also mentions variations388 which are neither injurious nor favorable and to which 
I will refer as ‘irrelevant’ as in irrelevant for Natural Selection. Darwin identifies such variations in 
polymorphic species: 
“There is one point connected with individual differences which seems to me 
extremely perplexing: I refer to those genera which have sometimes been called 
‘protean’ or ‘polymorphic,’ in which the species present an inordinate amount of 
variation; and hardly two naturalists can agree which forms to rank as species and 
which as varieties. […] These facts seem to be very perplexing, for they seem to show 
that this kind of variability is independent of the conditions of life. I am inclined to 
suspect that we see in these polymorphic genera variations in points of structure 
which are of no service or disservice to the species, and which consequently have not 
been seized on and rendered definite by natural selection, as hereafter will be 
explained.” (Darwin 1860: 46) 
In sum, the Input to Darwin’s dynamic model can be described by a simple matrix which opposes 
three types of ecological change and two types of individual variations to the three labels ‘favorable’, 
‘injurious’ and ‘irrelevant’. Thus, all kinds of variations and all kinds of ecological change389 can be 
either favorable, injurious, or irrelevant for Natural Selection. (see Table 10) 
 Favorable Injurious Irrelevant 
Ecological change Climate change 
Isolation or the end of isolation 
Individual Inheritable Variations of other organisms 
Inheritable indivi-
dual variations 
Deviations in structure 
Change in habit 
Table 10: Expressions of the Input of Darwin's dynamic model 
iv. Output: Evolution, in all its expressions for Individuals, Varieties and Species as well as 
Fluctuations of Varieties and Conservations of Species 
The basic distinction of favorable, injurious and irrelevant changes of individuals and the ecology, is 
also to be found in Darwin’s Output – and it can be found with respect to all three types within his 
                                                            
388  Darwin mentions no irrelevant ecological change.  
389  I assume that Darwin also implied this, although I find no such examples. If one disagrees with this belief, 
one can obviously restrict the matrix with respect to ecological change. 
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Object Classes – individuals, varieties and species. As in Darwin’s Object Class, the boundaries 
between effects on individuals, varieties and species are often blurred; therefore short-term, 
medium-term and long-term evolutionary effects are blended.390 
Thus, Darwin mentions the effects of favourable variations on individuals 
„Again, it may be asked, how is it that varieties, which I have called incipient species, 
become ultimately converted into good and distinct species, which in most cases 
obviously differ from each other far more than do the varieties of the same species? 
How do those groups of species, which constitute what are called distinct genera, 
and which differ from each other more than do the species of the same genus, arise? 
All these results, as we shall more fully see in the next chapter, follow from the 
struggle for life. Owing to this struggle for life [sic!], any variation, however slight, 
and from whatever cause proceeding, if it be in any degree profitable to an individual 
of any species, in its infinitely complex relations to other organic beings and to 
external nature, will tend to the preservation of that individual, and will generally be 
inherited by its offspring.”“ (Darwin 1860: 61) 
“When we see any structure highly perfected for any particular habit, as the wings of 
a bird for flight, we should bear in mind that animals displaying early transitional 
grades of the structure will seldom continue to exist to the present day, for they will 
have been supplanted by the very process of perfection through natural selection.“ 
(Darwin 1860: 182-3) 
„As we sometimes see individuals of a species following habit widely different from 
those of their own species and of the other species of the same genus, we might 
expect, on my theory, that such individuals would occasionally have given rise to new 
species, having anomalous habits, and with their structure either slightly or 
considerably modified from that of their proper type.“ (Darwin 1860: 184) 
but also on varieties and species 
„It would be easy to show that within the same group carnivorous animals exist 
having every intermediate grade between truly aquatic and strictly terrestrial habits; 
and as each exists by a struggle for life, it is clear that each is well adapted in its 
habits to its place in nature. Look at the Mustela vison of North America, which has 
webbed feet and which resembles an otter in its fur, short legs, and form of tail; 
during summer this animal dives for and preys on fish, but during the long winter it 
leaves the frozen waters, and preys like other pole-cats on mice and land animals.“ 
(Darwin 1860: 179-80) 
„Look at the family of squirrels; here we have the finest gradation from animals with 
their tails only slightly flattened, and from others. As Sir J. Richardson has remarked, 
with the posterior part of their bodies rather wide and with the skin on their flanks 
rather full, to the so-called flying squirrels; and flying squirrels have their limbs and 
                                                            
390  Darwin does not use these terms but I assume that they provide a useful time-scale for the effects 
concerning individuals, varieties and species. Varieties which exist for a long period of time and are not 
considered species sometime within this period might, however, blur this distinction. 
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even the base of the tail united by a broad expanse of skin, which serves as a 
parachute and allows them to glide through the air to an astonishing distance from 
tree to tree. We cannot doubt that each structure is of use to each kind of squirrel in 
its own country, by enabling it to escape birds or beasts of prey, or to collect food 
more quickly, or, as there is reason to believe, by lessening the danger from 
occasional falls. But does not follow from this fact that the structure of each squirrel 
is the best that it is possible to conceive under all natural conditions? Let the climate 
and vegetation change, let other competing rodents or new beasts of prey 
immigrate, or old ones become modified, and all analogy would lead us to believe 
that some at least of the squirrels would decrease in numbers or become 
exterminated. Unless they also became modified and improved in structure in a 
corresponding manner. Therefore, I can see no difficulty, more especially under 
changing conditions of life, in the continued preservation of individuals with fuller 
and fuller flank-membranes, each modification being useful, each being propagated, 
until by the accumulated effects of this process of natural selection, a perfect so-
called flying squirrel was produced.“ (Darwin 1860: 180-1) 
He who believes in the struggle for existence and in the principle of natural selection, 
will acknowledge that every organic being is constantly endeavouring to increase in 
numbers; and that if any one being vary ever so little. Either in habits or structure, 
and thus gain an advantage over some Other inhabitant of the country, it will seize 
on the place of that inhabitant, however different it may be from its own place.“ 
(Darwin 1860: 186) 
Injurious variations of individuals are mentioned only a few times, presumably because they produce 
no long-term effects: 
„Natural selection will never produce in a being anything injurious to itself, for 
natural selection acts solely by and for the good of each. … If a fair balance be struck 
between the good and evil caused by each part, each will be found on the whole 
advantageous. After the lapse of time, under changing conditions of life, if any part 
comes to be injurious, it will be modified; or if it be not so, the being will become 
extinct, as myriads have become extinct.“ (Darwin 1860: 201) 
For varieties and species, i.e. large groups of organisms, such effects are both visible and well-
marked, and Darwin discusses them extensively: 
„… the intermediate varieties will be liable to accidental extermination; and during 
the process of further modification through natural selection, they will almost 
certainly be beaten and supplanted by the forms which they connect; for these from 
existing in greater numbers will, in the aggregate, present more variation, and thus 
be further improved through natural selection and gain further advantages.“ (Darwin 
1860: 179) 
„The whole subject of the extinction of species has been involved in the most 
gratuitous mystery. Some authors have even supposed that is the individual has a 
definite length of life, so have species a definite duration. No one I think can have 
marveled more at the extinction of species, than I have done. When I found in La 
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Plata the tooth of a horse embedded with the remains of Mastodon, Megatherium, 
Toxodon, and other extinct monsters, which all co-existed with still Toxodon, and 
other extinct monsters, which all co-existed with still living shells at a very late 
geological period, I was filled with astonishment; for seeing that the horse, since its 
introduction by the Spaniards into South America, has run wild over the whole 
country and has increased in numbers at an unparalleled rate, I asked myself what 
could so recently have exterminated the former horse under conditions of life 
apparently so favourable. But how utterly groundless was my astonishment! 
Professor Owen soon perceived that the tooth, though so like that of the existing 
horse, belonged to an extinct species. Had this horse been still living, but in some 
degree rare, no naturalist would have felt the least surprise at its rarity; for rarity is 
the attribute of a vast number of species of all classes, in all countries. [f we ask 
ourselves why this or that species is rare, we answer that something is unfavourable 
in its conditions of life; but what that something is, we can hardly ever tell. On the 
supposition of the fossil horse still existing as a rare species, we might have felt 
certain from the analogy of all other mammals, even of the slow-breeding elephant, 
and from the history of the naturalization of the domestic horse in South America, 
that under more favourable conditions it would in a very few years have stocked the 
whole continent. But we could not have told what the unfavourable conditions were 
which checked its increase, whether some one or several, contingencies, and at what 
period of the horse’s life, and in what degree, they severally acted. If the conditions 
had gone on, however slowly, becoming less and less favourable, we assuredly 
should not have perceived the fact, yet the fossil horse would certainly have become 
rarer and rarer, and finally extinct;—its place being seized on by some more 
successful competitor.“ (Darwin 1860: 318-9) 
However, Darwin most often describes injurious effects for one individual / variety /species as a 
favorable effect for another individual / variety / species which competes for the same resources. 
Such effects might emerge through individual variations and their preservation: 
 “…varieties, in order to become in any degree permanent, necessarily have to 
struggle with the other inhabitants of the country, the species which are already 
dominant will be the most likely to yield offspring, which, though in some slight 
degree modified, still inherit those advantages that enabled their parents to become 
dominant over their compatriots.   
If the plants inhabiting a country and described in any Flora be divided into two equal 
masses, all those in the larger genera being placed on one side, and all those in the 
smaller genera on the other side, a somewhat larger number of the very common 
and much diffused or dominant species will be found on the side of the larger 
genera.” (Darwin 1860: 54) 
„We have seen that in each country it is the species of the larger genera which 
oftenest present varieties or incipient species. This, indeed, might have been 
expected; for as natural selection acts through one form having some advantage over 
other forms in the struggle for existence, it will chiefly act on those which already 
have some advantage; and the largeness of any group shows that its species have 
inherited from a common ancestor some advantage in common. Hence, the struggle 
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for the production of new and modified descendants will mainly lie between the 
larger groups, which are all trying to increase in number. One large group will slowly 
conquer another large group, reduce its numbers, and thus lessen its chance of 
further variation and improvement. Within the same large group, the later and more 
highly perfected sub-groups from branching out and seizing on many new places in 
the polity of Nature, will constantly tend to supplant and destroy the earlier and less 
improved sub-groups. Small and broken groups and sub-groups will finally disappear. 
Looking to the future, we can predict that the groups of organic beings which are 
now large and triumphant, and which are least broken up, that is, which as yet have 
suffered least extinction, will for a long period continue to increase. But which groups 
will ultimately prevail, no man can predict; for we well know that many groups, 
formerly most extensively developed, have now become extinct. Looking still more 
remotely to the future, we may predict that, owing to the continued and steady 
increase of the larger groups, a multitude of smaller groups will become utterly 
extinct, and leave no modified descendants; and consequently that of the species 
living at any one period, extremely few will transmit descendants to a remote 
futurity. … I may add that on this view of extremely few of the more ancient species 
having transmitted descendants, and on the view of all the descendants of the same 
species making a class, we can understand how it is that there exist but very few 
classes in each main division of the animal and vegetable kingdoms. Although 
extremely few of the most ancient species may now have living and modified 
descendants, yet at the most remote now have living and modified descendants, yet 
at the most remote many species of many genera, families, orders, and classes, as at 
the present day.“ (Darwin 1860: 126-7) 
„As natural selection acts solely by the preservation of profitable modifications, each 
new form will tend in a fully-stocked country to take the place of, and finally to 
exterminate, its own less improved parent or other less-favoured forms with which it 
comes into competition. Thus extinction and natural selection will, as we have seen, 
go hand in land. Hence, if we look at each species as descended from some other 
unknown form, both the parent and all the transitional varieties will generally have 
been exterminated by the very process of formation and perfection of the new 
form.“ (Darwin 1860: 172) 
Yet, they are often described as the result of both preserved variations and ecological factors 
combined: 
„By my theory these allied species have descended from a common parent; and 
during the process of modification, each has become adapted to the conditions of life 
of its own region, and has supplanted and exterminated its original parent and all the 
transitional varieties between its past and present states. Hence we ought not to 
expect at the present time to meet with numerous transitional varieties in each 
region, though they must have existed there, and may be embedded there in a fossil 
condition. […] the neutral territory between two representative species is generally 
narrow in comparison with the territory proper to each. We see the same fact in 
ascending mountains. And sometimes it is quite remarkable how abruptly, as Alph. 
De Candolle has observed, a common alpine species disappears. The same fact has 
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been noticed by E. Forbes in sounding the depths of the sea with the dredge.“ 
(Darwin 1860: 173-4) 
„To those who look at climate and the physical conditions of life as the all-important 
elements of distribution, these facts ought to cause surprise, as climate and height or 
depth graduate away insensibly. But when we bear in mind that almost every 
species, even in its metropolis, would increase immensely in numbers, were it not for 
other competing species; that nearly all either prey on or serve as prey for others; in 
short, that each organic being is either directly or indirectly related in the most 
important manner to other organic beings, we must see that the range of the 
inhabitants of any country by no means exclusively depends on insensibly changing 
physical conditions, but in large part on the presence of other species, on which it 
depends, or by which is destroyed, or with which it comes into competition; and as 
these species are already defined objects (however they may have become so), not 
blending one into another by insensible gradations, the range of any one species, 
depending as it does on the range of others, will tend to be sharply defined. 
Moreover, each species on the confines of its range, where it exists in lessened 
numbers, will, during fluctuations in the number of its enemies or of its prey, or in 
the seasons, be extremely liable to utter extermination; and thus its geographical 
range will come to be still more sharply defined.“ (Darwin 1860: 175) 
„… the intermediate varieties will be liable to accidental extermination; and during 
the process of further modification through natural selection, they will almost 
certainly be beaten and supplanted by the forms which they connect; for these from 
existing in greater numbers will, in the aggregate, present more variation, and thus 
be further improved through natural selection and gain further advantages.“ (Darwin 
1860: 179) 
Finally, Darwin describes the effects of variations which are irrelevant for Natural Selection. Within 
species they lead to fluctuations of varieties: 
„…we occasionally see an animal like the Ornithorhynchus or Lepidosiren, which in 
some small degree connects by its affinities two large branches [of the Tree] of life, 
and which has apparently been saved from fatal competition by having inhabited a 
protected station. “ (Darwin 1860: 130) 
„Organs now of trifling importance have probably in some cases been of high 
importance to an early progenitor, and, after having been slowly perfected at a 
former period, have been transmitted in nearly the same state, although now 
become of very slight use; and any actually injurious deviations in their structure will 
always have been checked by natural selection. Seeing how important an organ of 
locomotion the tail is in most aquatic animals, its general presence and use for many 
purposes in so many land animals, which in their lungs or modified swimbladders 
betray their aquatic origin, may perhaps be thus accounted for. A well-developed tail 
having been formed in an aquatic animal, it might subsequently come to be worked 
in for all sorts of purposes, as a fly-flapper, an organ of prehension, or as an aid in 
turning, as with the dog…“ (Darwin 1860: 195-6) 
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„Natural selection will never produce in a being anything injurious to itself, for 
natural selection acts solely by and for the good of each. … If a fair balance be struck 
between the good and evil caused by each part, each will be found on the whole 
advantageous. After the lapse of time, under changing conditions of life, if any part 
comes to be injurious, it will be modified; or if it be not so, the being will become 
extinct, as myriads have become extinct.“ (Darwin 1860: 201) 
In the long-term and with respect to species they lead to the conservation of species in what, today, 
we would describe as ecological niches, i.e. isolated areas with a less severe struggle for life: 
„… in the case of an island, or of a country partly surrounded by barriers, into which 
new and better adapted forms could not freely enter, we should then have places in 
the economy of nature which would assuredly be better filled up, if some of the 
original inhabitants were in some manner modified; for, had the area been open to 
immigration, these same places would have been seized on by intruders. In such 
case, every slight modification, which in the course of ages chanced to arise, and 
which in any way favoured the individuals of any of the species, by better adapting 
them to their altered conditions, would tend to be preserved; and natural selection 
would thus have free scope for the work of improvement.“ (Darwin 1860: 81) 
„On a small island, the race for life will have been less severe. And there will have 
been less modification and less extermination. Hence, perhaps, it comes that the 
flora of Madeira … resembles the extinct tertiary flora of Europe. All fresh-water 
basins, taken together, make a small area compared with that of the sea or of the 
land; and, consequently, the competition between fresh-water productions will have 
been less severe than elsewhere; new forms will have been more slowly formed, and 
old forms more slowly exterminated. And it is in fresh water that we find seven 
genera of Ganoid fishes, remnants of a once preponderant order, and in fresh water 
we find some of the most anomalous forms now known in the world, as the 
Ornithorhynchus and Lepidosiren, which, like fossils, connect to a certain extent 
orders now widely separated in the natural scale. These anomalous forms may 
almost be called living fossils [sic!], they have endured to the present day, from 
having inhabited a confined area, and from having thus been exposed to less severe 
competition.“ (Darwin 1860: 106-7) 
These different cases of Output can be presented in a simple matrix, by opposing Individuals, 
varieties and species as the bearers of evolution (and the Object Class) to favourable, injurious and 
irrelevant effects as Darwin distinguishes them in the Input. (See Table 11) 
 Individuals  
(short-term) 
Varieties  
(medium-term) 
Species  
(long-term) 
Favourable varia-
tion or favourable 
ecological change 
Reproduction Geographical 
expansion & 
Increase in frequency 
Divergence & Emergence 
of New Species 
Injurious varia-
tion or injurious 
ecological change 
No Reproduction Geographical 
contraction & Decrease 
in Frequency 
Convergence, Extinction 
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Irrelevant varia-
tions or irrelevant 
ecological change 
? (Reproduction or 
No Reproduction) 
Fluctuation Conservation 
Table 11: Expressions of the Output of Darwin's dynamic model 
Favorable variations or favorable ecological change allows for the reproduction of an individual, the 
increase in frequency and geographical expansion of a variety and the divergence of species and, 
finally, the emergence of new species. In this, favorable ecological change may consist in isolation or 
climatic change but not in the change of other organisms for these cannot survive a change in a 
direction injurious to themselves and favorable to their ecology. Injurious variations391 or injurious 
ecological change leads to the individual’s failure to reproduce, the decrease in frequency of a variety 
and its geographical contraction as well as the convergence, and, finally, the extinction of a species. 
The effects of irrelevant variations on individuals are not specified by Darwin; these organisms may 
either reproduce or fail to do so. In varieties, irrelevant changes lead to fluctuation, in species to the 
conservation.392 
According to Darwin, these different Outputs cover all relevant phenomena of long-term change in 
groups of organisms. It allows to explain the geological record i.e. the geological-paleontological 
regularities393: 
„Passing from these difficulties, all the other great leading facts in palaeontology 
seem to me simply to follow on the theory of descent with modification through 
natural selection. We can thus understand how it is that new species come in slowly 
                                                            
391  Injurious variations occur in individuals only; they are not preserved in varieties or species because they 
diminish the bearing individual’s capacity to reproduce: “Natural selection will never produce in a being 
anything injurious to itself, for natural selection acts solely by and for the good of each. … If a fair balance 
be struck between the good and evil caused by each part, each will be found on the whole advantageous. 
After the lapse of time, under changing conditions of life, if any part comes to be injurious, it will be 
modified; or if it be not so, the being will become extinct, as myriads have become extinct.“ (Darwin 1860: 
201) 
392  Theoretically, conservation would also be the result of an absence of change but this would not be covered 
by Darwin’s model. Moreover, as nature is constantly changing, it seems hard to describe any period in the 
history of life as free of change. Rather, the change is constant but may or may not be relevant for an 
organism in question. 
393  Darwin, however, stressed how imperfect remained the contemporary knowledge of these regularities: „I 
have attempted to show that the geological record is extremely imperfect; that only a small portion of the 
globe has been geologically explored with care; that only certain classes of organic beings have been 
largely preserved in a fossil state; that the number both of specimens and of species, preserved in our 
museums, is absolutely as nothing compared with the incalculable number of generations which must have 
passed away even during a single formation; that, owing to subsidence being necessary for the 
accumulation of fossiliferous deposits thick enough to resist future degradation, enormous intervals of 
time have elapsed between the successive formations; that there has probably been more extinction 
during the periods of subsidence, and note variation during the periods of elevation, and during the latter 
the record will have been least perfectly kept; that each single formation has not been continuously 
deposited; that the duration of each formation is, perhaps, short compared with the average duration of 
specific forms; that migration has played an important part in the first appearance of new forms in any one 
area and formation; that widely ranging species are those which have varied most, and have oftenest given 
rise to new species; and that varieties have at first often been local. All these causes taken conjointly, must 
have tended to make the geological record extremely imperfect, and will to a large extent explain why we 
do not find interminable varieties, connecting together all the extinct and existing forms of life by the finest 
graduated steps.“ (Darwin 1860: 370-1) 
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and successively; how species of different classes do not necessarily change together, 
or at the same rate, or in the same degree; yet in the long run that all undergo 
modification to some extent. The extinction of old forms is the almost inevitable 
consequence of the production of new forms. We can understand why when a 
species has once disappeared it never reappears. Groups of species increase in 
numbers slowly, and endure for unequal periods of time; for the process of 
modification is necessarily slow, and depends on many complex contingencies. The 
dominant species of the larger dominant groups tend have many modified 
descendants, and thus new sub-groups and groups are formed. As these are formed, 
the species of the less vigorous groups, from their inferiority inherited from a 
common progenitor, tend to become extinct together, and to leave no modified 
offspring on the face of the earth. But the utter extinction of a whole group of 
species may often be a very slow process, from the survival of a few descendants, 
lingering in protected and isolated situations. When a group has once wholly 
disappeared, it does not reappear; for the link of generation has been broken.  
We can understand how the spreading of the dominant forms of life, which are those 
that oftenest vary, will in the long run tend to people the world with allied, but 
modified, descendants; and these will generally succeed in taking the places of those 
groups of species which are their inferiors in the struggle for existence. Hence, after 
long intervals of time, the productions of the world will appear to have changed 
simultaneously. 
We can understand how it is that all the forms of life, ancient and recent, make 
together one grand system; for all are connected by generation. We can understand, 
from the continued tendency to divergence of character, why the more ancient a 
form is, the more it generally differs from those now living. Why ancient and extinct 
forms often tend to fill up gaps between existing forms, sometimes mending two 
groups previously classed as distinct into one; but more commonly only bringing 
them a little closer together. The more ancient a form is, the more often, apparently, 
it displays characters in some degree intermediate between groups now distinct; for 
the more ancient a form is, the more nearly it will be related to, and consequently 
resemble, the common progenitor of groups, since become widely divergent. Extinct 
forms are seldom directly intermediate between existing forms; but are intermediate 
only by a long and circuitous course through many extinct and very different forms. 
We can clearly see why the organic remains of closely consecutive formations are 
more closely allied to each other, than are those of remote formations; for the forms 
are more closely linked together by generation: we can clearly see why the remains 
of an intermediate formation are intermediate in character.  
The inhabitants of each successive period in the world’s history have beaten their 
predecessors in the race for life, and are, in so far. Higher in the scale of nature; and 
this may account for that vague yet ill-defined sentiment, felt by many 
palaeontologists, that organisation on the whole has progressed. If it should 
hereafter be proved that ancient animals resemble to a certain extent the embryos 
of more recent animals of the same class, the fact will be intelligible. The succession 
of the same types of structure within the same areas during the later geological 
periods ceases to be mysterious, and is simply explained by inheritance.  
If then the geological record be as imperfect as I believe it to be, and it may at least 
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be asserted that the record cannot be proved to be much more perfect, the main 
objections to the theory of natural selection are greatly diminished or disappear. On 
the other hand, all the chief laws of palaeontology plainly proclaim, as it seems to 
me. That species have been produced by ordinary generation: old forms having been 
supplanted by new and improved forms of life, produced by the laws of variation still 
acting around us, and preserved by Natural Selection.“ (Darwin 1860: 343-5) 
but also the regularities of biogeography: 
„If the difficulties be not insuperable in admitting that in the long course of time the 
individuals of the same species, and likewise of allied species, have proceeded from 
some one source; then I think all the grand leading facts of geographical distribution 
are explicable on the theory of migration (generally of the more dominant forms of 
life), together with subsequent modification and the multiplication of new forms. We 
can thus understand the high importance of barriers, whether of land or water, 
which separate our several zoological and botanical provinces. We can thus 
understand the localisation of sub-genera, genera, and families; and how it is that 
under different attitudes, for instance in South America, the inhabitants of the plains 
and mountains, of the forests, marshes, and deserts, are in so mysterious a manner 
linked together by affinity, and are likewise linked to the extinct beings which 
formerly inhabited the same continent. Bearing in mind that the mutual relation of 
organism to organism is of the highest importance, we can see why two areas having 
nearly the same physical conditions should often be inhabited by very different forms 
of life; for according to the length of time which has elapsed since new inhabitants 
entered one region; according to the nature of the communication which allowed 
certain forms and not others to enter, either in greater or lesser numbers; according 
or not. As those which entered happened to come in more or less direct competition 
with each other and with the aborigines; and according as the immigrants were 
capable of varying more or less rapidly, there would ensue in different regions, 
independently of their physical conditions, infinitely diversified conditions of life,—
there would be an almost endless amount of organic action and reaction,—and we 
should find, as we do find, some groups of beings greatly, and some only slightly 
modified,—some developed in great force, some existing in scanty numbers—in the 
different great geographical provinces of the world.  
On these same principles, we can understand, as I have endeavoured to show, why 
oceanic islands should have few inhabitants, but if these a great number should be 
endemic or peculiar; and why, in relation to the means of migration, one group of 
beings, even within the same class, should have all its species endemic, and another 
group should have all its species common to other quarters of the world. We can see 
why whole groups of organisms, as batrachians and terrestrial mammals, should be 
absent from oceanic islands, whilst the Host isolated islands possess their own 
peculiar species of aerial mammals or bats. We can see why there should be some 
relation between the presence of mammals, in a more or less modified condition, 
and the depth of the sea between an island and the mainland. We can clearly see 
why all the inhabitants of an archipelago, though specifically distinct on the several 
islets, should be closely related to each other, and likewise be related, but less 
closely, to those of the nearest continent or other source whence immigrants were 
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probably derived. We can see why in two areas, however distant from each other, 
there should be a regularity, in the presence of identical species, of varieties, of 
doubtful species, and of distinct but representative species.“ (Darwin 1860: 408-10) 
and, finally, an important class of regularities in anatomy and morphology: useless, rudimentary or 
nascent organs and the overall similarity of organisms of different taxonomic classes394: 
„Organs or parts in this strange [i.e. rudimentary, atrophied, or aborted] condition, 
bearing the stamp of inutility, are extremely common throughout nature. For 
instance, rudimentary mammae are very general in the males of mammals: I 
presume that the ‘bastard-wing’ in birds may be safely considered as a digit in a 
rudimentary State: in very many snakes one lobe of the lungs is rudimentary; in other 
snakes there are rudiments of the pelvis and hind limbs. Some of the cases of 
rudimentary organs are extremely curious; for instance, he presence of teeth in 
foetal whales, which when grown up have no tooth in their heads; and the presence 
of teeth, which never cut through the gums, in the upper jaws of our unborn calves. 
It has even been stated on good authority that rudiments of teeth can be detected in 
the beaks of certain embryonic birds. Nothing can be plainer than hat wings are 
formed for flight, yet in how many insects do we see wings so reduced in size as to be 
utterly incapable of flight, and not rarely lying under wing-cases, firmly soldered 
together!“ (Darwin 1860: 450) 
„An organ serving for two purposes, may become rudimentary or utterly aborted for 
one, even the more important purpose; and remain perfectly efficient for the other. 
Thus in plants, the office of the pistil is to allow the pollen-tubes to reach the ovules 
protected in the ovarium at its base. The pistil consists of a stigma supported on the 
style; but in some Compositae, the male florets, which of course cannot be 
fecundated, have a pistil, which is in a rudimentary state, for it is not crowned with a 
stigma; but the style remains well developed, and is clothed with hairs as in other 
Compositae, for the purpose of brushing the pollen out of the surrounding anthers. 
Again, an organ may become rudimentary for its proper purpose, and be used for a 
distinct object: in certain fish he swim-bladder seems to be nearly rudimentary for its 
proper function of giving buoyancy, but has become converted into a nascent 
wreathing organ or lung. Other similar instances could be given.“ (Darwin 1860: 451-
2) 
                                                            
394  To explain these regularities was Owen’s project and before, Cuvier’s and Geoffroy’s. And, indeed, Darwin 
does link his work to theirs: „It is generally acknowledged that all organic beings have been formed on two 
great laws — Unity of Type, and the conditions of Existence. By unity of type is meant that fundamental 
agreement in structure, which we see in organic beings of the same class, and which is quite independent 
of their habits of life. On my theory, unity of type is explained by unity of decent. The expression of 
conditions of existence, so often insisted on by the illustrious Cuvier, is fully embraced by the principle of 
natural selection for natural selection acts by either now adapting the varying parts of each being to its 
organic and inorganic conditions of life; or by having adapted them during long-past periods of time: the 
adaptations being aided in some cases by use and disuse, being slightly affected by the direct action of the 
external conditions of life, and being in all cases subjected to the several laws of growth. Hence, in fact, the 
law of the Conditions of Existence is the higher law; as it includes, through the inheritance of former 
adaptations, that of Unity of Type.“ (Darwin 1860: 206) 
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„Organs, however little developed, if of use, should not be called rudimentary; they 
cannot properly be said to be in an atrophied condition; they may be called nascent, 
and may hereafter be developed to any extent by natural selection. Rudimentary 
organs, on the other hand, are essentially useless, as teeth which never cut through 
the gums; in a still less developed condition, they would be of still less use. They 
cannot, therefore, under their present condition, have been formed by natural 
selection, which acts solely by the preservation of useful modifications; they have 
been retained, as we shall see, by inheritance, and relate to a former condition of 
their possessor. It is difficult to know what are nascent organs; looking to the future, 
we cannot of course tell how any part will be developed, and whether it is now 
nascent; looking to the past, creatures with an organ in a nascent condition will 
generally have been supplanted and exterminated by their successors with the organ 
in a more perfect and developed condition. The wing of the penguin is of high 
service, and acts as a fin; it may, therefore, represent the nascent state of the wings 
of birds; not that I believe this to be the case, it is more probably a reduced organ, 
modified for a new function: the wing of the Apteryx is useless, and is truly 
rudimentary. The mammary glands of the Ornithorhynchus may, perhaps, be 
considered, in comparison with the udder of a cow, as in a nascent state. The 
ovigerous frena of certain cirripedes, which are only slightly developed and which 
have ceased to give attachment to the ova, are nascent branchiae.“ (Darwin 1860: 
452) 
v. Connector: Natural Selection, Drift, Use & Disuse, 
Darwin employs four different terms for the Connectors which link the Input and Output of his 
dynamic model: Natural Selection, Sexual Selection, Preservation and Elimination.395 Furthermore, he 
describes an assignment of a subset of the Input to a subset of the Output which he does not name, 
namely the fluctuation of certain features as the result of irrelevant variations. For lack of a fixed 
term, I will refer to this assignment as ‘Drift’, a term which anticipates the modern denotation. 
Natural Selection is the most general of these terms and logically implies Preservation – as Darwin 
states explicitly: 
“This preservation of favourable variations and the rejection of injurious variations, I 
call Natural Selection.” (Darwin 1860: 81) 
Moreover, Darwin clearly explains how he operationalizes this trio of terms. In an early reaction to 
the reception, in the 3rd edition of 1861, he further clarifies his use of the term and its denotative 
meaning. In accordance with my model, these terms summarize sets of empirical regularities: 
“…it is difficult to avoid personifying the word Nature; but I mean by Nature, only the 
aggregate action and product of many natural laws, and by laws the sequence of 
                                                            
395  In the later editions of the Origin, Darwin replaced ‘Natural Selection’ by ‘Survival of the Fittest’ and 
‘Elimination’ by ‘Destruction’. (Ruse 1971: 331) Extensionally, this does not change his dynamic model, but 
intensionally it attenuates the intentionality of his language. (‘Survival of the Fittest’ is first mentioned in 
the fourth edition, where it appears in the title of chapter and with explicit mention of the inventor of the 
expression, Herbert Spencer, on page 72. (Darwin 1869: 72, 92, 95, 103, 105, 125, 145, 149, 160, 168, 226, 
239, 421, 556) In the fifth and sixth edition can be found a similar number of references. 
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events396 as ascertained by us. [sic!] With a little familiarity such superficial 
objections will be forgotten.” (Darwin 1861: 81-2; Darwin 1866: 91-2; Darwin 1869: 
92-3; Darwin 1872a: 63-4)397 
He provides examples of the workings of both expressions of Natural Selection, Elimination and 
Preservation. In these, he no longer links extinction or emergence exclusively to one type of Input, 
like Ecological Change or Individual Variations. With Darwin, all kinds of Inputs may lead to all kinds 
of Output, it depends simply whether they are favorable, injurious or irrelevant. 
“…the struggle almost invariably will be most severe between the individuals of the 
same species, for they frequent the same districts, require the same food, and are 
exposed to the same dangers. In the case of varieties of the same species, the 
struggle will generally be almost equally severe, and we sometimes see the contest 
soon decided: for instance, if several varieties of wheat be sown together, and the 
mixed seed be resown, some of the varieties which best suit the soil or climate, or 
are naturally the most fertile, will beat the others and so yield more seed, and 
consequently in a few years quite supplant the other varieties.” (Darwin 1860: 75) 
„Take the case of a carnivorous quadruped, of which the number that can be 
supported in any country has long ago arrived at its full average. If its natural powers 
of increase be allowed to act, it can succeed in increasing (the country not 
undergoing any change in its conditions) only by its varying descendants seizing on 
places at present occupied by other animals… The more diversified in habits and 
structure the descendants of our carnivorous animal became, the more places they 
would be enabled to occupy. What applies to one animal will apply throughout all 
time to all animals – that is, if they vary – for otherwise natural selection can do 
nothing.“ (Darwin 1860: 113) 
„It has been experimentally proved, that if a plot of ground - be sown with one 
species of grass, and a similar plot be sown with several distinct genera of grasses, a 
greater number of plants and a greater weight of dry herbage can thus be raised. The 
same has been found to hold good when first one variety and then several mixed 
varieties of wheat have been sown on equal spaces of ground. Hence, if any one 
species of grass were to go on varying, and those varieties were continually selected 
which differed from each other in at all the same manner is distinct species and 
genera of grasses differ from each other, greater number of individual plants of this 
species of grass, including its modified descendants, would succeed in living on the 
same piece of ground. And we well know that each species and each variety of grass 
is annually sowing almost countless seeds; and thus, as it may be said, is striving its 
utmost to increase its numbers. Consequently, I cannot doubt that in the course of 
many thousands of generations, the most distinct varieties of any one species of 
grass would always have the best chance of succeeding and of increasing in numbers, 
                                                            
396  Darwin is a imprecise when he speaks of “sequences of events” for he applies his model to paleontological 
evidence, too. While paleontological evidence may stem from events, these events have not been 
observed. 
397  The number of pages decreases significantly from the 4th to the 5th and 6th edition. Therefore, the citation 
moves to lower pages. 
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and thus of supplanting the less distinct varieties; and varieties, when rendered very 
distinct from each other, take the rank of species.  
The truth of the principle, that the greatest amount of life can be supported by great 
diversification of structure, is seen under many natural circumstances.“ (Darwin 
1860: 113-114) 
„Only those variations which are in some way profitable will be preserved or 
naturally selected.“ (Darwin 1860: 117) 
„But during the process of modification, … another of our principles, namely that of 
extinction, will have played an important part. As in each fully stocked country 
natural selection necessarily acts by the selected from having some advantage in the 
struggle for life over other forms, there will be a constant tendency in the improved 
descendants of any one species to supplant and exterminate in each stage of descent 
their predecessors and their original parent. For it should be remembered that the 
competition will generally be most severe between those forms which are most 
nearly related to each other in habits, constitution, and structure. hence all the 
intermediate forms between the earlier and later states, that is between the less and 
more improved state of a species, as well as the original parent-species itself, will 
generally tend to become extinct. So it probably will be with many whole collateral 
lines of descent, which will be conquered by later and improved lines of descent. If, 
however, the modified offspring of a species get into some distinct country, or 
become quickly adapted to some quite new station, in which child and parent do not 
come into competition. Both may continue to exist.“ (Darwin 1860: 121-2) 
„In some cases we might easily put down to disuse modifications of structure which 
are wholly, or mainly, due to natural selection. Mr Wollaston has discovered the 
remarkable fact that 200 beetles, out of the 550 species inhabiting Madeira, are so 
far deficient in wings that they cannot fly; and that of the twenty-nine endemic 
genera, no less than twenty-three genera have all their species in this condition! 
Several facts, namely, that beetles in many parts of the world are frequently blown to 
sea and perish; that the beetles in Madeira, as observed by Mr Wollaston, lie much 
concealed, until the wind lulls and the sun shines; that the proportion of wingless 
beetles is larger on the exposed Desertas than in Madeira itself; and especially the 
extraordinary fact, so strongly insisted on by Mr Wollaston, of the almost entire 
absence of certain large groups of beetles, elsewhere excessively numerous, and 
which groups have habits of life almost necessitating frequent flight;—these several 
considerations have made me believe that the wingless condition of so many 
Madeira beetles is mainly due to the action of natural selection, but combined 
probably with disuse “ (Darwin 1860: 135-6) 
The fourth term for the Connector is sexual selection, a more complicated case. In the joint paper, 
Darwin had referred to it as a “second agency” (Darwin 1858 [1844]: 50) and does so again in the 
Origin (Darwin 1860: 90). (I will discuss its meaning with respect to the narrative below.) Whether 
one understands it as a second Connector, independent of Natural Selections, seems to depend on 
two factors. First, it depends on how one interprets the Struggle for Life: as a struggle for survival or 
a struggle for reproduction, i.e. a struggle for leaving most progeny. (see above) To me, Darwin’s text 
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suggests the latter and therefore, leaving more progeny implies more success in the struggle for life 
and, in the longer term, to the emergence of varieties and species. Therefore, I would argue that 
natural selection implies sexual selection because success in terms of sexual selection is also success 
in terms of natural selection398 – although his text sometimes opposes both: 
„…natural selection will be able to modify one sex in its functional relations to the 
other sex, or in relation to wholly different habits of life in the two sexes, as is 
sometimes the case with insects. […] This depends, not on a struggle for existence, 
but on a struggle between the males for possession of the females; the result is not 
death to the unsuccessful competitor but few or no offspring. Sexual selection is, 
therefore, Iess rigorous than natural selection. Generally, the most vigorous males, 
those which are best fitted for their places in nature, will leave most progeny. But in 
many cases, victory depends not on general vigour, but on having special weapons, 
confined to the male sex.” (Darwin 1860: 87-88) 
The ensuing examples, however, rather support my claim because, second, whether one understands 
natural selection as implying sexual selection or not, depends on whether Darwin provides a criterion 
to empirically distinguish between both. 399 He does no such thing; rather he equates the results of 
both types of selection: 
“A hornless stag or spurless cock would have a poor chance of leaving offspring. 
Sexual selection by always allowing the victor to breed might surely give indomitable 
courage, length to the spur, and strength to the wing to strike in the spurred leg, as 
well as the brutal cock-fighter, who knows well that he can improve his breed by 
careful selection of the best cocks. How low in the scale of nature the law of battle 
descends, I know not; male alligators have been described as fighting, bellowing, and 
whirling round, like Indians in a war-dance, for the possession of the females; male 
salmons have been seen fighting all day long; male stag-beetles often bear wounds 
from the huge mandibles of other males. The war is, perhaps, severest between the 
males of polygamous animals, and these seem oftenest provided with special 
weapons. The males of carnivorous animals are already well armed; though to them 
and to others, special means of defence may be given through means of sexual 
selection, as the mane to the lion, the shoulder-pad to the boar, and the hooked jaw 
to the male salmon; for the shield may be as important for victory, as the sword or 
spear.“ (Darwin 1860: 88) 
“Amongst birds, the contest is often of a more peaceful character. All those who 
have attended to the subject, believe that there is the severest rivalry between the 
males of many species to attract by singing the females. The rock-thrush of Guiana, 
birds of Paradise, and some others, congregate; and successive males display their 
gorgeous plumage and perform strange antics before the females, which, standing by 
as spectators, at last choose the most attractive partner. Those who have closely 
attended to birds in confinement well know that they often take individual 
                                                            
398  In modern terminology one would speak of natural selection implying both sexual and ecological (non-
sexual) selection. 
399  Himmelfarb argues for ‘sexual selection’ denoting a second connector without providing empirical support 
for her position. (Himmelfarb 1959: 257) 
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preferences and dislikes: thus Sir R. Heron has described how one pied peacock was 
eminently attractive to all his hen birds. …[thus] if man can in a short time give 
elegant carriage and beauty to his bantams, according to his standard of beauty, I can 
see no good reason to doubt that female birds, by selecting, during thousands of 
generations, the most melodious or beautiful males, according to their standard of 
beauty, might produce a marked effect.“ (Darwin 1860: 89) 
Beyond, the preservation of favourable variations and the elimination of injurious ones, Darwin 
assigns long-term changes of groups of organisms to variations which he considers neither injurious 
nor favourable: irrelevant variations. For this assignment, Darwin introduces no predicate, he does 
not denote it by any term as ‘natural selection’ or ‘sexual selection’. In order to refer to this 
assignment, I will speak of ‘drift’, the modern term by which are named changes which are not 
considered evolution.400 
The Origin contains several references to such drift and Darwin does clearly oppose it to the 
sequence of variation – selection – evolution, i.e. the core of his dynamic model: 
“This preservation of favourable variations and the rejection of injurious variations, I 
call Natural Selection. Variations neither useful nor injurious would not be affected 
by natural selection, and would be left a fluctuating element, as perhaps we see in 
the species called polymorphic.” (Darwin 1860: 81) 
„I have sometimes felt much difficulty in understanding the origin of simple parts, of 
which the importance does not seem sufficient to cause the preservation of 
successively varying individuals.“ (Darwin 1860: 194-5) 
 „The foregoing remarks lead me to say a few words on the protest lately made by 
some naturalists, against the utilitarian doctrine that every detail of structure has 
been produced for the good of its possessor. They believe that very many structures 
have been created for beauty in the eyes of man, or for mere variety. This doctrine, if 
true, would be absolutely fatal to my theory. Yet I fully admit that many structures 
are of no direct use to their possessors. […] Thus, we can hardly believe that the 
webbed feet of the upland goose or of the frigate-bird are of special use to these 
birds; we cannot believe that the same bones in the arm of the monkey, in the fore-
leg of the horse, in the wing of the bat, and in the flipper of the seal, are of special 
use to these animals. We may safely attribute these structures to inheritance. But to 
the progenitor of the upland goose and of the frigate-bird, webbed feet no doubt 
were as useful as they now are to the most aquatic of existing birds. “ (Darwin 1860: 
199) 
                                                            
400  Thus, Darwin not foresaw a concept equivalent of Genetic Drift in his Theory. He did not name it, yet, he 
clearly discusses examples which fall under such a concept, namely Variations which do not lead to 
sustainable evolution. As Ellegård put it, Darwin, over time, “was becoming increasingly willing to ascribe 
same variations to mere chance fluctuations, or to what he called ‘correlation of growth’: the fact that, in 
many cases, variations in one organ may be automatically accompanied by a variation in a different part of 
the organism. One of these variations might be useful, and thus naturally selected, the other, concomitant 
one, might be wholly useless, or even slightly injurious. The selection depended on the total effect.” 
(Ellegård 1958: 252) 
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Darwin does not preclude, however, that such irrelevant variations may latter become useful, namely 
after some favorable ecological change: 
„We are far too ignorant, in almost every case, to be enabled to assert that any part 
or organ is so unimportant for the welfare of a species, that modifications in its 
structure could not have been slowly accumulated by means of natural selection. But 
we may confidently believe that many modifications, wholly due to the laws of 
growth, and at first in no way advantageous to a species, have been subsequently 
taken advantage of by the still further modified descendants of this species. We may, 
also, believe that a part formerly of high importance has often been retained (as the 
tail of an aquatic animal by its terrestrial descendants), though it has become of such 
small importance that it could not, in its present state, have been acquired by natural 
selection, — a power which acts solely by the preservation of profitable variations in 
the struggle for life.“ (Darwin 1860: 205) 
In sum, Darwin explains the features of plants and organisms not by their particular use but by the 
fact that they have not been injurious to their bearer. 
Finally, Darwin mentions a fourth Connector – albeit mostly as a subordinate complement to Natural 
Selection. This fourth Connector is the Lamarckian use and disuse and is mentioned throughout the 
text, usually as part of the explanation of rudimentary organs: 
 “…the wingless condition of so many Madeira beetles is mainly due to the action of 
natural selection, but combined probably with disuse. For during thousands of 
successive generations each individual beetle which flew least, either from its wings 
having been ever so little less perfectly developed or from indolent habit, will have 
had the best chance of surviving from not being blown out to sea; and, on the other 
hand, those beetles which most readily took to flight would oftenest have been 
blown to sea and thus have been destroyed.“ (Darwin 1860: 135-6) 
„On the whole, I think we may conclude that habit, use, and disuse have, in some 
cases, played a considerable part in the modification of the constitution, and of the 
structure of various organs; but that the effects of use and disuse have often been 
largely combined with, and sometimes overmastered by the natural selection of 
innate variations.“ (Darwin 1860: 142-3) 
“In some cases habit or use and disuse have probably come into play. I do not 
pretend that the facts given in this chapter strengthen in any great degree my theory; 
but none of the cases of difficulty, to the best of my judgment, annihilate it.“ (Darwin 
1860: 242-3) 
„On my view of descent with modification, the origin of rudimentary organs is simple. 
[…] We often see rudiments of various parts in monsters. But I doubt whether any of 
these cases throw light on the origin of rudimentary organs in a state of nature, 
further than by showing that rudiments can be produced; for I doubt whether 
species under nature ever undergo abrupt changes. I believe that disuse has been the 
main agency; that it has led in successive generations to the gradual reduction of 
various organs, until they have become rudimentary,—as in the case of the eyes of 
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animals inhabiting dark caverns, and of the wings of birds inhabiting oceanic islands. 
Which have seldom been forced to take flight, and have ultimately lost the power of 
flying.“ (Darwin 1860: 454-5) 
„Disuse, aided sometimes by natural selection, will often tend to reduce an organ, 
when it has become useless by changed habits or under changed conditions of life; 
and we can clearly understand on this view the meaning of rudimentary organs. But 
disuse and selection will generally act on each creature, when it has come to 
maturity and has to play its full part in the struggle for existence, and will thus have 
little power of acting on an organ during early life; hence the organ will not be much 
reduced or rendered rudimentary at this early age. “ (Darwin 1860: 479-80) 
vi. Synthesis 
Figure 19 and Figure 20 provide an overview over Darwin’s dynamic model and specify its different 
elements as I have identified then in the Origin. Figure 19 is the more detailed and focusses on the 
assignments of Inputs to Outputs. It is thus oriented primarily on the distinctions between favorable, 
injurious and irrelevant Inputs and between individuals, varieties and species as subsets of the Object 
Class. Figure 20 is more oriented towards the kinds of events which count as Input and Output of 
Darwin’s model, i.e. the kinds of ecological change and variations he considers triggers of evolution. 
Thus, Figure 20 is more simplified but allows for a better comparison of Darwin to his predecessors 
and competitors analyzed above. Also, it focuses on the main Connectors of evolution and leaves 
Drift aside. In this sense, Figure 20 is a normalized version of Figure 19. 
In the literature, there are several other representations of Darwin’s dynamic model. (Himmelfarb 
1959: 256-76; Vorzimmer 1972: 3-20; Ruse 1971: Ruse 1979: 188-201; Beatty 1980; Bowler 1985. 
114-125; Oldroyd 1986; Lloyd 1988; Thompson 1989; Griffiths 1997; Thompson 2007) I consider my 
representation as both more precise and more detailed than any of them. Let me illustrate what I 
mean by this on one prominent representation of Darwin’s model by Ernst Mayr (Mayr 1991: 72; cf. 
Mayr 1985), which also seems to be the best-known among biologists. (see Figure 21) Mayr presents 
Darwin’s model as complex of three inferences, based on five facts. Of these five facts, four can be 
found in my model: Facts 1 and 2, are covered by my Situation Type, Fact 4 by the individuals in the 
Object Class, Fact 5 in Input 2 of my presentation. Fact 3, the limitation of resources, is no 
autonomous observation in my reading of Darwin; he observes only the Growth with Reproduction 
(overproduction) (Fact 1) and the stability of populations (Fact 2). One might read that Darwin 
interprets Facts 1 and 2 as suggesting Fact 3 but this takes no systematic position in his argument in 
my reading. As for the inferences, the first is the name for Facts 1 and 2 as displayed in my Situation 
Type. Inference 3 of Mayr’s scheme corresponds to my long-term Output for species and is, in his 
wording, a fact rather than an inference. His Inference 2 is my Connector, i.e. the name of the 
assignment of Inputs to Outputs in my model. In sum, I believe that my model covers all elements of 
Mayr’s model and is even more detailed. Also, it represents Darwin’s model in a more precise 
framework, separating its logical and empirical elements more neatly. 
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Figure 19: Darwin's dynamic model – full version, focus on the distinction favorable – injurious – irrelevant 
 
Figure 20: Darwin's dynamic model – simplified and normalized version 
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Figure 21: “Darwin’s Explanatory Model of Evolution through Natural Selection” taken from (Mayr 1991: 72) 
3.4.4 Narrative explanation: How did Darwin tell evolution? 
Already in the Origin’s short introduction (Darwin 1860: 4-5), Darwin outlines the blue-print for his 
narrative: All organisms are in a constant Struggle for Existence (or Struggle for Life), in which 
Variation or an Ecological Change401 leads to a slight advantage for certain organisms. Natural 
Selection then preserves the organisms with this advantage and, in the long run, produces a 
Divergence of Character in the original species. At the same time, the now less fit Organisms face the 
danger of Extinction. This basic narrative form is developed and applied throughout the Origin; 
elements of it can be found in empirical examples and theoretical discussions but also in prototypical 
imaginative stories, a particular feature of Darwin’s text. Let me address these little stories before I 
dissect Darwin’s general narrative. 
Darwin begins to tell his prototypical stories in Chapter 4 of the Origin, the chapter on Natural 
Selection in which Darwin assembles the components of his argument and first applies the blue-print 
from the introduction in complete explanations.402 These stories display the same blurring of the 
members of the Object Class as Darwin’s dynamic model; they evolve from incidents around 
individual organisms to tales about large groups of organisms, for instance in this story about wolves 
in which: 
„... a [wolf] cub [sic!] might be born with an innate tendency to pursue certain kinds 
of prey. Nor can this be thought to be very improbable; for [with cats the] tendency 
to catch rats rather than mice is known to be inherited. Now, if any slight innate 
change of habit or of structure benefited an individual wolf [sic!], it would have the 
                                                            
401  Remember that Darwin does not use the expression ‘ecological change’. Instead, speaks of the adaptation 
of organic beings to „physical conditions of life“ which presume either that these physical conditions have 
recently changed or that the organisms concerned have entered into a new territory. 
402  Rhetorically, Chapter 4 resolves a tension which Darwin built up from the introduction throughout the first 
three chapters. 
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best chance of surviving and of leaving offspring. Some of its young [sic!] would 
probably inherit the same habits or structure, and by the repetition of this process, a 
new variety [sic!] might be formed which would either supplant or coexist with the 
parent form of wolf. Or, again, the wolves inhabiting a mountainous district, and 
those frequenting the lowlands, would naturally be forced to hunt different prey; and 
from the continued preservation of the individuals best fitted for the two sites. Two 
varieties might slowly be formed. […] I may add, that, according to Mr Pierce, there 
are two varieties of the wolf inhabiting the Catskill Mountains in the United States, 
one with a light greyhound-like form, which pursues deer, and the other more bulky, 
with shorter legs, which more frequently attacks the shepherd’s flocks.“ (Darwin 
1860: 91) 
The organisms in this story change their form four times: from a cub, to an adult wolf, to a couple of 
young to a variety. Darwin’s narration does thus bend the laws of time. While his “vehicle of change” 
are individuals (Eliot 2009), his story does not stay with them: 
“Whereas a simple developmental narrative still using the model of the single life 
span might have placed the embryo at the beginning, and a narrative preoccupied 
with origins and cosmogony might have started with the geological record, Darwin 
places the initiating emphasis in his narrative on the profusion of individuals, their 
variability, the diversity of species. Only gradually do the laws emerge from the 
welter of particularity.” (Beer 2009: 59-60) 
This rhetorical trick allowed for accelerating the course of time throughout the story and, hence, 
telling processes which are much too slow for humans to observe.403 
Another powerful example of both effects is be the following fictive example of a species of plants 
excreting sweet juice: 
„Let us now take a more complex case. Certain plants excrete a sweet juice, 
apparently for the sake of eliminating something injurious from their sap: this is 
effected by glands at the base of the stipules in some Leguminosae, and at the back 
of the leaf of the common laurel. This juice, though small in quantity, is greedily 
sought by insects. Let us now suppose a little sweet juice or nectar to be excreted by 
the inner bases of the petals of a flower. In this case insects in seeking the nectar 
would get dusted with pollen, and would certainly often transport the pollen from 
one flower to the stigma of another flower. The flowers of two distinct individuals of 
the same species would thus get crossed; and the act of crossing, we have good 
reason to believe (as will hereafter be more fully alluded to), would produce very 
vigorous seedlings, which consequently would have the best chance of flourishing 
and surviving. Some of these seedlings would probably inherit the nectar-excreting 
power. Those individual flowers which had the largest glands or nectarines, and 
which excreted most nectar, would be oftenest visited by insects, and would be 
                                                            
403  Gillian Beer remarks that “The rapidity of Darwin's narrative made it difficult for him to render accurately 
the extreme slowness of the processes he was describing, Ontogeny and phylogeny might therefore be 
confused in the reader's mind - and even in the syntax of the text.” (Beer 2009: 98) 
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oftenest crossed; and so in the long-run would gain the upper hand.“ (Darwin 1860: 
92) 
Once these intuitive narrative patterns are established, Darwin can extend his explanation to less 
graphic cases like examples where the starting point of evolutionary change is a Variety not a single 
Individual or to the Elimination of less fit Organisms. In such cases, the Useful Variation of one 
Variety might represent an Injurious Environmental Change to another Variety which competes for 
the same resources: 
„It has been experimentally proved, that if a plot of ground - be sown with one 
species of grass, and a similar plot be sown with several distinct genera of grasses, a 
greater number of plants and a greater weight of dry herbage can thus be raised. The 
same has been found to hold good when first one variety and then several mixed 
varieties of wheat have been sown on equal spaces of ground. Hence, if any one 
species of grass were to go on varying, and those varieties were continually selected 
which differed from each other in at all the same manner is distinct species and 
genera of grasses differ from each other, greater number of individual plants of this 
species of grass, including its modified descendants, would succeed in living on the 
same piece of ground. And we well know that each species and each variety of grass 
is annually sowing almost countless seeds; and thus, as it may be said, is striving its 
utmost to increase its numbers. Consequently, I cannot doubt that in the course of 
many thousands of generations, the most distinct varieties of any one species of 
grass would always have the best chance of succeeding and of increasing in numbers, 
and thus of supplanting the less distinct varieties; and varieties, when rendered very 
distinct from each other, take the rank of species.  
The truth of the principle, that the greatest amount of life can be supported by great 
diversification of structure, is seen under many natural circumstances.“ (Darwin 
1860: 113-4) 
The explanatory effect in such examples ultimately stems from the same type of story as in the 
prototypical examples above: single Organisms benefit from a Useful Variation, are preserved by 
Natural Selection, survive and reproduce. In the medium and long run they will leave more progeny 
and form new Species. The opposite case of Death, Decrease of Frequency and Extinction is but the 
negative of Darwin’s story. – After this look at his prototypical stories, let me analyze Darwin’s 
general narrative. 
i. Scene: The struggle for life 
Evolution takes place within the Scene in which all of Darwin’s stories begin: the Struggle for Life – or 
Struggle for Existence. In his autobiography, Darwin has emphasized how much the concept of 
Struggle meant for the development of his theory: 
"In October 1838, that is, fifteen months after I had begun my systematic inquiry, I 
happened to read for amusement ‘Malthus on Population’, and being well prepared 
to appreciate the struggle for existence which everywhere goes on from long-
continued observation of the habits of animals and plants, it at once struck me that 
under these circumstances favourable variations would tend to be preserved, and 
unfavourable ones to be destroyed. The results of this would be the formation of a 
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new species. Here, then I had at last got a theory by which to work". (Darwin 1958c: 
120) 
And, indeed, the Struggle is the key to Darwin’s narrative which unfolds in the midst of an archaic 
competition for survival and reproduction – so archaic that Darwin “had initially … used the 
Hobbesian phrase ‘war of nature' and had quoted Hobbes directly.” (Beer 2009: 52-3)404 
Darwin himself emphasized that he employed the term ‘struggle’ in a “large and metaphorical sense” 
(Darwin 1860: 62) covering the struggle between individual organisms for resources, for survival, and 
for leaving progeny, as well as the relation between predator and prey. In the end, the very ferocity 
of this struggle explains why Natural Selection and Sexual Selection are necessary, why only some 
organisms are preserved and most are eliminated: resources and mating partners are scarce. Darwin 
thereby transcended Malthus’405 original notion by far406, providing a vivid and graphic impression of 
the arena in which Evolution was to take place. 
Moreover, employed in Darwin’s large sense, the term allowed for application in a wide array of 
different stories; it made Darwin’s Scene remarkably versatile. Hence, Darwin had succeeded in 
constructing a powerful and versatile Scene for his narrative, prone to be applied in numerous single 
explanations of evolutionary facts. 
ii. Agent: Nature, God, the organisms? 
The text of the Origin suggests several candidates for the Agent. The first and for modern readers 
most obvious is certainly Nature407. Throughout the book, Darwin personifies Nature408 and describes 
her as an Agent: 
                                                            
404  (Beer 2009: 52-3) interprets Darwin’s change of words as “an attempt to move away from the human into 
a word which lacked the organised force of war and expressed instead the interpenetration of energies.” 
405  Darwin clearly borrows the idea of a geometrical increase from Malthus and felt inspired by Malthus for his 
idea of a struggle. Yet, as Peter J. Bowler (1976) points out, Darwin’s concept of struggle differs very much 
from Malthus’. While Malthus described a struggle of groups for scarce resources, Darwin spoke of a 
struggle between individuals, which can be fiercest among individuals of the same species. (Bowler 1976: 
643; Darwin 1860: 63) Thus, Darwin clearly extends the denotative meaning of Malthus’ concept while 
preserving its connotative meaning, a category shift or metábasis. (cf. Radick 2003) 
Young discusses whether Darwin’s concept of struggle stems from the laissez-faire economists (cf. Gale 
1972) but denies this idea for “Where the modern observer sees cutthroat struggle and exploitation, the 
laissez-faire school saw a natural harmony between the different sections of the economy, with 
competition between self-seeking individuals at each level leading to a balance in which all would benefit.” 
(Young 1985: 643) He wonders, however, whether Darwin’s image of struggle might reflect the actual 
experience of economic reality as the namely cutthroat struggle. An indicator for this might be the 
frequency in which Darwin speaks of ‘competition’ and ‘compete’ in chapter three on the Struggle for 
Existence (8 times) and in chapter four on Natural Selection (15 times). (Hull 2005) dismisses Young’s 
suggestion – I hold the position that the metaphor of a struggle in nature is a basal mental model of 
biology, which can be found throughout the history of biology. (See sections 2.3 x, 5.1 vi) Therefore it 
makes no sense to identify one single source from which Darwin might have taken it. 
406  Neither the development of Malthus’ struggle nor the large field of application hindered the popularization 
of Darwin’s metaphor. Instead, in 1868, ‘struggle for life’ had already reached the “phraseology of 
everyday conversation". (Ellegård 1958: 43) Moreover, its impact was to be felt for decades to come, be it 
in Marx’s ‘Struggle of the Classes’ or in the Social Darwinist construction of human society. 
407  Gillian Beer highlights that the “Darwinian theory takes up elements from older orders and particularly 
from recurrent mythic themes such as transformation and metamorphosis. It retains the idea of natura 
naturans, or the Great Mother, in its figuring of Nature”. (Beer 2009: 7) 
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“… but Natural Selection … is a power incessantly ready for action, and it is 
immeasurably superior to man’s feeble efforts, as the works of Nature are to those of 
Art.”( Darwin 1860: 61-2) 
“Man selects only for his own good; Nature only for that of the being which she 
tends. Every selected character is fully exercised by her; and the being is placed 
under well-suited conditions of life.” (Darwin 1860: 84) 
 “…we must suppose that there is a power always intently watching each slight 
accidental alteration in the transparent layers; and carefully selecting each 
alteration…” (Darwin 1860: 189) 
"…natural selection will pick out with unerring skill each improvement…” (Darwin 
1860: 189) 
“Why should not Nature have taken a leap from structure to structure?” (Darwin 
1860: 194) 
Darwin’s personifications went so far that Wallace complained to Darwin about them in a letter. 
(Young 1985: 100) Consequently, in later editions, Darwin tried to explicitly delimit the metaphorical 
(connotative) implications of his metaphor. Already in the third edition of the Origin, in April 1861, he 
stated very clearly: 
"It has been said that I speak of natural selection as an active power or Deity; but 
who objects to an author speaking of the attraction of gravity as ruling the 
movements of the planets? Every one knows what is meant and is implied by such 
metaphorical expressions; and they are almost necessary for brevity. So again it is 
difficult to avoid personifying the word Nature; but I mean by Nature, only the 
aggregate action and product of many natural laws, and by laws the sequence of 
events as ascertained by us.” (Darwin 1861: 85, cf. Beer 2009: 62-4; Beer 2008: 
xxii)409 
Such explicit denial, however, could not prevent that any reader who looked for an explanatory 
narrative in the Origin, would first stumble upon Darwin’s Nature. 
The second possible Agent behind Evolution is God. Darwin mentions God only a few times in the 
Origin, much less than Chambers or Owen.410 These references, however, are placed prominently in 
the final chapter of the Origin. There, Darwin portrays God as having ignited the process that Darwin 
had modeled as evolution through natural selection: 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
408  Such, Darwin frequently writes nature with a capital ‘n’. (Darwin 1860: 61, 62, 66, 82, 83, 84, 126, 194, 225, 
269, 293, 388) Moreover, as Gillian Beer emphasizes: “His grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, had already noted 
the speed and ease with which personification takes place in English. Since English is an ungendered 
language one need only add a ‘his’ or ‘hers’ to turn a word into personification. With personification enters 
intention.” (Beer 2009: 62-3) For other discussions of this point, see Young 1985: 93; Mayr 1990a: 58; Ruse 
1971: 329-30; Beer 2009: xviii) 
409  It is revealing that Darwin compares Natural Selection to Gravity for these two Begriffe are the central 
conditional predicates in Darwin’s and Newton’s theory respectively; they fulfill the same logical role in the 
two theories and Darwin attempts to ascribe them the same role in the narrative as well. 
410  I count eight references in the body of the text. Of these eight, five address creationist (design) arguments 
and only three express Darwin’s own position. 
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“Therefore I should infer from analogy that probably all the organic beings which 
have ever lived on this earth have descended from some one primordial form, into 
which life was first breathed by the Creator.” Darwin 1860: 484) 
“Authors of the highest eminence seem to be fully satisfied with the view that each 
species has been independently created. To my mind it accords better with what we 
know of the laws impressed on matter by the Creator that the production and 
extinction of the past and present inhabitants of the world should have been due to 
secondary causes, like those determining the birth and death of the individual.” 
(Darwin 1860: 489) 
“There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally 
breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has 
gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning 
endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, 
evolved.“ (Darwin 1860: 490) 
The image of God which Darwin conveyed in the Origin was thus clearly deist; it significantly 
reduced411 his role in nature and let Nature fill “the space left by God” (Beer 2009: 64). In Victorian 
philosophy of science, however, this did not imply that God did not influence Nature; Nature could 
be understood as a secondary cause which was itself an agent of God, the First Cause. (See 
section2.3 xi) In any case, God clearly maintains a role in his tale of evolution; he is the Agent who 
created the first living beings and the laws by which evolution now proceeds.412 
Third, Darwin might have constructed the organisms undergoing Evolution as Agents. Lamarck had 
experienced important criticism and ridicule for passages which allowed for such a reading and 
Darwin had no interest in being associated with them. (Young 1985: 96; Ruse 1971: 331; Beer 2009: 
62; Hull 1973: 10) However, a couple of passages in the Origin do suggest that the organisms act, 
albeit in a different sense than in Lamarck’s Philosophie Zoologique:  
“The rock-thrush of Guiana, birds of Paradise, and some others, congregate; and 
successive males display their gorgeous plumage and perform strange antics before 
the females, which, standing by as spectators, at last choose the most attractive 
partner.” (Darwin 1860: 89) 
“…I can see no good reason to doubt that female birds, by selecting, during 
thousands of generations, the most melodious or beautiful males, according to their 
standard of beauty, might produce a marked effect.” (Darwin 1860: 89) 
“Yet, I would not wish to attribute all such sexual differences to this agency: for we 
see peculiarities arising and becoming attached to the male sex in our domestic 
animals (as the wattle in male carriers, horn-like protuberances in the cocks of 
certain fowls, &c.), which we cannot believe to be either useful to the males in battle, 
or attractive to the females.” (Darwin 1860: 90) 
                                                            
411  His position is further affirmed by his dismissal of creationist arguments throughout the book, e.g. in 
(Darwin 1860: 44, 55, 133, 159, 185, 203, 315, 355-6, 372, 389-96, 406, 420, 433, 434, 436, 456, 469-489) 
412  This does not imply that Darwin himself held elaborated religious beliefs. Rather, in a letter to his friend 
the botanist John Dalton Hooker Darwin regretted “having used expressions in the Origin which seemed to 
imply that he regarded the origin of life as supernatural.” (Ellegård 1958: 134). 
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These passages are less striking than Darwin’s speaking of a “second agency” in the joint paper. 
(Darwin 1858a [1844]: 50) However, they allow for identifying a third possible Agent in the Origin: 
the organisms themselves. 
iii. Agency: selection, the creation of life, variation? 
The Agency of two of Darwin’s possible Agents is selection: female organisms select males for 
breeding and nature selects favourable variations or organisms which encounter favourable 
ecological changes. Sexual Selection, the Agency of the organisms, is clearly inferior to Natural 
Selection413 in that it acts but on superficial features. Like Man, it “can act only on external and visible 
characters” (Darwin 1860: 84); females may select414 beautiful plumages or coats, melodious singing 
or the charming tail of a peacock (cf. Darwin 1860: 88-9) but no deeper, inherent features. 
Conversely, Natural Selection acts on internal features and can achieve much more profound 
changes in organisms: 
“As man can produce and certainly has produced a great result by his methodical and 
unconscious means of selection, what may not Nature effect? Man can act only on 
external and visible characters: Nature cares nothing for appearances [sic!], except in 
so far as they may be useful to any being. She can act on every internal organ [sic!], 
on every shade of constitutional difference [sic!]. On the whole machinery of life 
[sic!]. Man selects only for his own good; Nature only for that of the being which she 
tends.” (Darwin 1860: 84) 
“In the preservation of favoured individuals and races, during the constantly-
recurrent Struggle for Existence, we see the most powerful and ever-acting means of 
selection.“ (Darwin 1860: 467) 
Natural Selection is the core of Darwin’s narrative and, together with the Struggle, his most powerful 
metaphor. It suggests the principal Agent of the narrative: Nature, and, through Darwin’s explicit 
comparison to artificial selection415, it conveys a graphic image of the Agency by which Evolution is 
achieved. Thus,  
„… it claimed an explanatory role before contemporaries had learnt what it meant. 
They puzzled, as people have puzzled since, over its individual elements: natural as 
                                                            
413  From the fifth edition on, Darwin employed the term ‘Survival of the Fittest’ which does not evoke an 
Agent as much as ‘natural selection’. See (Darwin 1869: 72 (reference to Spencer), 92, 95, 103, 105, 125, 
145, 149, 160, 168, 226, 239, 421, 556) and (Darwin 1872a: 49, 63, 65, 70, 72, 85, 98, 103, 108, 146, 156, 
169, 315, 412). 
414  Remember that Darwin’s dynamic model comprises different Connectors: Natural Selection, Preservation, 
Elimination and Drift. However, most of Darwin’s case studies and examples concentrate on only one of 
them: Preservation. Cases of Drift are completely ignored by Darwin in his stories, presumably because 
Drift yields no sustainable Output. Elimination yields stories, but somewhat limited ones for Injurious 
Variation of individual organisms will quickly lead to death without reproduction and provide little material 
for extensive explanation. Therefore, Darwin’s stories are built around Preservation and Elimination figures 
but as the negative of Preservation. – Ruse emphasizes that Darwin replaced ‘Elimination’ by ‘destruction’ 
in the later editions – an expression which does immediately evokes an agent. (Ruse 1971: 331) 
415  To support this comparison, Darwin called gardeners, pigeon-fanciers and stock-breeders to witness for the 
power of artificial selection for they “can all refine chosen characteristics within a few short generations 
from among the animals or plants under their control.” (Beer 2008: xix) 
Sebastian Zacharias: The Darwinian Revolution as a knowledge reorganization 
 
188 
opposed to unnatural, or manmade? selected by whom or what? Part of Darwin’s 
triumph is that the phrase, in the event, quite rapidly passed from his unruly 
question-raising, context-rich status into technical description. It came to seem 
honed, even simple.” (Beer 2009: xviii) 
“Certainly, there is something extra, above and beyond the technical, in [Darwin’s] 
insistence on the naturalness of natural selection. Nature authorizes and is internal 
at once. Whereas artificial selection implies an outside agency, natural selection 
brings agency inside production.” (Beer 2008: xxii) 
Compared to Nature and the female organisms, God’s means are less immediate, albeit profound in 
their impact. In Darwin’s narrative, he created the first organisms and set the laws according to 
which evolution proceeds. Hence, once life had begun on earth, he does not interfere directly. 
However, if one considers Nature as a secondary cause, i.e. as an agent of God, then Nature merely 
carries out divine law and it is God who acts through its selection. 
iv. Act and Purpose: improving species for better adaption 
As Gillian Beer emphasized, evolutionary change, 
“is an invisible process, registered only in retrospect. It can therefore be expressed 
intellectually only as narrative; it has meaning primarily in terms of its own past.” 
(Beer 2009: 99) 
To make visible the results of this invisible process, the Act of his narrative, Darwin could only 
point416 to the paleontological and biogeographic record or to the variety of artificial races417 and 
suggest that the most likely explanation for either was the evolution of earlier forms and their 
supplanting their ancestors. In his narrative, he garnished this interpretation in a teleological 
metaphor of gradual and steady improvement. Throughout the text he speaks of the evolved 
descendants as being “improved” or of natural selection as improving them. (e.g. Darwin 1860: 83, 
84, 86, 102-110, 119-128, 172, 177-81, 189, 215, 279-281, 302, 314) With another nuance, Darwin 
spoke of Natural Selection as “better adapting” organisms to their environment. (e.g. Darwin 1860: 
81, 82, 104, 144, 406, 468), thus gradually filling ecological niches with the “fittest” organisms: 
“…there will always be a fair field for natural selection to improve still further the 
inhabitants, and thus produce new species.” (Darwin 1860: 108) 
“…if any one species does not become modified and improved in a corresponding 
degree with its competitors, it will soon be exterminated. […]   
within a confined area, with some place in its polity not so perfectly occupied as 
might be, natural selection will always tend to preserve all the individuals varying in 
the right direction, though in different degrees, so as better to fill up the unoccupied 
place.” (Darwin 1860: 102) 
                                                            
416  Gillian Beer highlights that Darwin begins the first Chapter on Variation with the words “When we look” 
(Darwin 1860: 7, 15, 74, 473, 486), inviting his readers to share the moment of observation. (Beer 2009: 59)  
417  In a subsection on pigeons, Darwin gave an particularly impressive account of the breeds raised in a 
London Pigeon Club. (Darwin 1860: 21-2) 
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Hence, in his narrative, Darwin gave “some considerable emphasis to the language of progress and 
improvement, generating an onward and upward motion” (Beer 2009: xix) and this motion provides 
the Purpose for the Origin’s narrative. Therefore, in Darwin’s narrative, evolution is no accidental 
development but a directed, teleological, process towards the “the betterment of the individual and 
its species” (Beer 2008: xix). New species produced by Nature are 
„…far ‚truer‘ in character than man’s productions; [… they are] infinitely better 
adapted to the most complex conditions of life, and … plainly bear the stamp of 
higher workmanship”. (Darwin 1860: 84, cf. 108) 
v. Synthesis 
In sum, Darwin provides a compelling narrative which is centered around two strong metaphors: 
Natural Selection and the Struggle for Life. His principal Agent is Nature, but God and, to a lesser 
degree, female organisms figure as well. The first and third act through selection, God acts through 
his initial creation of the first organisms as well as through the laws of evolution. The Purpose of 
evolution is the betterment of species and it achieves a gradual but continuous improvement in 
organisms and their better adaption to the conditions of life and, thus, an improved chance of 
survival and reproduction.418 
3.4.5 Implications: What did Darwin’s explanation imply about the world? 
Darwin is very much aware of the ontological implication of his narrative, how it relates to the world-
views of his contemporaries. He chooses, however, not to discuss these possible ontological 
consequences in length and merely hints at them on the last pages of the Origin. There, Darwin 
addresses the origins of Life and God’s role in it, clearly championing a deist image of the world: 
“It is interesting to contemplate an entangled bank, clothed with many plants of 
many kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and 
with worms crawling through the damp earth, and to reflect that these elaborately 
                                                            
418  While not tautological (Ruse 1971), one can argue that Darwin’s narrative is circular: “The 'survival of the 
fittest' seems at first sight one of the few single-direction stories in evolutionary thought - but its 
tautological structure makes of it a satire on organicism. It is (with a vengeance) as Coleridge said narrative 
should be a serpent with its tail in its mouth. The survival of the fittest means simply the survival of those 
most fitted to survive; this implies not distinction, nor fullest development, but aptness to the current 
demands of their environment – and these demands may be for deviousness, blueness, aggression, 
passivity, long arms, or some other random quality. So chance reenters the potentially deterministic 
organization of evolutionary narrative.“ (Beer 2009: 109; cf. Young 1985: 98) 
 Logically, this circularity can be identified in the two adjectives Darwin employs to characterize Variations 
and Environmental Changes: injurious & favourable. (He does not introduce a term for irrelevant ones.) 
Darwin provides no empirical criterion by which to distinguish both independently from the Output to 
which they lead. Therefore, one cannot determine a priori which Variation is favourable and which is 
injurious. Any variation which fails to reproduce is termed ‘injurious’ – even if a second organism with a 
similar variation could reproduce and lead to a new variety.  
Similar arguments can be made for the metaphorical ‘chance’ of surviving or dying as a supposedly 
statistical statement (Ruse 1971: 328-9): We do not know which organisms had a better chance until they 
have survived. as well as for Spencer’s Survival of the Fittest which Darwin employed from 1869 on: “’The 
‘survival of the fittest’ implies, tautologically, that those who survive are the ‘fit’, the ‘superior’ examples. 
Having survived proves them fit to survive; that other signification of ’fitness’ as ‘aptness’, also crucial to 
Darwin’s argument, is lost.” (Beer 2008: xix) 
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constructed forms, so different from each other, and dependent on each other in so 
complex a manner, have all been produced by laws acting [sic!] around us. These 
laws, taken in the largest sense, being Growth with Reproduction; Inheritance which 
is almost implied by reproduction; Variability from the indirect and direct action of 
the external conditions of life, and from use and disuse; a Ratio of Increase so high as 
to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a consequence to Natural Selection, entailing 
Divergence of Character and the Extinction of less-improved forms. Thus, from the 
war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable 
of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows. There is 
grandeur in this view of life [sic!], with its several powers, having been originally 
breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has 
gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity [sic!]419, from so simple a 
beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are 
being, evolved.” (Darwin 1860: 490) 
With respect to Man’s position in this world, Darwin is even more cautious, merely alluding to the 
possibility that Man may be of lowly descent in both his physical and mental features: 
„Analogy would lead me one step further, namely, to the belief that all animals and 
plants have descended from some one prototype. But analogy may be a deceitful 
guide. Nevertheless all living things have much in common, in their chemical 
composition, their germinal vesicles, their cellular structure, and their laws of growth 
and reproduction. […] Therefore I should infer from analogy that probably all the 
organic, beings which have ever lived on this earth have descended from some one 
primordial form, into which life was first breathed by the Creator.“ (Darwin 1860: 
490) 
“In the distant future I see open fields for far more important researches. Psychology 
will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental 
power and capacity by gradation. Light will be thrown [sic!] on the origin of man and 
his history.” (Darwin 1860: 488-9) 
Still, coming from a well-respected scientist, Darwin’s feeble allusions would provoke impressive 
repercussions in Victorian Britain. 
  
                                                            
419  Apparently, Darwin here compares the laws of evolution to those of gravitation, Newton’s theory. 
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3.5 Synthesis: Common points & differences of the theories from Lamarck to 
Darwin 
Let me synthesize the comparative analysis within the framework of my four-level model, thus 
highlighting differences and common features in specific elements of the respective theories. 
Furthermore, to account for those elements of the British debate which recapitulated the earlier 
French debate, I will also compare them to the works of Lamarck and Geoffroy – albeit in limited 
depth.420 
My synthesis spans a period of 60 years approximately. In France, Lamarck published his Philosophie 
Zoologique in 1809, Cuvier denied evolution until his death in 1832, Geoffroy expressed his late 
evolutionary ideas in his 1835 Etudes progressives d'un naturaliste. In Britain, Chambers published in 
1844 and 1845, Wallace in 1855 and 1858 and Darwin in 1859. Owen’s early works on evolution 
appeared in 1848 and 1849, the latest work here considered in 1868, at the end of the Darwinian 
revolution. Thus, the first evolutionary theories in Britain trailed the continent by at least 35 years 
and Geoffroy, the latest of the Parisian theoreticians, still by ten years.  
Darwin had begun his transmutation notebook in 1837, still two years after Geoffroy but Darwin had 
not read Geoffroy’s late works, missing out on the evolutionary part.421 Darwin’s early sketch and 
essay stem from 1842 and 1844, shortly before the publication of Chambers’ Vestiges. When Darwin 
finally published the Origin of Species in 1859, 24 years had passed since Geoffroy’s Etudes. Thus, 
historically speaking, Geoffroy sits right between Lamarck and Owen; he published 26 years after 
Lamarck and 24 before Darwin. 
During this period, empirical biology displayed unprecedented dynamics, exploiting new knowledge 
sources in paleontology and biogeography but also in morphology and comparative anatomy. Thus, 
although Darwin still doubted the empirical fundament of his theory, he knew immensely more than 
Geoffroy, not to speak of Lamarck. This advance in sheer knowledge accounts for much of the 
theoretical advances – but not for all. Let me specify along the lines of my model. 
3.5.1 Level 1: Description 
In my historical introduction to 19th biology, I identified three types of regularities in empirical 
biological knowledge: regularities on and between organisms, regularities in space and regularities in 
time. Table 12 specifies which sub-disciplines produced these regularities. 
 
                                                            
420  As I did not dispose of the resources to carry out the same in-detail analysis of the French theories as of the 
English theories, this comparison will remain limited in depth and representativeness. Still, it should reveal 
some major aspects of the English theories which can already be found in the works of the French 
theoretical biologists, particularly Lamarck and Geoffroy.  
421  Geoffroy’s Etudes progressives appear in Darwin’s brown notebook on the list for books to read, but a full-
text key-word search produces no direct reference to the book in Darwin’s notebooks and manuscripts. 
(darwin-online.org.uk/manuscripts) This lack of reception may be due to Darwin’s relatively weak French. 
(Grinnell 1985) 
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Regularities on and 
between organisms 
Regularities in space Regularities in time 
Shared 
knowledge from 
Anatomy, Morphology, 
Osteology, Physiology, 
Histology 
Biogeography Ontogeny (incl. 
embryology), 
Paleontology 
Table 12: Biological sub-disciplines and empirical regularities around 1840 
What did Chambers, Owen, Wallace, and Darwin add to these regularities, respectively? For 
Chambers, the answer is very short. He presented neither a new type of regularities nor any new 
empirics at all. His 1845 Vestiges and its 1846 sequel Explanations contain some eclectic second-hand 
empirics, but no novel empirical regularities. 
Owen presented plentiful of new empirics. He provided anatomical analyses of many “firsts”, for 
instance the Archaeopteryx, the gorilla or the chimpanzee. Moreover, he did specify ontogeny422, 
particularly Geoffroy’s embryology, by analyzing series of embryological development. He did not 
restrain his analysis to single embryo specimen of a species but compared embryos in different 
stages of their development, in order to describe their ontogenic development and identify 
regularities of growth. Yet, Owen did not tap a completely new source of knowledge in the sense in 
which Buffon had integrated biogeography into biology or in which Cuvier had advanced 
paleontology. 
Wallace and Darwin, first, provided a major novel empirical fact from their field work. Both 
acknowledged that organisms varied not only in space and in time but independently of space and 
time and, thus, independently of environmental changes.423 In other words, organisms of the same 
taxonomic group differ in numerous features despite living at the same moment in the same place.424 
This empirical finding related to all three types of empirical regularities above: (i) Darwin and Wallace 
pointed out that, even within the smallest taxonomic groups, organism do still differ. Thus, 
regularities on and between organisms were always incomplete; taxonomic groups always but partial 
descriptions.425 Hence, Darwin and Wallace directed the interest of biologists on individuals and 
individual differences.426 (ii) Moreover, these individual differences could be traced in space and 
time. One could distinguish sub-groups427 and individual features and investigate which of those 
                                                            
422  Ontogeny describes the development of an organism within its life-span, i.e. from embryo to adult. 
423  In comparison to Owen and Chambers it is interesting how little attention Darwin and Wallace pay to 
anatomy or embryology in their descriptions, and how much they focus on individual differences instead of 
common features. Both trends resonate in their models, which focus on the environment as a driving force 
of evolution and put the Struggle at the center of their explanation. This different view point fits well with 
how much time both Darwin and Wallace spend in the field and how little in the dissecting room. 
424  I do not know whether they were the first to notice this, although I do not suppose it. Still, Wallace and 
Darwin were the first to integrate this observation in a prominent place of their respective models. 
425  I do not assume that Linnaeus or other important taxonomists perceived their taxonomic features as fully 
determining individual exemplars of a type. However, this point is and was regularly forgotten by 
philosophical minds. 
426  However, already in Lamarck’s theory, individuals had taken center stage: The transforming development 
occurs on individuals and “races” are formed by all those individuals which are on the same level of 
development. (See section 2.3 vii)  
427  In the Darwinian debate, the reference point was species such that the sub-groups would be sub-species or 
varieties. 
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disappeared, persisted or multiplied over time. Or, one could study which individual differences and 
which sub-groups were found in which areas.428 
Second, Darwin and Wallace pointed out the regularity they would summarize by the term ‘struggle 
for life’, namely that all organisms reproduced at a rate which would allow for exponential growth 
(Growth with Reproduction), yet, populations remained constant. This regularity, a priori, applied to 
all regularities in time and could be assumed as a background regularity.429 
What neither Darwin430 nor Wallace nor Owen succeeded in was identifying the regularities which 
governed inheritance. This feat would be achieved by the Austrian monk Gregor Mendel (1822-1884) 
and his re-discoverers, the botanists Hugo de Vries (1848-1935) of the Netherlands, Carl Correns 
(1864-1933) of Germany and the Erich Tschermak (1871-1962) of Austria.431 
3.5.2 Level 2: Classification 
While the late 18th and early 19th century was characterized by a spectacular widening of and an 
important increase in biological knowledge, it saw no radical revolution of established taxonomic 
classifications. The same is true for the mid-19th century and the Darwinian revolution. Classifications 
were enlarged and specified, minor aspects were modified; yet, their basic form remained constant 
throughout this highly dynamic period of biology. Thus, the important differences on this level are 
limited to two questions: (i) Which general principles and concepts are being introduced to organize 
the aggregations? (ii) With respect to which principles and concepts are aggregations being justified? 
Chambers, again, provided no novel aggregating scheme of organisms. Instead, he cited the idealized 
“quinary system” which suggested a harmonic order in nature and presented taxonomic orders in a 
scheme of regular branches. Thus, he associated himself with a tradition which had dominated much 
of the 18th century: the pursuit of an ideal and regular scala naturae.432 In 1840, however, it was 
already obvious to biologists that such schemes did not fit the taxonomic record; the regularities on 
and between organisms did not comply with any regular scheme.  
In Lamarck’s and Cuvier’s writings, one still finds references to a scale (or échelle), yet neither 
presents the natural orders in an idealized, i.e. a perfectly regular, scheme.433 Particularly Cuvier had 
dismissed any such suggestions as empirically inadequate, denying transgression between larger 
classes of animals, intermediate types or progression in the geological record.434 In the later works of 
                                                            
428  To give one example, foxes with larger ears are found in warmer climate, foxes with smaller ears in colder 
climate. 
429  Remember though that it was not tested together with evolutionary changes. 
430  Darwin addressed this point very explicitly; he emphasized that he could only speculate on inheritance. 
(See section 3.4.3) 
431  Mendel carried out his experiments mainly between 1856 and 1863 and published them from 1865 on, yet, 
his contemporaries did not draw the link from his work to the open slots in evolution theory. Only in 1900, 
de Vries, Correns and Tschermak independently carried out similar experiments as Mendel and 
rediscovered his work. In the modern synthesis of the 1930s and 1940s, genetics was then integrated with 
evolution theory. 
432  The fact that his scheme had branches may have been inspired by the works of Geoffroy and Lamarck. Yet, 
the latter did not present idealized schemes. 
433  For an explicit denial, see also (Lamarck 1873a [1809]: 27-8) 
434  Remember that, to Cuvier, there existed independent (unrelated) types in every geological period which 
had each been created independently. 
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Geoffroy435, references to a “scale” are rare and there is no propagation of a harmonic, ideal order in 
nature. Thus, the French discourse already pointed towards the irregular branching schemes which 
Darwin and Wallace would present in 1858. 
Owen temporarily reversed this trend. In his minute descriptive and classificatory work, Owen 
followed Cuvier and specified established classifications, hence accounting for the many observable 
differences between organisms. Consequently, he also emphasized the continuity throughout 
taxonomic groups. Owen established three kinds of homologies as classificatory categories and 
systematized classifications over large taxonomic groups, allowing for systematic large-scale 
comparisons and the systematic description of regularities between distant taxonomic classes. 
In the interpretation (static modeling) of taxonomic relations, Owen continued Geoffroy’s earlier 
pursuit of a ‘unity of type’ by novel means.436 The archetype as a general, somewhat loose concept 
allows for many more irregularities and deviations than Geoffroy’s initial concept. By thus allowing 
for deviations within the boundaries of basic archetypes Owen could cope with taxonomic 
irregularities for some more time. The problems of his static model would only be uncovered when 
the 1850s and 1860s produced more and more intermediate forms, forms which could be attributed 
to different archetypes; fossils like the Archaeopteryx (an intermediate of birds and reptiles) clearly 
did not fit comply with Owen’s model, unless one altered basic taxonomic groups.437 
Wallace and Darwin allowed for even more deviations than Owen and, on this point, were closer to 
Cuvier than to Geoffroy. In line with their empirical finding that organisms varied independently from 
space and time, they denied the importance of taxonomic classifications, degrading them to mere 
pragmatic tools. Both sketched the taxonomic order as resembling a branching tree. Yet, neither 
specified this point: Wallace, in his two short papers, merely evoked the metaphor. Darwin, in the 
Origin, did provide his famous drawing but did not specify how to map the known taxonomic groups 
onto such a tree; his drawing is entirely generic. 
Moreover, neither Darwin nor Wallace provided a static model which could compare to Owen’s 
archetype. One may argue that the concept of common descent is the equivalent of Owen’s 
archetype insofar as it explains how the branches and twigs relate to the trunk of the branching tree 
and to each other. Yet, the concept of common descent is explanatory only before the specific 
background of Darwin’s and Wallace’s dynamic model; it requires an additional layer of theory. 
Contrarily, Owen’s archetype was and could be directly embedded in the existing narrative of divine 
creation and required no further modeling to be explanatory. Thus, Owen’s and even Chambers’ 
static models are both, more specified and more sophisticated than those of Darwin and Wallace; the 
former authors put much more emphasis on static modeling than the latter.  
Figure 22 provides an overview over the development from the late 18th century to Darwin, 
presenting simplified figures of a scala naturae, Chambers’ branching scheme with “stirpes”, Owen’s 
irregular branching within the boundaries of the archetype and the irregular tree of Darwin and 
Wallace before the background of Owen’s framework. As can be seen, Chamber’s ideal branching 
                                                            
435  Geoffroy’s pursuit of a “unity of type” in the 1820s can be read as the pursuit of an idealizing static model. 
436  Remember that it was Owen’s ambition to provide a synthesis of Cuvier’s functionalism (conditions of 
existence) and Geoffroy structuralism (unity of type); the archetype can clearly be read as an attempt of 
specifying the notion of ‘type’. 
437  Particularly problematic were old intermediate forms for in Owen’s scheme older forms should be closer to 
their own type, not to a neighboring one. 
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scheme already goes far beyond the idea of a scala naturae but remains idealizing in its regularity. 
Owen gives up the idea of harmonic classifications but upholds some idealism in the vertical lines 
which separate his archetypes. These are transgressed by the tree which depicts the static model of 
taxonomic relations of Darwin and Wallace. 
In sum, the development from the Aristotle-inspired concept of an ideal scala naturae to the 
irregular tree of Wallace and Darwin seems like one of continued disillusionment and pragmatization. 
The more empirical knowledge biology acquired, the less the image of a harmonic and orderly 
scheme could be upheld. Lamarck had already given up such ambitions, Cuvier had flat-out denied 
their legitimacy. Chambers clung to an idealized scheme which, at the time of its publication, had no 
more empirical basis. Geoffroy in his in unity of type and Owen in his archetype postulated some 
partial continuity but did not attempt or – in Geoffroy’s case – succeed in developing this continuity 
into a sophisticated static model. Owen’s work may be understood as a late attempt to salvage some 
elements of the broken scala naturae. Thus, his appears as the last attempt to make sense of the 
geological and biogeographical record based on a static model alone (embedded in a divine 
narrative). 
Wallace and Darwin had no more such ambitions; they suggested a pragmatic scheme by which 
taxonomic relations could be represented. Furthermore, by highlighting how much arbitrary choices 
were involved in classificatory work, they called into question the very ambition of identifying a 
scheme of harmonic organizing principles in nature. Conversely, their interpretation of taxonomic 
relations as resembling a tree does not hold up to Owen’s archetype in either technical sophistication 
or interpretative prowess. Rather, it depends on their dynamic model to bestow plausibility on this 
static model: the concept of common descent requires the dynamic model of Natural Selection in 
order to provide a compelling interpretation of the taxonomic record. Thus, Darwin and Wallace 
reallocated theoretical resources from the project of biological interpretation to dynamic modeling, 
the next level of my framework.438 
 
                                                            
438  Remember that this intricate link shows also in their ambiguous use of the term ‘variation’. To Darwin and 
Wallace, it denotes, first, an object, an organism which has diverged from its type: a variety. Second, it 
denotes the event in which such a variety occurs. Consciously or unconsciously, Wallace and Darwin 
identify both with another, thus blurring the distinction between the interpretation of analytic regularities 
on object features (level 2) and the explanation of synthetic regularities between object features or events 
(level 3). 
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Figure 22: Static models of taxonomic relations from the scala naturae to Darwin and Wallace439 
                                                            
439  The dots represent groups of fossils, individual fossils oliving forms on a timescale – except for the scala 
naturae. Recent organisms are found towards the top of the schemes; older ones towards to bottom. The 
lines in the Darwin-Wallace-tree represent genetic relations, the black dots intermediate forms (missing 
links) which were predicted by Darwin and did not comply with Owen’s model. The dotted lines in the 
tables represent the limits of Owen’s types as they were exceeded by the tree of Wallace and Darwin. The 
bold lines in the center of each column in Owen represent the types from which individual organisms or 
groups of organisms may diverge. – This is a standardized presentation which has been modified in order 
to allow for easier comparison. The number of species separated in a scala naturae is not representative of 
any actual scheme. Chambers does not specify how many lines and sub-lines (“stirpes”) he would 
distinguish; thus the representation is generic. The presentation from Owen is borrowed from his 
representation of the mammalian class (Darwin 1860: 407) but is not supposed to represent mammalian 
types. Darwin provides a generic figure in the Origin which I have simplified and modified in order to match 
the simplified representation of Owen. Note however, that Darwin did never identify intermediate types in 
the mammalian class. Wallace provides no drawing of his evolutionary “tree” or “capillary system”.  
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3.5.3 Level 3: Explanation – Dynamic Modeling 
For Cuvier, evolution did not occur. All others presented dynamic models of evolution or at least 
parts of such models. Figure 23, Figure 24 and Figure 25 display the models of Lamarck, Geoffroy, 
Chambers, Owen, Wallace and Darwin within my framework of dynamic models, distinguishing 
Situation Type, Object Class, Input, Connector and Output. Let me specify the important differences 
and common elements between these models in order to grasp how models of evolution changed 
between 1809 (Lamarck) and 1859 (Darwin). 
i. Object Class: species, varieties – and individuals? 
With respect to the Object Class, the major difference is whether the models applied to features of 
individual objects, notably individual variations. This is the case for Lamarck, Geoffroy, Wallace and 
Darwin but not for Chambers and Owen. Thus, in the models of Chambers and Owen, evolution could 
not be triggered by individual variations. 
ii. Situation Type: catastrophes vs. uniform change, spontaneous generation vs. struggle 
Except for Chambers, who wavered on the topic, all theoreticians supported uniform changes in 
geology and, with them, in biology. The commitment to the uniformitarianism of Lyell and Hutton 
implied the interpretation of geological strata as displaying continuous and gradual changes and it 
provided the time-scale for dynamic models of evolution: life evolved in equally gradual and small 
steps as the physical conditions of life. (See section 2.3 vi) 
 
Geological background: uniform or 
catastrophic? 
Biological background: Where does the 
supply for evolution come from? 
Lamarck 
(1809) 
Uniform changes Continued spontaneous generation 
Geoffroy 
(1835) 
Uniform changes Continued spontaneous generation 
Chambers 
1845/6) 
Uniform changes since the last 
catastrophe 
Continued spontaneous generation 
Owen 
(1848-68) 
Uniform changes Continued spontaneous generation 
Wallace 
(1855/58) 
Uniform changes Growth with Reproduction (overproduction) 
(as implied by the Struggle for Life) 
Darwin 
(1859) 
Uniform changes Growth with Reproduction (overproduction) 
(as implied by the Struggle for Life) 
Table 13: Geology and the supply for evolution in the explanations from Lamarck to Darwin 
A relevant difference existed with respect to the biological background of evolution: where did the 
organisms come from which evolved over time? Lamarck, Geoffroy, Chambers and Owen lend their 
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models plausibility by referring to spontaneous generation (nomogeny), claiming that new organisms 
were continuously created from dead matter and would then, successively and over many 
generations, evolve into higher forms.440 (See section 0) Darwin and Wallace, instead, denoted their 
Situation Type by the famous ‘Struggle for Life’441 which implied Growth with Reproduction 
(overproduction) as a source for evolutionary material. (see below) This constitutes an important 
difference in evolutionary narratives (see below) but also in modeling. The term ‘spontaneous 
generation’ denoted effects in experimental biology, for instance the appearance of bacteria on 
heated chicken broth. (See section 0) ‘Struggle for Life’, however, denoted a regularity of two 
observations in the field, namely the Growth with Reproduction (overproduction) and the overall 
constancy of populations. (See sections 3.3.3i; 3.4.3 ii)442 Table 13 provides an overview over the 
elements of the Situation Type. 
iii. Output: step-wise or continuous evolution, regular or irregular branching 
Everybody, Lamarck and Geoffroy, Chambers and Owen, Wallace and Darwin did put their 
classifications on a timeline and interpreted the geological (paleontological) record such that less 
complex organisms had been followed by more complex ones. All accepted extinction – except 
Lamarck (1809) who lacked the paleontological knowledge of it. 443 
However, even among those who integrated both the emergence of new species and extinctions in 
their Output, the understanding of their Output differed. Explanations differed with the different 
interpretations of the paleontological record. (See above) Moreover, Darwin was the only one to 
include polymorphic species in his model, describing an early form of genetic drift. 
iv. Input: more and more diverse triggers of evolution 
It was an established empirical regularity that organisms differed with climatic zones. Thus, it is not 
surprising to find climatic change in the Input of all six models. Owen goes a step further by including 
isolation or the end of isolation (for instance the immigration of enemies) as a second variant of 
ecological change. Wallace and Darwin add variations of neighboring organisms as a third variant, 
thus introducing complementing macro-ecological changes as climate and isolation by a micro-
                                                            
440  Remember that this debate had occupied biology since the 17th century. Pasteur carried out experiments 
to counter the claim as late as 1859. In the second half of the 19th century, after Pasteur’s experiments and 
the Darwinian revolution, the idea would lose most of its supporters and fade eventually. 
441  Owen spoke of ‘struggle’ and a ‘contest’ as well but did not specify what these terms denoted beyond the 
Input to his model, namely climate change and isolation. (See section 3.2.3 iii) Thus, I do not consider this a 
Situation Type. With respect to the Scene, these metaphors are discussed below. 
442  Remember, however, the logical role of the Situation Type with respect to the modeled empirical 
regularities (Input-Output-regularities): the Situation Types serves for denoting sets of Input-Output-
regularities but is not part of these regularities; it is not observed together with the underlying empirical 
regularities but independently. The electric field in Millikan’s example fulfills the same function (as the 
homo oeconomics in the Rational Choice explanation with respect to the Object Class). For a discussion of 
this point, see sections 2.1.3 and 6. 
443  One could argue that the inclusion or exclusion of the origin of life is another important difference, that, 
figuratively speaking, Wallace and Darwin explained only moves on their evolutionary tree, while the 
earlier theoreticians also debated discussed how the tree trunk formed. (cf. Perrier 2009 [1884]: 198) 
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ecological dimension. Furthermore, they introduced a fully novel Input for evolution: individual 
variations.444  
v. Connector: manifold choices 
 
Connector 
(Conditional 
predicate) 
Input-Output-Relations (Conditional statements) 
Input Op. Output 
Lamarck 
(1809) 
Use & disuse Ecological Change  Emergence of new species 
Geoffroy 
(1835) 
Modified 
respiration 
Ecological Change  Emergence of new species 
No modified 
respiration 
Ecological Change  Extinction of species 
Chambers 
1845/6) 
Development Ecological Change  Emergence of new species 
“Exhaustion of 
prolific energy” 
?  Extinction of species 
Owen 
(1848-68) 
“laws of 
development” 
?  Emergence of new species 
Disuse? Ecological Change   Extinction of species 
Wallace 
(1859) 
Preservation 
Favourable Individual Variation 
or favourable Ecological Change  Emergence of new species 
Perishing 
Injurious Individual Variation or 
injurious Ecological Change  Extinction of species 
Darwin 
(1859) 
Preservation 
Favourable Individual Variation 
or favourable Ecological Change  Emergence of new species 
Elimination 
Injurious Individual Variation or 
injurious Ecological Change  Extinction of species 
Table 14: Connectors and Input-Output-relations from Lamarck to Darwin 
Even when the same phenomena were modeled as Inputs to the model, they might have been 
related to different Outputs. Thus, for Geoffroy, Wallace and Darwin, ecological change triggers both 
the emergence of new species and their extinction, for Lamarck and Chambers only the emergence. 
For Owen, ecological change could only lead to the extinction of species, not to their emergence. 
Chambers provides no Input which would lead to extinctions, Owen none for the emergence of new 
species. Having introduced a novel Input with individual variations, Darwin and Wallace could also 
introduce it in a novel way in their models. They linked it to both extinctions and the emergence of 
new species. Moreover, Wallace & Darwin do not distinguish the Input by types of Input, e.g. 
ecological change versus individual variations, but by a tautological classification, namely the 
                                                            
444  While one finds deep and thorough reflections on “laws of development” (Owen) or a “unity of type” 
(Geoffroy) with previous biologists, none of them developed these insights into a trigger of long-term 
large-scale change in classes of organisms, i.e. a trigger of evolution. 
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distinction of favourable and injurious ecological changes or variations. Table 14 provides an 
overview of the different Connectors employed in the models from Lamarck to Darwin. (Not all of 
these differences are visible in Figure 23, Figure 24 and Figure 25.) 
 
Figure 23: Lamarck's and Geoffroy's dynamic models 
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Figure 24: Chamber's and Owen's dynamic models 
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Figure 25: Wallace's and Darwin's dynamic models 
vi. Summary 
Overall, my comparative analysis reveals a general closeness of the dynamic models from Lamarck to 
Darwin; they appear as continuous steps in a development of models of evolution. The progress of 
empirical knowledge posed new challenges to modelers and ultimately led to increasingly complex 
models, i.e. models with more distinctions. This is best visible in the increasing specification of Input 
Sebastian Zacharias: The Darwinian Revolution as a knowledge reorganization 
203 
and Output in this series of models. (The figures on the following pages visualize this successive 
increase in complexity.) 
Within this series, three innovations catch my eye: First, Geoffroy was the first to include extinctions 
in his model. Second, by taking focusing on individual variations, Wallace and Darwin significantly 
increased the Input of models of evolution. Third, they broke with the tradition of spontaneous 
generation-speculation and introduced a new and empirically observable back-ground observation as 
their Situation Type: Growth with Reproduction (overproduction) and the overall constancy of 
species, i.e. the Struggle for Life. 
3.5.4 Level 3: Explanation – Narration 
As I have pointed out in my analysis and the historical introduction, not all authors specified a 
complete narrative of evolution, notably not Cuvier and Wallace. The former denied evolution and 
never attempted to explain it, although he clearly championed a traditional theist narrative about 
the origins of life which applied after each of his catastrophes (revolutions). The latter provided only 
elements of a narrative, notably a Scene, the struggle for life, and a possible Purpose, the betterment 
or improvement of species. Thus, in terms of narratives, I will only compare the works of Chambers, 
Owen and Darwin to those of Lamarck and Geoffroy.  
i. Agent, Purpose, Agency: Who acted how and what for? 
In all important narratives of 19th century biology, God took an important role. Thus, the question 
was not whether God was an Agent in these narratives but whether other Agents were introduced 
next to God and how much autonomy these Agents were granted in terms of Purpose and Agency.  
Chambers and Owen were the most traditional and less imaginative in this respect. On their 
accounts, there is only God, he pursues his will and acts through laws, i.e. secondary causes.445 Owen 
does not specify these causes.446 Chambers explicitly denied personification of nature. (Chambers 
1845 [1844]: ix) Owen employed such personifications a few times, but never developed Nature into 
an Agent next to God; in his later writings, he even denied its validity as an explanatory device. (cf. 
Owen 2007 [1849]: 68; Owen 1868: 371, 794-795)  
Lamarck concurs with Owen in the latter point: Nature is no valid Agent.447 (Lamarck 1873b [1809]: 
349) Instead, he centers his Narrative on the organisms themselves. In reaction to environmental 
changes, organisms use certain organs more and less frequently. Such use and disuse ultimately 
                                                            
445  Remember that God was considered the First Cause and all other Agents as subordinate. 
446  As I did discuss it in the previous section, Owen introduces terms which might serve as Connectors but fails 
to specify the Input which such a Connector could transform into the Output. 
447  Lamarck explicitly states that the term ‘Nature’ denotes but observable objects and events : "La Nature, ce 
mot si souvent prononcé comme s'il s'agissait d'un être particulier, ne doit être à nos yeux que l’ensemble 
d’objets qui comprend : 1° tous les corps physiques qui existent; 2° les lois générales et particulières qui 
régissent les changements d'état et de situation que ces corps peuvent éprouver; 3° enfin, le mouvement 
diversement répandu parmi eux , perpétuellement entretenu ou renaissant dans sa source, infiniment 
varié dans ses produits et d'où résulte l'ordre admirable de choses que cet ensemble nous présente." 
(Lamarck 1873b [1809]: 349) 
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leads to evolutionary changes.448 As for God, he is (hardly ever mentioned in Philosophie Zoologique; 
one may surely read the environmental changes as divine actions and, thus, see God as a background 
agent, but no more than that. 
Both Geoffroy and Darwin, assign a major role to Nature in their narratives and mention it 
significantly more often than God.449 However, it is only Darwin who ascribes both a clear Purpose 
and a clear Agency to Nature: selection for the betterment of species. (QUELLE) Geoffroy, while 
frequently personifying Nature, seems not develop a coherent terminology of what Nature wants or 
does. Thus, I cannot identify a coherent Purpose in his texts. As Geoffroy considers environmental 
changes to trigger evolution, these can obviously be ascribed to the Agency of Nature. With Darwin, 
they may either be ascribed to Nature or God. 
Moreover, Darwin attributes a minor role to the organisms, namely the females. In sexual selection 
they select the “most vigorous, best adapted males” as mates. (Darwin 1860: 127) While this part of 
Darwin’s narrative is less prominent than the Natural Selection part, it is equivalent to Lamarck’s in 
that it ascribes agency to members of the Object Class, not to a third Agent. Remarkably, Darwin 
ascribes it to the females, not the males. 
Table 15 provides an overview over Agents, Purposes and Agencies in the different narratives. 
 
Agents by degree 
of direct impact 
Purpose  Agency 
Lamarck 
(1809) 
Organisms  Satisfaction of needs (“besoins”)  Use and disuse 
God God's Will Changes in environment 
Geoffroy 
(1835) 
Nature Not sufficiently specified Not sufficiently specified 
God God's Will Changes in environment 
Chambers 
1845/6) 
God God's Will Laws (secondary causes) 
Owen 
(1848-68) 
God God's Will Laws (secondary causes) 
Darwin 
(1859) 
Nature Betterment of species Selection 
God God’s Will Origin of Life 
 Female organisms Breed with best adapted male Sexual Selection 
Table 15: Agents, Purpose and Agency in the narratives from Lamarck to Darwin 
                                                            
448  Remember that this was Lamarck’s narrative: “Le produit des circonstances comme causes qui amènent de 
nouveaux besoins, celui des besoins, qui fait naître les actions, celui des actions répétées qui crée les 
habitudes et les penchants, les résultats de l'emploi augmenté ou diminué de tel ou tel organe, les moyens 
dont la nature se sert pour conserver et perfectionner tout ce qui a été acquis dans l'organisation, etc., 
sont des objets de la plus grande importance pour la philosophie rationnelle.” (Lamarck 1873a [1809]: 28) 
449  (Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire 1835) mentions Nature as an Agent throughout his text; just look for Nature with a 
capital N. God (Dieu, Seigneur) appears less often but in prominent places as conclusions or introductions. 
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ii. Act: What happened? 
With respect to the Act there exist three major differences between the narratives. First, Lamarck did 
not speak of extinctions; at the time of his writing extinctions were not an established scientific fact 
yet. All later authors include it in their narratives, though often in a less prominent place than is 
granted to the emergence of species. Thus, neither Owen nor Chambers integrate extinction in the 
narrative which explains evolution. Second, Owen and Chambers had the most openly teleological 
view of evolution. On both accounts evolution clearly is a mindful, prearranged process which is 
triggered by laws of development not by ecological change. For Lamarck, Geoffroy and Darwin 
evolution is triggered by ecological changes to which they ascribe no Purpose. 
Third, Owen and Chambers attributed both the origin of life and the origin of species to the same 
Agent and Agency: God produced both through laws. While both Geoffroy and Lamarck ascribed 
spontaneous generation to God, evolution (the origin of species) was attributed to another Agent. 
Darwin postulated not “lawful” spontaneous generation but a miraculous initial creation of life by 
God.450 The origin of species, however, he attributed to Nature and, partly, the organisms. Table 16 
displays these differences. 
 
Agent which produces Act Act 
Lamarck 
(1809) 
God Origin of Life 
Organisms Development of more complex forms 
Geoffroy 
(1835) 
God Origin of Life 
Not sufficiently specified Development of more complex forms or 
extinction 
Chambers 
1845/6) 
God 
Origin of Life, Development of higher 
organisms 
Owen 
(1848-68) 
God 
Origin of Life, Development of higher 
organisms or extinction 
Darwin 
(1859) 
God  Origin of Life 
Nature Improvement relative to competitors 
environment or extinction  
Table 16: Agent and Act in the narratives from Lamarck to Darwin 
                                                            
450  This is harshly criticized by Owen who complains that evolutionists postulated “primary life by miracle”. 
(Owen 1868: 814) Cosans concurs in his statement that Darwin “no more explains how and why life came 
to be than Owen explains how and why all life follows the laws of morphological form.” (Cosans 2009: 103) 
– On a side note, this decision resembles much the distinction which cosmologists draw between the Big 
Bang and the physical phenomena since. The beginning of the universe is considered a miracle but all 
subsequent phenomena are subject to physical modeling. 
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iii. Scene: Where did it happen? 
With respect to the Scene, Darwin’s narrative is definitely the most developed – to a degree where 
virtually outshines the differences in sophistication between the other narratives. Owen refers to a 
“struggle against surrounding agencies” but attributes it to extinction only, which is not the principal 
Act of his narrative. Beyond, his Scene is simply a well-ordered world in which God acts in 
omnipotence. For Chambers, this is true with respect to his entire narrative. With Lamarck and 
Geoffroy, the Scene appears little specified; it is neither entirely well-ordered nor a chaotic struggle. 
Table 17 presents these differences. 
 
Scene 
Lamarck (1809) Changing world to which organisms have to adapt in order to survive 
Geoffroy (1835) Changing world to which organisms have to adapt in order to survive 
Chambers 1845/6) Well-ordered changing world 
Owen (1848-68) Well-ordered changing world & Struggle against surrounding agencies  
Darwin (1859) Struggle for Life 
Table 17: Scene in the narratives from Lamarck to Darwin 
iv. Summary 
The comparison of the narratives reveals a number of interesting points. First, as I emphasized it in 
the introduction of my model, narratives around God are much less sophisticated than those in 
which God is not the central Agent. In them, the answers to the questions for Purpose, Scene and 
Agency are all more or less answered by reference to God: he is an omnipotent and omnipresent 
Agent who pursues his will. Such a narrative is a passe-partout, it can explain any event or any 
object’s features – such appears to be the explanatory power of the expression ‘god’. Consequently, 
Chambers and Owen, who employ this narrative, tell no novel or exciting stories about evolution. In 
Jerome Bruner’s words, their story is not driven by Trouble. (Bruner 2002: 34; cf. 2.1.4 iii) 
As soon as one opts for another agent than God, matters become more difficult and more 
interesting. A non-divine agent needs to possess the means (Agency) to produce the Act and he 
needs to display a Purpose which relates to the Act. Consequently, these narrative aspects are much 
more developed in the works of Lamarck and Darwin, to a lesser degree in Geoffroy’s. 
Lamarck does this very thoroughly with respect to the organisms, constructing them as humanoid 
beings with needs (besoins) and goals. While this is a complete and innovative narrative, it did not 
succeed in convincing the scientists or the public. (See section iii) Geoffroy and Darwin, on the other 
hand, both refer to Nature as an agent, a popular and old personification in which recognizes Gillian 
Beer recognizes “the idea of natura naturans, or the Great Mother”. (Beer 2009: 7) While Geoffroy 
does not develop this metaphor very far, Darwin provides a clear Purpose for Nature, the betterment 
of species, and – in the stroke of a genius – creates the analogy to the artificial selection of breeders. 
His Nature is not merely the Great Mother, it is the Great Breeder. Darwin’s second great narrative 
innovation is the struggle for life. It is the most developed of any Scene, a very graphic and intuitive 
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idea.451 It seems to that it also fills some of the void left by God because the Struggle explains why a 
selection of organisms is necessary.452 
Not coincidentally, the innovative narratives are found in the theories with developed dynamic 
models. Dynamic models describe regular, mechanistic processes in nature, no direct divine 
interventions. In order to connect to explanatory narratives, an autonomous Agent is required and 
with it, at least a compelling Purpose and an Agency which bestows plausibility on this Agent. The 
Agency is closely linked to the Connector of the dynamic model. If neither observed objects 
(Lamarck) nor God (Chambers, Owen) are Agents themselves, variations or environmental changes 
(the Input) cannot satisfy the Agency; only the Connector can. 
Lamarck fills both voids, the Connector and the Agency with the use and disuse of the organisms. 
Darwin, contrarily, opts twice for selection and attributes it to his Agent: Nature. Both succeed in 
explaining evolution by a full-fledged dynamic model and a complementary full-fledged narrative. 
With Geoffroy, however, the Connector in his model does not fit with the Agents he specified in his 
narrative. His Connector is a change in respiration, something he can attribute neither to Nature nor 
God.453 Thus, his narrative displays a glaring lack of Purpose and fails to tell a compelling story about 
evolution. 
3.5.5 Level 4: Ontological implications 
The narratives of Lamarck, Geoffroy, Chambers, Owen and Darwin conveyed different ontological 
implications. First, they portray God differently. Although moving beyond the theism of Cuvier or 
Paley, Owen and Chambers championed the most conservative views, portraying God as the sole and 
immediate Agent in nature – despite his acting through laws. Lamarck, Geoffroy and Darwin, in their 
mechanistic explanations, introduced supplementary Agents and shifted God more to the 
background. They opposed a rather distant God to the immediate version of Owen and Chambers. 
(See Table 18) 
Deistic world views Theistic world-view 
God in the background, acting 
through secondary Agents 
God as an immediate Agent, 
acting through laws 
God as an immediate Agent, 
continuously intervening 
Lamarck 
Geoffroy 
Darwin  
Owen 
Chambers 
Cuvier 
Paley 
Table 18: Distant God vs. intervening God from Lamarck to Darwin 
Second, Darwin and Lamarck threatened Man’s position in Nature for they did not set him apart from 
animals in absolute terms. Chambers and Owen acknowledged Man’s anatomical kinship to the 
higher apes but claimed a special position for him due to his mental and moral faculties. (Geoffroy 
                                                            
451  For a discussion of its origin, see section 5.1 vi. 
452  The Growth with Reproduction, secondary in Darwin’s narrative, can be seen as replacing the spontaneous 
generation, which is equally secondary in the narratives of Chambers, Lamarck and Geoffroy. 
453  One could certainly argue that God brought this change in respiration about but this a rather indirect way 
of telling a story and Geoffroy, as far as I see, does not develop this point. 
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seems not to clearly address these points.) Only Chambers and Owen stress a privileged relationship 
of Man to God. 
Third, the position of Man clearly touched the problem of slavery, or – more generally – the question 
how British gentleman related to “uncivilized” people and to their closest animal relatives, the apes. 
Is there a hierarchy of human races and/or a smooth transition to the higher apes? Darwin avoided 
these topics but both Owen and Chambers addressed them. 
Fourth, some of the narratives seemingly threatened established social orders by portraying nature 
as irregular and only loosely connected to God’s will. Elements of instability and purposelessness 
were strong in Lamarck’s, Geoffroy’s and Darwin’s narratives. Chambers and Owen attempt to 
portray nature as well-ordered and emphasize God’s role despite his acting through laws. 
Table 19 specifies Man’s position in nature and possible social and political implications. 
 
Man’s position in nature and towards 
God 
Elements of instability and lack of 
purpose (teleology) 
Lamarck (1809) Most complex part of nature, but no 
absolute top 
Irregular branching, God in the 
background 
Geoffroy (1835) Unknown / Not clearly specified Irregular branching, God in the 
background 
Chambers 1845/6) Anatomically a descendant of 
animals, but apart due to his mental 
and moral abilities & Special 
relationship to God 
God in the background 
Owen (1848-68) Anatomically a descendant of 
animals, but apart due to his mental 
and moral abilities & Special 
relationship to God 
God in the background 
Darwin (1859) Descendant of animals, no class of his 
own 
Irregular branching, God in the 
background 
Table 19: Man's position in nature, social and political implications from Lamarck to Darwin 
In sum, each of the analyzed theories had possible implications which were controversial in 19th 
century Britain. Therefore, in the 1840s, Lamarck and Geoffroy were condemned for their open 
deism. Chambers, in his anonymous Vestiges, broke the first layer of ice separating the British 
discourse from the continent and challenged firmly established theist views in the public and 
scientific discourse. Owen followed his trail in the late 1840s but retreated when he faced resistance 
and pressure from his Oxbridge friends. In the 1860s he would return to his cautious deist positions 
of the 1840s. Darwin, however, championed a narrative with implications like those discussed in 
France, Germany or elsewhere on the continent. Thus, Darwin went significantly beyond Chambers 
and Owen and, in retrospect, made the controversies of the 1840s look timid and provisional. 
However, Chambers and Owen clearly paved some of Darwin’s way, by overcoming Paley’s natural 
theology. 
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3.5.6 Synthesis 
In a synthesis of this synthesis, a most abstract view on my theory comparison, I find it interesting to 
see what aspects of my model are developed and which receive little attention. While all of these 
authors – Lamarck, Geoffroy, Chambers, Owen, Wallace and Darwin – provided theoretical accounts 
of evolution in 19th century biology, their manner of theorizing differs greatly. 
On level 1, differences are minimal. Only Chambers fails to explicitly link his theory to established and 
challenging empirical regularities, remaining on the theoretical surface instead. On level 2 the five 
scientific authors address taxonomic implications, Chambers hardly does. Owen and Chambers both 
present sophisticated static models (interpretations) of taxonomic relations and grant an important 
role in theories to these static models. Neither Lamarck and Geoffroy (in his later works) nor Wallace 
and Darwin follow this example. On level 3, the sophisticated dynamic models are found in the texts 
of Lamarck, Geoffroy, Wallace and Darwin, not with Owen and Chambers. Narratives are most 
developed in the works of Lamarck, Chambers, Owen and Darwin, much less in Geoffroy’s and hardly 
at all in Wallace’s. There is an important difference however, between Owen and Chambers on one 
hand versus Lamarck and Darwin on the other: To the former, explanation is the interpretation of a 
static model in a religious narrative, to the latter it is embedding a dynamic model in a stand-alone 
narrative, with only minor religious elements. The ontological implications of level 4 are explicitly 
addressed by Chambers, Darwin and Owen but not by Wallace. (For Lamarck and Geoffroy, my 
knowledge of the French context is too limited to assess this priority.) Figure 26 displays these 
different priorities in a simple scheme. A light shade signals a limited priority, a darker shade a high 
priority, a question mark my inability to assess it. 
 
Figure 26: Argumentative emphasis on different elements of the theories from Lamarck to Darwin 
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4 Reception analysis: The revolution which 
Darwin achieved with his British recipients 
4.1 Reception by the public 
4.1.1 To what depth did recipients receive the theory? 
The reception among the general public was very superficial; it consisted of short reviews and some 
polemic discussions in general journals and newspapers. Overall, the uneducated public or those 
lacking specific interest were hardly exposed to the intense discussion of Darwin’s theory. While the 
Origin  
“was indeed a big sale for a scientific book … it naturally did not reach the broad 
public … The book was indeed a sensation, but … a literary and scientific sensation, 
not a popular one.” (Ellegård 1958: 41; cf. Himmelfarb 1959: 209)  
Actually, if one speaks of successful scientific publications of the 19th century, the Origin can only be 
“categorized as being at the lower end of the extraordinarily successful best-seller group.” (Lightman 
2007: 34) Vestiges, for that matter, sold twice as many copies in the first ten years as the Origin 
fifteen years later.454 In most general publications, the debate was ignored or mentioned in passing 
only, for it seemed to be of little interest outside scientific or philosophical circles.455 (Ellegård 1958: 
41) 
The little reception which Darwin’s book received by the general public was due to its implications 
either for the common man’s religious convictions or for the biblical account of the descent of Man 
(Ellegård 1958: 27, 42; cf. Beer 2008: ix). Evolution, whatever it exactly implied, definitely 
contradicted a literal understanding of the bible: 
 
“Christian or heathen, most people, and above all the uneducated paid much more 
attention to the theory's contradiction of the plain statements of the Scriptures. The 
ordinary religious man hardly accepted the existence of any other religion than the 
revealed religion of the Bible. Abstruse philosophical arguments on final causes and 
supernatural interpositions meant little to him: the Bible meant the more.” (Ellegård 
1958: 155) 
With regard to the descent of Man, to “the uneducated majority the question was simply whether 
man was descended from Adam or from the apes: and most of them seem hardly to have believed 
that the second alternative could be seriously entertained.” (Ellegård 1958: 332) Thus, in the public 
theory was referred to as the ‘ape theory’ (Ellegård 1958: 43, 295) for it was only this possible 
                                                            
454  However, Darwin’s Origin would eventually bypass Vestiges. 
455   In later years, lending libraries provided copies of the Origin. (Ellegård 1958: 27) Besides, Darwin pressed 
his editor, Murray, to produce the later editions more cheaply, so a larger public could afford the book. 
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implication for their Weltanschauung which the general public cared for.456 Political or social 
implications of the theory were not discussed. (Beer 2008: ix; Ellegård 1958: 325) 
Interest and information were significantly higher among the educated classes. Some might have 
read the Origin and many “knew of the book through reviews and notices in the better-class 
periodicals” (Ellegård 1958: 42) like Charles Dickens’ literary All the Year Round, the Athenaeum, 
Chamber’s Journal, the Examiner, or MacMillan’s Magazine among others. Most of the authors were 
journalists, only a minority of these reviews was written by scientists. Such journalistic reviews, 
however, hardly penetrated the heart of Darwin’s theory457; instead, most of them focused on the 
ontological implication of Darwin’s theory, i.e. its most abstract level.  
Thus, the Examiner, All The Year Round and the Guardian all emphasized the controversial character 
of the Origin in the first couple of paragraphs of their reviews – even if they considered Darwin’s a 
respectable scientific theory: 
“This is a remarkable book, sure to make a mighty stir among philosophers, perhaps 
even among the theologians […] The doctrine [Darwin] adopts is, in fact, a revival of 
the old one of the transmutation of species; but he illustrates it with an amount of 
knowledge and ingenious appliances never before brought to its support. We are 
ourselves by no means convinced by his reasoning, nor do we think that it 
overthrows the existing theory of philosophers, founded on the evidences of 
geological discoveries, that the inorganic world, as we see it, is the result of a 
succession of creations and destructions. There will, however, we have no doubt, be 
many converts to Mr Darwin’s opinions, which for the perfect integrity with which 
they are stated are well entitled to the most respectful consideration.” (Anonymous 
[Crawford J.?] 1859: 772) 
“we have come upon more tolerant times, if a man can calmly support his heresy by 
reasons, the heresy will be listened to; and, in the end, will be either received or 
refuted, or simply neglected and forgotten. Mr. Darwin also enjoys the benefit of the 
bygone heresies of previous heretics; one heresy prepares the way for, and weakens 
the shock occasioned by, another. Astronomical and geological innovations render 
possible the acceptance of doctrines that would have made people’s hair stand on 
end three centuries ago.” (Anonymous 1860a: 293) 
“Is it too much to say that, in the good old times, opinions like these [Darwin’s] 
would have been strongly redolent of fagot and flame?” (Anonymous 1860a: 294) 
“There are forms of speculation so wild and improbable, or, at any rate, so alien to 
our ordinary habits of thought, that they can only obtain a fair consideration under 
the protection of some illustrious name. If an anonymous author [sic!], or one only 
known as an amateur in natural science, were to propound the startling theory, that 
                                                            
456  Ellegård reports that “Punch, a faithful mirror or ordinary middle-class culture, did not take up the matter 
of Darwinism until November 10, 1860, and then only in passing.” (Ellegård 1958: 42) However, in 1861, it 
“made the gorilla and its relationship to man one of the chief features” of the year, even giving an echo of 
the debate on the hippocampus minor. (Ellegård 1958: 43, 50) 
457   Popular papers by Asa Gray (Gray 1888b [1860]; Gray 1860a; Gray 1888c [1874]; Gray 1888d [1874]) 
display similar characteristics in the American debate. 
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all the various tribes of living creatures which people earth, air, and water with an 
infinite diversity of form and habit, are descended from some four or five 
progenitors, whose progeny have, by small successive degrees of difference in the 
lapse of ages, developed into the manifold divergence of the countless species now 
in existence, a busy man would be justified in turning from the unread volume with a 
smile of incredulity. But the case is widely different when this theory is put forward 
by Mr. Darwin, a man confessedly in the foremost ranks of natural philosophy, a 
Fellow of the Royal, Geological, and Linnæan Societies, honoured among his scientific 
peers …, and already favourably known to the outer world by his celebrated Journal 
of the Beagle. A new theory by such a man, however strange it may appear, deserves 
respectful attention…” (Anonymous [W.R. Church?] 1860: 134) 
Even Thomas Henry Huxley, in his favorable reviews, underlined the revolutionary potential of the 
Darwinian theory. In his review for the Times, he admitted that 
“… from time to time we are startled and perplexed by theories which have no 
parallel in the contracted moral world; for the generalizations of science sweep on in 
ever widening circles, and more aspiring flights, through a limitless creation. […]We 
must expect new conceptions of the nature and relations of its denizens, as science 
acquires the materials for fresh generalizations; nor have we occasion for alarm if a 
highly advanced knowledge, like that of the eminent Naturalist before us [Darwin], 
confronts us with an hypothesis as vast as it is novel.” (Huxley 1859a: 8) 
In Fraser’s Magazine, the mathematician William Hopkins lamented the “great extravagance” of 
Darwin’s theory. (Hopkins 1860: 741) 
In this dimension, the Origin was frequently linked to Chambers’ 1844 Vestiges of the Natural History 
of Creation. The Saturday Review, for instance, reminded his readers of how not many years earlier, 
Vestiges had “profoundly disturbed” the educated British by its tendency “to dispense with the 
agency of an intelligent Creator in the work of Creation”. (Anonymous 1859: 775) The writer claimed 
that 
“the conclusions announced by Mr. Darwin [in the Origin of Species] are such as, if 
established, would cause a complete revolution in the fundamental doctrines of 
natural history—and further, that although his theory is essentially distinct from the 
development theory of the Vestiges of Creation, it tends so far in the same direction 
as to trench upon the territory of established religious belief” (Anonymous 1859: 
775; cf. Jardine 1860: 280-1) 
Living Age characterized the Origin as endeavoring to establish, 
“though by a different theory and a somewhat different process of reasoning, the 
same conclusion which was arrived at by the French naturalist, Lamarck, and by the 
English author of the ‘Vestiges of Creation’; — namely, that all the species, genera, 
orders, and classes of animal and vegetable life are essentially of one blood and 
lineage, having been developed out of one another, without the intervention 
anywhere of any act of creative power; — developed by the slow but progressive 
accumulation, through what is practically an infinite lapse of ages, of differences and 
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variations which were at first, and for a long period of time, so slight as to be wholly 
imperceptible.” (Anonymous 1860b: 474) 
The public attention focused on three types of ontological implications which threatened three major 
elements of the Victorian world views, namely (i) Divine Providence, (ii) the Argument from Design 
and (iii) the position of Man. 
i. Ontological Implications: Divine Providence 
Arguably the most fundamental of these elements was the religious idea of Divine Providence, i.e. 
 
“the conviction that the world was placed under the watchful guidance of a higher 
power ... Without Divine supervision, one held, everything would disintegrate into 
chaos, for only chaos could result if the universe were left to the action of chance 
and blind, inexorable laws. Design and Purpose, the attributes of a Mind, were 
needed to create and sustain a Kosmos.” (Ellegård 1958: 102)  
Admittedly, one might interpret Darwin’s model such that God had established the law of Natural 
Selection. Yet, the text of the Origin did not present God458 as taking any direct action throughout the 
course of Evolution. (Hull 1973: 65; Ellegård 1958: 131) To many religious people this “made God 
appear too remote, His Providence too impersonal” and this was inacceptable to the educated 
Victorian public. (Ellegård 1958: 128; cf. Hull 1973: 56, 65; Argyll 1872 [1867]: 50-54) 
Thus, the Athenaeum regretted that Darwin had forwarded a theory which stood in such obvious 
conflict with established British theism: 
“Theologians will say – and they have a right to be heard – Why construct another 
elaborate theory to exclude Deity from renewed acts of creation? Why not at once 
admit that new species were introduced by the Creative Energy of the Omnipotent? 
Why not accept direct interference, rather than evolutions of law, and needlessly 
indirect or remote action?” (Anonymous [J.R. Leifchild?] 1859: 659-60)  
ii. Ontological Implications: The Argument from Design 
Similar reserves hold for the second religious conviction which Darwin’s model threatened to make 
obsolete: the argument from Design. In this argument, one inferred from the order and harmony of 
nature the existence of a benevolent God. It was argued that if the human mind was able to conceive 
the natural order and the laws of nature as purposeful then they bore witness to God’s purpose. 
(Ellegård 1958: 114-5, 125) Therefore, if proponents of Design were supposed to accept Evolution at 
all, they had to conceive it as a purposeful process. Thus, the educated public, were expecting some 
sort of predetermined evolution, merging the transmutation of species with a Divine plan. (Ellegård 
1958: 136, cf. 267-79) 
Darwin’s explanation of Evolution, however, threatened the alleged harmony and purposefulness of 
nature because it claimed that organisms were in a constant Struggle for Life in which only a fraction 
of them could survive long enough to reproduce. He called Variations accidental, hence, purposeless. 
                                                            
458  In the first and second edition God hardly appeared in the Origin. In later editions, however, Darwin raised 
his profile and assigned him an increasing role. 
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He refused to assign the organisms any active and conscious role in the process of Evolution (except 
for the females regarding sexual selection). His Connector, Natural Selection, was supposed to be a 
blind law, void of any purpose. Finally, the result of the processes, Evolution was not to be 
understood as an absolute improvement but a relative adaption to random living conditions. 
Such a narrative offended a substantial part of the Victorians, for instance the geologist Adam 
Sedgwick who, in his review in the Spectator, upheld his convictions against a perceived Darwinian 
relativism: 
“…I can see in all around me a design and purpose, and a mutual adaptation of parts 
which I can comprehend,– and which prove that there is exterior to, and above, the 
mere phenomena of Nature a great prescient and designing cause. Believing this, I 
have no difficulty in the repetition of new species during successive epochs in the 
history of the earth.” (Sedgwick 1973 [1860]: 161) 
Living Age strikes the same tone when, in a lengthy passage, it regretted how 
“Mr. Darwin openly and almost scornfully repudiates the whole doctrine of Final 
Causes. He finds no indication of design or purpose anywhere in the animate or 
organic world. Like Geoffroy St. Hilaire, he takes good care ‘not to attribute any 
intention to the Almighty.’ The nicest and most complex adaptations do not to him 
prove design. The eye was not made to see with, or the ear to hear. The fact that 
these organs respectively do see and hear is accounted for, on this theory, by 
supposing that, through an accidental and purposeless variation, some one zoöphyte 
or other animal very low down in the scale happened to be born with a faint 
glimmering of vision,— with the poor rudiment of an eye, — ‘an optic nerve merely 
coated with pigment, and without any other mechanism’; that this ‘slight accidental 
variation’ passed down by inheritance, giving to the possessors of it a great 
advantage over their fellows…   
Still further: the order and symmetry which prevail throughout animated nature; the 
correspondence of the organic with the inorganic world; the prevalence of a few 
general forms of structure amid a countless number of beings, like everywhere 
answering to like, and an exact balance of co‐operating agents being always 
preserved, — all the facts which have appeared to most minds so significant of unity 
of plan, and thereby declarative of the unity of the Creator, — all these seem to Mr. 
Darwin to be merely the inevitable and unforeseen results of the blind working of 
nature's laws.“ (Anonymous 1860b: 475-6)  
iii. Ontological Implications: The Position of Man 
The third big ontological topic was the application of Darwin’s model to Man. Particular interest was 
raised by the debates with obvious implications for the Victorian conception of Man. (Hodge 1988: 9-
10) Although Darwin had only cautiously alluded to the topic in the Origin (see section 3.4.5), the 
public debate quickly focused on Man’s place in Nature, particularly his relation to “the brutes”. The 
educated public went beyond the superficial comparisons between apes and humans, yet, critics 
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“maintained that Darwin was denying man's uniqueness and special creation in his own image by the 
Great Designer.” (Fishman 1997: 103) The gap between man and ape459 
“was held to be too big to be bridged. All races of men were clearly men, and all the 
various ape species were as clearly apes. There were no intermediate forms, no 
graduated series where each step should not appear greater than a varietal 
modification.” (Ellegård 1958: 299) 
Most of the papers immediately grasped the implications of Darwinian speculation for Man. Some 
tried to see this perspective as promising, like the Athenaeum: 
“Lady Constance Rawleigh, in Disraeli's brilliant tale, inclines to a belief that man 
descends from the monkeys. This pleasant idea, hinted in the 'Vestiges,' is wrought 
into something like a creed by Mr. Darwin. Man, in his view, was born yesterday - he 
will perish to-morrow. In place of being immortal, we are only temporary, and, as it 
were, incidental.” (Anonymous [J.R. Leifchild?] 1859: 659-60) 
“Yes, an unbroken, sure, though slow, living progress towards animal perfectibility is 
a delightful vision; natural and gradual optimism is a welcome fancy. What need of 
distinct creation? If a monkey has become a man - what may not a man become?“ 
(Anonymous [J.R. Leifchild?] 1859: 659-60) 
Yet, most educated Victorians felt offended by the perspective; considering the brute creation a 
close relation, invoked revulsion and horror among the public. (Ellegård 1958: 297) The Victorians 
chose to ignore their supposed relation with the apes and considered their own history, so to speak, 
a descent from noble savages to civilized nobles. (Desmond and Moore 1995: 653-4) The Examiner 
exemplifies this tension quite well: 
”The theory supposes an unlimited progress towards improvement. By it we may 
hope that the race to which we ourselves belong may in the course of some millions 
of years become angels or demigods. This is, no doubt, consolatory, and yet it is 
somewhat marred by the mortifying reflection that proud man may have been once 
an ape, a bat, or a mere monad—nay, that even Isaac Newton may have had the very 
same progenitor as a drum‐head cabbage. Millions of years hence … the best of us 
may be looked upon as no better than clever apes, which is the character in which 
the poet supposes "superior beings" to have admired Newton when he appeared 
among them. The theory, indeed, is a scientific metempsychosis, not only more 
ingenious but far more consolatory than that of Hindus and Buddhists, for it is all 
hopeful progress without any counterbalance of melancholy retrogression, or still 
worse, of annihilation.” (Anonymous [Crawford J.?] 1859: 772-3) 
Living Age was still more explicit: 
“Mr. Darwin boldly traces out the genealogy of man, and affirms that the monkey is 
his brother, and the horse his cousin, and the oyster his remote ancestor. The human 
                                                            
459  Remember how most of Darwin’s contemporaries did not see the question in the light of Darwin’s concept 
of common descent. Thus, they were asking whether an ape could have transformed into a human, not 
whether both might have had a common (and possible extinct) ancestor. (see 3.2.3 i, Figure 14) 
Sebastian Zacharias: The Darwinian Revolution as a knowledge reorganization 
217 
body, in his view, is only a slowly developed zoöphyte, out of which it has grown by a 
process as natural and uniform as that by which a calf becomes a cow; and, by a 
parallel advancement, the human mind has become what it is out of a developed 
instinct.” (Anonymous 1860b: 474-5) 
and the Saturday Review’s comment highlights how very noticeable460 Darwin’s cautious allusions on 
the last pages of the Origin had after all been: 
“Except in a single brief and somewhat obscure paragraph, Mr. Darwin has avoided 
all reference to the origin of the human race; but in his future work he can scarcely 
fail to be explicit upon that point.” (Anonymous 1859: 775-6) 
Between 1859 and 1875, the descent of Man would remain the most visible topic within the 
educated public. The now-famous exchange between ‘Darwin’s bulldog’ Thomas Henry Huxley and 
the Bishop Wilberforce at the 1860 meeting at the British association was not covered by the press461 
but in 1861, explorer and discoverer Paul Belloni du Chaillu returned from Africa and presented the 
first gorillas bodies to the British public. He toured England with his collection and published a 
popular book on his Explorations and Adventures in Equatorial Africa, enjoying remarkable popular 
success. (Lightman 2007: 2; Desmond and Moore 1995: 577-8) 
The colorful Du Chaillu provided graphic tales of humanoid emotions in gorillas (Desmond and Moore 
1995: 577), yet, coached by on anatomical details no one less than Richard Owen, he was “at pains to 
emphasize the differences between the beast and man.” (Ellegård 1958: 299) One of these 
anatomical details led to the famous clashes between Owen and Huxley at the British Association’s 
meetings in 1861 and 1862. Owen advanced Du Chaillu’s accounts and specimen against the 
Darwinians and claimed that certain elements of the human brain could not be found in apes, 
notably the so-called hippocampus minor.  
The public never followed these debates in any detail because the relationship of Man with the Ape 
quickly became, in the words of the 1863 Guardian, “buried beneath abstruse anatomical details”. 
(op. cit. Ellegård 1958: 74) However, the continued debate between the established and powerful 
Owen on one side and the young and rising Huxley received some coverage as a struggle between 
two eminent scientists. Incidentally, their debate inspired Charles Kingsley to his "hippopotamus 
major" in the children’s novel Water Babies. (Lightman 2007: 2) 
Moreover, the obscure topic became linked to one of the burning political questions of the day: “the 
place of the negro”. (Ellegård 1958: 74; Hodge 1988: 9-16) The American Civil War had been sparked 
by the slavery question and it raged during these very years of Darwinian controversy. Now, the 
                                                            
460   Gillian Beer explains this in the following manner: “However much Darwin may have represented to 
himself and his correspondents the absence of man from the text as a matter of diplomatic restraint, the 
exclusion had an immediate polemical effect: it removed man from the centre of attention. An act of will 
by the reader was required to restore him to his centrality. This transaction in itself problematised the 
centrality of man to the natural order. The absence of any reference to man as the crowning achievement 
of the natural and supernatural order made the text subversive: it was – as at some level it must have been 
known to be – deeply disquieting.” (Beer 2009: 54) 
461  As Alvar Ellegård dryly remarks with respect to the famous encounter: “If the Oxford meeting of the British 
Association in 1860 was an historical event, the press missed a great opportunity. […] the Oxford meeting 
was exceptionally meagerly reported: in the Times hardly at all. (Ellegård 1958: 67) Its supposedly crucial 
role in the Darwinian revolution is a later construction. 
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British public began to debate where the Negroes belonged in their view of the world: Where they 
humans? Then how were the seemingly irreversible inequalities of the races to be explained? Where 
did the seemingly innate superiority of the Caucasians stem from? (Kenny 2007)462 Racial 
commentators suggested differentiating between human races claiming 
“that at least European man’s progenitors had never led a savage life. Savages [like 
Africans ancestors of the American blacks], on the other hand, had not received the 
Divine gift of civilization… In this manner the distinction between the civilized 
Europeans and the uncivilized races could still be upheld as divinely ordained, while 
the unity of the human species was retained.” (Ellegård 1958: 311, cf. 301-2, 71, 74-
5; cf. Desmond and Moore 2009) 
Huxley clearly enunciated463 these questions in his review for the Times: 
“…we are in the habit of regarding mankind as of one species, but a fortnight's steam 
will land us in a country where divines and savans, for once in agreement, vie with 
one another in loudness of assertion, if not in cogency of proof, that men are of 
different species; and, more particularly that the species Negro is so distinct from our 
own that the Ten Commandments have actually no reference to him.” (Huxley 
1859a: 8) 
iv. Explanation: Much narration & little modeling 
When Darwin’s explanation via Natural Selection was addressed, it was presented as a mere story, 
i.e. only in its connotative component. To the educated public, the mention of the term ‘natural 
selection’ and the discussion of its possible explanatory power for the descent of Man definitely did 
not imply knowledge of Darwin’s model. Instead, few of the educated and interested laymen knew it 
at all: 
“Writers in the non-scientific press seldom made any clear distinction between 
Evolution pure and simple, and the peculiarly Darwinian doctrine of Natural 
Selection. Darwinism and Development were more or less synonymous to the 
general reader. But when the two concepts were distinguished, it was generally in 
order to point out that most experts did not go as far as Darwin, especially as regards 
Natural Selection.“ (Ellegård 1958: 58, cf. 334)  
In reviews, the situation is somewhat better; only the philosopher George Henry Lewes, in the 
Cornhill Magazine, mentions neither of the Darwinian key concepts, avoiding both the struggle and 
natural selection. (Lewes 1860) Yet, hardly any review addressed the logical component of Darwin’s 
explanation, his dynamic model. The 1860 “Popular Exposition of Mr. Darwin's On the Origin of 
Species” by the economist and statesman Henry Fawcett from MacMillan’s Magazine is a case in 
point. It mentions ‘Natural Selection’ only twice and in passing, provides a very brief and superficial 
exposition of Darwin’s explanation of evolution. (Fawcett 1860) The Athenaeum provides a literary 
exposition of Darwin’s explanation instead of a logical explication – all the while mentioning the key 
                                                            
462   See (Kenny 2007) for an examination of the debate in ethnological and anthropological circles. 
463  I do not find any clear statements from Huxley on the question of slavery; he seemed not to have linked his 
anatomical arguments to the ongoing debate, at least not in his writings. 
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concept names in Darwin’s dynamic model: Variation, Struggle for Life and employing Darwin’s 
category shift from artificial selection to metaphorically (connotatively) introduce Natural Selection. 
(Anonymous [J.R. Leifchild?] 1859: 659-60)  
Robert Chambers cited long passages of the Origin, thus probably giving the most prudent and most 
faithful summary of Darwin’s thoughts, however, he does provide no further analysis, particularly no 
logical one. (Chambers 1859) The cases of All the Year Round and the Examiner are similar. 
(Anonymous 1860a; Anonymous [Crawford J.?] 1859) 
Joseph Dalton Hooker’s review in the Gardener Chronicle is an interesting case: He addresses an 
audience with practical knowledge on gardening but without scientific training or knowledge of the 
contemporary models and theories. Therefore, he refers to their experience when introducing the 
problem – the experience of an artificial selector. In his presentation of the Darwinian model, 
however, he remains in the literary sphere, providing a story for an explanation. Notably, his mention 
of the Struggle for Life is merely metaphorical. (Hooker 1859) 
The Saturday Review provided this account of Darwin’s theory: 
 
“Mr. Darwin's theory may be stated in a few words. All organic beings are liable to 
vary in some degree, and tend to transmit such variations to their offspring. All at the 
same time [they] tend to increase at a very rapid rate, and their increase is kept in 
check by the incessant competition of other individuals of the same species, or that 
of individuals of other species, or by physical conditions injurious to each organism or 
to its power of leaving healthy offspring. Whatever variation occurring among the 
individuals of any species of animals or plants is in any way advantageous in the 
struggle for existence will give to those individuals an advantage over their fellows, 
which will be inherited by their offspring until the modified variety supplants the 
parent species. This process, which is termed natural selection, is incessantly at work, 
and all organized beings are undergoing its operation. By the steady accumulation, 
during long ages of time, of slight differences, each in some way beneficial to the 
individual, arise the various modifications of structure by which the countless forms 
of animal and vegetable life are distinguished from each other.” (Anonymous 1859: 
775-6) 
In Fraser’s Magazine, the mathematician William Hopkins also introduced the concept of Natural 
Selection via Darwin’s category shift and summed up Darwin’s theory like this: 
“The principle on which Mr. Darwin's reasoning rests is that of Natural selection. An 
immensely greater number of animals must be born than can possibly live to what 
may be regarded as the natural term of their lives. A 'struggle for existence' ( to use 
our author's phrase ) must therefore necessarily ensue; and in this struggle the 
stronger will vanquish the weaker, and live to transmit their species to future 
generations. Thus nature is supposed to 'select' the best variety of any existing 
species, however it may have arisen, for the propagation of the race, as a breeder of 
domestic animals selects the best of those he may be cultivating, to breed from ; and 
as he dooms to more immediate slaughter the inferior portion of his flocks and 
herds, and thus year by year improves his stock, so nature abandons to early 
destruction and final extermination those inferior portions of any race of animals 
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which are least able to protect themselves in the 'struggle for existence,' and thus 
improves the general character of succeeding generations, to which every 
improvement is supposed to be transmitted by descent.” (Hopkins 1860: 751) 
Sedgwick provided a short summary of what he considered the Origin’s main hypotheses in the 
beginning of his article and devotes two sentences to Darwin’s dynamic model: 
“The organic ascent is secured by a Malthusian principle through nature,-by a battle 
of life, in which the best in organization (the best varieties of plants and animals) 
encroach upon and drive off the less perfect. This is called the theory of natural 
selection.” (Sedgwick 1973 [1860]: 159)  
An exception to the rule is the Times review, which was authored by the anatomist, zoologist and 
great popularizer Thomas Henry Huxley.464 Huxley’s review begins with an abstract introduction of 
the challenges which Darwin’s model was supposed to address: the concept of species, the 
geographical distribution of living animals and the rudimentary organs. It briefly refers to previous 
theoretical explanations by Lamarck and Chambers, and in the end, introduces Darwin’s explanation 
of Evolution. The interplay of Struggle for Existence, Accidental Variations and Natural Selection is 
illustrated in a generic story about three varieties A, B and C and their hypothetical development in 
the Struggle for Life. This story is the closest thing to a logical analysis which I find in the public 
reviews: 
“Suppose that in the midst of this incessant competition some individuals of a species 
(A) present accidental variations which happen to fit them a little better than their 
fellows for the struggle in which they are engaged, then the chances are in favour, 
                                                            
464  Huxley’s role as one of the first professional scientist to popularize scientific findings and theories on a 
large scale. (cf. Schwartz 1999) Huxley’s also explicitly addressed the working class in his famous public 
lectures on the Darwinian Theory in the early 1860s. In his Lectures to Working Men, he explained the 
“Knowledge of the Causes of the Phenomena of Organic Nature” in popular fashion and from the 
Darwinian point of view, covering the important components of Darwin’s model like the Struggle for 
Existence, Variation and Natural Selection and estimating the merits of its explanation. (chapters 4-6) 
Man’s place in Nature, the topic of Huxley’s forthcoming monograph, was hinted at only. (Huxley 1893c 
[1863]: 473) While remarkably detailed and complex, these lectures do not qualify as a scientific treatment 
of Darwin’s model but as an early example of popularized science: First, he presents evidence in illustration 
of his accounts but it appears highly idealized. For instance, he explains the morphology of a horse by 
likening its jaw to a mill its heart to a force-pump etc. (Huxley 1893c [1863]: 310-3) Second, Huxley covers 
only the upmost level of the model, hardly specifying its complexity. Second and instead, his explication of 
the model his mostly narrative; Huxley elucidates aspects through little stories and presents the whole 
model as a major story about the phenomena of organic nature and how they came about.  
To give an overview of the topics covered: In lecture 1, Huxley provided a basic understanding of 
morphology, the problem of the geographical distribution and morphological relations among organisms. 
He mentions the idea of a unity of plan. In Lecture 2, he discusses geography and geology, the geological 
record, fossils, extinct organisms and relations of extinct organisms to living ones. In lecture 3, he speaks of 
scientific methods and their application to the vital phenomena (the living), of induction, deduction and 
hypotheses and how the Darwinian theory does not cover the origin of life. In lecture 4, he covered 
heredity and reproduction, variation and possible causes of variation as well as artificial selection and its 
effects. In lecture 5, he presents the exponential reproduction of unchecked organisms, the Struggle for 
Existence, natural selection and indirect proofs for it. In his 6th and final lecture, he discusses the merits of 
Darwin’s model vs. explanations based on creationism and design, hybridism and sterility as theoretical 
problems for Darwin. Finally, he touches lightly on Man’s position in Nature, addressing Man’s moral and 
mental qualities and asking the rhetorical question, what it is that constitutes and makes man what he is. 
(Huxley 1893c [1863]: 473) 
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not only of these individuals being better nourished than the others, but of their 
predominating over their fellows in other ways, and of having a better chance of 
leaving offspring, which will of course tend to reproduce the peculiarities of their 
parents. Their offspring will, by a parity of reasoning, tend to predominate over their 
contemporaries, and there being (suppose) no room for more than one species such 
as A, the weaker variety will eventually be destroyed by the new destructive 
influence which is thrown into the scale, and the stronger will take its place. Sur 
rounding conditions remaining unchanged, the new variety (which we may call B)—
supposed, for argument's sake, to be the best adapted for these conditions which 
can be got out of the original stock—will remain unchanged, all accidental deviations 
from the type becoming at once extinguished, as less fit for their post than B itself. 
The tendency of B to persist will grow with its persistence through successive 
generations, and it will acquire all the characters of a new species. But, on the other 
hand, if the conditions of life change in any degree, however slight, B may no longer 
be that form which is best adapted to withstand their destructive, and profit by their 
sustaining, influence; in which case if it should give rise to a more competent variety 
(C), this will take its place and become a new species; and thus, by natural selection, 
the species B and C will be successively derived from A.” (Huxley 1859a: 8-9)  
Even Huxley’s simultaneous review for MacMillan’s Magazine was much more metaphorical and is 
founded on the analogy between artificial and natural selection: 
“The peculiar feature of the latter is, in fact, that it professes to tell us what in nature 
takes the place of the breeder; what it is that favours the development of one variety 
into which a species may run, and checks that of another; and, finally, shows how this 
natural selection, as it is termed, may be the physical cause of the production of 
species by modification.” (Huxley 1859b: 147) 
In later contributions to the debate, information on Darwin’s model did not improve. Rather, reviews 
considered the Darwinian explanation as well-known and provided even shorter representations or 
discussed only isolated aspects. A case in point is the successful 1867 monograph The Reign of Law 
from the Duke of Argyll, a noble British politician without scientific experience or expertise. The book 
provided an extensive discussion of theological and philosophical issues as miracles or Divine 
Purpose, Divine Will and Divine Mind (Argyll 1872 [1867]:1-125) and argued for explaining natural 
phenomena from the reign of Divine law. His representation of Darwin’s model, however, is only 
indirect and works mainly through evoking the main metaphors of Darwin’s narrative. (Argyll 1872 
[1867]: 219-267) 
Thus, Darwin’s explanation penetrated the public discourse mainly through the strong connotations 
of its metaphors. It became to shift the meaning of words like development, transformation or 
inheritance and the catchy ‘Struggle for Life’ quickly reached the “phraseology of everyday 
conversation".465 (Ellegård 1958: 43, cf. Beer 2009: 13) Thus, within the general public, the 
expression ‘natural selection’ was employed as a metaphor, not as the name for Darwin’s Connector. 
  
                                                            
465  Thus, Darwin began to shape the shared dialogue which, before, had shaped the formulation of his theory. 
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v. Classification: the idea of common descent 
Public information on Darwin’s classification resembled information on his explanation in that it 
focused mainly on the connotative component of the level. Many articles explained the concept of 
common descent metaphorically but hardly any one provided a logical analysis of Darwin’s static 
model. For instance, Sedgwick summed up Darwin’s static model like this: 
“1st Species are not permanent: varieties are the beginning of new species.  
2nd Nature began from the simplest forms – probably from one form – the primaeval 
monad, the parent of all organic life.  
3rd There has been a continual ascent on the organic scale, till organic nature became 
what it is, by one continued and unbroken stream of onward movement.” (Sedgwick 
1973 [1860]: 159-60) 
Hooker’s exposition is similar in its metaphorical style: 
“Again, the whole system of animal and plant classification into individuals, species, 
genera, &c., presents a series strictly analogous to that of the members of the human 
or any other family; and we further express our notions of the mutual relations of 
animals and plants in the very terms that would represent their affinities as being 
due to a blood relationship; so that either Nature has mocked us by imitating 
hereditary descent in her creations, or we have misinterpreted her in assuming that 
she has followed one method for families and another for species.” (Hooker 1859: 
1052) 
The Examiner, the Saturday Review and Fawcett in MacMillan’s Magazine gave even briefer 
summaries: 
“The theory thus adopted by our author leads him at length to the startling 
conclusion, that the countless multitude of organized beings which now people and 
adorn our earth may have originally sprang from no more than four or five vegetable, 
and as many animal species; nay, indeed, that all these may have originated in a 
single progenitor.” (Anonymous [Crawford J.?] 1859: 772) 
“All existing animals have descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and 
plants from an equal or lesser number. Analogy (which Mr. Darwin admits to be a 
deceitful guide) would even lead him to infer that "all the organic beings which have 
ever lived on this earth have descended from some one primordial form into which 
life was at first breathed." (Anonymous 1859: 776) 
“Mr. Darwin has endeavoured to bring this subject within the cognisance of man's 
investigations, by supposing that every species has been produced by ordinary 
generation from the species which previously existed.” (Fawcett 1860: 83) 
Lewes, in the Cornhill Magazine, poignantly summed up the guiding question of Darwin’s 
classification but did not enter into a discussion of classificatory concepts: 
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“Can the descendants of animals become so unlike their ancestors, in certain 
peculiarities of structure of instinct, as to be classed by naturalists as a different 
species?” (Lewes 1860: 444)  
Instead, he illustrated it by comparing the development of species to the development of languages: 
“The development of numerous specific forms, widely distinguished from each other, 
out of one common stock, is not a whit more improbable than the development of 
numerous distinct languages out of a common parent language, which modern 
philologists have proved to be indubitably the case. Indeed, there is a very 
remarkable analogy between philology and zoology in this respect: just as the 
comparative anatomist traces the existence of similar organs, and similar 
connections of these organs, throughout the various animals classed under one type, 
so does the comparative philologist detect the family likeness in the various 
languages scattered from China to the Basque provinces, and from Cape Comorin 
across the Caucasus to Lapland—a likeness which assures him that the Teutonic, 
Celtic, Windic, Italic, Hellenic, Iranic, and Indic languages are of common origin, and 
separated from the Arabian, Aramean, and Hebrew languages, which have another 
origin.” (Lewes 1860: 445) 
A number of reviews put Darwin’s Origin in the context of previous classificatory and explanatory 
concepts. All the Year Round links Darwin to the much older idea of a “natural system of 
classification”, the scala natura: 
“The natural system of classification becomes a genealogical arrangement, in which 
we have to discover the lines of descent by the most permanent characters, 
however, slight their vital importance may be; because the real affinities of all 
organic beings are due to inheritance or community of descent.” (Anonymous 1860a: 
299) 
Most reviews, however, linked Darwin to Lamarck and to Chambers’ anonymously published 
Vestiges. (Lewes 1860; Huxley 1859a; Jardine 1860; Hopkins 1860) For instance, Living Age claimed 
that in the Origin of Species, Darwin  
“endeavors to establish, though by a different theory and a somewhat different 
process of reasoning, the same conclusion which was arrived at by the French 
naturalist, Lamarck, and by the English author of the "Vestiges of Creation"; — 
namely, that all the species, genera, orders, and classes of animal and vegetable life 
are essentially of one blood and lineage, having been developed out of one another, 
without the intervention anywhere of any act of creative power; — developed by the 
slow but progressive accumulation, through what is practically an infinite lapse of 
ages, of differences and variations which were at first, and for a long period of time, 
so slight as to be wholly imperceptible.” (Anonymous 1860b: 474) 
Only Huxley and Fawcett, seemed to explicitly emphasize how much Darwin’s theory differed from 
Vestiges and Lamarck: 
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“We think our exposition will indicate the great difference between the speculations 
of Mr. Darwin and those of other theorisers upon the transmutation of species, such 
as Lamarck and the author of the ‘Vestiges of Creation.’ “ (Fawcett 1860: 83) 
“Lamarck's conjectures, equipped with a new hat and stick, as Sir Walter Scott was 
wont to say of an old story renovated, formed the foundation of the biological 
speculations of the "Vestiges," a work which has done more harm to the progress of 
sound thought on these matters than any that could be named; and, indeed, I 
mention it here simply for the purpose of denying that it has anything in common 
with what essentially characterises Mr. Darwin's work.“ (Huxley 1859a: 147) 
The most elaborated information on Darwin’s classificatory system came from Huxley, again. In 
MacMillan’s Magazine, he provided a lengthy introduction on paleontology and leads to the problem 
of species determination. He summed up Darwin’s classification as guided by  
“the hypothesis that the forms or species of living beings, as we know them, have 
been produced by the gradual modification of pre-existing species” (Huxley 1859b: 
146) 
In both, his Times review and the article for MacMillan’s magazine, Huxley links it back to Darwin’s 
dynamic model: 
“…if it be true that all living species are the result of the modification of other and 
simpler forms, the existence of these little altered persistent types, ranging through 
all geological time, must indicate that they are but the final terms of an enormous 
series of modifications, which had their being in the great lapse of pregeologic time, 
and are now perhaps for ever lost.” (Huxley 1859b: 146) 
“If species have really arisen by the operation of natural conditions, we ought to be 
able to find those conditions now at work; we ought to be able to discover in nature 
some power adequate to modify any given kind of animal or plant in such a manner 
as to give rise to another kind, which would be admitted by naturalists as a distinct 
species.” (Huxley 1859a: 8) 
vi. Empirics: sketches and illustrations 
The public did not receive substantial information on the empirical content of Darwin’s theory, i.e. 
enough information to understand and assess the empirical content and implications of the theory. A 
number of reviews did not mention empirics at all. (Fawcett 1860; Anonymous [Crawford J.?] 1859; 
Hooker 1859; Anonymous [J.R. Leifchild?] 1859: 659-60; Anonymous 1859) Those which did, 
provided no more than illustrative sketches of what the Darwinian theory meant empirically. 
Frequently, reviews cited instances of artificial selection (breeding and gardening) for illustration. 
(Huxley 1859a; Huxley 1859b; Hooker 1859; Jardine 1860; Anonymous 1860a; Anonymous 1860b; 
Anonymous [W.R. Church?] 1860) While such illustrations were certainly instructive and followed 
Darwin’s own rhetorical maneuver, they did not provide information on Darwin’s core topic: the 
evolution of organisms in the wild. When natural selection was illustrated, examples were often 
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highly idealized466 or consisted in severe misrepresentations of Darwin’s examples or in 
misapplications of his theory, which rendered Darwin’s argument a caricature of its own. 
In the infamous “a bear becoming a Whale” example, a somewhat graphic passage467 about the 
similarity of bears and wales in the first edition of the Origin was interpreted as if Darwin suggested 
that 
“a bear swimming about a certain time [would grow] … into a whale…. Anti-
Darwinian writers seem to have deliberately played on the ambiguity of ‘a bear’ and 
‘a whale’, the word can be used to denote the individual, and to denote the class or 
species. The image of the swimming bear is so particular, so comic, that even a 
sympathetic reader will be inclined to indulge the dreamlike image of the bears with 
larger and larger mouths metamorphosing into something very like a whale.” 
(Ellegård 1958: 238-41, cf. de Beer 1963: 176) 
Sedgwick (purposely or not) played on the same ambiguity when he uttered that  
“In some rare instances, Darwin shows a wonderful credulity. He seems to believe 
that a white bear, by being confined to the slops floating in the Polar basin, might in 
time be turned into a ... whale: that a lemur might easily be turned into a bat; that a 
three-toed tapir might be the great grandfather of a horse: or that the progeny of a 
horse may (in America) have gone back into the tapir.” (Sedgwick 1973 [1860]: 165) 
The lack of substantial information on the empirical component of Darwin’s theory among non-
biologists is not too surprising. After all, Darwin’s book mainly addressed a non-expert audience, i.e. 
readers outside his immediate scientific community. The Origin’s focus was the presentation of 
Darwin’s dynamic and static model and the corresponding explanation and interpretation. Granted, 
Darwin devoted a large part of the Origin on sketching empirical applications of his models (their 
denotative meaning), yet understanding and assessing even these sketches required a large amount 
of previous knowledge and was not possible to non-biologists.468  
                                                            
466  Argyll’s Reign of Law is a striking example here: Argyll presents evidence throughout two entire chapters 
(Argyll 1872 [1867]: 126-207), however, his examples consist mainly of popular and easily imaginable birds 
like the Green Woodpecker or the Humming Bird and his representation of their anatomical features and 
behavior are idealized sketches only. – In his review of the book, Wallace points this weakness out right 
from the beginning: “The noble author represents the feelings and expresses the ideas of that large class, 
who take a keen interest in the progress of Science in general, and especially that of Natural History, but 
have never themselves studied nature in detail, or acquired that personal knowledge of the structure of 
closely allied forms, the wonderful gradations from species to species and from group to group, and the 
infinite variety of the phenomena of " variation" in organic beings, which are absolutely necessary for a full 
appreciation of the facts and reasonings contained in Mr. Darwin's great work.” (Wallace 1870e [1867]: 
264) 
467  Jardine, for instance, cited the passage verbatim: "In North America the black bear was seen by Hearne 
swimming for hours, with widely open mouth, thus catching; like a whale, insects in the water. Even in so 
extreme a case as this, if the supply of Insects were constant, and if better adapted competitors did not 
already exist in the country, I can see, no difficulty in a race of bears being rendered, by natural selection, 
more and more aquatic in their structure and habits, with larger and larger mouths, till a creature was 
produced as monstrous as a whale." (Jardine 1860: 282; cf. Darwin 1859: 184) 
468  Darwin was obviously aware of the limits of his book. He had intended to publish his theory in a “big book”, 
a thorough empirical study named Natural Selection. When he was rushed into publication by Wallace’s 
1858 paper, Darwin did write but an abstract of his big book: the Origin. This abstract he wanted to call “An 
Sebastian Zacharias: The Darwinian Revolution as a knowledge reorganization 
 
226 
vii. Synthesis 
In sum, both the general and the educated public received ontological implications of Darwin’s 
theory as well as the connotative part of his models, i.e. its interpretation and narration. However, 
the uneducated received of the theory but the most superficial features, i.e. the supposed relation of 
Man and the apes as well as Darwin’s claim that the living species had not been created one by one 
out of the ground by God. 
The educated public grasped the concept of evolution as transmutation of species beyond the 
descent of Man - a concept which had already been popularized by Chambers’ Vestiges.469 They were 
aware of fundamental philosophical issues raised by Evolution and adapted their world views but 
they refused its full application to Man. However, their reception stopped clear of Darwin’s model, 
Natural Selection, at the connotative part of the second layer of information on Darwin’s theory. In 
the public discourse, the model appeared as a story, its core terms ‘natural selection’ or ‘struggle for 
life’ were merely metaphors to the educated laymen. Neither the model’s mechanism nor its links to 
empirical evidence were covered. Empirical evidence was sparsely presented and if so highly 
idealized; it served merely as an illustration of the story Darwin seemed to tell about Evolution. 
4.1.2 By which criteria was the Darwinian theory assessed? 
As the large and uneducated public of the time received information on Darwin’s theory only on its 
upmost abstraction level and of this only the most superficial part, they could judge the theory only 
by this surface. Their criticism of Darwin’s theory did therefore focus on two issues. First, they 
criticized Man’s supposed descent from the lower animals, his supposed relation with the brutes. 
How much this framed the perception of Darwin among the general public is probably best 
exemplified by the famous 1871 caricature in Fun which depicts an ape body with Darwin’s face 
lecturing on evolution.470 Second, Darwin’s theory contradicted a literal understanding of the Bible 
and, therefore, caused a stir among the general public. Judging from the general press there was no 
further criticism of any of the other layers. (Ellegård 1958)  
The criticism in the quality press focused on the three elements of Victorian world-views which 
Darwin’s theory seemed to threaten. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Abstract of an Essay on the Origin of Species and Varieties Through Natural Selection”, only his editor, John 
Murray, convinced Darwin to adopt the catchier title. (cf. Freeman 1977)  
469  This does not imply that they grasped the difference between Chambers’ and Darwin’s models. By some 
commentators Darwin was accused of having taken his ideas from Chambers’ Vestiges. (Schwartz 1990: 
138) 
470  Julia Voss emphasizes how well-known both images of evolutionary series and of Darwin must have been 
for such a caricature to work in a popular magazine. (Voss 2007: 11-2) Janet Browne provides an overview 
on the topic of caricatures in the Darwinian debate. (Browne 2001) For a look at the caricatures just search 
“caricature Darwin ape” in an online image repository, e.g. Google images. 
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i. Ontological criticism: Divine Providence and Design 
First, critics dismissed the agnostic471 tendencies and aimed at amending Darwin’s narrative with 
elements of Victorian theism. Darwin found defenders like the economist Henry Fawcett who 
claimed that the theory did not lessen the glory of God: 
“Those who, like Mr. Darwin, endeavour to explain the laws which regulate the 
succession of life, do not seek to detract one iota from the attributes of a Supreme 
Intelligence. Religious veneration will not be diminished, if, after life has been once 
placed upon this planet by the will of the Creator, finite man is able to discover laws 
so simple that we can understand the agency by which all that lives around us has 
been generated from those forms in which life first dawned upon this globe.” 
(Fawcett 1860: 283) 
However, while most supporters of Darwin avoided teleological topics – often claiming they assessed 
the theory on scientific grounds only – most public critics aimed precisely at these perceived 
ontological implication of Darwin’s theory.472 In Fraser’s Magazine, the mathematician William 
Hopkins blamed Darwin for 
“the adoption of pantheistic views, and the utter rejection of the doctrine of final 
causes, and of the belief in a Supreme Intelligence and personal Governor of the 
universe. “ (Hopkins 1860: 741) 
Sedgwick, in the Spectator, stopped just inches short of accusing Darwin of atheism which, at the 
time, would have been a strong public defamation: 
“A cold atheistical materialism is the tendency of the so-called material philosophy of 
the present day. Not that I believe that Darwin is an atheist; though I cannot but 
regard his materialism as atheistical; because it ignores all rational conception of a 
final cause. ” (Sedgwick 1973 [1860]: 161) 
Living Age called Darwin out for taking good care “not to attribute any intention to the Almighty” and 
for ignoring “all the facts which have appeared to most minds so significant of unity of plan, and 
thereby declarative of the unity of the Creator” and condemned the biologist’s intrusion into the 
domain of theology. (Anonymous 1860b: 475-6)  
Moreover, both Sedgwick and Living Age offered an alternative ontology to Darwin’s, one that could 
be perceived as proving God’s existence and revealing his purpose473 (Hull 1973: 57) and preserved 
natural harmony: 
“Species have been constant for thousands of years; and time (so far as I see my way) 
though multiplied by millions and billions would never change them, so long as the 
conditions remained constant. Change the conditions, and old species would 
disappear; and new species might have room to come in and flourish. But how, and 
                                                            
471  The term ‚agnostic‘ was termed by Huxley. 
472  Indeed, opponents of the Darwinian theory often chose to address ontological issues while his supporters 
usually withheld from addressing these issues, often claiming that they wanted to assess the theory on 
scientific grounds only. 
473  See (Hull 1973: 55-66) for a close discussion of the two main forms of teleology. 
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by what causation? I say by creation. But, what do I mean by creation? I reply, the 
operation of a power quite beyond the powers of a pigeon-fancier, a cross-breeder, 
or hybridizer; a power I cannot imitate or comprehend; but in which I can believe, by 
a legitimate conclusion of sound reason drawn from the laws and harmonies of 
Nature. For I can see in all around me a design and purpose, and a mutual adaptation 
of parts which I can comprehend,-and which prove that there is exterior to, and 
above, the mere phenomena of Nature a great prescient and designing cause. 
Believing this, I have no difficulty in the repetition of new species during successive 
epochs in the history of the earth.   
But Darwin would say I am introducing a miracle by the supposition. In one sense, I 
am; in another, I am not. The hypothesis does not suspend or interrupt an 
established law of Nature. It does suppose the introduction of a new phenomenon 
unaccounted for by the operation of any known law of Nature; and it appeals to a 
power above established laws, and yet acting in harmony and conformity with 
them.” (Sedgwick 1973 [1860]: 161) 
“Now these countless differences which distinguish all living forms from each other, 
…, are yet just as much a part of creation — a part, so to speak, of the Divine plan — 
as the general laws themselves which underlie them, and which alone come within 
the scope and power of human science. Admitting, for the nonce, that law and order 
can be ascribed to the blind action of secondary or mechanical causes, these endless 
diversities still remain inexplicable except upon the supposition of the constant 
action of a free personal cause. […]thus, indeed, ‘we can perceive that events are 
brought about, not by insulated interpositions of Divine power,’ but by exertions of it 
so frequent and beneficent, that we come to regard them as the ordinary action of 
Him who laid the foundations of the earth, and without whom not a sparrow falleth 
to the ground.” (Anonymous 1860b: 505-6) 
This, alternative, however, was incompatible with Darwin’s explanation, a process which lacked a 
teleologicaIly acceptable power and a definite direction for evolution. An important part of the public 
criticism aimed precisely at filling these perceived holes in Darwin’s narrative; technically speaking, 
Darwin’s critics aimed at providing a new Agent and a Purpose. (Ellegård 1958: 102, 128-140, 150) 
This line of criticism probably culminated in the Duke of Argyll’s interventions in the mid-sixties. In 
The Reign of Law, he claimed that Darwin had not given any explanation  
“of the method in which Vital Forces are made to evolve a new Form of Life. But even 
if such explanation could be given, it would render no account at all of the fittings of 
that Form into the outward requirements of its life. These are Correlations which in 
their very nature belong to Mind, are the work of Mind, and are intelligible only in 
the light of Mind.” (Argyll 1872 [1867]:261) 
To Argyll and the majority of Darwin’s opponents, there was no difference between the supernatural 
and the natural, both being the workings of the “Reign of Law”. Therefore, they wished to interpret 
evolution as a product of Divine law and required amendments to the model of Natural Selection – 
or they would not accept it as an explanation of Evolution. (Lynch 2001: xiii) To them, there was at 
least a “residuum of change” in Evolution not explicable by Natural Selection alone and this residuum 
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opened the door for Design and Divine Providence. A comment in the 1871 Guardian’s put this very 
clearly: 
"This amounts, as it seems to us, to a confession that Natural Selection may, after all, 
play only a secondary part in the differentiation of species, – that there may be 
behind and above it an 'unknown agency: giving the first impulses in certain definite 
directions which natural selection cannot alter ... It is a vast concession, and one 
which seems to us to cover all that [we] need ask for; since it is obvious that we may 
assign this 'unknown agency' to any cause ... and if we assign it to the finger of God, it 
will amount to a perpetual divine superintendence of the physical development of 
the world." (op. cit. Ellegård 1958: 130, cf. 274) 
ii. Ontological Implications: Position of Man 
On the descent of Man, opposition was equally strong. Anatomical similarities between Man and the 
higher apes were often admitted; for instance, Argyll admits that  
“the close and mysterious relations between the mere animal frame of Man, and 
that of the lower animals, does render the idea of a common relationship by descent 
at least conceivable. “ (Argyll 1872 [1867]: 29) 
However, according to most critics, the human mind, soul and reason put Man apart from all other 
organic beings and in a class of his own.474 (Ellegård 1958: 311-329, Hull 2005: 149) These qualities in 
Man could not stem from some incipient form in animals; they must have been added independently 
from an outside force.475 
“… we cannot speculate on man's position in the actual world of nature, on his 
destinies, or on his origin, while we keep his highest faculties out of our sight. Strip 
him of these faculties, and he becomes entirely bestial; and he may well be (under 
such a false and narrow view) nothing better than the natural progeny of a beast, 
which has to live, to beget its likeness, and then die for ever.” (Sedgwick 1973 [1860]: 
164) 
The question of morality implied social and political consequences for the social order of the time 
was erected upon religious truths. (Ellegård 1958: 322-5) Shattering these truths meant, in the eyes 
of many, shattering the fundament of the social order. (Desmond and Moore 1995: 655) Thus, 
rejection of the Darwinian theory frequently went hand in hand with a warning of its possible 
negative effect on the British society, if not the entire civilized world. As Sedgwick put it in the 
Spectator:  
                                                            
474  For radical Darwinians, the difference between man and animals was one of degree, not of kind. (Ellegård 
1958: 330; Desmond and Moore 1995: 566-569) 
475  Note that this still is the contemporary position of the Catholic Church. Pope Pius XII stated in the 1950 
encyclical Humani Generis (Pope 1950) that “Catholics could believe whatever science determined about 
the evolution of the human body, so long as they accepted that, at some time of his choosing, God had 
infused the soul into such a creature.” (Gould 1997) 
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“The pretended physical philosophy of modern days strips Man of all his moral 
attributes, or holds them of no account in the estimate of his origin and place in the 
created world.“ (Sedgwick 1973 [1860]: 161) 
The Saturday Review blank-point refused entering in the debate and issued a warning to biologists 
not to address the descent of man: 
“To him [Darwin], or to any other man of science who should attempt to prove to us 
that the moral and spiritual faculties of man have been gradually developed by the 
working of matter upon matter, we should reply by demurring in toto to the 
applicability of his reasoning. No conceivable amount of evidence derived from the 
growth and structure of animals and plants would have the slightest bearing upon 
our convictions in regard to the origin of conscience, or man's belief in a Supreme 
Being and the immortality of his own soul.” (Anonymous 1859: 775) 
Therefore, while their debate was more sophisticated, the educated public followed the uneducated 
in predominantly rejecting the application of Evolution to Man. (Desmond and Moore 1995: 653-4, 
663) 
iii. Darwin’s explanation: just speculation? 
As Darwin’s model was hardly described in the public press, it virtually escaped methodological or 
logical criticism here. Sedgwick (1860: 164) accused Darwin in the Spectator of having “deserted the 
inductive track, - the only track that leads to physical truth”, yet, he did not develop this point with 
respect to scientific methodology but embedded it in his general moral critique of Darwin’s 
supposedly  
“unflinching materialism … [which] utterly repudiates final causes and thereby 
indicates a demoralized understanding on the part of its advocates.” (Sedgwick 1973 
[1860]: 164) 
Huxley, in his December review for the Times, had already anticipated such moral debate when he 
demanded that Darwin’s theory be judged on scientific grounds only: 
“This hypothesis may or may not be sustainable hereafter; it may give way to 
something else, and higher science may reverse what science has here built up with 
so much skill and patience, but its sufficiency must be tried by the tests of science 
alone, if we are to maintain our position as the heirs of Bacon and the acquitters of 
Galileo. We must weigh this hypothesis strictly in the controversy which is coming, by 
the only tests which are appropriate, and by no others whatsoever.” (Huxley 1859a: 
8) 
A more detailed critique came from Hopkins in Fraser’s Magazine. His review is untypical for general 
publications and rather resembles reviews for the broader scientific community in that it contains a 
long discussion of scientific methodology in which Hopkins compared (and largely equates) Darwin’s 
theory with Lamarck’s works and opposed both to the supposedly ideal physical theories. He blamed 
Darwin of not having identified actual causes and suggested that Darwin was theorizing “as if Bacon 
and Newton had never lived.” (Hopkins 1860: 741) 
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Such criticism was countered by Henry Fawcett in the MacMillan’s Magazine: 
“There we find it reiterated, ‘This is not a true Baconian induction.’ In reply to all this, 
it should at once be distinctly stated that Mr. Darwin does not pretend that his work 
contains a proved theory, but merely an extremely probable hypothesis. The history 
of science abundantly illustrates that through such a stage of hypothesis all those 
theories have passed which are now considered most securely to rest on strict 
inductive principle. Dr. Whewell has remarked, "that a tentative process has been the 
first step towards the establishment of scientific truths." Some association 
perchance, as the falling apple, first aroused in Newton's mind a suspicion of the 
existence of universal gravitation. He then had no proof of the particular law of this 
gravitating force; he made several guesses. The inverse square was the only one 
which caused calculation to agree with observation; the inverse square was therefore 
assumed to be the true law. The most complicated calculations were based upon this 
assumption; they have been carefully corroborated by observation, and in this 
manner the law of gravitation has been proved true beyond all dispute. Those who 
attack the philosophic method of Mr. Darwin ought explicitly to state how they 
would proceed to establish a theory on the origin of species by what they term a 
rigorous induction.” (Fawcett 1860: 82-3) 
iv. Criticism of Darwin’s classification missing links and the concept of species 
A group of issues which were discussed in this group figured under the term ‘missing links’; Darwin 
himself referred to them by the formula ‘the imperfection of the geological record’. The debate 
focused on the question whether geology (paleontology) had produced enough fossils to support the 
Darwinian classification, particularly the links between important classes of organisms.476 
In the missing-links debate, it was taken as evidence against Darwin that the historical record of 
mankind did not contain any accounts of “specific changes in the animals that had been associated 
with man since ancient times”477 (Ellegård 1958: 216) or that the paleontological record displayed 
extinct species but no evidence of transitional forms between these species or between those and 
contemporary species478: “Connecting links, in the sense of forms which could equally well be put in 
one species as in another, were rare or missing.” (Ellegård 1958: 216) 
                                                            
476  I do not consider these objections to be empirical but classificatory objections because they did not 
challenge Darwin’s model by contradictory empirical evidence. Instead, they claimed that there existed not 
enough evidence to support Darwin’s classification by common descent. Hence, challenged how Darwin 
aggregated and systematized the available evidence. – One might say that an empirical objection 
challenges a classification with positive evidence, i.e. evidence which has been gathered, while a 
classificatory challenge challenges a classification by negative evidence, i.e. imaginary evidence which has 
not been gathered. 
477  For instance, it was argued that Cuvier’s expedition to Egypt had revealed that mummified cats in the 
pyramids did not differ from cats in the 19th century. 
478  Both arguments were answered by Darwin: One, if the recorded history of mankind knew no drastic 
Environmental Change, then no drastic Evolution was to be expected. Two, according to Darwin, 
competition between similar organisms was the most severe; therefore, intermediate forms were to be 
quickly eliminated by Natural Selection and an infinite number of gradations between species was not to 
be expected. 
Sebastian Zacharias: The Darwinian Revolution as a knowledge reorganization 
 
232 
Missing links or the problem of the imperfection of the geological record were mentioned in the 
reviews in the majority of reviews, albeit in most cases only briefly. (Anonymous 1860b; Chambers 
1859; Anonymous [J.R. Leifchild?] 1859: 659-60; Fawcett 1860; Anonymous [Crawford J.?] 1859: 772-
3) The Saturday Review devoted a longer passage to geology and claimed that even “in the earliest 
geological record” species displayed a “perfectly definite character” and that the facts of geological 
did thus oppose the Darwinian theory. (Anonymous 1859: 775-6)  
The geologist Adam Sedgwick devotes a lengthy passage to an overview over the established body of 
empirical knowledge of paleontology and then over his reading of the geological history of the earth. 
Sedgwick came to the conclusion that 
“the great broad facts of geology are directly opposed to [the Darwinian theory]”. 
(Sedgwick 1973 [1860]: 159-60) 
Hopkins’ article in Fraser’s Magazine is again a particular case in that it provided a more explicit 
criticism of Darwin’s classification. Hopkins blamed Darwin and Lamarck of having an incorrect notion 
of species when they considered species those groups which are “convenient for the purposes of 
classification”. (Hopkins 1860: 752) According to the mathematician Hopkins, 
“The accurate distinction between varieties and species consists in this – the former, 
when crossed, always produce fertile offspring: the latter either do not admit of 
being crossed at all, or when crossed they produce sterile offspring.” (Hopkins 1860: 
751) 
v. Pseudo-empirical criticism: misrepresentations, sterility, Man’s moral and mental qualities 
Another group of objections to Darwin’s model were supposed to be empirical but were founded on 
distorted accounts of reality or Darwin’s model. These objections suggested that Darwin’s model did 
not fit the available empirical evidence; yet they were expressed by writers from outside the 
immediate scientific community of paleontologists, botanists or zoologists, i.e. by writers who did 
not gather the relevant empirical evidence. This led them to challenge Darwin’s model by a version of 
reality which was not (or not well) empirically founded or to challenge a distorted version of Darwin’s 
model. 
An example for the latter case is provided by the Examiner which equated size and physical strength 
with fitness and argued that the extinction of large animals contradicts Darwin’s model of natural 
selection: 
„A comparison of extinct with existing species of the same natural families seems to 
us to afford an unanswerable argument against the theory of ‘natural selection.‘ 
Thus, the extinct mastodons and elephants were at least equal in size and strength 
with the living species, and the latter could not by any superiority have displaced and 
extinguished them. Still stronger is the case with the class of Saurians or lizards, some 
of the extinct species were such monsters that a Nilotic or Gangetic alligator would 
have made but a poor breakfast for one of them.” (Anonymous [Crawford J.?] 1859: 
772-3) 
Even Adam Sedgwick, the geologist, took up this line of argument in the Spectator:  
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“The reptile fauna of the Mesozoic period is the grandest and highest that ever lived. 
How came these reptiles to die off, or to degenerate? And how came the Dinosaurs 
to disappear from the face of Nature, and leave no descendants like themselves, or 
of a corresponding nobility? By what process of natural selection did they disappear? 
Did they tire of the land, and become Whales, casting off their hind-legs? And, after 
they had lasted millions of years as whales, did they tire of the water, and leap out 
again as Pachyderms?” (Sedgwick 1973 [1860]: 163) 
Following a similar argument, Living Age mentioned the simultaneous existence of higher and lower 
forms as contradicting Darwin’s theory. (Anonymous 1860b: 496) 
A number of reviews followed Hopkins’ definition of species as two groups of organisms which, when 
crossed, can only produce sterile offspring. (Anonymous 1860b: 478; Anonymous [Crawford J.?] 
1859: 772-3; Hopkins 1860: 751) This criticism, however, was unconnected to the body of biological 
knowledge of the time and, therefore, pseudo-empirical. To biologists, it was clear that a definition 
like Hopkins’ could not be operationalized and, therefore, not be applied in the distinction of 
species.479 Huxley had anticipated such arguments when he clarified in a lengthy passage of his Times 
review that there existed no empirical criterion for the determination of species: 
“But is it not possible to apply a test whereby a true species may be known from a 
mere variety? Is there no criterion of species? Great authorities affirm that there is—
that the unions of members of the same species are always fertile, while those of 
distinct species are either sterile, or their offspring, called hybrids, are so. It is 
affirmed not only that this is an experimental fact, but that it is a provision for the 
preservation of the purity of species. Such a criterion as this would be invaluable; 
but, unfortunately, not only is it not obvious how to apply it in the great majority of 
cases in which its aid is needed, but its general validity is stoutly denied. The Hon. 
and Rev. Mr. Herbert, a most trustworthy authority, not only asserts as the result of 
his own observations and experiments that many hybrids are quite as fertile as the 
parent species, but he goes so far as to assert that the particular plant Crinum 
capense is much more fertile when crossed by a distinct species than when fertilised 
by its proper pollen! On the other hand, the famous Gaertner, though he took the 
greatest pains to cross the primrose and the cowslip, succeeded only once or twice in 
several years; and yet it is a well-established fact that the primrose and the cowslip 
are only varieties of the same kind of plant. Again, such cases as the following are 
well established. The female of species A, if crossed with the male of species B, is 
fertile; but, if the female of B is crossed with the male of A, she remains barren. Facts 
of this kind destroy the value of the supposed criterion.” (Huxley 1859a: 8) 
Henry Fawcett, the economist concurred with Huxley: 
“The following definition of a species is sometimes given: that two animals or 
vegetables belong to different species when they are infertile with each other. This 
hardly deserves the name of a definition. It is enunciated in deference to pre-
                                                            
479  The case is different for the modern concept of species. Following Mayr, species are understood as 
reproductively isolated populations can therefore be distinguished by the criterion suggested by Hopkins 
and others. 
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conceived notions, and assumes the incorrectness of the theory which it is 
afterwards used to disprove. This definition can manifestly have little influence in 
diminishing that difficulty, which has been above alluded to, of deciding what is a 
specific difference; for it requires a test which can rarely be applied to the existing 
organic world, and is entirely inapplicable to those numerous species which have 
passed away. Thus it would be almost impossible to ascertain whether different 
molluscs, or insects, or testacea, are fertile with each other; and, manifestly, such an 
imperfect experiment in breeding cannot be made upon those animals and plants of 
which we have solely a geological record. Therefore it would seem that the 
classification of species must remain so arbitrary, that equally high scientific 
authorities may continue to dispute whether the plants of a limited area like England 
should be held to constitute two thousand or one thousand two hundred species. 
The question of species may thus, at the first sight, appear to be a dispute about an 
arbitrary classification…” (Fawcett 1860: 82) 
Moreover, Hopkins doubted that varieties may transmute beyond their mother-species; according to 
him, they are limited to “the sphere” in which they were born. (Hopkins 1860: 76) Living Age 
expressed the same concern. (Anonymous 1860b: 490) Again, this point had been anticipated by 
Huxley who drew a line from Lamarck480 to Darwin in his Times review and emphasized that 
independent minds had been doubting the doctrine of “definable limits” for some time and that 
there existed no empirical proof for it. (Huxley 1859a: 8) 
Finally, some opponents of the Darwinian theory claimed that Man’s mental and moral qualities 
singled him out in Nature and that, therefore, Man’s descent cannot be solely due to Natural 
Selection. (Sedgwick 1973 [1860]: 164-5; Anonymous 1859: 775) Living Age provided quite good a 
representation of the Victorian majority opinion on the topic: 
“[Darwin] is bound … to find the means of bridging over, by imperceptibly fine 
gradations, the immense gap which now separates man from the animals most 
nearly allied to him, — a gap not only between the two structural forms, which, 
however unlike, may still be affirmed to be of the same kind, but between reason 
and instinct, where nearly all psychologists are agreed that the difference is in kind, 
and not in degree.“ (Anonymous 1860b: 501-2) 
The moral qualities-argument was adopted by many scientists and laymen alike and it prevented the 
application of Darwin’s model to all of Man. This, however, was not due to the noble British 
inductivism but to world-views. Mind, moral, soul and reason were subjects of theorizing and 
speculation, not yet of systematic empirical study. Psychology as an empirical discipline would 
emerge only in the 1870s, the study of mental processes in animals would require still more time. On 
what shaky grounds Darwin’s critics were arguing with respect to differences between animals and 
humans in mental and moral qualities becomes clear in an 1870 statement by Wallace who clarified 
how little the science of the time knew about the mental processes of animals: 
                                                            
480  I find it remarkable how Huxley, took the time to defend Lamarck’s reputation against the widespread 
ridicule he had encountered in Britain, raising his profile against Cuvier and Chamber’s Vestiges and 
stating: “The Lamarckian hypothesis has long since been justly condemned, and it is the established 
practice for every tyro to raise his heel against the carcass of the dead lion. But it is rarely either wise or 
instructive to treat even the errors of a really great man with mere ridicule, and in the present case the 
logical form of the doctrine stands on a very different footing from its substance.” (Huxley 1859a: 8) 
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“Whatever we may define instinct to be, it is evidently some form of mental 
manifestation, and as we can only judge of mind by the analogy of our own mental 
functions and by observation of the results of mental action in other men and in 
animals, it is incumbent on us, first, to study and endeavour to comprehend the 
minds of infants, of savage men, and of animals not very far removed from ourselves, 
before we pronounce positively as to the nature of the mental operations in 
creatures so radically different from us as insects. We have not yet even been able to 
ascertain what are the senses they possess, or what relation their powers of seeing, 
hearing, and feeling have to ours.” (Wallace 1870b) 
4.1.3 Which elements of the Darwinian theory were accepted, which rejected? 
Among the large and uneducated public, Darwin’s theory had no sustainable effects. The two 
elements of the theory which reached this audience – Man’s relationship with the Apes and the idea 
of common descent – where considered fancies of the literary circles and received no serious 
consideration. An amusing example of the widespread ignorance already on Darwin’s topic is 
reported by Gertrude Himmelfarb who quotes a country clergyman as saying: 
“I cannot conceive how a book can be written on the topic [of evolution]. We know 
all there is to know about it. God created plants and animals and man out of the 
ground.” (Himmelfarb 1959: 247)  
The educated public had few problems with evolution as such and embraced it quickly – even before 
the scientific community: It was the general periodicals of educated and interested public, not the 
scientific publications who first accepted the transmutation of species.481 (Ellegård 1958: 57) Among 
the educated laymen Evolution steadily gained ground such that, by 1869, about three quarters of 
the intellectuals accepted it and “the battle for it was virtually over by 1870.” (Ellegård 1958: 33; Hull 
2005: 149; Desmond and Moore 1995: 605, 653) 
However, this acceptance did not cover all of Darwin’s model nor its philosophical implications. They 
accepted evolution as applied to the animals and plants but denied (i) its application to man and (ii) 
the mechanism supposed to produce it, i.e. Natural Selection. (Ellegård 1958: 47-8; Young 1985: 109, 
121; Desmond and Moore 1995: 663)482 Frequently, these two arguments came hand in hand. 
(Ellegård 1958: 331) First, it was argued that if Man possessed mental qualities not existent among 
the animals. Second, critics argued that Natural Selection could not account for the development of 
these mental qualities. Therefore, Natural Selection was an incomplete, even insufficient explanation 
of Evolution and it required additions. (Argyll 1872 [1867]: 220) 
Thus, most educated and interested Victorians felt that Darwin’s model required additions and 
suggested to add a ‘principle of design’ to it. Therefore, their concept of Evolution was more of  
                                                            
481  One might explain this by Chambers’ Vestiges which had already advanced evolutionary thought from 1844 
on and had enjoyed great public attention. Although ignored or dismissed by the scientists, it might have 
paved some of Darwin’s way. (cf. Ellegård 1958:333) 
482  This argument remained unaffected by Darwin’s supplementing the term of ‘natural selection’ by Herbert 
Spencer’s ‘survival of the fittest’. 
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“a pre-Darwinian evolutionism, where Design figured as if Darwin had never 
propounded the Natural Selection theory.” (Ellegård 1958: 126, cf. 47-8)  
Natural Selection was supplemented or replaced 
“by a postulate of Divine Design, so it was also possible to accept the gradual 
development of the soul, if it was combined with a recognition that it must have 
been providentially guided. The manner of that providential guidance might be 
obscure […, yet it] provided the foundation for all the various individual schemes of 
reconciling Evolution with traditional modes of thought as regards man's nature.” 
(Ellegård 1958: 331) 
This move let the public keep most of their Weltanschauung intact and steer a middle course 
between the revolutionary doctrine of Evolution and traditional views as Divine Providence or the 
argument from Design for it “did not necessitate any fundamental modification of the Design 
argument. All the features that on the direct Creation theory had been interpreted as indicative of 
foresight and Design could still be so regarded.” (Ellegård 1958: 127) Such was the majority opinion 
among the educated public. (Ellegård 1958: 136) 
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4.2 Reception by the broader scientific community 
4.2.1 To what depth did recipients receive the theory? 
As the reception in concentric circles suggests (see section 1.3), this group received all of the public 
debate, i.e. philosophical and religious, social and political implications of Darwin’s narrative as 
debated among the educated public. Some of these issues were discussed by the broader scientific 
community as well and usually in greater depth and complexity. However, the issues shared with the 
educated public were mostly religion and philosophy, politics and social implications took a back seat 
within the broader scientific community.  
Furthermore, the debate of the broader scientific community covered a novel topic: Darwin’s model. 
To them, it was no longer a mere narrative but also a logical structure with empirical implications. 
They discussed its details and sketched empirical implications. Moreover, they focused on its inner 
logical consistency, its compatibility with other models and its compliances with meta-models, i.e. 
the philosophy of science-conceptions of the time. These issues accounted for much of the debate 
within the broader scientific community. 
i. Ontological Implications: world-views 
To Darwin’s surprise483, the broader scientific community reacted to the perceived attacks of the 
Victorian world views in a similar intensity as the public; “… for many of [Darwin’s scientific critics] … 
it is impossible to separate scientific and religious motives completely.” (Ruse 1979: 206) Thus, even 
the debate on 
“…the philosophical and methodological foundations of the Darwinian theory was 
largely motivated by its religious implications. It was impossible to accept the theory 
without effecting changes in a whole system of religious and metaphysical beliefs 
sanctioned by tradition, or, conversely, to preserve that body of beliefs intact 
without rejecting the theory. To the religious, the theory was an incubus which had 
to be cast out, or at any rate isolated and neutralized. To attack the theoretical 
foundations of the theory was one of the ways, and an important one, of achieving 
this result: thereby the theory could be, if not directly refuted, at any rate 
represented as no more than a loose speculation, scientifically unjustifiable, and 
without any foundation in fact.” (Ellegård 1958: 195) 
This was very obvious in laymen contributions to the debate of the broader scientific 
community, for instance in two opening addresses to the Royal Society of Edinburgh by the 
Duke of Argyll.484 (Argyll 1862 [1860]: 371-6; Argyll 1865 [1864]: 264-292) Another case in 
                                                            
483  As Himmelfarb remarks: “When Darwin predicted that his book would find more favour with intelligent 
laymen than with professional scientists, it was because he thought the scientists were too committed to 
the old conception of species to admit new ideas on the subject. What he did not expect was that their 
objection would be not only professional but also religious. The religious issue having played no part in his 
own thinking, he was entirely unprepared for its prominence in the judgments of even the most 
professional and reputable scientists.” (Himmelfarb 1959: 231) 
484  Argyll presided the society for a number of years in the mid-1860s, presumably one of the last times a 
nobleman without scientific training chaired a scientific association in Britain. 
Sebastian Zacharias: The Darwinian Revolution as a knowledge reorganization 
 
238 
point is John Morris’ review for the Dublin Review which addresses both the descent of 
Man and its political implications: 
“Mr. Darwin makes reply and says, that not only is there no difficulty in believing that 
an Ojibbeway, a Hottentot, and an Australian, have descended from a common 
parent with a Chinese and an Englishman, but that ‘he believes that animals have 
descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or 
lesser number:’ and, much further still, that he would ‘infer from analogy that 
probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have descended 
from some one primordial form, into which life was first breathed,’ or in other words, 
‘that all animals and plants have descended from some one prototype.’ (p. 484.) 
Truly the oscillations of Science are somewhat alarming. We should, however, be 
extremely sorry to leave the impression that we consider Mr. Darwin's book as 
empirical or unscientific. He has the misfortune not to believe in Adam and Eve, and 
he has filled up the gap thus left in his mind by substituting in their place some 
prototype of far more venerable antiquity, though it must be confessed, of rather a 
humiliating character to one who would fain believe himself as coming directly from 
the Hand of God ‘a little lower than the angels;’ and he looks back through a 
bewildering number of years to his simple progenitor, a worm perhaps, or a bit of 
sponge, or some animated cellule.” (Morris 1860: 58-9) 
However, it were not only laymen who debated these questions, many of the scientists of the 
scientists addressed them, too – often very overtly. For instance, the botanist, zoologist and 
entomologist Andrew Murray485 published a critical review of Darwin’s theory in the 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in which he opposed the randomness of Darwin’s 
accidental variations and the wastefulness of the struggle for life, defending ideas of design and a 
theist God: 
“[Darwin’s] assumption is, that it is not alone beneficial variations which Nature 
makes. She makes them in any and every way; some being profitable, others the 
reverse; and the reason why we find all that have ever been seen on the face of the 
earth beneficially endowed (that is, provided with structures which, to the 
unilluminated eye, indicate design) is, that only those variations which happen to 
have been so endowed have been preserved,-the blots which Nature made having 
become extinct through the preponderance of the beneficially endowed. To use Mr 
Darwin's words, "Natural selection is daily and hourly scrutinizing throughout the 
world every variation, even the slightest; rejecting that which is bad, preserving and 
adding up all that is good, silently and insensibly working whenever and wherever 
opportunity offers at the improvement of each organic being, in relation to its 
organic and inorganic conditions of life!' (P. 84.) Now, I cannot believe in such 
doctrine. When I look at the anatomy of any part of the body, and see exactly the 
same mechanism and Contrivances had recourse to which a mechanician [sic!] would 
have used to secure similar results, I cannot bring myself to believe that it is 
fortuitous, or other than evidence of the prevalence of direct design. A belief in such 
design I should be most loath to surrender…” (Murray 1862 [1860]: 291) 
                                                            
485  Interestingly, Murray later converted and employed Darwinian concepts. 
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Murray wondered aloud why Darwin had to stretch his theory to this point while other eminent 
biological theorists had left open the possibility for design: 
“The views of Agassiz and Oken do not challenge the fact of design existing in the 
wonderful adaptations of structure to purpose which we see everywhere displayed in 
living organisms. Their theory allowed us to retain our belief in the great argument 
on which the whole of natural theology is based; nay, even to place it on higher 
grounds, as the intelligence which performs its work by the intervention of a law or 
machinery designed by itself, and operating on a great scale, is superior to the 
intelligence which executes each individual detail directly and without such 
intervention. If it furnished no explanation of the causes of adaptation of structure to 
habit, at least it did not prevent us from holding, if we chose, that, by some 
unexplained means, the germ of life was supplied with such a principle of growth as, 
under certain physical conditions, developed itself into these adaptations. We could 
hold design still to be there, although its direct means of operation was shrouded 
from our view in the laboratory of Nature.“ (Murray 1862 [1860]: 290-1) 
Richard Owen486, in his article for the Edinburgh Review cited Darwin’s passage on the Creator 
breathing life into the first beings and inferred that 
“Darwin formally recognises, in the so‐limited beginning, a direct creative act, 
something like that supernatural or miraculous one which, in the preceding page, he 
defines, as 'certain elemental atoms which have been commanded suddenly to flash 
into living tissues.' … He leaves us to imagine our globe, void, but so advanced as to 
be under the conditions which render life possible; and he then restricts the Divine 
power of breathing life into organic form to its minimum of direct operation.” (Owen 
1860b: 511; cf. Cosans 2009: 97-8)  
However, it were not only Darwin’s opponents who addressed ontological implications. Huxley, in a 
talk before the Royal Institution of Great Britain, refused contempt for the lower animals487: 
“Another, and unfortunately a large class of persons take fright at the logical 
consequences of such a doctrine as that put forth by Mr. Darwin. If all species have 
arisen in this way, say they—Man himself must have done so; and he and all the 
animated world must have had a common origin. Most assuredly. No question of it. 
But I would ask, does this logical necessity add one single difficulty of importance to 
those which already confront us on all sides whenever we contemplate our relations 
to the surrounding universe? I think not. Let man's mistaken vanity, his foolish 
contempt for the material world, impel him to struggle as he will, he strives in vain to 
break through the ties which hold him to matter and the lower forms of life.  
                                                            
486  Interestingly, Owen is among the few reviewers who addresses the fact that Darwin employed such graphic 
metaphors and such a compelling narrative in his explanation: “Referring to Darwin's reputation for vivid 
and clear writing, Owen credits Darwin for his fame ‘to the Literary World, by the charming style in which 
his original observations on a variety of natural phenomena are recorded’. He notes that with its ‘pleasing 
style’ and ‘certain artistic disposition’, the Origin had already persuaded much of the reading public to 
believe the theory of natural selection.” (Cosans 2009: 99) 
487  Note that Chambers had taken the same line of argument in 1844. (Chambers 1845 [1844]: 178; cf. section 
3.1.5) 
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… in the course of his development, man passes through stages which correspond to, 
though they are not identical with, those of all the lower animals; that each of us was 
once a minute and unintelligent particle of yolk‐like substance; that our highest 
faculties are dependent for their exercise upon the presence of a few cubic inches 
more or less of a certain gas in one's blood; in the face of these tremendous and 
mysterious facts, I say, what matters it whether a new link is or is not added to the 
mighty chain which indissolubly binds us to the rest of the universe? Of what part of 
the glorious fabric of the world has man a right to be ashamed—that he is so 
desirous to disconnect himself from it?” (Huxley 1860a: 194-5) 
Huxley repeated this position one year later in the Natural History Review, where he claimed that a 
close relationship between humans and apes would not  
"one whit diminish man's divine right of kingship over nature; nor lower the great 
and princely dignity of perfect manhood which is an order of nobility, not inherited, 
but won by each of us, so far as he consciously seeks good and avoids evil"” (op. cit. 
Cosans 1994: 147; cf. Cosans 2009: 105)  
Zoologist and physiologist William Benjamin Carpenter, in the British and Foreign Medico-Chirurgical 
Review, went in a similar direction: 
“Nobody would think of advancing it as an objection to modern Embryology, that it 
teaches that the human infant, instead of first coming into existence as a fully‐
formed though minute homunculus, begins life in the condition of the simplest 
protozoon, and successively acquires those peculiarities of organization which end in 
constituting him a Man. And we do not suppose that the naturalist who first found 
out that butterflies and beetles were caterpillars in the earlier stage of their 
existence, instead of coming out from the egg in the full possession of their insect 
attributes, was considered on that account less religious than his neighbours. Why, 
then, should it be regarded as impious to maintain that an analogous development 
went on during what may be called the life of the world; and that the existing forms 
of Plants and Animals have originated by genetic descent with modification from 
those which preceded them, even as the latter did from yet older forms, and so on, 
back to the beginning of Life on our planet? To deny that such might have been the 
Will of the Creator, is virtually either to deny that His power is constantly exerted in 
maintaining that regular succession of similar forms, on which the notion of the 
"permanence of species" is based, or to set limits to the exercise of that power, by 
asserting that it could not have been exerted in any other mode than that which Man 
chooses to prescribe.” (Carpenter 1860a: 379) 
The geologist Frederick Wollaston Hutton, in his review for the Geologist, defended the deistic 
conception of the Darwinian theory: 
“Why should it be considered atheistical to believe the laws of the Great Perfection 
to be perfect. The inscrutable Eternal cannot err; why then should His laws be so 
defective and imperfect as to require repeated efforts of creative energy? Is this 
world like an old watch so much out of order as to require continual oilings and 
repeated repairs? Why, too, should it be objectionable to consider the laws He has 
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given to nature as worthily and incessantly subservient to His will? Or why should it 
be thought irreligious to believe the Maker of all things in His first designs should 
have foreseen the necessity of future modifications to future altered conditions, and 
have provided accordingly in His first type-plans for their future illimitable 
adaptations to the ever-changing scenes presented in the progress of our earth's 
ever-altering conditions? Why, indeed, may we not look around us and believe in the 
universal bowing of all nature hourly, daily, unceasingly to the unerring laws and 
sustaining power of God? Why should we not see in every change His presence and 
His will? Why should the high position of man be brought in on all occasions in our 
natural history researches when we do not at present know of any link which binds 
him to the brute creation?” (Hutton 1860: 466) 
These ontological issues would continue to mark the debate on evolution. Such, the professor of 
engineering Fleming Jenkin ponders religious issues in 1867 (Jenkin 1867), Wallace does so in his 
article on mimicry for the Westminster Review (Wallace 1870c [1867]), William Thomson (the later 
Lord Kelvin) in his 1871 Presidential Address to the British Association (Thomson 1891b [1871]) and 
biologist St. George Jackson Mivart in his public opposition to Darwinism in the 1870s. (Mivart 1871a; 
Mivart 1871b)  
ii. Explanation: modeling and philosophy of science debate 
The debate within the broader scientific community covered more logical aspects of Darwin’s 
explanation, with reviews usually488 addressing concepts beyond their names, distinguishing sub-
concepts and discussing their relations. Morris, in the Dublin Review, mentioned use and disuse as 
Connectors in Darwin’s dynamic model (Morris 1860: 61-7; cf. Hutton 1861) and provided a detailed 
account of the model: 
“But what is there in nature that can supply the place of the judgment and will in the 
fancier, who pairs birds or dogs with the express intention of perpetuating a 
modification of the original form? According to our author one thing and one thing 
alone can do it. The multiplication of creatures on the face of the earth is out of 
proportion to their means of subsistence; this produces what he styles in his title 
"The Struggle for Life;" and those will survive and multiply that have some advantage 
over their competitors in the struggle. Every little variation, therefore, if it be 
advantageous to the individual, and in that case only, will be perpetuated. This 
involves, it need not be said, the extraordinary powers of inheritance, the singular 
property that all creatures possess of transmitting their own properties to their 
progeny. And the moment that we advert to this we are conscious of the very limited 
nature of our knowledge of the laws that govern inheritance; for if the offspring 
inherits the parent's qualities, it inherits what the parent received: it has thus the 
tendency to have and to impart the image of the aboriginal parent, as well as the 
variations by which the successive generations have diverged from that standard, 
and, more mysterious still, the tendency to vary more or less has been transmitted 
                                                            
488  Some reviews provided very little explicit information on Darwin’s dynamic model and focused instead on 
specific issues of the ongoing debate. (Haughton 1973 [1860]; D.T.A. 1860; Murray 1862 [1860]; Huxley 
1860b; Huxley 1860a) 
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also. What causes one of these tendencies to prevail at one time or under one 
condition rather than another, so that now the progeny, retaining certain variations 
in other characters reverts to the ancestral type, now exactly represents its 
immediate parent, now again shows rather the inherited tendency to vary, we are 
profoundly ignorant.  
That what Mr. Darwin has well called the Struggle for Life must be very severe, no 
one who remembers the extraordinary fertility of all nature, can possibly doubt. […] 
And this struggle will be felt most severely by those who are nearest of kin, for they 
feed on the same food, and are liable to the same casualties; and thus the tendency 
throughout nature will always be for those who have an advantage slowly to 
supplant their congeners, who have to work their way through the same difficulties, 
but under some less favourable condition. Thus, an increase of one variety will be at 
the expense of another variety of the same species, and the prevalence of one 
species will have been effected by the diminution of other species of the same genus, 
when, as is almost always the case, the field is already fully occupied. And the more 
numerous a species becomes, the better chance it will have in competition with its 
congeners; for the greater probability there will be of the appearance of 
advantageous variations, and the greater strength will be derived from the 
interbreeding, not too close, but with individuals in slightly varying conditions of life. 
This gives a decided advantage to the variety over the species, and to the specific 
form over the generic, giving thus, it is plain, a tendency to variation to all organic 
beings that are subject to severe competition. With nature, then, it is as with society. 
As the population increases, there is a greater number of claimants for every 
employment, and those who are the best fitted for them, or have some other 
advantage over their rivals, obtain them, while sharp wits are at work devising some 
change or variety which may tell in their favour.” (Morris 1860: 58-60) 
Wilberforce, in the Quarterly Review, was closer to a metaphorical description, and offered little 
discussion of logical relations:  
“Now, the main propositions by which Mr. Darwin's conclusion is attained are 
these:—  
1. That observed and admitted variations spring up in the course of descents from a 
common progenitor.  
2. That many of these variations tend to an improvement upon the parent stock. 
3. That, by a continued selection of these improved specimens as the progenitors of 
future stock, its improvements may be unlimitedly increased.  
4. And, lastly, that there is in nature a power continually and universally working out 
this selection, and so fixing and augmenting these improvements.” (Wilberforce 
1860: 231) 
A number of reviews began with a short narrative introduction of the Darwinian explanation but 
addressed the single concepts and their logical relations over the course of the text. (Hutton 1860; 
Hutton 1861; Carpenter 1860a) Thus, Carpenter, in the National Review, built upon metaphorical 
introduction by a discussion of Variation, Natural Selection, the Struggle for Life and the ensuing 
Evolution (divergence of character). (Carpenter 1860b: 192, 194-6, 196-7, 197-204, 204) 
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A number of authors distinguished between the denotative (logical) and connotative (literary) 
meaning of Darwin’s metaphors, for instance Hutton in the Geologist: 
“[Darwin] shows that, owing to the rapid increase of animal and vegetable life, by 
which many more are born each year than can possibly survive, there is a continual 
warfare going on among them for food and other necessaries. This he calls the 
‘struggle for life’.   
He then shows that if any animal or plant should have, by variation, any organ or 
property so modified as to give it some advantage over its fellows in the struggle for 
life, it will, as a general rule, live longer and produce more offspring; and these 
offspring will have a tendency to inherit the organ or property modified in the same 
manner: but if in one of these offspring the organ should be still further modified, it 
will give him a like advantage over his brethren, and his offspring again will have a 
tendency to reproduce the organ in its more modified state; and so on. This he calls 
‘Natural Selection.’   
Mr. Darwin thinks that this, together with the minor causes of habit, use and disuse, 
climate, &c., are sufficient to account for all the various forms of organic life, by the 
gradual transmutation of one species into another.” (Hutton 1861: 132) 
Owen followed the same line. After separating the connotative and denotative component of 
Darwin’s explanation, criticizes Darwin’s personification (Owen 1860b: 511) Wollaston’s position is 
similar when he complained in the Annals and Magazine of Natural History that 
“…to make ‘nature’ accomplish anything requiring intelligence and foresight, and 
other attributes of mind, is nothing more or less than to personify an abstraction, 
and must be regarded therefore as in the highest degree unphilosophical. […] who is 
this ‘Nature,’ we have a right to ask, who has such tremendous power, and to whose 
efficiency such marvellous performances are ascribed? What are her image and 
attributes, when dragged from her wordy lurking-place? Is she aught but a pestilent 
abstraction, like dust cast into our eyes to obscure the workings of an-Intelligent First 
Cause of all?” (Wollaston 1860: 138; cf. Owen 1860b: 511) 
This general coverage of the Darwinian explanation was complemented with a specific line of 
philosophical coverage for 
“Darwin had both the good fortune and the misfortune to begin his scientific career 
at precisely that moment in history when philosophy of science came into its own in 
England.” (Hull 1973: 3; cf. Ellegård 1958: 113, 174-97) 
His model and explanation of Evolution triggered an extensive discussion on scientific methods, 
bringing “into view some fundamental problems of philosophy of science. What was a scientific 
explanation of an event? What was a natural law? What was a cause? What was induction, and 
inductive proof?” (Ellegård 1958: 175) Darwin triggered a debate on what counted as science and 
challenged the established standards of what constitutes good scientific practice. 
This showed in the reception. Many of the reviews by the broader scientific community addressed 
philosophy of science aspects in one way or another. (Wollaston 1860; Hutton 1860; Owen 1860b; 
Huxley 1860b; Thomson 1891b [1871]) Moreover, the Origin motivated the three leading 
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philosophers of science to weigh in on Darwin: In 1861, Herschel included a footnote in his Physical 
Geography of the Globe. In 1862, Mill inserted a footnote in the fifth edition of his System of Logic, 
and in 1864 Whewell added a short discussion to the preface of the seventh edition of Astronomy 
and General Physics. (Hull 2003: 181) Neither of them provided an extensive discussion of Darwin. 
Maybe because they considered it just one of many instance of too hypothetical reasoning and not 
some interesting new argument which demanded new philosophical strategies? Probably, Whewell, 
Mill, and Herschel expressed their previously established positions on science rather than positions 
which were shaped by the reception of Darwin’s theory in philosophy of science-respects. (Hull 2003: 
169)  
iii. Classification: missing links, Man’s Place and the Archaeopteryx 
The debate within the broader scientific community covered more classificatory issues than the 
public debate; most489 reviews went substantially beyond a mere mentioning of the concept of 
common descent; I count Morris’ and Wilberforce’s papers as the sole exceptions. (Morris 1860; 
Wilberforce 1860) Already Duns, in the North British Review addressed the difference between the 
concept of the scala natura and the actual, pragmatic mode of classification. He discussed difficulties 
in classification at length and debated sterility and hybridism as possible criteria for the definition of 
species. (Duns 1860: 461-5, 484-5) 
Among the scientific authors, Hutton, in his two papers for the Geologist, presented a schematic 
diagram which illustrated the development of mollusca from prehistoric times to the Victorian 
present (Hutton 1860: 470) and discussed a detailed list of 23 biogeographical, paleontological and 
taxonomic regularities which are covered by Darwin’s static model, in both cases explicating the 
classification. (Hutton 1861: 134-6) 
Carpenter, in the British and Foreign Medical-Chirurgical Review, provided a lengthy discussion of 
common descent and applied the concept throughout the text in much detail. (Carpenter 1860a) 
Wollaston and Carpenter for the National Review discussed different definitions of species and 
developed genealogical – and hence historical – notions. (Wollaston 1860: 133-4; Carpenter 1860b: 
189-191) Carpenter specifically claimed that  
“…no species can be fairly admitted as having a real existence in nature, until its 
range of variation has been determined both over space and through time; and that 
the species of the mere collector, who describes every form as new which does not 
precisely correspond with existing definitions, can only be accepted provisionally, to 
be verified or set aside by more extended research.” (Carpenter 1860b: 190) 
and explained: 
“… we fully agree with him [Darwin], that individual differences, though hitherto 
accounted as of small interest to the systematist, are of high importance in any 
philosophical inquiry into the origin of species, as being the first step towards those 
slighter varieties which are barely thought worth recording in works on natural 
history. So varieties which are in any degree more distinct and permanent, are steps 
                                                            
489  Some reviews do already focus on specific issues of the debate and treat Darwin’s model only on the side. 
(Huxley 1860b; D.T.A. 1860; Haughton 1973 [1860]) 
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in a regular gradation that leads through more strongly-marked and more permanent 
varieties to sub-species, and thence to species.” (Carpenter 1860b: 209) 
Owen, in the Edinburgh Review, went one step further. He distinguished the metaphorical concept of 
an ancestor-heir relation from the observable differences distinguished by anatomists (Owen 1860b: 
522-3) and demanded that Darwin not only evoke the idea of a predecessors but specify (define) it, 
in order to move beyond mere metaphors: 
“Mr. Darwin's statements elude, by their vagueness and incompleteness, the test of 
Natural History facts. Thus he says:— 'I think it highly probable that our domestic 
dogs have descended from several wild species.' It may be so; but what are the 
species here referred to? Are they known, or named, or can they be defined? If so, 
why are they not indicated, so that the naturalist might have some means of judging 
of the degree of probability, or value of the surmise, and of its bearing on the 
hypothesis?” (Owen 1860b: 528, cf. 511) 
Just like the public, the broader scientific community discussed the position of Man in Nature – only 
in greater depth. To them, as to everybody, it was evident that there were undisputable systematic 
physical affinities of man with the higher apes. However, these affinities did not necessitate that Man 
had developed from the higher apes. In his pre-Origin works on apes, Richard Owen had always 
emphasized the anatomical gap between Man and the closest apes and had classified Man in a group 
of his own, apart from the apes.490 Still in 1859, Owen had claimed in a paper to the Zoological 
Society that there exists a 
“much greater difference between the highest ape and lowest man, than exists 
between any two genera of Quadrumana" (Owen 1866c [1859]:269). 
In his early reviews of the Origin already, Huxley hinted at his differing position, one which saw 
gradual differences between different species of Man and different species of apes: 
“In the face of the demonstrable facts, that the anatomical difference between man 
and the highestof the Quadrumana is less than the difference between the extreme 
types of the Quadrumanous order…“ (Huxley 1860a: 199) 
After Owen’s sharp critical review of the Origin (Owen 1860b) began a heated public debate of five 
years. (Cosans 1994: 147; Cosans 2009: 16) Huxley first publicly challenged Owen’s classification at 
the 1860 meeting of the British Association.491 In January, he specified his criticism in a paper for the 
Natural History Review. (Huxley 1861; cf. Desmond and Moore 1995: 566-7) Owen responded in 
                                                            
490  Towards the end of the 1850s, this debate had gained further steam trough the discovery of the 
Neanderthal skull near Düsseldorf, in Germany. However, neither this skull nor the 1829 Engis skull from 
Belgium were considered to bridge the gap between humans and apes. While it was admitted that “… they 
showed some transitional features, yet [, it was claimed] they were well within the range of variation of 
present-day human forms, and outside that of the anthropoid apes. […] Thus under no circumstances were 
the fossil skulls to be accepted as intermediate, they were apes, or they were men, for ape-men could not 
exist.” This position was shared by Huxley. (Ellegård 1958: 300-1) – From today’s point of view the 
Neanderthal skull forms such an intermediate step but clearly is human. 
491  For a detailed account of the meetings of the British Association from 1860 to 1872 see (Ellegård 1958:62-
94), for the episode on Wilberforce for instance (Himmelfarb 1959: 238-240). However, Ellegård points out 
that this episode did not stir much attention at the time; its supposedly crucial role in the Darwinian 
revolution is a later construction. 
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1861 in the Athenaeum and elevated the anatomical problem to one of human descent. (Desmond 
and Moore 1995: 569) Huxley countered by doing in 1863 what Darwin had not dared and would not 
dare until 1871: he published on the descent of Man in his Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature. 
(Huxley 1863; Darwin 1871) Owen meanwhile retreated to the position that there was a wide 
difference between the human and the ape hippocampus and that  
“the apes formed a continuous series of small steps, whereas no intermediate steps 
linked the chimpanzee with man.” (Ellegård 1958: 306)  
The anatomical details of this debate obviously eluded both the public and the broader scientific 
community and they were often omitted by the two opponents.492 The minute empirical descriptions 
on the question all appeared in biological journals, not in the publications of the broader scientific 
community. Thus, the debate remained in the rather vague sphere of whether there was an 
"impassable gulf" separating man and ape or not. (Ellegård 1958: 305-6, cf. 50-1, 70, 295-6) 
By the mid-1860s, Huxley had “convinced the larger scientific community that Owen was wrong” 
with respect to the hippocampus minor. (Cosans 2009: 117) This, however, did not put an end to the 
debate on human descent. Rather, in correspondence with the public discussion, Darwin’s opponents 
pointed to alleged unique human qualities to support their point. The human mind, soul, reason and 
morality were supposed to document just how big the gap was.  
Towards the end of the 1860s, this argument made Wallace switch sides. In 1869, he spoke at the 
British association and published an article in the Quarterly Review, dissociating himself from Darwin 
with regard to the Descent of Man. He further elaborated this criticism in a chapter of his 1870 
collection Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection. In a chapter named The Limits of Natural 
Selection as Applied to Man, Wallace claimed that natural selection cannot explain the development 
of mental faculties. (cf. Wallace 1870d) Obviously, it was a heavy blow to Darwinians to lose the 
virtual co-author of the theory of evolution on this issue. 
Another important classification issue caused much less of a stir. In 1861, in Solnhofen in Germany, a 
fossil had been discovered which seemed to display features of both birds and reptiles. It was 
acquired by Owen who had it shipped to London and provided the first description and classification 
of it. (Owen 1863 [1862]: 38, 43; cf. Rupke 1994: 71-74) Owen named the fossil Archaeopteryx and 
classified it as a reptile – not as a bird or an intermediate. Again, Huxley would rise to contradict 
Owen, notably in an 1862 address to the Geological Society. (Rupke 1994: 71-4) 
iv. Empirics: sketches and illustrations 
Like the public, the broader scientific community received no substantial information on the 
empirical dimension of Darwin’s theory. Examples in the reviews of the broader scientific community 
were usually longer and more detailed than in the public debate. However, most of the examples 
were still sketches and some examples of artificial selection. (Haughton 1973 [1860]; Morris 1860; 
Duns 1860; Wilberforce 1860; Jenkin 1867; Wollaston 1860; Carpenter 1860b; Hutton 1860; Murray 
1862 [1860]; Huxley 1860b; Huxley 1860a) Very few articles specified how Darwin’s theory related to 
findings of paleontology, biogeography, anatomy or morphology, and even these articles provided 
                                                            
492  Already at the 1860 meeting of the British Association, Huxley had “declined to enter into a discussion of 
facts at the meeting, but promised to present them elsewhere.” (Ellegård 1958: 92)  
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highly aggregated representations of actual descriptions of empirical phenomena. (Carpenter 1860a; 
Owen 1860b; D.T.A. 1860; Hutton 1861) Empirical issues were confined to the journals of Darwin’s 
immediate scientific community, the biologists. Therefore, as with the public, members of the 
broader scientific community did not receive the necessary information for assessing the empirical fit 
of Darwin’s theory. This showed in the criteria by which they assessed Darwin’s theory. (see below) 
v. Synthesis 
In sum, like the public, the broader scientific community received the connotative dimension of 
Darwin’s theory, i.e. its interpretation and narration as well as their ontological implications. 
However, they also received its logical component, i.e. the main concepts and sub-concepts of 
Darwin’s static and dynamic model. With regard to empirics, the broader scientific community 
received more empirical examples in greater depth but they did not receive enough information to 
grasp the empirical meaning of Darwin’s theory in the different branches of biology. 
4.2.2 By which criteria was the Darwinian theory assessed? 
The broader scientific community had a deeper understanding of the Darwinian theory and grasped 
more of its possible implications. Consequently, opponents pursued more complex lines of criticism 
to avert these implications. On one hand, they highlighted how much Darwin’s theory collided with 
Victorian world views (i) but also with established standards of scientific explanation and theorizing 
(ii, iii) and, finally, theories in other fields of science (v). Moreover, they attempted to uncover 
inconsistencies in the model (iv) and expressed classificatory and semi-empirical objections to it (v, 
vi). 
i. Conflicts with Victorian Weltanschauung: God and his purpose 
Like their laymen counterparts, many critics within the immediate scientific community opposed 
Darwin’s theory on religious or philosophical grounds. Such concerns were sometimes uttered 
indirectly by scientists but very openly by the laymen writers in this group. Morris, in the Dublin 
Review, lamented that a book which seemed so “valuable” and “genuinely scientific”, with a basis of 
fact “so unusually broad and comprehensive” and a reasoning “so dispassionate”, that such a book 
“should be marred by the introduction of so gratuitous and so repulsive an idea, or 
that the theory should be carried to such unreasonable lengths..” (Morris 1860: 59) 
Wilberforce, in his sharper tongue, portrayed the ontological implications of Darwin’s theorizing as 
outright absurd in the Quarterly Review: 
“Man, beast, creeping thing, and plant of the earth, are all the lineal and direct 
descendants of some one individual ens, whose various progeny have been simply 
modified by the action of natural and ascertainable conditions into the multiform 
aspect of life which we see around us. This is undoubtedly at first sight a somewhat 
startling conclusion to arrive at. To find that mosses, grasses, turnips, oaks, worms, 
and flies, mites and elephants, infusoria and whales, tadpoles of to‐day and 
venerable saurians, truffles and men, are all equally the lineal descendants of the 
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same aboriginal common ancestor, perhaps of the nucleated cell of some primæval 
fungus, which alone possessed the distinguishing honour of being the 'one primordial 
form into which life was first breathed by the Creator'— this, to say the least of it, is 
no common discovery—no very expected conclusion.” (Wilberforce 1860: 231) 
and wondered aloud how a Christian could advocate such ideas on the descent of Man: 
“Mr. Darwin writes as a Christian, and we doubt not that he is one. We do not for a 
moment believe him to be one of those who retain in some corner of their hearts a 
secret unbelief which they dare not vent; and we therefore pray him to consider well 
the grounds on which we brand his speculations with the charge of such a tendency. 
First, then, he not obscurely declares that he applies his scheme of the action of the 
principle of natural selection to MAN himself, as well as to the animals around him. 
Now, we must say at once, and openly, that such a notion is absolutely incompatible 
not only with single expressions in the word of God on that subject of natural science 
with which it is not immediately concerned, but, which in our judgment is of far more 
importance, with the whole representation of that moral and spiritual condition of 
man which is its proper subject matter. Man's derived supremacy over the earth; 
man's power of articulate speech; man's gift of reason; man's free‐will and 
responsibility; man's fall and man's redemption; the incarnation of the Eternal Son; 
the indwelling of the Eternal Spirit,—all are equally and utterly irreconcilable with the 
degrading notion of the brute origin of him who was created in the image of God, 
and redeemed by the Eternal Son assuming to himself his nature. Equally 
inconsistent, too, not with any passing expressions, but with the whole scheme of 
God's dealings with man as recorded in His word, is Mr. Darwin's daring notion of 
man's further development into some unknown extent of powers, and shape, and 
size, through natural selection acting through that long vista of ages which he casts 
mistily over the earth upon the most favoured individuals of his species.” 
(Wilberforce 1860: 258-9) 
In the broader scientific community, objections regularly found their form in suggestions for 
amendments to the concept of Natural Selection. Some of them had no marked divine element, yet 
most were distinctly Christian. And all aimed at complementing the Purpose and the Agent in 
Darwin’s narrative493: 
“Many philosophers and scientists were willing to accept evolutionary theory if only 
Darwin would admit divine providence. Without it they felt trapped between 
inexorable law and blind chance. The terminology of this position varied, but the 
message was always the same. Some maintained that some phenomena were law-
governed, other phenomena not. Others maintained that all phenomena were law-
governed. In either case, God instituted these laws and guided their action. A 
universe governed by divinely Instituted law did not seem so cold and barren. Add 
periodic miracles and the world-picture became even more intimate. Exclude God, 
and both accidental and law-governed phenomena became equally ‘accidental’, 
given the peculiar terminology of the time.” (Hull 1973: 60) 
                                                            
493  Note that I have identified these two elements as crucial in any scientific narrative. (see section 2.1.4) 
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I will systematize the different suggestions according to the elements of Darwin’s model in order to 
highlight where the introduction of Purpose and Agent was suggested.494 
First, the problem with Darwin’s Struggle for Life was its wastefulness. Countless individual 
organisms were born and only a fraction of them would survive to reproduce and again a fraction of 
them would bear Favourable Variations. Darwin’s opponents, however, found it “impossible to 
believe that God had so ordained that His created beings would not find subsistence enough in the 
place where He had put them” (Ellegård 1958: 118) 
One solution to this conflict was to be to deny injurious variations and all those individuals that did 
not succeed in reproducing. If one counted only the successful results one needed not “entertain the 
idea that any trial and error process took place.” (Ellegård 1958: 123) However, it was hard to uphold 
this view in the face of empirical evidence. The geologist Frederick Wollaston Hutton, in the 
Geologist, suggested steering a middle course and emphasizing purpose and design as opposing 
forces to the wasteful struggle: 
“The beautiful perfection of our bodies – the wonderful adaptations in the forms of 
animals to render them efficient for their purposes of life seem so skilfully planned, 
that it is impossible to regard them as effects of chance, and not as inapproachably 
perfect designs. If we could accept the transmutation doctrines, we must concede 
the transmutatory laws as of pre-eminently divine origin and maintenance, purposely 
conceived to be ever forcibly acting in direct antagonism to the necessity of 
destruction and change, to which all nature seems subject.” (Hutton 1860: 472) 
Another, more sophisticated suggestion, was to seek the Struggle’s divine purpose not in this world, 
but in one of Leibniz’ possible worlds. If, in one of the infinite possible worlds, Evolution was 
harmonious and ordered it would be purposeful in this possible world. And this would justify the 
lesser copy in the actual world. (Ellegård 1958: 136-7) Unsurprisingly, this solution failed to convince 
the masses. 
Second and more widespread, Purpose was assigned to the Organisms undergoing Evolution; this 
occurred in several forms, which were often combined and referred back to previous evolutionists 
like Demaillet, Erasmus Darwin, Lamarck or Chambers. However, this move usually did not imply 
assigning volition to the organisms. (Ruse 1971: 329-30, Ellegård 1958: 278) Instead, Evolution was 
sometimes ascribed to an “unconscious craving of the race, or even of Life as such”. (Ellegård 1958: 
278) Or, “the internal forces of the organism(s], or … fixed laws of development … were said to push 
the forms inevitably along the road of progressive change.” (Ellegård 1958: 268, cf. 276-7) Thus, such 
interpretation set in on Darwin’s blurring of the distinctions between Individual, Variety and Species. 
(see sections 3.4.2, 3.4.3) 
Moreover, what most of Darwin’s critics saw behind the craving of the race, or the internal forces or 
the laws of development was a Vital Force; and this Vital Force was either identical to God or acting 
on his behalf. This line of argument can again be found with Hutton in the Geologist: 
“In this light we might accept it, and trace back the natural divergence of life-forms 
to the first vital force [sic!] thrown off from the hand of the Creator, who threw off 
with an eternal and ever enduring force the vast clouds of vapours that have in the 
                                                            
494  I am leaving out Evolution for it is the element to be explained.  
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roll of ages collapsed into the myriads of worlds and suns that swarm in the heavens 
above and around us-of which we can neither see the limits nor conceive the 
expanse-but which may yet be the smallest and least wonderful of all the myriads of 
world-clusters with which the same great Creator has stardusted His course through 
the realms of boundless and interminable space.” (Hutton 1860: 471-2) 
In the extreme, such views could lead to a totally deterministic world in which God had foreseen 
both the physical changes of the world and the organisms’ adaption to them. On such view, 
“God was not considered as constantly intervening to achieve the perfect 
adaptations of living forms to their environment. Instead, he was conceived to have 
foreseen in advance all the various changes that would occur both in the organic and 
inorganic world, and to have provided the first created life-germ [sic!] with an 
internal ‘law of development’, which would carry its descendants infallibly in the 
direction beneficial to each. In other words, instead of spreading out the Divine 
interventions in time, they were concentrated into one single, and therefore the 
more wonderful event: the original creation of the first living organism, provided 
with a capability of development which would carry it further and further, and 
ultimately to the height reached by man.” (Ellegård 1958: 132, cf. 135-6)  
This point was taken up by Owen who argued in the Edinburgh Review that such a wonderful event is 
even more miraculous than the idea of continued creation: 
“[Darwin] leaves us to imagine our globe, void, but so advanced as to be under the 
conditions which render life possible; and he then restricts the Divine power of 
breathing life into organic form to its minimum of direct operation. All subsequent 
organisms henceforward result from properties imparted to the organic elements at 
the moment of their creation, pre‐adapting them to the infinity of complications and 
their morphological results, which now try to the utmost the naturalist's faculties to 
comprehend and classify.” (Owen 1860b: 511; cf. Cosans 2009: 100) 
Third, another possibility of amending Darwin’s model was to assign purpose to the Explaining 
Phenomena, i.e. Variation or Environmental Change. Such, Variations and Environmental Change 
were considered Agencies of the Agent God. As just detailed, in deterministic accounts of evolution, 
Darwin’s critics sometimes claimed that all physical changes, the external circumstances acting on 
the organism were foreseen by God, hence purposeful. (Hull 1973: 62; Ellegård 1958: 132, cf. 268, 
276-7) Such an argument shines through in Hutton’s suggestion in the Geologist to consider all 
changes in nature as pre-ordained and lawful: 
“We should incline to think that a theory which proposed to view the development of 
the required races or species as concurrent with the physical changes rendering 
necessary their presence,-and as consequently necessarily developed by natural 
laws, like we see everywhere else around us so wisely and immutably preordained, 
apparently from the be inning of all things, by the Almighty Designer,-would be 
preferable to the idea of direct creations, and affording a more reasonable reply than 
the mere assertions of the miraculous agency with which our query is so commonly 
met.” (Hutton 1860: 465) 
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More popular were reinterpretations of Variation. For instance, critics could deny the existence of 
Injurious Variations (see above) or they could attempt to relieve Variation of its randomness, 
claiming that 
“there were two sorts of variability. Ordinary variations one admitted, might be 
random, i.e., sometimes good and sometimes bad. But they never led to specific 
change. But there were other variations, of another type, which did produce new 
species: and these variations, it was claimed, were directed and designed.” (Ellegård 
1958: 126, cf. 123) 
Alternatively, the law of heredity was supposed to contain “an ‘instruction’ that … it should permit all 
improvements” (Ellegård 1958: 246) or Favorable Variations were supposed to be endowed “with a 
special power of being transmitted undiluted to the offspring. In other words, even though only one 
of the parents was improved, all the offspring would exhibit the favourable peculiarity in its full 
force.” (Ellegård 1958: 245) 
Fourth and finally, one could amend the Connector of Darwin’s model itself: Natural Selection. This 
rarely meant understanding Nature as Agent. (cf. Ruse 1971: 329-30) Instead, according to a more 
popular idealist argument, Natural Selection was understood as an “operative cause” in the sense of 
conceptual realism. (Ellegård 1958: 245) Thus ‘natural selection’ was supposed to denote not 
sequences of events but an abstract entity which acted on behalf of the Final Cause, God. (see 
below) Besides, the process of Natural Selection was frequently understood as a purposeful law, i.e. 
a law designed by God as part of his Agency: 
“Granted, for the sake of the argument, that all sorts of variation occur, was it not 
evident that intelligence and forethought were needed to select the useful 
variations? Darwin's own parallel of man's selective breeding of domestic animals 
was cited against him. […] A religious journal expressed the same view: ‘The action 
which [Darwin] attributes to natural selection is clearly regulated action. Why should 
natural selection favour the preservation of useful varieties only? Such action cannot 
be referred to blind force; it can belong to mind alone’." (Ellegård 1958: 125-6)  
While this conception portrayed God as an, albeit almighty, distant Agent, there were also demands 
to include a hands-on God who would constantly and directly interfere in the process of Evolution. 
Such, Herschel claimed: 
“EquaIly in either case, an intelligence, guided by a purpose, must be continually in 
action to bias the directions of the steps of change – to regulate their amount – to 
limit their divergence – and to continue them in a definite course.” (op. cit. Hull 1973: 
61) 
In sum, the amendments to Darwin’s explanation added an Agent and a Purpose to Darwin’s 
narrative by re-interpreting the Input and the Connector. Thus, the amendments provided answers 
to the questions why selection happened and what it happened for, they introduced God or Nature 
as an Agent (and rarely the Organisms) and they interpreted Natural Selection, Variation and 
Environmental Change as the means by which the Agents achieved their Purpose. Overall, Darwin’s 
critics, through an interpretation of his terms, transformed Darwin’s model into a narrative 
compatible with their Weltanschauung. 
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ii. Conflicts with meta-models: miracles, verae causae, design 
Darwin put at least three concepts of Victorian philosophy of science at stake: miracles, the 
argument from Design and the idealist idea of a causal explanation. For each concept, defenders rose 
and opposed Darwin. First, in Mid-Victorian science miracles where fully legitimate explanations. As 
soon as an event could not be explained by natural laws it was considered a result of divine 
intervention and called ‘miracle’. Darwin rejected such classifications as explanations, refusing “to 
take into account anything but the facts of experience”. (Ellegård 1958: 144) Thus, he stripped a 
whole class of events of their Purpose and of an Agent who produced them. (cf. Ellegård 1958: 141-
154)  
The zoologist Wollaston, in the Annals and Magazine  of Natural History, defended miracles in 
arguing that one single creation and the continuous operation of an Agent Nature – as they are 
suggested in the Origin – are no less miraculous than many independent creations: 
“To our mind, the wonder consists in the act at all, and not in the number of times 
that it may have been repeated: for a Being that can create may surely do so as often 
as He pleases; and we have no right therefore to limit that act,—at any rate on the 
question of its probability; for, if we admit that it has been exerted so much as once, 
there is no à priori reason why it should not have been a million times repeated, or 
why, if He had so willed it, it might not, at some period or other, have been in even 
constant operation. Such an idea is difficult to conceive, we admit; but (be it 
remembered) it is not one atom more so than the process of creation at all: and with 
respect to the marvel of it (so difficult, and impossible, to understand), it may be well 
to recollect that it has been contended by some of our greatest minds that even the 
sustaining power of Nature is, in point of fact, as much of a miracle as the creative 
power.” (Wollaston 1860: 142) 
Duns, in the North British Review wondered aloud why science wanted to get rid of miracles at all, 
why there should not be considered satisfactory explanations495: 
“The question of the presence of miracle, at various points in the history of the earth, 
is one which has been, with a strange want of logic, almost universally regarded by 
eminent men with suspicion. Why? We suppose very few, if any, not even excepting 
Mr Darwin, would be willing to deny that there has been the exercise, at some period 
of the earth's history, of creative power,—in a word, miracle. But if you acknowledge 
its presence at any one point, why be suspicious of it, or deny its probability, at any 
after‐point in the history? If in every respect you find, that what demanded a miracle 
at A, is again found existing at E, after having ceased to be before it again made its 
                                                            
495  Criticism of miracles was expressed by Hutton (Hutton 1860: 295-6) and by Huxley: “I have said that the 
man of science is the sworn interpreter of nature in the high court of reason. But of what avail is his honest 
speech, if ignorance is the assessor of the judge, and prejudice foreman of the jury? I hardly know of a 
great physical truth, whose universal reception has not been preceded by an epoch in which most 
estimable persons have maintained that the phenomena investigated were directly dependent on the 
Divine Will, and that the attempt to investigate them was not only futile, but blasphemous. And there is a 
wonderful tenacity of life about this sort of opposition to physical science. Crushed and maimed in every 
battle, it yet seems never to be slain; and after a hundred defeats it is at this day as rampant, though 
happily not so mischievous, as in the time of Galileo.” (Huxley 1860a: 199) 
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appearance, first at B, second at C, and third at D, is there anything to forbid the 
conclusion, that at every one of these stages there was miraculous action? One says, 
it is not God's usual way of working. But we would have needed to have witnessed 
the change from one well‐marked epoch to another, to entitle any one to make such 
an answer. It would be a waste of power, adds another. But, if intelligence is not to 
be suffocated in the blackhole of rank atheism, there must have been ten thousand 
instances of such waste of power in the introduction of new species. This form of 
answer is even less satisfactory than the other; for it ignores the fact, that with an 
Omnipotent One there can be no waste of power. But, reply others, you find in the 
species of successive fauna, very many, with only the slightest differences to 
distinguish them, and others you find continue through more faunas than one. The 
answer to both these statements, we believe, is contained in the remarks made in 
reply to the second objection. We conclude, then, that all geology testifies that 
species are permanent; that they have continued so under all varieties of influence; 
and that, in every case, they have been introduced by the miraculous power of a 
personal God, who is the Almighty and Omniscient One revealed to man in the Bible. 
Mr Darwin's work is in direct antagonism to all the findings of a natural theology, 
formed on legitimate inductions in the study of the works of God; and it does open 
violence to everything which the Creator Himself has told us in the Scriptures of 
truth, of the method and results of His working.” (Duns 1860: 485-6) 
Physicist William Thomson mentions them in a theoretical excurse on explanations: 
“Is the sun a miraculous body ordered to give out heat and to shine for ever? Perhaps 
the sun was so created. He would be a rash man who would say it was not—all things 
are possible to Creative Power. But we know also, that Creative Power has created in 
our minds a wish to investigate and a capacity for investigating; and there is nothing 
too rash, there is nothing audacious, in questioning human assumptions regarding 
Creative Power. Have we reason to believe Creative Power did order the sun to go 
on, and shine, and give out heat for ever? Are we to suppose that the sun is a 
perpetual miracle? I use the word miracle in the sense of a perpetual violation of 
those laws of action between matter and matter which we are allowed to investigate 
here at the surface of the earth, in our laboratories and mechanical workshops.” 
(Thomson 1891a [1868]: § 21) 
Second, the argument from Design was popular not merely with the public, but also among 
scientists. It is supported by Murray in the Proceedings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh: 
“Now, I cannot believe in such doctrine. When I look at the anatomy of any part of 
the body, and see exactly the same mechanism and Contrivances had recourse to 
which a mechanician [sic!] would have used to secure similar results, I cannot bring 
myself to believe that it is fortuitous, or other than evidence of the prevalence of 
direct design. A belief in such design I should be most loath to surrender, and I am 
therefore glad that, on other grounds, viz. the legitimate result of the argument 
already discussed, I have come to be of opinion that Mr Darwin's theory is unsound, 
and that I am to be spared any collision between my inclinations and my 
convictions.” (Murray 1862 [1860]: 291) 
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by Hutton in the Geologist: 
“We should incline to think that a theory which proposed to view the development of 
the required races or species as concurrent with the physical changes rendering 
necessary their presence,—and as consequently necessarily developed by natural 
laws, like we see everywhere else around us so wisely and immutably pre-ordained, 
apparently from the beginning of all things, by the Almighty Designer, —would be 
preferable to the idea of direct creations, and affording a more reasonable reply than 
the mere assertions of the miraculous agency with which our query is so commonly 
met.” (Hutton 1860: 465) 
and by William Thomson (the later Lord Kelvin) in his 1871 Presidential Address to the British 
Association, a discussion of the Darwinian theory at large: 
“I have always felt that this hypothesis does not contain the true theory of evolution, 
if evolution there has been, in biology. […] I feel profoundly convinced that the 
argument of design has been greatly too much lost sight of in recent zoological 
speculations [for] … overpoweringly strong proofs of intelligent and benevolent 
design lie all round us, and if ever perplexities, whether metaphysical or scientific, 
turn us away from them for a time, they come back upon us with irresistible force, 
showing to us through nature the influence of a free will, and teaching us that all 
living beings depend on one ever-acting Creator and Ruler.” (Thomson 1891b [1871], 
cf. Pulte 1995: 126)  
Third, to the idealists Causes and concepts as the Vital Force were substantial entities, they had an 
existence. (Ellegård 1958: 179-80; Bowler 1990: 203) Causes had to be verae causae, true causes. 
Herschel had famously claimed that explanations had to refer to causes “recognized as having a real 
existence in nature, and not being mere hypotheses or figments of the mind” (Herschel 1831: 144)496 
Empiricists like Darwin497, however, treated causes as logical fictions. Huxley drily remarked that "all 
we know about the 'force' of gravitation, or any other so-called 'force' is that it is a name for the 
hypothetical cause of an observed order of facts." (op. cit. Ellegård 1958: 181) Darwin himself stated 
his opposition to such conceptual realism most clearly in the 3rd edition of the Origin: 
"It has been said that I speak of natural selection as an active power or Deity; but 
who objects to an author speaking of the attraction of gravity as ruling the 
movements of the planets? Every one knows what is meant and is implied by such 
metaphorical expressions; and they are almost necessary for brevity. So again it is 
difficult to avoid personifying the word Nature; but I mean by Nature, only the 
aggregate action and product of many natural laws, and by laws the sequence of 
events as ascertained by us.” (Darwin 1861: 85) 
                                                            
496  The problem was to determine just what qualifies a cause as a ‘true cause’. (Hull 2003: 175)  
497  Note that, during “the Darwinian controversy Darwin's supporters quite consistently sided with the 
empiricists, while his opponents almost equally consistently took the idealist line. The Darwinians found 
philosophical support in the writings of J. S. Mill, and the long British empiricist tradition, while the anti-
Darwinians found theirs in the idealistic philosophical tradition from Plato onwards, and in the writings of 
the foremost philosopher of science of the age, William Whewell.” (Ellegård 1958: 175) Hull distinguishes 
empiricists and rationalists but I find Ellegård’s distinction more appropriate. (Hull 1973: 67) 
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To his critics, Darwin could not provide an acceptable account of what caused Evolution. To the 
mainstream idealist philosophy the task of causal scientific explanations consisted in tracking causal 
chains back to their beginning thus revealing the Supreme Cause or Final Cause: God. Idealist 
philosopher William Whewell claimed that 
“In contemplating the series of Causes which are themselves the effects of other 
causes we are necessarily led to assume a Supreme Cause in the Order of Causation, 
as we assume a First Cause in Order of Succession.” (op.cit. Ellegård 1958: 178-9) 
and considered both the Supreme and the First Cause names for God. (Ellegård 1958: 178-9, cf. Hull 
1973: 56) Thus Sedgwick demands whether natural selection is a ‘true cause’, Owen goes a long way 
with him, Wollaston and Hutton both mention true causes. (Sedgwick 1973 [1860]: 161-4; Owen 
1860b: 177, 179-80;  Wollaston 1860: 137; Hutton 1860)  
In sum, the Origin could not deliver what the idealists wished for in a scientific explanation. 
Therefore, Darwin’s opponents demanded amendments to or corrections of the model of Natural 
Selection or they would not accept it as an explanation of Evolution. 
iii. Conflicts with meta-models: induction and hypotheses 
Beyond defending notions of miracles and true causes, anti-Darwinians based their critique of 
Darwin’s theory on the opposition of induction and hypotheses. Their general accusation was that 
Darwin’s theory or at least parts of it were speculative and hypothetical, that Darwin had not 
followed the principles of Bacon and Newton. (Ellegård 1958: 189; Lynch 2001: xi) This line of 
criticism can be found in virtually all of the early reviews of the Origin. 
Both Carpenter and Hutton once refer to Darwin’s theory or parts of the theory as speculation; 
(Carpenter 1860a; Hutton 1860) Wilberforce employs the term throughout his text in the Quarterly 
Review and reverend Haughton, in his review for the Natural History Review, tells an entire story of 
speculation which link Darwin to a line of speculators from Lamarck and Buffon to the old Romans. 
(Haughton 1973 [1860]; Wilberforce 1860) To William Thomson, much of the work of geology and 
biology was speculation and lacked sufficient empirical support; he maintains this throughout his 
interventions in the debate on the age of the earth. (see below) It can also be found with his 
collaborators and friends, physicist Peter Guthrie Tait and professor of engineering Fleming Jenkin. 
(Thomson 1864 [1862]; Thomson 1862; Thomson 1866; Thomson 1869; Thomson 1891a [1868]; 
Jenkin 1867; Tait 1869; cf. Pulte 1995: 113, 116)  
Particularly harsh was Richard Owen’s criticism on this point. In his article for the Edinburgh Review, 
he refers to the Darwinian theory as a mere hypothesis and opposes Darwin’s theorizing to his own 
brand of sober inductive research: 
“In a joint paper on the tendency of varieties to form species by natural means of 
selection, [Darwin] writes:— 'Any minute variation in structure, habits, or instincts, 
adapting the individual better to the new conditions, would tell upon its vigour and 
health. In the struggle it would have a better chance of surviving, and those of its 
offspring which inherited the variation would also have a better chance. Let this work 
go on for a thousand generations, and who will pretend to affirm,' asks Mr. Darwin, 
'that a new species might not be the result?'  
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Thereupon is adduced the imaginary example of dogs and rabbits on an island, which 
we have already cited. Now this, we take leave to say, is no very profound or 
recondite surmise; it is just one of those obvious possibilities that might float through 
the imagination of any speculative naturalist; only, the sober searcher after truth 
would prefer a blameless silence to sending the proposition forth as explanatory of 
the origin of species, without its inductive formation.“ (Owen 1860b: 516) 
“all these instances of exaggerated peculiarities of structure and instinct are 
manifested in individuals which never could have transmitted them.  
No zoologist, perhaps, is better acquainted with these fatal exceptions to his 
principle of the organisation of species by hereditary transmission of variation‐
characters, than Mr. Darwin. He could not, with any pretension to free and candid 
discussion, pass over the chief instances which have checked the natural disposition 
of all zoologists to obtain inductively an infallible idea of the most mysterious 
phenomena of their science. But the barrier at which Cuvier hesitated, Mr. Darwin 
rushes through….“ (Owen 1860b: 525) 
„…instead of satisfying our craving with the mature fruit of inductive research, Mr. 
Darwin offers us the intellectual husks above quoted, endorsed by his firm belief in 
their nutritive sufficiency!” (Owen 1860b: 526) 
However, as the debate evolved, it became clear within the scientific community that one could not 
condemn the use of hypotheses498 per se. After all, both the empiricist John Stuart Mill and the 
idealist William Whewell acknowledged their necessity for science.499 (Ellegård 1958: 191, Hull 1973: 
5) Instead, anti-Darwinians began to contest the content of Darwin’s hypotheses:  
“Whewell demanded that [hypotheses] should be ‘clear and appropriate’, terms 
which he discusses at some length. The first of these requirements put a premium on 
mathematical concepts - such as gravity -, the second, which Whewell himself 
recognized was difficult to apply, was in reality a conservative criterion, serving to 
exclude such hypotheses as clashed with established view. As instances of 
inappropriate conceptions he cited mechanical and chemical hypotheses to explain 
vital powers.” (Ellegård 1958: 184)  
Likewise, the Dublin Review recommended scientists to mistrust those hypotheses that clash “with 
portions of truth already firmly established”, i.e. the established Weltanschauung. (Ellegård 1958: 
191) Overall, Herschel, Whewell and Mill agreed on the estimate that Darwin’s theory, at best, was 
not good enough, and certainly not as credible as the theory of creation by a designing intelligence. 
                                                            
498  Huxley defended Darwin on this point already in his 1860 article in the Westminister Review, claiming that: 
“There cannot be a doubt that the method of inquiry which Mr. Darwin has adopted is not only rigorously 
in accordance with the canons of scientific logic, but that it is the only adequate method. Critics exclusively 
trained in classics or in mathematics, who have never determined a scientific fact in their lives by induction 
from experiment or observation, prate learnedly about Mr. Darwin's method, which is not inductive 
enough, not Baconian enough, forsooth, for them. But even if practical acquaintance with the process of 
scientific investigation is denied them, they may learn, by the perusal of Mr. Mill's admirable chapter ‘On 
the Deductive Method,’ that there are multitudes of scientific inquiries in which the method of pure 
induction helps the investigator but a very little way.” (Huxley 1893d: 465) 
499  Interestingly, Darwin did make at least one assumption less than his predecessors. Just like Laplace, Darwin 
omitted the hypothesis of assuming the existence of God.  
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At worst, it was not a legitimate scientific theory at all.” (Hull 2003: 169) Herschel uttered his 
dismissal thus: 
“We can no more accept the principle of arbitrary and casual variation and natural 
selection as a sufficient account, per se, of the past and present organic world, than 
we can receive the Laputan method of composing books … as a sufficient one of 
Shakespeare and the Principia. Equally in either case, an intelligence, guided by a 
purpose, must be continually in action to bias the directions of the steps of change - 
to regulate their amount – to limit their divergence - and to continue them in a 
definite course.” (Herschel 1831: 12) 
Thus, the seemingly philosophical debate on scientific methods turned out to be about world views. 
Religious science clashed with irreligious science and each side defended their conception of the 
world and what role science should play in it. (Ellegård 1958: 337, Hull 1973: 65) In sum, the Anti-
Darwinian line of argument was to reveal the irreligious Weltanschauung suggested by Darwin and 
his allies500 and to reject it for its philosophical and religious implications. 
iv. Alleged inconsistencies: evolution to a limit 
Positive arguments for amendments of Purpose and Agent were flanked by attempts to dismiss 
Darwin’s model by revealing technical inconsistencies in it. Such attempts were either mathematical 
or logical objections and they were championed by 
“…a ‘North British’ group composed of Glasgow professor of natural philosophy 
William Thomson, Scottish natural philosophers James Clerk Maxwell and Peter 
Guthrie Tait, and the engineers Fleeming Jenkin and Macquorn Rankine. These men 
found the perceived anti-Christian materialism of the metropolitan scientific 
naturalists quite distasteful, and they were prepared to enter into an alliance with 
Cambridge Anglicans to undermine the authority of Huxley and his allies. They 
promoted a natural philosophy in harmony with, though not subservient to, Christian 
belief.” (Lightman 2007: 7-8) 
These men pursued two lines of technical objections against the Darwinian model. First, they claimed 
that the small random variations described by Darwin could not produce evolution, i.e. substantial 
changes in larger populations. Second, they argued that the earth was too young to allow for the 
slow-working natural selection to produce evolution. 
The first argument was brought forward by Fleeming Jenkin in his 1867 Review of the Origin in the 
North British Review. He argued that variation occurred within limits and could, therefore, not lead to 
evolution as described by the Darwinists: 
“Although many domestic animals and plants are highly variable, there appears to be 
a limit to their variation in any one direction. This limit is shown by the fact that new 
points are at first rapidly gained, but afterwards more slowly, while finally no further 
perceptible change can be effected. Great, therefore, as the variability is, we are not 
                                                            
500  Ellegård points out that “the leading Darwinians of the time – Darwin, Huxley, and Hooker - were all 
agnostics (a term invented by Huxley), while the leading anti-Darwinians, Owen and Mivart, were decidedly 
religious men.” (Ellegård 1958: 337) 
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free to assume that successive variations of the same kind can be accumulated.” 
(Jenkin 1867: 311; Ruse 1979: 204) 
Jenkin supported his argument by the claim that single large variations (“sports”) could never shift 
whole populations in new directions501 – despite their being more likely to survive and reproduce 
than other individuals: 
“The advantage, whatever it may be, is utterly outbalanced by numerical inferiority. 
A million creatures are born; ten thousand survive to produce offspring. One of the 
million has twice as good a chance as any other of surviving; but the chances are fifty 
to one against the gifted individuals being one of the hundred survivors. No doubt, 
the chances are twice as great against anyone other individual, but this does not 
prevent their being enormously in favour of some average individual.” (Jenkin 1867: 
314) 
Furthermore, even successful reproductions of favourable variations would inevitably be diluted in 
the much larger surrounding population. Figuratively speaking, one Grizzly Bear could not blacken a 
colony of Ice Bears. (cf. Ellegård 1958: 242) Underlying Jenkin’s argument was the concept of 
Blending Inheritance, the idea that in reproduction the parental characters were blended in the 
offspring. This comprised 
“the intermediate expression of two different parental characters in the offspring (a 
white-flowered plant producing a descendant with pink flowers when crossed with a 
red-flowered plant); offspring being a mixture of unblended parental characters (a 
child could have his father's eyes, hair, and walk but his mother's smile, skin color, 
and disposition); and the statistical contribution made by a variation within a 
population or a succession of populations.” (Jenkin 1867: 345)502 
Darwin reacted to such criticism by shifting his focus from strongly marked yet infrequent variations 
to less strongly marked but frequent ones as accounting for most of the preserved variations. 
(Ellegård 1958: 244-5; Hull 1973: 302-3; Ruse 1979: 211; Bowler 1990: 198-200)503 Hence, he chose 
to modify the Input or Situation Type of his model instead of its Connector: Natural Selection was not 
be touched upon. This choice implied, however, that Darwin needed more time: if variations were 
less strongly marked, it would take more generations to produce the same evolutionary effects. This 
drove Darwin in the second flank of the North British attack. 
                                                            
501  This problem was solved only in the 1950s when population geneticists have begun modeling the effects of 
individual variations on entire populations. Ronald Aylmer Fisher (1890-1962) is one of the famous 
scientists to have contributed to this strand of research. 
502  Modern genetics tells us that Jenkin’s argument is unfounded; parental characters do not blend in their 
offspring but are both preserved in the genotype – unless a mutation occurs. (This is not easy to discern as 
only the dominant characteristics are visible in the phenotype. For a more complete discussion of the issue, 
see for instance (Hull 1973: 345-349).)  However, in the 1860s, such arguments caused Darwin severe 
trouble, as he admitted in a letter to Wallace: “F. Jenkin argued in the 'North British Review' against single 
variations ever being perpetuated, and has convinced me, though not in quite so broad a manner as here 
put. I always thought individual differences more important; but I was blind and thought that single 
variations might be preserved much oftener than I now see is possible or probable.” (Darwin 1869, op. cit. 
Hull 1973: 302-3) 
503  I do not discuss the concept of pangenesis here, because it never made its way into the Origin. 
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v. Conflicts with physical models of the age of the earth 
In the first half of the 19th century, geology had not bothered to provide quantitative estimates of its 
timescales: Lyell considered geological time to be indefinite. (Desmond and Moore 1995: 638) 
Accordingly, Darwin had taken such virtually infinite time spans as his starting point in the Origin504, 
still, he “thought it necessary merely to illustrate, not prove, the vastness of geological time.” 
(Burchfield 1974: 305)  
In 1860, the lack of proof began to fall back on Darwin. In his Life on the earth, the geologist John 
Phillips attacked Darwin’s estimate of the age of the Weald, a geological formation in South East 
England. In the first edition of the Origin had calculated the Weald to be approximately 300 years 
old; Phillips, however, offered 1.3 million years, a fraction of Darwin’s estimate. In the same go, he 
claimed that the absolute earth time would not exceed 95 million years. (Philips 1860) Yet, other 
geologists disagreed with Phillips estimations, taking the debate out of the realm of both the public 
and the broader scientific community (Ellegård 1958: 87, 236): If the supposed specialists, the 
geologists, could not agree and “were on the whole hardly in a position to translate their time-scale 
into absolute figures”, what weight was to be attributed to Phillips’ objection? (Ellegård 1958: 236) 
Still, in the third edition of the Origin in April 1861, Darwin omitted the calculation and withdrew to 
vaguer statements. (Ruse 1979: 222-3; Burchfield 1974: 305-7) 
Shortly thereafter, a more formidable foe entered the ring, girt with modern mathematics and the 
fundamental laws of physics – “which to most scientists seemed far more reliable than the flimsy 
theories of the geologists.” (Bowler 1990: 194; cf. Pulte 1995: 126-7) William Thomson, the later Lord 
Kelvin, came to question Darwin’s starting point and his mentor, Charles Lyell. Thomson claimed that 
Lyell had overlooked the “essential principles of Thermo-dynamics” (Thomson 1864 [1862]: §1) and 
flat-out declared uniformitarianism wrong, asserting that: 
“geological speculations assuming somewhat greater extremes of heat, more violent 
storms and floods, more luxuriant vegetation, and hardier and coarser-grained plants 
and animals, in remote antiquity, are more probable than those of the extreme 
quietist, or ‘uniformitarian’, school.” (Thomson 1864 [1862]: §3) 
Thomson’s argument was based on the observation that the temperature of the earth increases with 
the depth by about 1° Fahrenheit per 50 British feet of descent. (Thomson 1864 [1862]: §6) Since 
“the upper crust does not become hotter from year to year, there must be a secular loss of heat from 
the whole earth.” (Thomson 1864 [1862]: §7) Through an application of Fourier’s mathematical 
theory of the conduction of heat he calculated “with much probability” that the consolidation of the 
earth’s crust 
“cannot have taken place less than 20,000,000 years ago, or we should have more 
underground heat than we actually have, nor more than 400,000,000 years ago, or 
we should not have so much as the least observed underground increment of 
temperature.” (Thomson 1891a [1868]: § 11) 
                                                            
504  Darwin spoke of “immense ages” already in his 1842 Sketch and the 1844 Essay. (cf. Burchfield 1974: 302; ) 
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The implication for Darwin’s model was obvious: according to Thomson’s estimate too little time had 
passed to allow for the evolutionary effects Darwin had modeled. (Ellegård 1958: 235, cf. Hull 1973: 
12-3)  
Thomson affirmed his objection in 1866 and Jenkin repeated Thomson’s objections in his own article 
for the North British Review. (Thomson 1866; Jenkin 1867) However, it was not until Thomson 
himself addressed the question before the Geological Society of Glasgow that the geologists felt 
obliged to respond to Thomson’s high-handed claim that “a great reform in geological speculation 
seems now to have become necessary” (Thomson 1891a [1868]: §1). 
It is important to note that Thomson’s “arguments were entirely physical […] and completely ignored 
geological evidence” (Burchfield 1974: 308-9): he had applied physical models on physical evidence 
and referred to the calculated result as ‘the age of earth’. His results conflicted with the geologists 
estimates, i.e. it conflicted with what the geologists called ‘the age of the earth’: the result of 
applying geological models to geological evidence. In sober fact, two disciplines were fighting for the 
right to name their evidence interpreted by their models ‘age of the earth’. 
Yet, “[s]o great were Kelvin's prestige and the apparent strength of his argument that most 
geologists began to rework their theories to incorporate much faster rates of change than those 
postulated by Lyell.” (Bowler 1990: 194; Burchfield 1974: 318) Darwin followed; the fifth edition of 
the Origin, published in December 1868, “contained the most significant changes Darwin was ever to 
make in his treatment of geological time. He was much more tentative and cautious in his 
pronouncements, and much more willing to admit that his earlier demands for time had been 
excessive.” (Burchfield 1974: 311) 
Finally, Hooker and particularly Huxley met the physicists’ attack. (Hooker 1868; Huxley 1869; cf. 
Burchfield 1974: 309; Hull 1973: 350) In his Presidential address to the Geological Society of London, 
Huxley dismissed the physicists’ interference with the geological debate in presumptuous manner. 
He contested the supposedly exact grounds of Thomson’s calculations, claiming that “pages of 
formulae will not get a definite result out of loose data.” (Huxley 1869: 333) 
Huxley stressed that they were talking of different times, i.e. that the terms ‘time’ and consequently 
‘age of earth’ denoted different things505 for the physicists and biologist: 
"Biology takes her time from Geology. The only reason we have for believing in the 
slow rate in the change of living forms is the fact that they persist through a series of 
deposits which, geology informs us, have taken a long while to make. If the geological 
clock is wrong, all the naturalist will have to do is to modify his notions of the rapidity 
of change accordingly' (Huxley 1869: 329) 
Despite new contributions by Tait and Thomson, the debate resulted in a dead end. (Tait 1869; 
Thomson 1869; Thomson 1891b [1871]) Darwin compromised partly, strengthening the Lamarckian 
                                                            
505  I find it interesting how very clearly Huxley states the conflict here. Physicists and geologists / biologists 
were not fighting over empirics; neither disputed the validity of the others’ observations. Rather, they 
fought for the right to use the term ‘age of the earth’. The question was whose empirical findings justified 
using the term and telling the history of the world in the public sphere. - (Hattiangadi 1971: 506) describes 
this relation between the competing theories as one of incommensurability. For once, this seems like an 
appropriate use of the term: these theories did indeed display no common measure by which they might 
have been compared. (see annex, section 6 iv) 
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concept of inheritance of acquired characteristics. (Ruse 1979: 224) Yet, at some point, he “rather 
miserably dug in his heels and refused to defer to the physicists”. (Ruse 1979: 224) In a letter to 
Hooker of July 1869 Darwin expressed the “conviction that the world will be found rather older than 
Thomson makes it, and far older than [Tait] makes it.” (cf. de Beer 1963: 175)506 His biological model 
would not be subordinate to the physical models, it demanded to be accepted in its own right. (Ruse 
1979: 210-1; Bowler 1990: 195; Desmond and Moore 1995: 638-9) 
vi. Classificatory debates: missing links, the hippocampus & the Archaeopteryx 
As in the public debate, the missing links-issue was brought up quite frequently within the broader 
scientific community, both by supporters and opponents of the Darwinian theory. In the reviews, it 
usually figured as an objection to the Darwinian theory, for instance in the reviews of Duns for the 
North British Review, Wilberforce for the Quarterly Review and the unknown author D.T.A. for the 
Dublin University Magazine: 
“This is the theory which really pervades the whole volume. Man, beast, creeping 
thing, and plant of the earth, are all the lineal and direct descendants of some one 
individual ens, whose various progeny have been simply modified by the action of 
natural and ascertainable conditions into the multiform aspect of life which we see 
around us. This is undoubtedly at first sight a somewhat startling conclusion to arrive 
at. To find that mosses, grasses, turnips, oaks, worms, and flies, mites and elephants, 
infusoria and whales, tadpoles of to‐day and venerable saurians, truffles and men, 
are all equally the lineal descendants of the same aboriginal common ancestor, 
perhaps of the nucleated cell of some primæval fungus, which alone possessed the 
distinguishing honour of being the 'one primordial form into which life was first 
breathed by the Creator'— this, to say the least of it, is no common discovery—no 
very expected conclusion.” (Wilberforce 1860: 240) 
“But if the zoology be so very far from satisfactory, when we come to the purely 
geological portion we are made to feel that it is far worse. It is the most feeble part 
of the volume; and no apology which Mr Darwin may make for it, even in his most 
insinuating style and greatest smoothness of speech, will ever be reckoned a 
substitute for the fact, that in that one department of nature in which we have a 
right to ask the author to show us the proofs, or even the remote corroborations of 
his theory, not one is to be found. […] The truth is, that if the author has wholly and 
signally failed to produce even one unquestioned corroborative proof of true 
transitional variety among present forms of life, he cannot discover material in the 
geological record for a chapter on transitional varieties in palæontology.” (Duns 
1860: 484-5; cf. D.T.A. 1860) 
Scientists used the argument, too. The biologist Murray, in the Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh, and the engineer Jenkin, in the North British Review, both refused to follow Darwin’s 
argument on the imperfection of the geological record: 
                                                            
506  Today’s science is on Darwin’s side, estimating the age of the earth at approximately four and a half billion 
years. Ironically, these calculations are once again based on physical methods and models, radiometric age 
dating. Nowadays, biology and physics can agree on what should be named ‘the age of the earth’. 
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“Now I believe no one will dispute as an abstract proposition the extreme 
imperfection of the geological record. But I cannot admit that its imperfection is of 
that character or degree that will entitle Mr Darwin to plead it in his favour. He 
dwells on the poorness of our palæontological collections—the great spaces of time 
wholly, or nearly wholly, unrepresented in them—the extreme rarity of terrestrial 
animals in the deposits—the destruction of the soft parts of most animals, and the 
crushed state of many others. I shall not follow him into his details on these points. 
All that he says on the subject may be very true—is very true— but will avail him 
nought if, in any portion of the geological records, we can find any one succession of 
strata of moderate depth which may be fairly held to have been deposited 
unintermittently, and in which we find a liberal representation of the animals of any 
one class.” (Murray 1862 [1860]: 283) 
“Something might be said as to the alleged imperfection of the geological records. It 
is certain that, when compared with the total number of animals which have lived, 
they must be very imperfect; but still we observe that of many species of beings 
thousands and even millions of specimens have been preserved. If Darwin's theory 
be true, the number of varieties differing one from another a very little must have 
been indefinitely great, so great indeed as probably far to exceed the number of 
individual which have existed of any one variety. If this be true, it would be more 
probable that no two specimens preserved as fossils should be of one variety than 
that we should find a great many specimens collected from a very few varieties, 
provided, of course, the chances of preservation are equal for all individuals.” (Jenkin 
1867: 317) 
Owen, in the Edinburgh Review, was especially candid in his dismissal of the Darwinian classification: 
“The geological record, it is averred, is so imperfect! But what human record is not? 
Especially must the record of past organisms be much less perfect than of present 
ones. We freely admit it. But when Mr. Darwin, in reference to the absence of the 
intermediate fossil forms required by his hypothesis—and only the zootomical 
zoologist can approximatively appreciate their immense numbers—the countless 
hosts of transitional links which, on 'natural selection,' must certainly have existed at 
one period or another of the world's history—when Mr. Darwin exclaims what may 
be, or what may not be, the forms yet forthcoming out of the graveyards of strata, 
we would reply, that our only ground for prophesying of what may come, is by the 
analogy of what has come to light. We may expect, e.g., a chambered‐shell from a 
secondary rock; but not the evidence of a creature linking on the cuttle‐fish to the 
lump‐fish.” (Owen 1860b: 530)507 
                                                            
507  Interestingly, Owen did not only criticize that Darwin’s classification was not sufficiently supported, he also 
demanded that Darwin specified the features of the ancestral forms he supposed to have existed: “He 
[Darwin] has, doubtless, framed in his imagination some idea of the common organic prototype; but he 
refrains from submitting it to criticism.” (Owen 1860b: 511) Owen’s demand makes sense in his focus on 
static modeling and his neglect of dynamic models. But this was not Darwin’s perspective, he was not to 
provide a graphic representation of an archetype against which future fossils might be checked. (see 
section 3.5.6; cf. Cosans 2009: 100) 
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However, there were also supportive references to the geological record. Hutton, the geologist, and 
Carpenter, the zoologist and physiologist, were much more optimistic on the matter and concurred 
with Darwin in their articles for the Geologist and the British and Foreign Medico-Chirurgical Review: 
“This record Darwin justly says is defective. No doubt, it is; no doubt there are great 
gaps in the earth's past history of which no trace remains—and many, and far more 
numerous gaps which scientific investigations have not yet filled up. Still, we may 
hope to find, and by patience and research no doubt we ultimately shall mark out, 
the great points in the picture around which the details may reliably be filled in by 
correctly drawn inferences.” (Hutton 1860: 469; cf. Hutton 1861) 
“We are fully satisfied that [Darwin] does not in the least exaggerate the 
imperfection of the geological record…” (Carpenter 1860a: 400) 
One important missing link could have existed in the class which Linnaeus had called the primates, a 
group of species which included both Man and the apes. In the debate on the hippocampus minor, 
Owen argued for a large gap and an absolute limit between humans and apes while Huxley argued 
for gradual transitions and minor differences. In his opposition to Owen, Huxley did not dispute 
Owen’s empirical findings but their interpretation: Owen had based his classification on means and 
on dynamics in brain development, i.e. he had asked how large human and ape brains are on average 
and how they develop over time. Huxley, contrarily, based his classification on extremes and on 
mature specimen, i.e. he asked whether extreme variants of mature apes and humans displayed 
significant differences.508 In sum, the debate on the hippocampus minor was a struggle over 
classifications and criteria for classification; it was a debate on the interpretation of empirical 
evidence not on the evidence itself.509 Huxley’s classificatory criteria seemed to have stuck better; he 
won the debate. Owen, however, did not back down and upheld his position.510 
A second missing link could have been the Archaeopteryx, a fossil which displayed both reptilian and 
bird-like features. It was first described by Owen in 1862 and classified as a reptile, not a bird or an 
intermediate form.511 (Owen 1863 [1862]) This brought along another opportunity for Huxley to 
publicly contradict Owen. In 1862, he praised the Archaeopteryx as one of the missing links which 
Darwin’s critics had demanded. (Rupke 1994: 71-4) As in the debate on the hippocampus minor, 
Huxley did not dispute Owen’s description of the fossil but his classification of it; thus, their debate 
was a classificatory one, not one of empirics. 
                                                            
508  Christopher Cosans provides an in-detail analysis of the debate. (Cosans 1994; Cosans 2009)  
509  Cosans links these differences back to „different metaphysical attitudes on the observer’s role in biology” 
and attempts to identify different epistemological positions in Owen and Huxley which he supposes to 
have influenced their roles as observers. (Cosans 1994: 154) Among other points, he mentions Owen’s 
opposition to slavery and Huxley’s not linking intelligence to the brain. (Cosans 1994: 137, 152; Cosans 
2009: 115, 124) – I do not know whether Cosans is right in ascribing these positions to Owen and Darwin, 
he may well be. However, I do not think that his argument is accurate: Huxley never disputed that Owen 
made wrong observations, he merely disputed how Owen interpreted his observations. Cosans seems to 
mix up descriptions and classifications based on such descriptions, a typical fallacy of proponents of the so-
called theory-ladenness of observation. (See annex, annex, section 6 iv) 
510  As Cosans reports “In 1865, [Owen] published the book Memoir on the Gorilla, which repeats the 
arguments from his 1851 and 1859 papers virtually word-for-word.” (Cosans 1994: 154) 
511  Rupke reports that this led to a discussion with a referee of the Royal Society. (Rupke 1994: 71-4) 
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vii. Pseudo-empirical objections: complexity, rudimentary organs, sterility & Man’s moral 
qualities 
As in the public debate, critics in the broader scientific community forwarded pseudo-empirical 
objections, i.e. allegedly empirical objections which were founded on distorted representations of 
reality. One line of allegedly empirical arguments focused on highly complex structures as the human 
eye, the constructive instinct of the hive bee or the neck of the giraffe. (Ellegård 1958: 249; cf. 
Haughton 1973 [1860]) It was argued that these organs were special and could not be derived from 
any incipient prototype for the removal of any part of their complex whole would stop these organs 
to function altogether.512 This line of criticism usually came from laymen whose knowledge of 
complex organs rarely exceeded idealized model versions of such organs.513 In the reviews of the 
Origin, this argument was forwarded by the bishop Wilberforce who suggested in the Quarterly 
Review how very unlikely it was that Natural Selection could have produced something as fascinating 
as the eye: 
“Sometimes Mr. Darwin seems for a moment to recoil himself from this extravagant 
liberty of speculation, as when he says, concerning the eye,—'To suppose that the 
eye, with its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the focus to different distances, for 
admitting different amounts of light, and for the correction of spherical and 
chromatic aberration, could have been formed by natural selection, seems, I freely 
confess, absurd in the highest possible degree.'—p. 186.  
But he soon returns to his new wantonness of conjecture, and, without the shadow 
of a fact, contents himself with saying that—'he suspects that any sensitive nerve 
may be rendered sensitive to light, and likewise to those coarser vibrations of the air 
which produce sound.'—p. 187.  
And in the following passage he carries this extravagance to the highest pitch, 
requiring a licence for advancing as true any theory which cannot be demonstrated 
to be actually impossible:— 'If it could be demonstrated that any complex organ 
existed, which could not possibly have been formed by numerous, successive, slight 
modifications, my theory would absolutely break down. But I can find no such 
case.'—p. 189.” (Wilberforce 1860: 248-9)514 
A second type of allegedly empirical objections concerned incipient structures and rudimentary 
organs. It was argued that Darwin could not demonstrate that all the steps by which organs are being 
developed during the growth of an organism are more favourable than the previous step. (Ellegård 
1958: 247) This line of argument, however, gained little steam for it threatened to hurt the anti-
Darwinians themselves who perceived any organ as useful and could hardly argue for the uselessness 
of incipient structures and rudimentary organs. (Ellegård 1958: 250-1)515 
                                                            
512  The same argument is still employed by modern Creationists like Intelligent Design proponent Michael J. 
Behe. (Behe 2000) – In a very simplified form these arguments also reached the public. 
513  See (Zacharias and Schulz) for an analysis of this fallacy in modern arguments for intelligent design.  
514  The last point of criticism by Wilberforce is directed at what modern philosophy of science calls 
‘abduction’, i.e. the expression of a far-reaching theory before the necessary evidence is provided. Indeed, 
Darwin’s theory was not sufficiently specified to assess whether it fit with all available or future evidence.  
515  Sometimes, anti-Darwinians sought refuge in the claim that the supposedly useless structures were useful 
to man. Such, it was “maintained that the rings of the rattlesnake were created to warn its unfortunate 
victims off … A variant of this argument was that many structures in the organic world had been created 
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A third type of objections focused on sterility, namely the assumption that members of different 
species cannot breed with one another and that therefore, one could test whether a new species has 
emerged by experimentally testing whether its members could still breed with their original type. It 
was held that if Darwin’s theory was true then 
“experiments ought to give evidence of the appearance of successive variations, 
leading by a series of small steps from one species to another. [Hitherto, no] such 
evidence had been produced…” (Ellegård 1958: 216) 
The sterility argument was uttered with much conviction by the laymen authors who addressed the 
broader scientific community; it can be found with Morris, Wilberforce and also with Duns, who 
confidently claimed in the North British Review: 
“As to Hybridism, we accept the admission made [by Darwin] at page 252, ‘I doubt 
whether any case of a perfectly fertile hybrid animal can be considered as thoroughly 
well authenticated.’ The early recognition of this by the author would have taken 
more than thirty pages from his book. The sterility of true hybrids affords another 
evidence of the jealousy with which the Creator regards all attempts to introduce 
confusion into His perfect plan.“ (Duns 1860: 484; Morris 1860: 71-3; Wilberforce 
1860: 275, 277) 
The scientist-authors were much more cautious on the matter, raising the matter but putting not too 
much weight on it. (Owen 1860: 524-6; Murray 1862 [1860]: 276, 279; Carpenter 1860a: 397-9) 
Huxley, as in his December article for the Times, urged for caution with respect to this difficult 
criterion:  
“Not only do these great practical difficulties lie in the way of applying the 
hybridisation test, but even when this oracle can be questioned, its replies are 
sometimes as doubtful as those of Delphi. For example, cases are cited by Mr. 
Darwin, of plants which are more fertile with the pollen of another species than with 
their own; and there are others, such as certain Fuci, the male element of which will 
fertilise the ovule of a plant of distinct species, while the males of the latter species 
are ineffective with the females of the first. So that, in the last‐named instance, a 
physiologist, who should cross the two species in one way, would decide that they 
were true species; while another, who should cross them in the reverse way, would, 
with equal justice, according to the rule, pronounce them to be mere races. Several 
plants, which there is great reason to believe are mere varieties, are almost sterile 
when crossed; while both animals and plants, which have always been regarded by 
naturalists as of distinct species, turn out, when the test is applied, to be perfectly 
fertile. Again, the sterility or fertility of crosses seems to bear no relation to the 
structural resemblances or differences of the members of any two groups.“ (Huxley 
1860b: 553) 
In the course of the 1860s, it was attempted to address this question experimentally but the 
outcomes were inconclusive and the debate faded out. (Ellegård 1958: 218-223, 206-9; Hull 1973: 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
solely for the sake of beauty, wholly irrespective of use.” (Ellegård 1958: 250-1) A similar case is made by 
the Duke of Argyll. In The Reign of Law, he argues that the beauty of the humming bird fulfills one function 
only: to praise God. (Argyll 1872 [1867]: 230; cf. Desmond and Moore 1995: 616, 623-4) 
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50) There never existed any substantial evidence for or against Darwin’s model with respect to 
sterility.516 
A fourth pseudo-empirical objection surfaced in the debate on Man’s descent, mostly after Owen 
had lost the hippocampus debate to Huxley. (see below) Critics claimed that Man might resemble the 
apes in his anatomical and morphological structure but that he displayed moral and mental qualities 
which put him apart from all animals. The broader scientific community shared this argument with 
the public but could bestow more scientific credibility upon it, notably after Alfred Russel Wallace 
adopted the argument. In 1869, Wallace claimed before the British Association that 
“Neither natural selection nor the more general theory of evolution can give any 
account whatever of the origin of sensational or conscious life ...” (op. cit. Ellegård 
1958: 308; cf. 278; Hull 1973: 64; Desmond and Moore 1995: 642) 
One year later, a chapter of his Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection was named The 
Limits of Natural Selection as Applied to Man. In this chapter, Wallace claimed that natural selection 
cannot explain the development of mental faculties517: 
“…the same power which has modified animals has acted on man; and … as soon as 
the human intellect became developed above a certain low stage, man's body would 
cease to be materially affected by natural selection, because the development of his 
mental faculties would render important modifications of its form and structure 
unnecessary. It will, therefore, probably´ excite some surprise among my readers, to 
find that I do not consider that all nature can be explained on the principles of which 
I am so ardent an advocate; and that I am now myself going to state objections, and 
to place limits, to the power of ‘natural selection.’ I believe, however, that there are 
such limits; and that just as surely as we can trace the action of natural laws in the 
development of organic forms, and can clearly conceive that fuller knowledge would 
enable us to follow step by step the whole process of that development, so surely 
can we trace the action of some unknown higher law, beyond and independent of all 
those laws of which we have any knowledge. We can trace this action more or less 
distinctly in many phenomena, the two most important of which are the origin of 
sensation or consciousness, and the development of man from the lower animals.” 
(Wallace 1870d: 332-3) 
viii. Synthesis 
In sum, the critique by the broader scientific community focused on Darwin’s explanation. The 
arguments on missing links, complexity and rudimentary organs centered on the model’s relation to 
allegedly empirical facts. The technical objections centered on the model’s inner logic and its 
                                                            
516  Darwin, after the study of Primula (primroses, cowslips) realized that sterility was linked to self-fertility and 
made some changes on the topic in the 4th edition of the Origin. (Ruse 1979: 214-9) 
517  Hull points out just how many prominent scientists and philosophers agreed with Wallace: “There were 
those like Sedgwick and Agassiz who wished to retain special creation to lend significance to their 
teleological claims. A majority of philosophers and scientists, however, gradually abandoned the notion of 
special creation but still wished to retain teleology as a significant doctrine. Whitehead, Dewey, and Peirce 
all espoused creative evolution, Wallace, Asa Gray, and Lyell belabored Darwin with arguments for 
admitting divine providence, especially with respect to man's mental and moral faculties.” (Hull 1973: 64-5) 
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conflicts with physical models. Finally, the philosophy of science objections focused on its compliance 
with meta-demands about proper scientific methods. 
4.2.3 Which elements of the Darwinian theory were accepted, which rejected? 
Like the public, the broader scientific community came to accept Darwin’s static model and its 
interpretation via the concept of common descent. However, again like the public, amateur scientists 
and scientists from other disciplines predominantly refused a close link between Man and the 
supposedly lower apes. After Huxley had won the debate on the hippocampus minor, critics 
retreated to the same mental and moral qualities of Man which had been cited in the public debate. 
Their most prominent advocate was obviously Wallace, the co-author of the evolution theory, who 
claimed that natural selection was unable to explain sensational or conscious life. 
With regard to Darwin’s explanation, there was a general ambiguity towards Natural Selection. 518 
Many were “hesitant about Darwin's mechanism of natural selection. There were always doubts 
about its power to do all Darwin claimed, and by the early 1870s support for it had declined even 
further.” (Ruse 1979: 229; cf. Himmelfarb 1959: 252; Bowler 1990: 183) The overall consensus among 
the broader scientific community may correspond to the account Huxley gave in his 1878 article on 
evolution in the Encyclopedia Britannica. There, he addressed the history of biology, the history of 
evolutionary thought and the etymology of the term ‘evolution’. He provided an abstract description 
of the domain of Darwin’s model, but presented no factual evidence. Huxley mentioned variation 
and natural selection but did not discuss their logical links and omitted the struggle. (Huxley 1893a 
[1878]) 
Even if recipient accepted ‘natural selection’ to denote a process in nature and admitted that this 
process had been correctly identified by Darwin, they demanded supplements to its connotation and 
the narrative in which it was embedded. (Ruse 1979: 205-6; Himmelfarb 1959: 252; Bowler 1990: 
178, 183) Like the public, scientists suggested amending more elements of Purpose and Design to the 
theory as well as attributing God a larger and more direct role in evolution.519  
                                                            
518  Michael Ruse suggests tactical reasoning behind this dichotomy: “There was therefore a tactical advantage 
to accepting evolution: one could show one's ‘reasonableness’, one could accept all of Darwin's arguments 
that one found attractive, one could avoid an all-out negative war, and therefore one could more easily 
balk at selection.” (Ruse 1979: 229) 
519  Peter J. Bowler suggests that Darwin achieved a “revolution in the values accepted by scientists” in that 
law-like explanations gained more ground in biology. (Bowler 1990: 177-9) It seems to me that some of his 
observations reach beyond the known facts. For instance, I am not sure that the following statement 
describes a majority position around the 1870s: “The Darwinists' success clearly points to a change of 
attitude within the scientific community, … the new movement was committed to a causal interpretation 
of the development of life, repudiating not only divine creation but any teleological explanation in which 
evolution was drawn toward predetermined goals. The permanent success of Darwinism lay in the triumph 
of this attitude, because the arguments over natural selection itself did not diminish as the century drew to 
a close. One might still hope – as Darwin himself did at times – that the laws of evolution would produce a 
gradual ascent of life toward higher forms, but it was no longer legitimate to use future goals to explain 
evolutionary trends. If the Creator designed the laws of evolution, His actions were no longer 
demonstrable by science and His role in the universe had to he accepted as a matter of faith. The rise of 
Darwinism corresponds to the emergence of a new generation of biologists determined to allow the 
scientific method complete access to the question of the origin of species.” (Bowler 1990: 184-5) 
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4.3 Reception by the immediate scientific community 
4.3.1 To what depth did recipients receive the theory? 
Biologists were the only group to receive information on Darwin’s theory on all four levels of my 
model; articles in their publications and specialized monographs addressed issues of description, 
classification, explanation and ontological implications alike.  
i. Application of the static and the dynamic model in empirical case studies 
Within the biological journals, most references to the Darwinian theory occurred in papers which 
applied Darwin’s static and his dynamic model in empirical case studies. The first such paper was 
authored by appeared in Ibis and employed the Darwinian model in an explanation of ornithological 
observations in Northern Africa. (Tristram 1859: 415-435) Its author, the reverend and ornithologist 
Henry Baker Tristram (1822-1906), mentioned the joint paper520: 
“Writing with a series of about 100 Larks of various species from the Sahara before 
me, I cannot help feeling convinced of the truth of the views set forth by Messrs. 
Darwin and Wallace in their communications to the Linnean Society … ‘On the 
Tendency of Species to form Varieties, and on the Perpetuation of Varieties and 
Species by natural means of selection.’ It is hardly possible, I should think, to 
illustrate this theory better than by the Larks and Chats of North Africa.” (Tristram 
1859: 429) 
and employed Darwin’s argument, mentioning both the struggle and natural selection and 
demonstrating the applicability of Darwin’s dynamic model. (Tristram 1859: 430, 432)  
Physiologist William Benjamin Carpenter (1813-1895) published a series of articles on Foraminifera, a 
marine plankton group. The last of these articles appeared in the Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society of London in 1861. In the conclusion, Carpenter explicitly linked his findings to 
Darwinian evolution and demonstrated the applicability of Darwin’s static model to complex 
classifications.521 (Carpenter 1861[1860]: 570-85) 
The same year, botanist and friend of Darwin, John Dalton Hooker published an extensive overview 
over the distribution of arctic plants in the Transactions of the Linnean Society and came to the 
conclusion that it did indeed concur with the Darwinian model: 
“It appears, therefore, to be no slight confirmation of the general truth of Mr. 
Darwin's hypothesis, that, besides harmonizing with the distribution of arctic plants 
within and beyond the polar zone, it can also be made, without straining, to account 
for that distribution and for many anomalies of the Greenland flora, viz., 1, its 
identity with the Lapponian; 2, its paucity of species; 3, the fewness of temperate 
plants in temperate Greenland, and the still fewer plants that area adds to the entire 
                                                            
520  I mention this paper because it explicitly referred to the Darwinian part of the joint paper, notably natural 
selection, which Darwin then developed in the Origin. One might also count it as reviewing the joint paper 
and ignore it for the reception of the Origin. 
521  Carpenter did not employ any of the key terms of Darwin’s dynamic model. 
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flora of Greenland; 4, the rarity of both Asiatic and American species or types in 
Greenland; and 5, the presence of a few of the rarest Greenland and Scandinavian 
species in enormously remote alpine localities of West America and the United 
States.” (Hooker 1862 [1860]: 254) 
In the Transactions of the following year, the entomologist, friend and travel companion of Wallace, 
Henry Walter Bates (1825-1892) published a long paper on the Heliconidae (Lepidoptera, butterflies) 
of the Amazonas Valley in which he mentioned all the key terms of Darwin’s dynamic and static 
model and applied both in his explanation of a large-scale classification. He even mentioned sexual 
selection and reproductive isolation:  
“The process of the creation of a new species I believe to be accelerated in the 
Ithomiae and allied genera by the strong tendency of the insects, when pairing, to 
select none but their exact counterparts: this also enables a number of very closely 
allied ones to exist together, or the representative forms to live side by side on the 
confines of their areas, without amalgamating.” (Bates 1862 [1861]: 501) 
Alfred Russel Wallace provides two further such applications in the transactions of the Linnean 
Society and the Royal Entomological Society (Wallace 1865 [1864]: 1-72; Lubock 1867: xliii-xlviii). The 
first paper is treats the variation and geographical distribution of Papilionidae (butterflies) in the 
Malayan Region and displays heavy usage of the both the static and the dynamic model of evolution. 
The second application occurs not in a paper but in a report on a discussion at an 1866 meeting of 
the Royal Entomological Society in which both Wallace and Bates intervened. Wallace defended 
evolution theory in a lengthy reply to a Dr. Sharp in which he addressed several objections and 
applied concepts of both the static and dynamic model of evolution, even mentioning the ‘Survival of 
the Fittest’ as a synonym of ‘Natural Selection’.522 
Towards the end of the analyzed period, banker-naturalist John Lubock (1834-1913) contributed a 
short paper to the zoology section of the Linnean Society. His On the Origin of Insects provides a very 
general and abstract explanation of the evolutionary origin of a large class of organisms. (Lubock 
1873 [1871]: 422-5) 
In the same volume, American missionary and naturalist John T. Gulick (1832-1923) published the 
paper On Diversity of Evolution under one set of External Conditions. He addressed evolution without 
ecological change or migration, solely triggered by variation. His argument is definitely one of the 
most sophisticated in the application of the Darwinian explanation; he weighs different sets of 
explanatory factors (Inputs) and concludes that under constant external conditions, evolution can 
only take place if one assumes a tendency towards reproductive separation (reproductive isolation): 
“A comparison of the distribution of island mollusks with the widely contrasted 
distribution of continental species, leads me to believe that the evolution of many 
different species may take place without any difference in the food, climate, or 
enemies that surround them. […]   
If we suppose separation without a difference of external circumstances is a 
condition sufficient to ensure variation, it renders intelligible the fact that, in nearly 
allied forms on the same island, the degree of divergence in type is in proportion to 
                                                            
522  Herbert Spencer introduces the term in a paper in the same volume. (Spencer 1865: 418) 
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the distance in space by which they are separated. The difference between two miles 
and ten miles makes no change in climate; but it is easy to believe that it is the 
measure of a corresponding difference in the time of separation. In forms that differ 
more essentially, the separation may have been as complete and as long-continued 
in the case of those which now inhabit one valley as in the case of those which are 
separated by the length of an island. When a wide degree of divergence has been 
established, hybridation would be precluded. We accordingly find that the difference 
between species of different genera or subgenera is in most instances equally great 
whether we take for comparison those from the same or from different valleys.  
If, on the other hand, we suppose that a difference in the external conditions is 
necessary to the evolution of distinct forms, these and other similar facts remain 
unexplained.” (Gulick 1873 [1872]: 504-5) 
ii. Discussion of narrative, ontological implications 
Within the immediate scientific community, world views are a much less frequent topic; only a few 
handful of biological articles and monographs address ontological topics and none enter into a 
discussion of Darwin’s narrative and its ontological implications. An exception is Owen who, time and 
again, confirmed his opposition to Darwinism in the conclusion of his articles, notably in his paper 
1866 on the Aye-Aye for the Zoological Society and an 1873 paper On the American King-Crab. (Owen 
1866a [1862]: 33-101; Owen 1873: 459-506) Moreover, in the third volume of his Anatomy of 
Vertebrates Owen explicitly addressed the Darwinian narrative and deconstructing it and offering a 
deist narrative as an alternative. (Owen 1868: 694, 814, 818; see below)  
Beyond these few interventions on narrative and ontological issues, however, members of the 
immediate scientific community could access the debate in the more general publications. 
iii. Meta-perspective and philosophy of science 
Towards the end of the period, a number of reviews appear which touched upon the impact of the 
Darwin on biology. Three examples stand out. In 1871, Wallace, as the president of the 
Entomological Society, reviewed a catalogue of European Lepidoptera and highlighted that  
“A very good feature in this catalogue is the separation of accidental variations from 
true local varieties or races. The former are called ‘aberrations,’ the latter only 
‘varieties.’ Those forms which some naturalists class as varieties, while others 
consider them to be good species, are termed ‘Darwinian species.’ “ (Wallace 1871: 
lx-lxi) 
In December 1874, 15 years after the publication of the Origin, Russian paleontologist Wladimir 
Kowalevsky (1848-1935), in his paper On the Osteology of Hyopotamidae, praised Darwin more 
explicitly: 
“The wide acceptance by thinking naturalists of Darwin’s theory has given a new life 
to palaeontological research; the investigation of fossil forms has been elevated from 
a merely inquisitive study of what were deemed to be arbitrary acts of creation to a 
deep scientific investigation of forms allied naturally and in direct connexion with 
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those now peopling the globe, and the knowledge of which will remain imperfect and 
incomplete without a thorough knowledge of all the forms that have preceded them 
in the past history of our globe.” (Kowalevsky 1874 [1873]: 20-1)  
Huxley, in a general paper on taxonomy one year later, assessed the contribution of evolution theory 
to taxonomy, highlighting it as introducing: 
“a new element into Taxonomy” and emphasizing that “Phylogeny, or the history of 
the evolution of the species, becomes no less important an element than 
Embryogeny in the determination of the systematic place of an animal. The logical 
value of phylogeny, therefore, is unquestionable…” (Huxley 1876 [1874]: 200) 
but also discussing its limits523 
“the misfortune is, that we have so little real knowledge of the phylogeny even of 
small groups, while of that of the larger groups of animals we are absolutely 
ignorant.” (Huxley 1876 [1874]: 200) 
iv. Synthesis 
In sum, members could receive and understand information of all levels, i.e. on descriptions of 
empirics, on classifications, explanations and on their ontological implications. This does not mean 
that everyone could judge anything but that anybody could check Darwin’s unifying theory against 
the facts in his particular domain, be it in zoology, botany, anatomy, morphology, or paleontology. 
4.3.2 By which criteria was the Darwinian theory assessed? 
i. Narrative and Philosophical implications 
As few papers in biological journals addressed Darwin’s narrative, few criticized it. All papers which I 
could find came from Richard Owen. First, in his 1866 paper on the Aye-Aye, Owen concluded a long 
description of the ape with a discussion of its origin and its relation to Man. He suggested 
degeneration as a possible explanation and dismissed both the Lamarckian and the Darwinian 
explanation in favor of a deist narrative, the creation by law:  
 “Whilst admitting the general evidence, therefore, in favour of 'creation by law,' I am 
compelled to acknowledge ignorance of how such secondary causes may have 
operated in the origin of the Chiromys. Darwin seems to be as far from giving a 
satisfactory explanation of them as Lamarck.” (Owen 1866a [1862]: 99) 
In the volume of The Anatomy of Vertebrates, Owen attempted what may have been the only public 
deconstruction of the Darwinian narrative. (Owen 1868) He explicitly criticized Darwin’s 
personification and his core metaphor ‘natural selection’: 
                                                            
523  The same point was made by Brady, Parker and Jones some years earlier without mentioning Darwin. 
(Brady, Parker, and Jones 1871 [1869]: 198) 
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“Assuming, then, that Palaeotherium did ultimately become Equus, I gain no 
conception of the operation of the effective force by personifying as ' Nature ' the 
aggregate of beings which compose the universe, or the laws which govern these 
beings, by giving to my personification an attribute which can properly be predicated 
only of intelligence, and by saying, ‘Nature has selected the mid-hoof and rejected 
the others.' … to say that Palaeotherium has graduated into Equus by 'Natural 
Selection' is an explanation of the process of the same kind and value as that which 
has been proffered of the mystery of 'secretion.' [..] Such figurative language, I need 
not say, explains absolutely nothing of the nature of bilification.” (Owen 1868: 794) 
A couple of pages later, Owen drove his point even further and demonstrated to what absurdities the 
Darwinian metaphor could be stretched: 
“Amber or steel when magnetised seem to exercise a ‘selection’: they do not attract 
all substances alike.” (Owen 1868: 818) 
In his paper 1873 paper on the American King-Crab, Owen concluded a long description with a 
discussion of the genealogical position. (Owen 1873: 459-506) Only last paragraph addresses 
ontological questions and Owen statement sounds more like a proud declamation in a long-lost 
battle than an attempt to convince the readers by his explanation: 
“That old Ocean should have afforded the chance conditions of origin of crustaceous 
subclasses, orders, genera, species, by ' Natural Selection,' is not conceivable by me: 
the metaphysical fact that there is ' will,' that a ' sense of the beautiful' exists, that ' a 
love of virtue' operates, opposes the supposition. Such fact sufficeth for the rejection 
of a ' Nature ' working without will, taking no counsel of either the good or the 
beautiful, casting up from her dark abyss only eternal transformations of herself, 
furthering, with the same restless activity, decline and increase of organs, death and 
life of individuals, extinction and origination of species. Nevertheless I hold by the 
conviction that till forms and grades of Articulata are due to ' secondary cause or law' 
as strongly as when I expressed the same belief in regard to the Vertebrata, and 
denned it as ‘the deep and pregnant principle in Philosophy’ evolved in the 
researches on the General Analogies and Archetype of the Vertebrate Skeleton.” 
(Owen 1873: 501-2) 
ii. Empirical fit of Darwin’s dynamic and model 
Papers which challenged Darwin’s dynamic model in its application to empirics were equally rare.524 
The above-mentioned Dr. Sharp specified a number of observations or non-observations with which, 
on his account, the Darwinian model did not comply. (Lubock 1867: xlv-xlviii) 
James Murie, the prosector to the Zoological Society, and St. George Jackson Mivart525 present 
another supposedly526 empirical challenge in their paper on the anatomy of Lemuroidea (lemurs). 
                                                            
524  It seems that most opponents of the theory ignored it in their papers in biological journals rather than 
opposing it. 
525  Mivart was a Darwinian early in his career but dissociated himself from Darwinian materialism, notably 
with respect to Man’s supposedly unique features, morals, soul and reason. This led to a rupture with 
Huxley, Darwin and Hooker. (Desmond and Moore 1995: 643, cf. 689-90)  
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They describe a “peculiar modification of the nail of the petal index” and question its utility, 
challenging:  
“How this mutilation can have aided in the struggle for life, we must confess, baffles 
our conjections on the subject; for that a very appreciable gain to the individual can 
have resulted from the slightly lessened degree of required nourishment thence 
resulting (i.e. from the suppression) seems to be an almost absurd supposition.” 
(Murie and Mivart 1872 [1866]: 91-2) 
The empirical fit of Darwin’s static model, i.e. its adequacy as a classification, was no big issue. While 
the empirical papers on the relationship of Man with the apes and on the Archaeopteryx appeared in 
the biological journals, the battles on their interpretation were fought in the more general 
publications. (cf. Owen 1857; Owen 1862a; Owen 1866a [1862]; Owen 1863 [1862]; Owen 1865) I 
found one paper named On the Posterior Lobes of the Cerebrum of the Quadrumana in which 
anatomist William Henry Flower (1831-1899) took up the question, mentioned opposing reports on 
the existence of a hippocampus minor in apes but denied the relevance of the hippocampus minor 
with respect to the descent of Man: 
“whatever inferences others may draw from the facts related, for my own part I see 
no reason to assign any special importance, in determining the value of such a 
theory, to the condition of the particular portion of the cerebral organization now 
under consideration, especially as the general dose resemblance between the 
physical structure of Man and the Quadrumana has long been a matter of common 
observation.” (Flower 1862: 187-9) 
4.3.3 Which elements of the Darwinian theory were accepted, which rejected? 
i. Overview 
Of the 1.916 articles published in biological journals between 1859 and 1875/6, 88 mention the 
concept natural selection (4.59%), 150 the concept evolution (7.69%), 192 the concept homology 
(10.02%).527 Both Darwinian concepts overlap in 46 articles, i.e. 46 of the 150 articles which mention 
evolution (30.67%) and 46 of the 88 articles which mention natural selection (52.27%) do also 
mention the other concept. Overall, 192 of the 1.916 articles mention at least one of the Darwinian 
concepts, exactly the same share as for homology. (10.02%) 
On the 34.209 journal pages, 271 hits were counted for natural selection, 580 for evolution, and 915 
for homology. The concept natural selection was thus employed with an average intensity of one hit 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
526  From a Darwinian point of view this challenge is based on a fallacy for it presumes that every sustainable 
change is covered by the Darwinian model. 
527  The medians were 4.41% for natural selection, 7.69% for evolution and 8.60% for homology. 
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every 126 pages. Usage528 of evolution was twice as intense; references could be found every 59 
pages. Homology was mentioned every 37 pages.529 
26 papers mention evolution five or more times. Of these, five papers come from Wallace, and two 
apiece from Darwin and Huxley and the Duke of Argyll in his presidential addresses to the Royal 
Society of Edinburgh. No other author contributed more than one. 13 of these 26 papers mention 
evolution ten or more times. Of these 13 papers, three come from Wallace, two from Darwin, two 
from Argyll; no other author contributed more than one. Natural selection is mentioned more than 
five times in 8 articles and more than ten times in 6 articles. All of these latter articles overlap with 
the high-intensity articles on evolution; any paper which mentioned natural selection at least five 
times did also mention evolution at least five times. The same is true for articles with ten or more 
hits. 
ii. Development over time530 
Before 1859, 10 volumes with 194 articles contained zero references to natural selection (as was 
expected), 7 to evolution (3.60%) and 16 to homology (8.24%). Thus, from the pre-Origin period to 
the post-Origin period, the frequency531 of the concept evolution doubled while hits for homology 
increased by ca. 25%. In its best three years, from 1865 to 1867, natural selection was referred to in 
8.05, 8.26 and 8.85 percent of all articles. In its worst three years – 1859, 1863, 1864 – it was 
mentioned in 2.36, 0.00 and 2.67 percent of all articles.532 Evolution was mentioned most frequently 
in 1866, 1867 and 1871 when 15.04, 21.84 and 9.80 percent of all articles mentioned it. In its worst 
years – 1860, 1868 and 1874 – references decreased to 2.22, 2.15 and 4.21 percent. Homology had 
its peak years in 1862, 1866 and 1869 when it was employed in 16.85, 15.04, and 15.69 percent of all 
articles. Its worst years – 1860, 1861 and 1864 – saw 4.44, 2.65, and 6.67 percent of articles 
mentioning homology. 
When one divides the analyzed period in thirds and looks at six-year spans533, natural selection was 
mentioned most in the middle period, from 1865 to 1870, in 6.25% of all articles. From 1859 to 1864 
it was mentioned least frequently (3.53%) and from 1871 to 1875/6 second most often (4.05%). For 
evolution, the trend is similar; its use changed from 5.79% in the first to 10.00% in the second, to 
7.92% in the third period. References to homology display less peaks and increase steadily from 
9.04% to 10.47% to 10.74% over time.  
                                                            
528  These differences are more marked than the differences between the percentages of articles which cite 
the concepts. Thus, the concepts which appear in more articles are also more frequently used within these 
articles. 
529  The medians were 238 for natural selection, 70 for evolution and 45 for homology. 
530  Remember that articles were attributed to the publication year of the volumes in which they were 
published not to the year in which they were read. For journals which did not publish yearly volumes, 
trends are delayed.  
531  By ‘frequency’ I denote the number of articles which mention the concept, by ‘intensity’ the overall 
number of hits in relation to the number of pages. 
532  In 1863, only two volumes were published – by the Ibis and the Royal Society of London – and the number 
of when the number of articles and pages was below 50% of the average. Within the analyzed period, it is 
thus the year with the smallest sample size. This explains much of the extremes. 
533  In some case the latest considered volume was published in 1875 and the third period comprises five years 
only. 
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Regarding intensity, trends are similar. In its peak years 1859, 1862, 1866, natural selection was 
mentioned every 40, 35 and 65 pages. In 1868, 1872 and 1875/6 it was cited only every 436, 623 and 
561 pages. Evolution peaked in 1862, 1866 and 1867 at one reference every 21, 28 and 36 pages. 
Homology reached its highest intensity in 1859, 1862 and 1866 at 16, 18 and 19 pages between 
references and its lowest in 1860, 1861 and 1864 at 114, 125 and 114 pages between references. 
Figure 27 and Figure 28 provide an overview over the timely development, Table 20 more details. 
 
Figure 27: Mentions of concepts: homology, evolution, natural selection (1857/8-1875/6) 
  
Figure 28: Intensity of usage: homology, evolution, natural selection (1857/8-1875/6)534 
This independence of the dissemination of the Darwinian concepts and Owen’s homology complies 
well with an episode which Nicolaas A. Rupke reports:  
“…in 1870 Huxley's friend E. Ray Lankester proposed to abandon the term 'homology' 
because as he disdainfully argued - it belonged 'to the old Platonic school' and was 
connected with the notion of an ideal type [e.g. Owen’s archetype]. Before Darwin, 
embryonal development had already been accepted as the reliable guide to 
homology, and since the appearance of the Origin of Species, it had become common 
descent: Lankester now suggested that 'homology' he replaced with two other terms, 
                                                            
534  For frequencies below 200 pages between references exact values are not displayed. (see Table 20) 
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'homogeny' to indicate genetically related structures; and as no genetic identity 
exists between, for example, legs and arms: he proposed for the phenomenon of 
such serially homologous parts the term 'homoplasy' or, under particular conditions 
of origin, 'homotrophy'.“ (Rupke 1994: 217) 
Lankester’s suggestion petered out. Owen’s concept continued to be used for the aggregation of 
empirical descriptions and was combined with Darwin’s interpretation of the resulting static model 
and, by some, with Darwin’s explanation. Just as Darwin had reinterpreted Owen’s archetype as an 
actual and observable progenitor, homologies could be interpreted as indications of actual 
evolutionary relations and this reinterpretation did not require a renaming of Owen’s terminology. 
iii. Positive, neutral and negative hits535,536 
Negative hits are rare; 7 of the 88 references to natural selection dismissed the concept, 4 of the 150 
references to evolution. No year saw more than two dismissive references for either concept; the 
number is too small to deduce any pattern from it. The eleven dismissive references come from nine 
articles, four authors and three journals only: Four of the articles were authored by Richard Owen 
and published in the Transactions of the Zoological Society in 1866, 1869 and 1872. Two of the 
articles were presidential addresses to the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1860 and 1864 and came 
from the Duke of Argyll, the politician who presided at the Association at the time. (Argyll 1862 
[1860]: 350-77; Argyll 1865 [1864]: 264-311) Another article from the Edinburgh Proceedings was 
authored by Andrew Murray read in 1860. (Murray 1862 [1860]: 274-291) Finally two critical articles 
came from presidential addresses to the Transactions of the Royal Entomological Society. (Westwood 
1872: liv-lxi; Westwood 1873: xxxix-xlv) If one excludes the articles from the Duke of Argyll, who was 
no scientist, then seven articles from three authors remain – among 1.916 articles over 17 years.  
Of the 88 references to natural selection 77% are positive (3.55% of all articles) and 15% neutral. To 
evolution, 73% of the 150 references were positive and 24% neutral such that 5.74% of all articles 
supported the concept. The articles with positive references to either of the concepts overlap in 34 
articles such that exactly half of all articles which use or support the concept natural selection also 
use or support the concept evolution. Conversely, 34 of the 110 articles which employ or support 
evolution do also employ or support natural selection. (30.91 %) Consequently, the number of 
articles which support at least one of the concepts amounts to 144, i.e. 7.52%. 
Over all three six-year spans, the absolute number of neutral references remained about constant for 
both concepts. In the second span (1865-70), however, the absolute number of positive references 
increased. Therefore, in these six years of heated public debate, the relative relation between both 
changed to 80% positive references and 13% neutral references for natural selection as well as 78% 
positive and 19% neutral references for evolution.537 (For more details, see Table 20) 
                                                            
535  Remember that a mere mention of a concept was counted as a neutral use. Explicit approval of a concept 
or its application to specific cases was counted as a positive use. Explicit criticism or disapproval of a 
concept was counted as a negative case. 
536  Remember that or homology, this was not studied because the concept had much less theoretical import 
than Darwin’s concepts and encountered less much criticism. Therefore, rejections were not expected. 
537  By my estimate by far the largest number of positive references throughout the entire studied period are 
cases where the author applies one of the Darwinian concepts in order to explain a specific set of 
observations. Explicit praise of the concepts was rare, though not as rare their explicit rejection. 
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25 of the 26 which mention evolution five or more times and 12 of the 13 papers which mention it 
ten or more times are positive, i.e. endorse or employ the concept. The lone exception is the same 
1866 paper from Richard Owen for the Transactions of the Zoological Society. 6 of the 8 articles 
which mention natural selection five or more times are positive and 3 of the 6 articles which mention 
it ten or more times. Thus, high-intensity articles support evolution but half of them dismiss natural 
selection. 
iv. Concepts and keywords 
The 271 references to the concept natural selection contained the string ‘select’ 138 times (50,92%), 
the string ‘preserv’ 79 times (29.15%) and the string ‘struggle’ 54 times (19.93%). Over the three six-
year spans uses of the string ‘select’ decreased remarkably, from 53.57 to 58.76 to 33.87 percent of 
all references to the concept natural selection.538 Meanwhile, the share of ‘preserv’ increased from 
23.21 to 24.74 to 46.77 percent. 
The 580 references to the concept evolution are distributed rather unequally and the distribution 
shifts over time. Only the strings ‘origin’ and ‘descen’ accounted for more than 10 percent of the hits 
throughout the three six-year spans; on average ‘origin’ produced 37.07% of the hits, ‘descen’ 
19.83%. ‘evol’ is hardly mentioned in the first two spans but accounts for 17.39% of the hits between 
1871 and 1875. ‘progen’ and ‘inherit’ each peak between 1865 and 1870 and display significantly 
lower values in the other two six-year spans. (For more details, see Table 20) For the concept of 
homology, the hits for the string ‘archetyp’ could be neglected; every article which mentioned 
‘archetyp’, did also mention ‘homolog’. Moreover, of the five references to Richard Owen’s 
archetype concept, four are from Owen himself. (The other one comes from Mivart.) 
It was checked whether the references for one of the concepts came predominantly from a small 
group of authors but no strong pattern appeared. While the concepts were indeed often used by 
their prominent supports – Owen for homology, Darwin, Bates, Bentham, Wallace for the Darwinian 
concepts – no small group accounted for anything close to a majority of the respective references. 
Interestingly, Owen’s concept of homology was frequently employed by Darwinians, for instance by 
Bates, Wallace, Huxley, Hooker but also by Darwin himself. (Darwin 1862: 152; Darwin 1865: 190; 
Darwin 1867 [1865]: 48-117) 
 
                                                            
538  From cursory reading, I gained the impression that towards the end of the period, the latter two strings 
were not necessarily associated to the term ‘natural selection’ anymore. Thus, the number of references to 
the concept natural selection might be artificially high. To test this impression would require a more 
detailed study – If it is possible at all. 
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Table 20: Overview quantitative analysis (1857/8-1875/6) 
Median
< 1858 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875/6 59-64 65-70 71-75/6 59-76 59-76
# of volumes 6 4 5 4 5 7 2 6 5 5 4 4 6 6 5 5 6 4 6 29          30            26            85               5            
# of articles 137 57 127 90 113 178 50 150 109 113 87 93 102 136 102 117 123 95 131 708        640          568          1.916         113        
# of pages 1511 1148 1615 1139 1622 1974 859 2159 1725 1898 1998 2179 2358 3337 2363 1868 2974 1898 2243 9.368    13.495    11.346    34.209       1.974    
# of articles 0 0 3 4 5 9 0 4 9 10 7 3 5 6 3 3 9 4 4 25          40            23            88               4            
select* 0 0 2 2 1 7 0 3 6 6 3 2 3 5 3 1 5 4 2 15          25            15            55               3            
preserv* 0 0 2 0 3 3 0 0 2 5 4 1 1 3 0 1 4 2 1 8            16            8               32               2            
struggle* 0 0 3 2 3 5 0 2 3 4 3 1 2 1 1 1 5 1 1 15          14            9               38               2            
% of articles 0,00% 0,00% 2,36% 4,44% 4,42% 5,06% 0,00% 2,67% 8,26% 8,85% 8,05% 3,23% 4,90% 4,41% 2,94% 2,56% 7,32% 4,21% 3,05% 3,53% 6,25% 4,05% 4,59% 4,41%
affirmative 3 3 4 5 0 4 7 7 7 2 4 5 3 2 8 2 2 19          32            17            68               4            
neutral 0 1 1 2 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 4            5               4               13               1            
negative 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 2            3               2               7                 -             
# of hits 0 0 40 4 7 56 0 5 22 29 19 5 8 14 6 3 41 8 4 112        97            62            271             8            
select* 0 0 20 2 1 34 0 3 17 13 9 3 5 10 4 1 10 4 2 60          57            21            138             4            
preserv* 0 0 11 0 3 12 0 0 2 10 7 1 1 3 0 1 25 2 1 26          24            29            79               2            
struggle* 0 0 9 2 3 10 0 2 3 6 3 1 2 1 2 1 6 2 1 26          16            12            54               2            
1 hit per __ pages n.a. n.a. 40 285 232 35 n.a. 432 78 65 105 436 295 238 394 623 73 237 561 84          139          183          126             238        
# of articles 5 2 7 2 5 14 4 9 7 17 19 2 7 12 10 9 11 4 11 41          64            45            150             
evol* 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 1 0 0 1 2 5 3 3 5 2            6               18            26               1            
transmut* 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 4 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 4            6               3               13               1            
inherit* 0 0 1 0 1 3 0 0 3 2 2 0 1 2 3 1 3 1 1 5            10            9               24               1            
fit* 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 1 3            5               5               13               1            
origin* 1 2 4 2 2 12 4 7 3 9 6 1 5 3 6 1 6 1 4 31          27            18            76               4            
ancest* 1 0 1 0 1 5 0 0 1 2 2 0 2 5 4 4 6 2 3 7            12            19            38               2            
progen* 3 0 3 0 2 4 0 1 2 1 10 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 10          18            8               36               2            
descen* 1 0 2 0 2 6 1 2 1 5 6 1 1 5 3 0 5 1 4 13          19            13            45               2            
% of articles 3,65% 3,51% 5,51% 2,22% 4,42% 7,87% 8,00% 6,00% 6,42% 15,04% 21,84% 2,15% 6,86% 8,82% 9,80% 7,69% 8,94% 4,21% 8,40% 5,79% 10,00% 7,92% 7,83% 7,69%
affirmative 5 0 4 10 2 7 5 14 15 1 5 10 10 3 9 2 8 28          50            32            110             5            
neutral 2 2 1 4 2 2 2 3 4 1 0 2 0 5 1 2 3 13          12            11            36               2            
negative 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 -             2               2               4                 -             
# of hits 13 4 33 3 35 95 10 13 23 67 55 4 34 24 34 17 73 35 25 189        207          184          580             33          
evol* 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 3 1 0 0 1 2 7 10 6 7 3            6               32            41               1            
transmut* 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 9 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 4            11            3               18               1            
inherit* 0 0 1 0 1 5 0 0 7 12 2 0 4 3 4 1 3 1 1 7            28            10            45               1            
fit* 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 3 3 0 0 1 0 1 5 1 1 3            8               8               19               1            
origin* 5 4 19 2 16 51 7 8 8 30 14 1 11 3 12 1 25 2 5 103        67            45            215             8            
ancest* 1 0 1 0 5 9 0 0 1 3 2 0 2 8 9 5 10 6 4 15          16            34            65               3            
progen* 4 0 8 0 2 5 0 1 4 1 20 2 1 2 2 2 2 7 3 16          30            16            62               2            
descen* 1 0 2 0 8 23 1 4 1 6 11 1 16 6 4 0 17 11 4 38          41            36            115             4            
1 hit per __ pages 116 287 49 380 46 21 86 166 75 28 36 545 69 139 70 110 41 54 90 50          65            62            59               70          
# of articles 11 5 13 4 3 30 4 10 9 17 6 8 16 11 11 16 9 11 14 64          67            61            192             11          
homolog* 11 5 13 4 3 30 4 10 9 17 6 8 16 11 11 16 9 11 14 64          67            61            192             11          
archetyp* 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 1            -               4               5                 -             
% of articles 8,03% 8,77% 10,24% 4,44% 2,65% 16,85% 8,00% 6,67% 8,26% 15,04% 6,90% 8,60% 15,69% 8,09% 10,78% 13,68% 7,32% 11,58% 10,69% 9,04% 10,47% 10,74% 10,02% 8,60%
# of hits 27 8 100 10 13 112 16 19 26 101 54 48 43 57 58 75 37 93 58 270        329          321          920             54          
homolog* 27 8 100 10 13 111 16 19 26 101 54 48 43 57 56 74 36 93 58 269        329          317          915             54          
archetyp* 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 1            -               4               5                 -             
1 hit per __ pages 56 144 16 114 125 18 54 114 66 19 37 45 55 59 41 25 80 20 39 35          41            35            37               45          
Darwin* (# of articles) 0 0 2 2 3 10 1 6 6 11 3 4 5 3 2 2 3 3 2 24          32            12            68               3            
Darwin* (# of hits) 0 0 1 5 3 56 1 7 17 22 11 9 5 23 3 2 6 5 2 73          87            18            178             5            
Overview Quantitative Analyis: Share of articles which mention concepts, frequency of references to the concepts
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v. Distribution over journals 
If one compares the six journals which certainly addressing the immediate scientific community of 
biology to the two borderline cases – the transactions of the Royal Societies – few marked 
differences appear. The Darwinian concepts are mentioned about equally often in the group of six as 
in the group of eight. The same is true regarding intensity. Homology, however, produces markedly 
stronger effects in the group of eight, i.e. it is less often mentioned in the journals of the Royal 
Societies. (See Table 21 for the comparison and Table 22 to Table 25 for the individual journals.) 
 
Aggregate values over all eight journals Aggregate values without Royal Societies 
Sample size 
# of 
volumes 
# of  
articles 
# of  
pages 
# pages  
per article 
# of 
volumes 
# of  
articles 
# of  
pages 
# pages  
per article 
85 1.916 34.209 18 63 1.686 29.443 17 
Natural  
Selection 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
Aggregates 88 4,59% 271 126 78 4,63% 229 129 
select* 55 3% 138 248 48 3% 115 256 
preserv* 32 2% 79 433 29 2% 71 415 
struggle* 38 2% 54 634 32 2% 43 685 
Utilization total positive neutral Negative total Positive neutral negative 
Totals 88 68 13 7 78 63 11 4 
in % 100% 77% 15% 8% 100% 81% 14% 5% 
Evolution 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
Aggregates 150 7,93% 580 59 124 7,35% 427 69 
evol* 26 1% 41 834 18 1% 31 950 
transmut* 13 1% 18 1901 6 0% 11 2677 
inherit* 24 1% 45 760 20 1% 30 981 
fit* 13 1% 19 1800 9 1% 11 2677 
origin* 76 4% 215 159 67 4% 173 170 
ancest* 38 2% 65 526 26 2% 44 669 
progen* 36 2% 62 552 32 2% 52 566 
descen* 45 2% 115 297 36 2% 75 393 
Utilization total positive neutral Negative total Positive neutral negative 
Totals 150 110 36 4 124 93 27 4 
in % 100% 73% 24% 3% 100% 75% 22% 3% 
Homology 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
Aggregates 192 10,02% 915 37 116 6,88% 547 54 
homolog* 192 10% 915 0 116 7% 547 0 
archetyp* 5 0% 5 0 3 0% 3 0 
Darwin* 68 4% 178 192 61 4% 126 234 
Table 21: Quantitative analysis: Aggregate values for all eight journals and without Royal Societies 
Of the 1.916 articles, more than half (53.18%) are contributed by the Royal Entomological Society 
and the British Ornithologists’ Union (Ibis). They also account for nearly half of the pages (45.84%) 
and have, thus, a marked effect on the overall values. Unsurprisingly, least articles came from the 
Royal Societies, 100 from London and 130 from Edinburgh, which sum up to 12.00% of the overall 
number. The shortest papers come from the Edinburgh proceedings, which often only printed 
abstracts or titles of lectures; Edinburgh papers are on average less than 4 pages long and account 
for 1.40% of all pages. In turn, the longest papers are found in the London transactions, of which the 
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100 articles have an average length of 43 pages and account for 12.53% of all pages. The remaining 
journals oscillate between article lengths of 11 and 29 pages, relative close to the average of 17. 
As a measure for the overall intensity of theoretical discourse, one may ask for how frequently any of 
the concepts was employed. Over all eight journals, one of the concepts is found every 19 pages. This 
number is significantly higher for the Royal Society of Edinburgh (4), the Zoological Society (8), the 
Royal Society of London (10), and the Transactions of the Linnean Society (12). All of these intensities 
are driven by the concept homology which has exceptionally strong showings in each of the journals. 
 
Transactions of the Linnean Society Linnean Society - Proceedings Botany 
Sample size 
# of 
volumes 
# of  
articles 
# of 
pages 
# pages  
per article 
# of 
volumes 
# of  
articles 
# of 
pages 
# pages  
per article 
8 173 4.218 24 11 219 3.625 17 
Natural  
Selection 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
Aggregates 10 5,78% 53 80 9 4,11% 34 107 
select* 9 5% 39 108 4 2% 6 604 
preserv* 3 2% 8 527 4 2% 23 158 
struggle* 4 2% 6 703 4 2% 5 725 
Utilization total positive neutral Negative total Positive neutral negative 
Totals 10 9 - 1 9 8 1 - 
in % 100% 90% 0% 10% 100% 89% 11% 0% 
Evolution 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
Aggregates 22 12,72% 114 37 15 6,85% 77 47 
evol* 4 2% 5 844 - 0% - n.a. 
transmut* 1 1% 1 4218 - 0% - n.a. 
inherit* 6 3% 10 422 4 2% 7 518 
fit* 1 1% 1 4218 1 0% 1 3625 
origin* 11 6% 48 88 12 5% 35 104 
ancest* 9 5% 17 248 2 1% 2 1813 
progen* 6 3% 13 324 3 1% 5 725 
descen* 10 6% 19 222 4 2% 27 134 
Utilization total positive neutral Negative total positive neutral negative 
Totals 22 21 1 - 15 13 2 - 
in % 100% 95% 5% 0% 100% 87% 13% 0% 
Homology 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
Aggregates 43 24,86% 184 23 12 5,48% 31 117 
homolog* 43 25% 184 23 12 5% 31 117 
archetyp* 2 1% 2 2109 - 0% -  
Darwin* 9 5% 22 192 4 2% 4 906 
Table 22: Quantitative analysis: Linnean Society – Transactions & Proceedings Botany (1859-75/6) 
The least intense theoretical discourse display The Ibis (96), the Royal Entomological Society (51) as 
well as the botany (26) and the zoology section (22) of the Linnean Society.539 As the Ibis and the 
Transactions of the Royal Entomological Society constitute about half of the data set, their effect on 
the average is marked. With the exception of the Zoological Society, these frequencies correlate to 
the general character of the journals: the Transactions are the most abstract publication of the 
Linnean Society and the transactions of the Royal Societies are borderline cases between the broader 
and immediate scientific community anyway; they discuss more theoretical issues.  
                                                            
539  For the latter two, the frequency might have been lowered by bad scan quality. 
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Linnean Society - Proceedings Zoology Transactions of the Zoological Society 
Sample size 
# of 
volumes 
# of  
articles 
# of  
pages 
# pages  
per article 
# of 
volumes 
# of  
articles 
# of  
pages 
# pages  
per article 
10 191 3.450 18 5 84 2.469 29 
Natural  
Selection 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
Aggregates 12 6,28% 59 58 6 7,14% 10 247 
select* 6 3% 28 123 4 5% 7 353 
preserv* 9 5% 20 173 2 2% 2 1235 
struggle* 5 3% 11 314 1 1% 1 2469 
Utilization total positive neutral negative total positive neutral negative 
totals 12 9 3 - 6 2 1 3 
in % 100% 75% 25% 0% 100% 33% 17% 50% 
Evolution 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
Aggregates 14 7,33% 63 55 13 15,48% 36 69 
evol* 3 2% 9 383 3 4% 3 823 
transmut* - 0% - n.a. 3 4% 8 309 
inherit* 4 2% 5 690 1 1% 2 1235 
fit* 2 1% 3 1150 1 1% 1 2469 
origin* 10 5% 34 101 6 7% 17 145 
ancest* 3 2% 3 1150 2 2% 3 823 
progen* 2 1% 2 1725 - 0% - n.a. 
descen* 6 3% 7 493 2 2% 2 1235 
Utilization total positive neutral negative total positive neutral negative 
totals 14 11 3 - 13 7 4 2 
in % 100% 79% 21% 0% 100% 54% 31% 15% 
Homology 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
Aggregates 14 7,33% 35 99 36 42,86% 271 9 
homolog* 14 7% 35 99 36 43% 271 9 
archetyp* - 0% -  1 1% 1 2469 
Darwin* 7 4% 30 115 3 4% 5 494 
Table 23: Quantitative analysis: Linnean Society – Zoology, Zoological Society (1859-75/6) 
In a number of volumes, the concepts were not mentioned at all. For the Darwinian concepts this 
occurred in 18 of 85 volumes: in 7 of the 11 volumes of the botany section of the Linnean Society, 3 
of the 10 volumes of the zoological section of the Linnean Society, 1 of the 8 volumes of the 
Transactions of the Linnean Society, 2 of the 5 volumes of the Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
Edinburgh and 5 of the 17 volumes of the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London.540 Homology was not mentioned in 7 of the 11 volumes of the botany section of the Linnean 
Society, 4 of the 10 volumes of the zoological section of the Linnean Society, 1 of the 8 volumes of 
the Transactions of the Linnean Society and 14 of the 17 volumes of the Ibis. 
The share of positive articles of all articles is lowest for the Zoological Society (33% for evolution, 54% 
for natural selection) and the Edinburgh proceedings (0% and 33%) as well as for the Entomological 
Society with respect to natural selection (66% positive articles). It is around the average for the 
zoology section of the Linnean Society (75% and 79%) as well as The Ibis (81% and 71%) and high for 
the transactions (90% and 95%) and the botany section of the Linnean Society (89% and 87%) as well 
as Royal Society of London (100% and 75%). 
                                                            
540  Remember, however, that the scan quality was bad for the botany section of the Linnean Society and 
mediocre for the zoology section. 
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Transactions - Royal Entomological Society  The Ibis (British Ornithologists’ Union) 
Sample size 
# of 
volumes 
# of  
articles 
# of  
pages 
# pages  
per article 
# of 
volumes 
# of  
articles 
# of  
pages 
# pages  
per article 
12 316 7.839 25 17 703 7.842 11 
Natural  
Selection 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
Aggregates 20 6,33% 48 163 21 2,99% 25 314 
select* 14 4% 23 341 11 2% 12 654 
preserv* 9 3% 16 490 2 0% 2 3921 
struggle* 7 2% 9 871 11 2% 11 713 
Utilization total positive neutral negative total positive neutral negative 
totals 20 18 2 - 21 17 4 - 
in % 100% 90% 10% 0% 100% 81% 19% 0% 
Evolution 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
Aggregates 29 9,18% 84 93 31 4,41% 53 148 
evol* 6 2% 10 784 2 0% 4 1961 
transmut* 2 1% 2 3920 - 0% - n.a. 
inherit* 3 1% 4 1960 2 0% 2 3921 
fit* 4 1% 5 1568 - 0% - n.a. 
origin* 7 2% 8 980 21 3% 31 253 
ancest* 7 2% 15 523 3 0% 4 1961 
progen* 15 5% 26 302 6 1% 6 1307 
descen* 8 3% 14 560 6 1% 6 1307 
Utilization total positive neutral negative total positive neutral negative 
totals 29 19 8 2 31 22 9 - 
in % 100% 66% 28% 7% 100% 71% 29% 0% 
Homology 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
Aggregates 7 2,22% 22 356 4 0,57% 4 1961 
homolog* 7 2% 22 356 4 1% 4 1961 
archetyp* - 0% - n.a. - 0% - n.a. 
Darwin* 17 5% 33 238 21 3% 32 245 
Table 24: Quantitative analysis: Royal Entomological Society, The Ibis (1859-75/6) 
With respect to the single concepts, natural selection and evolution show a rather regular 
distribution. The median does not deviate much from the mean and the frequency increases and 
decreases with the general propensity of the journal to employ theoretical concepts. For evolution, 
however, the Royal Society of London and the Zoological Society display a large number of articles 
mentioning it 2.5 about times and about twice as often as on average. (The Zoological Society cites 
natural selection about 1.5 times as often as usual but of the 6 articles four are negative.)For 
homology, the deviations from its average (10.02%) are more marked. It is mentioned in 57.00% 
percent of articles of the London transactions, 42.86% of the articles of the Zoological society and in 
24.86% of the articles in the Linnean Transactions. In return, the Ibis cites the concept only in 0.57% 
of its articles, the entomologists in 2.22%, the Proceedings of the Linnean Society for botany in 5.48% 
and for Zoology in 7.33% of the articles. Thus, homology shows a far more unequal distribution than 
the Darwinian concepts. 
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Transactions - Royal Society of London Transactions - Royal Society of Edinburgh 
Sample size 
# of 
volumes 
# of  
articles 
# of  
pages 
# pages  
per article 
# of 
volumes 
# of  
articles 
# of  
pages 
# pages  
per article 
17 100 4.288 43 5 130 478 3,68 
Natural  
Selection 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
Aggregates 5 5,00% 9 476 5 3,85% 33 14 
select* 2 2% 4 1072 5 4% 19 25 
preserv* 1 1% 1 4288 2 2% 7 68 
struggle* 3 3% 4 1072 3 2% 7 68 
Utilization total positive neutral negative total positive neutral negative 
totals 5 5 - - 5 - 2 3 
in % 100% 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 40% 60% 
Evolution 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
Aggregates 20 20,00% 94 45,62 6 4,62% 59 8 
evol* 6 6% 8 536 2 2% 2 239 
transmut* 5 5% 5 858 2 2% 2 239 
inherit* 1 1% 1 4288 3 2% 14 34 
fit* 3 3% 5 858 1 1% 3 159 
origin* 5 5% 20 214 4 3% 22 22 
ancest* 11 11% 20 214 1 1% 1 478 
progen* 3 3% 9 476 1 1% 1 478 
descen* 5 5% 26 165 4 3% 14 34 
Utilization total positive neutral negative total positive neutral negative 
totals 20 15 5 - 6 2 4 - 
in % 100% 75% 25% 0% 100% 33% 67% 0% 
Homology 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
# of  
articles 
% of  
articles 
# of  
hits 
1 hit  
per … pages 
Aggregates 57 57,00% 343 12,50 19 14,62% 25 19 
homolog* 57 57% 343 13 19 15% 25 19 
archetyp* 2 2% 2 2144 - 0% - n.a. 
Darwin* 2 2% 3 1429 5 4% 49 10 
Table 25: Quantitative analysis: Royal Societies in London & Edinburgh (1859-75/6) 
vi. Conclusion 
The general assessment among both Darwin’s contemporaries and modern historians is, first, that 
the Darwinian revolution was achieved by ca. 1868 and, second, that many more biologists accepted 
evolution than did accept natural selection. Both assessments are confirmed by my analysis. Third, 
my analysis allows for estimating the overall impact of the Darwinian revolution on biology in Britain. 
First, the peak of references to the Darwinian concepts clearly lies around the mid- to late 1860s, 
afterwards mentions faded. As my analysis did attributed articles to the publication year of the 
volume in which the articles appeared, the fading effect should even be delayed in my data. I can 
thus confirm the assessments of the time at which the revolution is achieved. 
Second, the concept evolution was mentioned in much more articles and produced significantly more 
hits than natural selection. Moreover, the number of negative references to evolution is negligible 
while natural selection produced about 8% negative references. Furthermore, references to natural 
selection declined much stronger than references to evolution towards the end of the analyzed 
period, indicating that the concept enjoyed less sustainable success. 
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Third, the impact of both concepts on biological publications was small. In the sixteen years 
immediately after the publication of the Origin, less than 4.59% of the papers mentioned natural 
selection and 3.55% employed it or explicitly expressed support for it. Less 7.83 percent of papers 
mentioned evolution and less than 5.74% employed it or explicitly supported it. When one accounts 
for the overlap, i.e. papers which contain positive references to both concepts, only 7.52% of all 
papers employed or endorsed at least one of the concepts. Thus, only a fraction of the biological 
papers displayed an influence of Darwinian concepts on their presentation of descriptions of 
observations (data) and on their arguments.541 
Moreover, the rise of both concepts was overshadowed by the parallel success of Richard Owen’s 
homology concept. Homology is a classificatory concept (level 2 of my model) which Owen 
developed in the context of his archetype theory of the late 1840s. Between 1859 and 1875/6, 
homology produced more hits than the Darwinian concepts combined and was employed in exactly 
as many articles as both combined.542 Moreover, its lasting effect on biological papers is much more 
sustainable throughout the analyzed period; hits increased towards the mid-1870s. 
  
                                                            
541  Moreover, during the analysis I gained the impression that papers in the early and mid-1860s often 
employed the concepts in ornamental fashion or as a political statement. For instance, an area was 
described as dry and hot such that plants had to struggle for their existence there. The struggle metaphor 
obviously is not necessary here and serves as an ornament, although it formally counts as a use. I did not 
quantify this effect. 
542  Remember that homology was not theoretically contested. Therefore, I counted every reference as a use 
of the concept. 
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4.4 Synthesis 
In this chapter I have distinguished four important groups of recipients of Darwin’s evolution theory: 
(i) the immediate scientific community doing empirical work in Darwin’s field, namely 
paleontologists, zoologists, botanists etc. (ii) professional and amateur scientists from other fields 
forming a broader scientific community, (iii) the public who followed the debate in newspapers and 
popular journals or more specialized magazines. My aim was to compare the reception of Darwin’s 
theory among these groups in order to answer three questions: (i) Who received what information 
on Darwin’s theory? (ii) By what criteria was the theory assessed? (iii) What elements of Darwin’s 
theory were accepted and which rejected? The results of the analysis can be summarized as follows. 
i. Reception depth and width 
I have demonstrated that the three groups received increasing amounts of information on the theory 
and that the increase largely543 followed the categories of my four-level model of scientific theories: 
 The public received the theory mainly through its philosophical implications for their world-
views, be it Man’s alleged descent from the apes or its conflicts with the Victorian world 
views, notably the conception of a theist God. They received Darwin’s explanation and 
classification only in their connotative component, i.e. they received Darwin’s narration and 
interpretation but not his dynamic and static model.544 
 The broader scientific community received the entire levels 2 to 4, although their reception 
of Darwin’s static and dynamic model was usually somewhat limited. 
 Only the immediate scientific community received and discussed all four levels. 
Figure 29 summarizes the relation between these layers of reception depth and the different 
recipient groups.  
 
Figure 29 : Recipient groups, depth of reception, types of biological knowledge 
                                                            
543  This is a simplified representation, there exist exceptions to it. Some reviews for the public provided good 
explications of Darwin’s static or dynamic model and a couple of reviews for the broader scientific 
community provided extensive descriptions of empirical evidence. 
544  Remember that this layer of information corresponds to the level of scientific knowledge which is easiest 
accessible to laymen; humans receive information, first and foremost, through metaphors and narratives. 
(cf. sections 2.1.2.i; 2.1.4.i, ii, particularly footnotes 80 and 81.) 
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Besides, it displays that the three recipient groups had three different kinds of knowledge of 
Darwin’s evolution theory: The public’s understanding was based on connotative meaning; it 
consisted in associations from the main metaphors in Darwin’s narrative and in their linking to 
relevant metaphors of Victorian world-views. Thus, the public’s knowledge of biology may be best 
called associative knowledge. The broader scientific community additionally possessed a generic 
scientific knowledge which allowed for understanding the main categories of Darwin’s models and 
relating them in consistent statements. Only the immediate scientific community of working 
biologists possessed the specialized and empirical scientific knowledge to access the lowest layer of 
knowledge and to grasp the empirical meaning of the Darwinian theory. 
Furthermore, the analysis revealed that the heated debate on Darwin did not take place in the 
biological journals. The number of extensive discussions in the journals for Darwin’s immediate 
scientific community is very small, both compared to the overall number of biological papers and the 
number of reviews and extensive discussions in publications for the broader scientific community 
and the public. As only a small minority of biologists engaged in these more general debates, we can 
infer that the large majority of biologist did not engage in the debate. Moreover, this discrepancy 
suggests that much of the existing historical and philosophical reception of the Darwinian revolution 
focused on the public debate and debate among the broader scientific community as well as on a 
small group of biologists which engaged in these debates, notably Huxley, Owen, Darwin and 
Wallace.545 This focus provides no representative image of the debate among biologists. 
ii. Criteria for the assessment of the Darwinian theory: lines of criticism 
Criticism followed the same pattern as reception depth: For lack of further knowledge, the general 
public judged the theory by the plausibility of Man’s descent from the apes, notably the image of a 
deist God. The educated public focused on the possible political and moral implications conveyed by 
Darwin’s narrative and judged its plausibility against the backdrop of Victorian Weltanschauung. The 
broader scientific community additionally looked for logical inconsistencies in the model and for the 
model’s consistency with established models and meta-models, i.e. models from other disciplines 
and contemporary conceptions of scientific methods. The immediate scientific community 
discussed546 aspects of all of the above but they also debated the empirical fit of Darwin’s theory, for 
instance classifications or descriptions of experiments and observations relevant for assessing the 
theory. 
The different criteria by which the recipient groups assessed the theory can be summarized in three 
categories: (i) plausibility: the fit with other ontologies, (ii) inner consistency: the logical consistency 
                                                            
545  In this respect it is interesting that The Origin itself be a book for the broader scientific community. The 
book that triggered the scientific revolution is itself a book with sparse and illustrative evidence; it is, in 
Darwin’s words, “an essay” and its focus clearly lies on the presentation of the Darwinian model. The 
thorough empirical study was to follow in the “big book” Darwin promised but never published. Therefore, 
the revolution began and proceeded without a publication which would rigorously explain what empirics 
where presumed to support the novel model and how exactly the model related to the actual, thorough 
descriptions of empirics communicated within the immediate scientific community. 
546  Remember that the immediate scientific community had access to the other debates and participated in 
them. Thus, even if ontological issues were not discussed in the biological journals, biologists could receive 
these debates – although many biologists might not have cared for the layman debate.  
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of Darwin’s static and dynamic model, (iii) empirical fit: fit with the set of descriptions of 
observations which Darwin aimed to explain.547 Table 26 summarizes these relations. 
Audience Criteria for assessing the theory 
Public: laymen Plausibility 
Broader scientific community: 
scientists from outside biology 
Plausibility – Inner consistency 
Immediate scientific community: 
biologists 
Plausibility – Inner Consistency – Empirical fit 
Table 26: Audience and criteria for assessing the Darwinian theory 
iii. Acceptance and rejection of elements of the theory 
The lines of criticism allow for deducing what Darwin’s theory changed in the minds and work of his 
contemporaries, i.e. what elements of the Darwinian theory were ultimately accepted by its 
recipients. Unsurprisingly, no audience accepted any of the information they had not received.548 
Therefore, the theory failed to revolutionize the world views of the general public which rejected all 
that it knew about the theory: Man’s descent from the apes. It did modify the world views of the 
educated and interested public, however, who accepted the idea of the common descent of animals 
– albeit often blending it with their traditional idea of Divine Providence and Design. The educated 
public refused to apply Evolution to man – at least to his moral and mental faculties. The broader 
scientific community followed this refusal. Moreover, they would accept Darwin’s model only if it 
was supplemented by elements of Design, by explicit reference to a First Causes or by a Vital Force 
which steered the critical variations. 
Trends for the immediate scientific community resembled those of the broader; many biologists 
accepted evolution and few criticized Darwin’s static model and its interpretation. Natural selection 
encountered much more opposition, was employed less frequently and criticized more often; 
biologists clearly were divided on topic. Towards the end of the studied period, it seems that the 
term was mostly avoided and biologist preferred the more neutral concept of preservation.549 
However, neither concept had a large impact on biological work in Britain. In Darwin’s home country 
and arena of the heated public debates, only 3.55% and 5.85% percent of papers employed or 
explicitly supported the concepts natural selection and evolution. This seems like a weak effect, 
particularly when compared with Richard Owen’ concept of homology which was employed in 
10.02% of the papers, produced more hits than natural selection and evolution combined and 
                                                            
547  Note that Darwin’s theory was challenged by empirical evidence from other debates or, more precisely, by 
models based on such evidence. In the debate on the age of the earth, Thomson did provide data from 
physical observations and challenged Darwin’s theory by his interpretation of this data. As this is conflict of 
explanations, not of the underlying data, I do not count Thomson as assessing the empirical fit of Darwin’s 
theory. 
548  As it was no result of an informed decision, I hesitate to call this lack of acceptance ‘rejection’. 
549  In Darwin’s model preservation is a sub-concept of natural selection, however, connotatively it has less 
anthropocentric overtones and less immediately suggests an agency than selection. 
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showed a more sustainable long term effect than the Darwinian concepts for which the references 
decrease in the 1870s.550 
iv. Synthesis 
My analysis provides a classification of reception depths during the Darwinian revolution in Victorian 
Britain551; it demonstrates that different audiences received Darwin’s theory to different depths and 
that these depths largely follow the abstraction levels and the two kinds of meaning which I have 
distinguished in my model of scientific theories. 
Moreover, this classification of reception explains the criteria by which the recipient groups judged 
the theory and the elements they considered552 for acceptance.553 Thus, it explains why the debates 
on the Darwinian theory differed between the three recipient groups and why there existed little 
shared debate: the recipient groups generally discussed different topics and where topics overlapped 
they differed in the depth in which they were discussed.554 
Finally, the reception analysis reveals to which point the acceptance of the Darwinian theory was a 
selective matter. Recipients did not accept the theory as a whole; they did not even accept all the 
elements they received. Rather, they deliberately chose single elements of Darwin’s classification, 
explanation and ontology and combined it with elements of other theories or their established 
world-views – no matter how Darwin had intended his theory to work. This independence between 
the text of the Origin and its effect on the Victorian Britain highlights the difference between a 
theory as a linguistic entity – a meaningful text – and a social entity – a collection of cluttered and 
incoherent interpretations of and projections on the text. – In its reception, Darwin’s theory led a life 
of its own. 
  
                                                            
550  It is evidently possible that references increase again in the 1880s and later but such an effect needs is not 
known; moreover, it would require demonstration that the effect is still due to Darwin. Regarding the mid-
20th century modern synthesis of genetics and evolution theory, such a relation would be dubious. 
551  In order to assess whether my results translate to other contexts – to different periods or geographical 
areas or to other scientific revolutions – requires additional research. 
552  It does not, however, explain which elements were ultimately accepted; this might be possible through 
additional explaining phenomena, for instance a specification of the Situation Type in which the reception 
took place: the cultural context of the reception. 
553  In other words, there is a dynamic model in which the reception depths figure as Input and the criteria for 
the theory choice and elements of theory figure as Output. 
554  For instance, the debate on the descent of Man in the broader scientific community was way more 
complex then within the general public; it included references to the model of Natural Selection and the 
Evolution of animals and plants. Within the immediate scientific community, it also had an empirical 
dimension, including references anatomical studies and field observations. Hence, although often 
employing the same concept names, the three recipient groups did not speak about the same piece of 
denotative content, i.e. the same set of empirics. 
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5 Conclusion 
My dissertation pursued a triple project, partly historical-epistemological, partly philosophical and 
partly sociological. In section 2.1, I have developed a novel model for the analysis of scientific 
theories which distinguishes four abstraction levels and two kinds of meaning within scientific 
theories. I applied this model in the analysis of a group of theories of evolution in the first half of the 
19th century. (Chapter 3) As a complementary perspective, I have developed a novel framework for 
the analysis of the reception of scientific theories with heterogeneous audiences (section 0) and I 
have studied the reception of the Darwinian theory with its help. After distinguishing three groups of 
recipients – biologists, other scientists and the public – I have analyzed which parts of the theory 
were received by its different recipients, by which criteria different recipients judged the theory and 
which elements they accepted or dismissed. (Chapter 0) 
Now let me interpret and explain these results and let me demonstrate how they improve our 
understanding of both the Darwinian and scientific revolutions in general. I will begin by a historical-
epistemological reconstruction of Darwin’s contribution to the debate on evolution, continue with an 
assessment of Darwin’s impact on 19th century biology and conclude by discussing possible 
generalizations from the Darwinian to other theoretical revolutions in science. 
5.1 Historical-epistemological conclusion: What reorganization of biological 
knowledge and what revolution of biological beliefs did Darwin suggest 
and achieve? 
No unifying theory of biological phenomena existed at the beginning of the 19th century, only 
fragments and fading older beliefs. First, on the level of interpretations (level 2), the idea of a scala 
naturae was continuously losing supporters. Buffon had publicly dismissed any such notions and had 
considered taxonomic classifications to be useful tools, no more. More importantly, however, each 
newly identified species made it more and more difficult to cling to an ideal order of organisms. In 
order to organize the known organisms in a regular static scheme, more and more complex models 
were needed and they were less and less intuitive. Second, on the level of explanations (level 3), the 
British and Cuvier stuck to the trail of natural theology, studying nature in order to reveal divine 
greatness. On the continent, theistic explanations were a thing of the past. De Maillet, Buffon or the 
German idealists had expressed tentative deistic explanations. Yet, no full-fledged naturalistic 
(mechanistic) explanation was available. In terms of ontological implications (level 4), Man’s place at 
the pinnacle of nature was still intact, both in Britain and on the continent. In the British context, God 
continued to intervene in nature, studiously taking care of each of his beings. On the continent, God 
rather took back-stage, acting through laws and secondary agencies. 
At the end of the 1860s, these different levels of biological beliefs had undergone revolution and 
biology displayed two dominant models and a unifying theory: the static model of the common 
descent-tree and the dynamic model of natural selection, both embedded in a deistic framework of 
law-like divine actions. – How much of this revolutionary change can be explained in the framework 
of shared knowledge and shared beliefs? What role did shared challenging objects and mental 
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models play? And how much of the change was actually an individual achievement of Charles 
Darwin, after whom we name this revolution? 
i. Fossils and foreign organism: the challenging objects of early 19th century biology 
The challenging objects of the Darwinian revolution were produced by two biological sub-disciplines 
which had emerged in the late 18th century: biogeography and paleontology.555 The first 
biogeographic studies can be traced back to Buffon in the 1770s, but it were systematic studies like 
those of Alexander von Humboldt and Aimé Bonpland (1799-1804), Charles Darwin (1831-1836), or 
Alfred Russel Wallace and Henry Bates (1848-1852), which discovered (i) the wealth of novel species 
and (ii) the remarkable biogeographical regularities which challenged the established understanding 
of biology. 
In the 1830s and 1840s, specimens “flooded into museums, as collectors plundered Nature at home 
and abroad”, displaying manifold subtle differences and challenging taxonomists to classify them. 
(England 1997: 270) Thus, the question of the origin of species partly emerged from the sheer need 
to develop new classification systematics in order to cope with the more and more complex 
taxonomic classifications: 
“What constituted a good species, and what was merely a local variety (hardly a new 
problem to taxonomy), became a common source of dispute and concern among 
naturalists. Species "splitters" insisted that slight differences often marked a distinct 
species, while species "lumpers" claimed that this approach needlessly multiplied 
species and confused them with mere varieties.” (England 1997: 270) 
Among the most spectacular and most philosophically challenging new species were the apes; 
Owen’s important papers on orangutans, gorillas, and chimpanzees all appeared between 1837 and 
1859.556 
Paleontology posed further problems. Mollusk fossil series had led Lamarck to adopt evolutionary 
views as early as 1800. Cuvier had denied that the fossil record supported any such views up to his 
death in 1832. Yet, while such views could still be considered to be reasonable skepticism in the 
1830s, this became increasingly difficult. Geoffroy converted in the mid-1830s because of a series of 
reptiles. Moreover, each decade complemented the geological record and pointed towards the same 
conclusion: species evolved. Such, in the horse genus, the Hipparion fossils of 1855 and 1859 formed 
a link between Cuvier’s extinct Paleotherium and the modern Equus. 
Thus, in 1868, Owen concluded that the fossil record allowed for no other interpretation than that 
evolutionary change had indeed occurred: 
“The progress of Palaeontology since 1830 has brought to light many missing links 
unknown to the founder of the science. My own share in the labour led me, after a 
few years' research, to discern what I believed, and still hold, to be a tendency to a 
                                                            
555  In cultural-sociological terms, these challenging objects emerged because of the commercial expansion 
(expeditions, trade) and the industrial revolution (construction of channels and railroads). 
556  Important discoveries of prehistoric human species were made in the same period, with the Engis skull 
being discovered in 1829, the Neanderthal skull in 1856. Yet, these skulls were interpreted as stemming 
from prehistoric humans only much later. 
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more generalised, or less specialised, organization as species recede in date of 
existence from the present time. Even instances which to some have appeared to 
oppose the rule, really exemplify it.“ (Owen 1868: 790) 
Furthermore, biogeographers reported remarkable specifications of Buffon’s law, i.e. the fact that 
species did not simply correlate to climate zones; instead many regions display distinct animals and 
plants despite quite similar physical conditions. Thus, organisms were not merely adapted and 
designed for their “conditions of existence”. – There had to be more. Wallace, in his 1855 paper, 
summarized the regularities of biogeography and paleontology best, stating that 
“Every species has come into existence coincident both in space and time with a pre-
existing closely allied species.” (Wallace 1870a [1855]: 5) 
Everybody in the biological community was aware of these challenges, indeed some made for 
veritable sensations, as the first gorilla in 1837 or the Archaeopteryx in 1861. 557 Thus, these objects 
were not only known to the biologists of the early 19th century, it was also clear in what way they 
challenged established beliefs. This becomes clear when one studies the impact of these challenging 
objects on the shared knowledge and shared research topics. 
ii. Evolution as a shared research topic of 19th century biology 
First and foremost, by undermining the static view of a scala naturae, the challenging objects hoisted 
evolution onto the biological research agenda of the early 19th century. To de Maillet and Buffon, 
long term change of large groups of organisms had been an intriguing idea and a worth-wile topic of 
speculation. With Lamarck’s analysis of the mollusk series, however, evolution began to move into 
the realm of the empirically accessible.558 This move could be denied for another decade or two, as 
Cuvier did, but the evidence kept piling up. In the mid-1830s, when Geoffroy converted after 
studying a series of reptile fossils, the tides were clearly turning. 
Therefore, it is no surprise to find evolution on the research agendas of all, Geoffroy, Owen, Wallace 
and Darwin, not mentioning Chambers or the diverse debate in Germany. In England, John Herschel 
referred to it as the “mystery of mysteries”. Hence, it is clear that evolution was not a topic which 
Darwin or Wallace identified by themselves and which they studied in opposition to everybody else. 
Instead, evolution was one of the “hot” topics in biology, fostered by the challenging objects of 
biogeography and paleontology. 
Moreover, by the 1830s at least, it was clear that both the environment and inherited features 
(structure) had to play a role in the explanation of evolution. In their famous debate at the Académie 
Royale des Sciences in Paris, Cuvier and Geoffroy had advocated both sides as unique explanations of 
the taxonomic relations. Cuvier was considered the winner of this particular battle, but none had 
                                                            
557  There was a third class of challenging regularities, namely regularities in the growth of organisms within 
their life-span. (ontogeny, embryology) Yet, these did not trigger the Darwinian revolution nor were they 
explained by Darwin and Wallace. 
558  I believe it reasonable to draw the line between evolutionary speculations and the first model of evolution 
(in a qualitative sense) here: Buffon and de Maillet had no empirical evidence on which to test their ideas, 
thus they speculated. Lamarck, meanwhile, developed the first (scientific) model of evolution using actual 
empirical evidence (albeit a very limited set). Thus, Lamarck modeled actual regularities between features 
of empirical objects. As for the question whether Buffon’s and de Maillet’s speculations might be referred 
to as ‘theories’, see section 6 vi, vii. 
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won the war; neither the “conditions of existence” nor the “unity of type” alone made sense of the 
paleontological and biogeographical record. This, too, was shared knowledge among the biologist of 
the time. Consequently, we find references to both the environment and to structure in the later 
works of Geoffroy, as well as in Chambers, Owen, Wallace and Darwin. 
iii. Different pathways of coping with the challenging objects 
The respective individual contributions consisted, first, in specific organizations of the shared 
knowledge in static and dynamic models and, second, in the beliefs by which these models were 
interpreted or embedded in narrative structures. 
I cannot identify any major differences in aggregation pathways (strategies). Several of the 
considered biologists achieved important improvements of existing classifications, for instance 
Lamarck, Cuvier and Owen. Moreover, taxonomic discussions seemed a regular phenomenon in the 
immediate community of biologists. However, these technical questions never provoked such heated 
debates as evolution and, more importantly, they produced no lasting divides in the biological 
community. 
The interpretation of classifications was another matter. Lamarck, based on his very limited empirical 
knowledge, interpreted them as evidence for transformations of lower into higher organisms, but 
not for extinctions. To Cuvier, they did not suggest evolution, only extinctions and successive new 
creations, to Chambers, a regular and orderly progression to higher types. Owen interpreted 
taxonomic relations as oriented on archetypal form. To Darwin and Wallace classifications were 
irregular branching trees, evidence of common descent but no teleological or ideal order. 
In dynamic modeling, distinct pathways can be distinguished. Lamarck and Geoffroy were both 
willing to link evolution (Output) to environmental changes (Input), but ignored individual variations 
as triggers of evolution and an important part of environmental changes. Chambers followed this 
assignment fully, Owen only with respect to extinctions; he traced sustainable alterations of 
structure to “laws of development” instead. Darwin and Wallace, by stressing the importance of 
individual variation for both a species and its competitors and predators/prey, introduced a new 
Input to dynamic models of evolution, thus creating new aggregate statements. The inspiration to 
this probably came from their shared interest in field work559 and was outside the research focus of a 
lab researcher like Richard Owen.560 
                                                            
559  Both seem to have gained this inspiration in the field and on living organisms. It probably could not have 
been gathered on paleontological evidence for this evidence was too sparse and did not display the minute 
differences. (Only a small number of fossils were available per species.) It could not have been gathered in 
the dissecting room for anatomy focused on types and saw too little exemplars of each species. Both had 
carried out extensive field work early in their career – even before their expeditions to Latin Americas and 
South-East Asia. Wallace had worked as a land surveyor during the railway boom and the well-off Darwin 
had gone on long walks with the botanist and friend John Stevens Henslow (1796-1861) while in 
Cambridge. In their theoretical work, they established something like a micro-biogeography as opposed to 
the macro-approach of Buffon and others. 
560  As an anatomist, Owen spent his time in the dissecting room and marveled in the description of single 
organisms which he considered to be representatives of the species; he focused much more on similarities 
than differences. 
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Both, Lamarck and Geoffroy, introduced Connectors which conveyed the idea of an altered behavior 
of the organisms.561 Chambers and Owen did not specify a Connector nor a fully developed dynamic 
model. Wallace has a very developed model; only a Connector is missing. The most complete model 
is Darwin’s. In a metábasis562 (category shift), he introduced a Connector which draws an analogy to 
artificial selection (breeding) and paves the way for portraying Nature as the principal Agent of 
evolution.563 
The most marked differences seem to have existed in the narratives by which evolution was told and 
in the ontological implications of these narratives. Chambers and Owen told in a deist narrative, 
explaining their static models by divine laws. This was already a controversial move in Britain as these 
narratives limited God’s role to that of a distant observer who controlled biological life but did not 
intervene directly. Lamarck, Geoffroy and Darwin developed mechanistic (non-divine) narratives 
which complemented their dynamic models. These narratives championed novel Agents and pushed 
God still further to the back of biology. Moreover, with the distance to God increased controversial 
ontological implications regarding God’s relation to Man, Man’s place in Nature and social stability. 
In sum, different pathways of knowledge reorganizations are rather found in dynamic models than 
static models; they concerned synthetic empirical regularities, much less the analytic empirical 
regularities on which classifications were founded. However, much of these different pathways can 
be explained by the growth of biological knowledge in the first half of the 19th century: Wallace’s 
independent development of Darwin’s dynamic model reveals that the relation of individual variation 
to evolution was not merely a product of Darwin’s brilliant mind but suggested by the empirical 
evidence of field researchers.564  
With respect to beliefs, the image is much more diverse. Biologists differed greatly on how to 
interpret taxonomic relations, on how to tell evolutionary change and what this telling implied about 
the world. Here, individual and distinct pathways become visible. 
iv. From interpretation to explanation: the switch from static to dynamic models 
One remarkable aspect about biology in the first half of the 19th century is its shift from 
interpretation (level 2) to explanation (level 3), from static modeling to dynamic modeling565. From 
my point of view, this shift had at least three important dimensions. 
First, the shift in modeling was preceded by a shift in empirical knowledge. With the advent of 
biogeography and paleontology, biology shifted from analytic empirical regularities to synthetic566 
ones: it shifted from regularities on the same objects, independent of space and time, to regularities 
in space and time. The first kind of knowledge is best represented by Linnaeus and Cuvier who 
                                                            
561  This does not imply that both considered the organisms to be Agents of evolution. (see below) 
562  A category shift consists in employing an established concept name in a new context to denote a new 
concept. Darwin borrowed a term which was well-established in the context of breeding and denoted a 
clear concept. He then transferred it to another context, wild-life, where it had not previously been used, 
thus bestowing much of the connotation of the original use onto the new context. 
563  Wallace dismissed breeding as evidence on the question of evolution while Darwin extensively drew on the 
knowledge of breeders. (See sections 3.3.3, 3.3.4) 
564  This does not imply that it was an obvious correlation; in the end, only Wallace and Darwin suggested it. 
565  Historian of science Michel Morange calls this shift a move from encyclopedic knowledge to explanatory 
knowledge. (Morange 1998) 
566  For the distinction, see section 6 ii. 
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studied which features of one organism were correlated to which other feature of the same 
organism. The second kind is embodied by Buffon, Wallace, or Darwin, who studied how organisms 
changed in space, geographical zones, and time, geological strata. 
Second, the shift in modeling devalued static modeling. While static models like the scala or the 
archetype dominated the works biologists up the Linnaeus, they are still central to Owen’s work and 
some of his contemporaries, for instance the early Geoffroy’s type. In the later works of Geoffroy, 
but also in Lamarck, Wallace and Darwin, the static modeling becomes less and less sophisticated. 
Moreover, Darwin and Wallace devalued their own static modeling by emphasizing how arbitrarily 
species were defined, the units of their static model (the tree).567 Conversely, these authors 
developed the first sophisticated dynamic models of evolution (around their simpler static ones). 
Third, the shift in modeling anticipated, probably even initiated a shift from object knowledge to 
event knowledge. In Darwin’s and Wallace’s models, but also in Geoffroy’s and Lamarck’s, the terms 
employed to denote the Input and Output denote regularities of features of objects, for instance 
different properties of geological strata or of single living organisms. Yet, in their connotations, terms 
like ‘variation’ or ‘evolution’ conveyed the impression that biologists had observed the events which 
had produced these features in the first place. This terminological transgression may have served as 
a powerful heuristic, anticipating experimental biology and the real-time observations of evolution 
which would be possible only much later. 
v. Filling the space between fact and tale: what explanations implied about the world 
In his foreword to Matthias Schemmel’s study of Thomas Harriot, Jürgen Renn remarked with respect 
to early 16th century-physics that “It was only after the growing body of mechanical knowledge 
became a vital resource of early modern societies that mechanical knowledge within its own 
conceptual systematizations started to compete with natural philosophy by constructing its own 
worldviews.” In biology, this moment should probably be dated to the period here analyzed: the first 
half of the 18th century, when biologists expressed the first explanations (dynamic models) of 
biological phenomena. The shift from static to dynamic models implied the suggestion of novel 
narratives which were not centered around God. These narratives conflicted with established 
worldviews and eventually required biologists to construct their own, competing world-views.  
In Britain, this meant loosening the grip of theology on the biology in the first place. While physics 
had separated its models from clerical judgment more than a century earlier, British biologists still 
faced adversity when promoting deistic explanations of natural phenomena. On the continent, this 
was mostly a question of the past, Cuvier again being a notable exception. 
Beyond, the big issue was what secondary agents one could introduce between God and his natural 
subjects. Lamarck was the first to give it a try by ascribing some enigmatic agency to the plants and 
animals and he failed to convince. Geoffroy alluded to God and nature but stuck with the safe choice. 
Chambers and Owen remained in the traditional framework and introduced no secondary agent. 
Wallace’s two articles of 1855 and 1858 contained no clues about secondary agents. It was Darwin 
                                                            
567  This does not imply that static models or their components would not matter anymore. For instance, for 
Ernst Mayr they are not merely morphologically similar individuals, but a reproductive group which does 
not (hardly) breed with non-members. 
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who dared most and won big in installing Mother Nature as an Agent next to God, thus shifting God 
more to the background of organic life.568 
It seems to me that science has always told stories. Moreover, even before there was empirical 
access to biological phenomena, philosophers and poets were telling stories about how organic life 
was organized; the bible, one of the most widely received stories, has much to say about the origin of 
life.569 Such, my point here is not that Darwin or Lamarck were the first to tell stories about nature. 
Nor is it the point that someone expressed a narrative which contradicted Scripture. 
The remarkable point here is Jürgen Renn’s from above: the scientists dared to express their own 
world-views for the first time and these ontologies were based on observations. Thus, in the conflict 
with the then-dominant reading of the bible they were not as easily dismissible as earlier 
“unfounded” speculation; the biologists had accumulated an impressive body of knowledge, one 
which was accessible, notably in public museums. Thus, the facts seemed to support their 
heterodoxy. 
In sum, the first half of the 19th century was the period in which biologists accumulated the body of 
knowledge which allowed them to fill the space between observable biological facts and tales about 
biology. This allowed them to start telling their own tales: their own world-views. 
vi. Three mental models of the Darwinian revolution: the tree, the “Struggle for Life” and 
“Natural Selection” 
I see three crucial mental models570 which shaped the Darwinian revolution, i.e. mental 
representations by which Darwin and Wallace organized their thoughts and through which they 
communicated their explanation of evolution.571 
On level 2 of my model, both Darwin and Wallace employed the image of a tree to describe their 
static model. This is a rather basal model, yet, it implies a couple of important characteristics of 
                                                            
568  As modern debates with creationists demonstrate, most scientists now prefer to completely exclude god 
from their tales, although quite some of them profess Christian faith. One can believe in god without 
referring to him in scientific explanations. (cf. Miller 2007) 
569  Today’s majority opinion among scientists and theologians is that the bible’s account and scientific 
narratives do not compete with one another. In some parts of the USA and in Victorian Britain this is and 
was disputed. 
570  Based on (Renn and Damerow 2007), I have described mental models as mental representations of basal 
belief structures and/or shared knowledge, often practical knowledge. Mental models support and guide 
inferences in default logic. When confronted with aberrant or contradictory experience (challenging 
objects and events), mental models may be modified or extended in order. In such inferences, mental 
models do not give up their basic structure; they are characterized by a remarkable longevity. Such, novel 
interpretations or explanations, which arise in reorganizations of knowledge systems, can often be 
described as modifications of old mental models. (See section 1.1) 
571  Remember that my use of mental models here differs slightly from the typical use within Historical 
Epistemology. I am not considering mental models to shape shared beliefs but rather scientists to employ 
mental models in their formulation of shared beliefs. This, however, is a difference in narrative only. Both 
explanations are based on the observation that specific mental models appear, first, in the history of a 
discipline and, second, (in modified form) in novel scientific theories. I construct this correlation as a 
human action to employ a certain model, whether this action stems from conscious choice or not. 
Historical Epistemology would rather construct it as a mental model shaping a knowledge-reorganization. 
My explanation employs more of a social science narrative, the historical-epistemological one more of a 
natural science narrative. 
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evolution. First, a tree has a common trunk from which all its branches and twigs originate, and, 
conversely, to which they can be traced back: a single origin.572 Second, the image of the tree implied 
common points to relate different twigs and branches: the famous “intermediate forms”, which were 
immediately claimed by the opponents of evolution. Third, the “tree”-metaphor might have been 
understood as implying disorderly yet opportunistic growth, an idea which easily accommodates the 
disorderly stream of new species which continued to flow to European museums. 
On the third level, the most popular metaphor of the Darwinian revolution can be found, the Struggle 
for Life or Struggle for Existence.573 As a mental model it implies that somebody is fighting for 
something, possibly by certain means. As specified by Darwin and Wallace, the struggle conveys the 
image of two or more parties fighting for a common goal, namely life / existence. Thus, the concept 
of the struggle put a teleological imprint on nature, conveying the idea of a common goal towards 
which all organisms are oriented. When asking for the means by which the parties lead their struggle, 
one evokes the question of what constitutes an advantage in survival, a key element of Darwin’s 
narrative. 
Both of these mental models were easily accessible to the biological community and the public. The 
idea of a tree easily related to the metaphors of biologist, who had been speaking of branches or 
embranchements for some time. A number of historians have attempted to identify the one author 
who inspired Darwin’s and Wallace’s574 metaphor of the struggle for life.575 Most of these sources are 
legitimate, yet, the whole enterprise appears futile. The idea of a struggle in nature is probably as old 
as biological thought, it simply is a very basal mental model576, which Darwin and Wallace modified 
and linked to modern thought. Thus, if they created a powerful metaphor which was intuitive to both 
scientists and the public, it was because he drew upon a powerful mental model, a belief structure 
which was already shared by his contemporaries. 
The truly innovative mental model of the Darwinian revolution came from Darwin himself and is 
found on level 3 of my model. The category shift (metábasis) from artificial selection to “natural” 
selection may be the masterpiece of his theory, its rhetorical hinge joint. It takes up the old idea of 
Nature as an Agent and combines it with an analogy from breeding, the selective action of the 
breeder. Hence, the mental model of selection suggests the two core elements of Darwin’s narrative: 
the Agent and his Purpose; selecting requires someone to select and a goal for which one is selecting. 
                                                            
572  This implication of the metaphor was somewhat weakened by both, Darwin’s diagram in the Origin, of 
which the “trunk” displayed more than one line, and by his enigmatic statement about “a few forms” into 
which the Creator might have breathed life, instead of just one. 
573  Ellegård reports that ‘struggle’ is the metaphor which was popularized the fastest. (Ellegård 1958: 43)  
574  Allusions to it can be found in all three parts of the joint paper as well as in the Origin. 
575  Desmond and Moore, among others, attempt to trace the concept of Darwin’s struggle back to the Swiss 
botanist Augustin-Pyrame de Candolle (1778-1841), who, in his Organographie végétale (1826), mentioned 
Nature’s war for space and resources and spoke of plants as being “at war one with another”. (Desmond 
and Moore 1995: 323) Darwin himself would point to Lyell, Herbert and de Candolle (Darwin 1858b [1857]: 
51) Owen claimed the honour for himself. (Owen 1868: 799-800) In my historical introduction, I referred to 
Aristotle, Linnaeus, and Geoffroy. (0 x) Other supposed sources are Robert Malthus or 19th century 
economic theory. (cf. Bowler 1976) – In sum, I suppose that if one looks closely enough, one can identify at 
least one author per decade to employ this mental model between the 1770s (Buffon) and the 1850s 
(Darwin). 
576  This is not surprising at all when one considers how fundamental a thought the ideas of ecological niches 
and specialization is; a child realizes that species do not occupy all of nature but are found in specific 
limited spaces in which they outperform competitors. Thus, the acknowledgement of ecological niches 
already suggests the idea of a competition in nature. 
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By evoking the image of a benevolent Nature which selected for “the betterment” of species, Darwin 
related to an established belief about Nature as an Agent. He thus created one of the most influential 
narratives, which preserved some elements of the design and teleology, all the while loosening the 
link between God and life. Much of Darwin’s success in both science and the public sphere can be 
explained from the intuitive appeal of this mental model. 
vii. The first modern biologist? – How much was Darwin still rooted in his time? 
Keeping these gaps in Darwin’s résumé in mind, one might wonder in what aspects of his work 
Darwin transcended his contemporaries and in what aspects he remained firmly rooted in his 
historical context. 
On one hand, Darwin was an innovator on different levels of biological knowledge. With respect to 
empirics (level 1), he and Wallace and were pioneers of biogeography and extended it by focusing on 
individual variations and other organisms as ecological factors. Again with Wallace, he abandoned 
static modeling in the sense of Linnaeus or Owen and lessened the role of static models. (level 2) In 
terms of explanation, he excluded the origin of life (spontaneous generation) from his model and in 
his narrative, he moved from theistic to deistic narratives. 
On the other hand, Darwin’s work remained within the context of his time. He did not integrate the 
developmental aspects of Geoffroy’s and Owen’s work in his theory and he did not anticipate 
genetics, a biological discipline founded by his contemporary Gregor Mendel (1822-1884). In terms of 
explanations and ontologies, Darwin did not transcend the deistic framework already dominant in 
France or Germany; God clearly played a role in his narrative.577 
Thus, not surprisingly, the picture is a mixed one. In some aspects of his work Darwin was innovative 
and pointed the way to the future of biology. In other aspects, however, Darwin remained firmly 
rooted in his time and his theory obstructs the view on other, more innovative strands of research. 
viii. His and only his? – What are Darwin’s truly individual achievements? 
Another interesting question is how much of the Darwinian revolution actually is Darwin’s individual 
achievement. In terms of description (level 1), Darwin’s innovative empirical methods were 
reproduced, at least, by Wallace and foreseen by Geoffroy. Wallace independently came to the same 
conclusion as Darwin in terms of interpretation, suggesting an irregularly branching tree. (level 2) 
Darwin’s and Wallace’s models were equivalent, as one would expect from their equivalent empirical 
innovations, and display close resemblance to Geoffroy’s works of the mid-1830s. Moreover, in their 
modeling, the all drew largely on shared knowledge. (level 3) Finally, Darwin’s important ontological 
innovations, the deistic world-views, had been anticipated in Germany and France a century earlier 
and, still decades earlier, by Chambers and Owen in Britain.578 
                                                            
577  This is particularly remarkable when one considers how Darwin is today portrayed in the debate on 
creationism. While Darwin clearly opposed the kind of theistic explanations favored by design theorists like 
Michael Behe (Behe 2000, 2004), he also did not take an atheist position in the Origin of Species as, 
prominently, Richard Dawkins is taking today. 
578  This concurs with Ernst Mayr’s judgment that “…the publication of the Origin in 1859 was the mid-point of 
the so-called Darwinian revolution rather than its beginning. Stirrings of evolutionary thinking preceded the 
Origin by more than 100 years, reaching an earlier peak in Lamarck's Philosophie Zoologique in 1809. The 
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In sum, the only part of Darwin’s theory which was exclusively his seems to be his narrative: the 
manner in which Darwin told the story of variation, selection and evolution. For every other part it is 
true what the contemporary historian and biologist Edmond Perrier said: “Before the appearance of 
Darwin's book, all the information needed to construct this theory of the individuality of species was 
already known to science. There is not one of his chapters that some naturalist could not at some 
stage have formulated in his mind. But all the facts were widely scattered ...” (Perrier 2009 [1884]: 
198) In sum, Darwin was the one who assembled the facts and told people how to make sense of 
them.579 
I do not say this to belittle Darwin. Rather, the results of my historical-epistemological reconstruction 
display what is true of other theoretical revolutions: they are group achievements. Darwin was not a 
single hero of science among blind contemporaries but one in a series of excellent biologists, a series 
which linked Lamarck, the later Geoffroy, Wallace and Darwin on one side as well as Cuvier, the 
earlier Geoffroy and Owen on the other side. The continuity in biological works, however, becomes 
visible only in close analysis. The more we focus on the person of Darwin, the less we see the 
continuity between his work and the work of other excellent biologists of the time. Only to Duhem’s 
“superficial observer”580 does the theoretical revolution in 19th century biology appear as the 
individual achievement of Charles Darwin. 
5.2 Sociological conclusion: How was the Darwinian revolution received and 
what effect did it have on biology? 
My analysis has focused on two sociological dimensions of the Darwinian revolution: the reception of 
the Darwinian theory and its effects on scientific practice. Let me recapitulate my results on four key 
points here: (i) the public reception of Darwin, (ii) the reception within the community of biologists, 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
final breakthrough in 1859 was the climax in a long process of erosion which was not fully completed until 
1883 when Weismann rejected the possibility of an inheritance of acquired characters [or, even later, the 
modern synthesis of the first half of the 20th century, when most biologists would finally accept natural 
selection]." (op. cit. Mayr 1990b: 86-7)  
579  I am unsure of whether to concur with Peter J. Bowler’s argument that the Darwinian revolution is 
erroneously called “Darwinian” because (i) his theory shared many of its elements with previous or 
competing theories and (ii) because Natural Selection was accepted but by a minority of biologists and the 
public. (Bowler 1992 [1988]: 1-6) I agree with his historical assessment but it seems to me that two reasons 
support the current denomination. First, a relevant group of Darwin’s contemporaries identified the 
revolution with Darwin and historically linked it to his name – and not to Lamarck’s, Geoffroy’s or 
Wallace’s. Second, much what we consider today the crucial elements of evolution theory do indeed stem 
from Darwin. (cf. Ruse 2009) Beyond this, one can obviously dismiss the label “Darwinian”. In this case, 
however, probably no theoretical revolution in science should be named by the name of a single scientist. 
For a more extensive discussion of the topic see (Ruse 2009). 
580  Remember my introductory quotation: “When the progress of experimental physics goes counter to a 
theory and compels it to be modified or transformed, the purely representative part enters nearly whole in 
the new theory, bringing to it the inheritance of all the valuable possessions of the old theory, whereas the 
explanatory part falls out in order to give way to another explanation. Thus, by virtue of a continuous 
tradition, each theory passes on to the one that follows it a share of the natural classification it was able to 
construct, as in certain ancient games each runner handed on the lighted torch to the courier ahead of him 
and this continuous tradition assures a perpetuity of life and progress for science. This continuity of 
tradition is not visible to the superficial observer [sic!] due to the constant breaking-out of explanations 
which arise only to be quelled.” (Duhem 1962 [1906]: 32-3) 
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(iii) the effects of this latter reception on supporters of the Darwinian theory and (iv) on competing 
research strands. 
i. Why did Darwin become the star of early 19th century biology? 
If the Darwinian revolution, for the greater part, is the common work of the biological community of 
the 19th century, how come we identify it so much with Charles Darwin – and so little with Lamarck, 
Geoffroy, Wallace or Owen? Why did his British contemporaries considered Darwin one of the, if not 
the outstanding scientist of the Victorian age, granting him a grave next to Newton and Herschel in 
Westminster Abbey? A combination of several factors provide for an explanation. 
First, Victorian Britain experienced the advent of popular culture, including a popular interest in 
scientific issues. Major technical improvements in printing led to a massive decrease in printing costs 
and an unprecedented dissemination of books, magazines and journals. In combination with the 
liberal British press laws, this development made content accessible to ever-increasing audiences, 
particularly hot and controversial topics, among them some scientific issues.581 
Second, the debate on evolution touched some important social and political issues of the time, 
notably the debate on deism. The advance of deist positions from the continent had been brought to 
a halt by the political restoration after the French Revolution. Yet, the first half of the 19th century 
revealed that the proponents of liberal religious could not be held in check much longer. The 
immense reception of the Bridgewater Treatises (1830s) on one hand and Essays and Reviews (1860) 
on the other hand, exemplifies the importance of the debate.582 Moreover, the debate on evolution 
touched more down-to-earth topics like slavery or the separation of social classes in Britain. The 
public interest in these questions directed attention towards the topic of evolution. 
Third, it is around the Darwinian revolution that biology emerged as a discipline and gained public 
relevance. The emergence was fueled by both biology’s professionalization and its unification. The 
professionalization is exemplified by the advent of the first generation of professional biologists, 
scientists who made their living of biology583 but also by the formation of many important biological 
journals584. Moreover, with the Darwinian revolution, British biologists began to refer to their 
discipline as ‘biology’ and considered paleontology, anatomy or physiology as sub-disciplines of this 
unified life science. To this development, Darwin’s unifying theory made an important contribution; 
he was one of the founding fathers of biology. 
Moreover, by the 1850s, biologists had acquired a body of knowledge which allowed them to suggest 
their own world-views and to challenge not only established religious dogmas but also the dominant 
science of the age: physics. It is for these world-views that the works of Lamarck, Chambers or 
Darwin were discussed in the public sphere and that such a heated debate as the one on the age of 
the earth could take place. (See sections 4.1.2, v) The respectability to which biology rose in these 
                                                            
581  Both Darwin’s Origin and Chambers’ Vestiges experienced remarkable public reception. 
582  The reception of Essays and Reviews overshadowed the Origin in the 1860s. 
583  Huxley and Hooker but also Owen belonged to this group. Darwin was a gentlemen-naturalist, i.e. an 
amateur of independent means. The majority of the biological journals which I analyzed in the reception 
analysis came into being in the 1840s and 1850s. 
584  The large majority of the journals which were analyzed in the quantitative part of the reception analysis 
were formed in the 1840s and 1850s. 
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debates is probably best exemplified by the fact that geology and biology were granted their own 
museum in 1881.585 
Fourth, it seems to me that Darwin’s fame was further fueled by the need for an ambassador of the 
newly unified, emerging biology. Physics and chemistry had produced their share of heroes but, in 
the mid-19th century, biologists were still struggling for respect and public attention. In this struggle, 
important biologists championed Darwin as the face of their discipline, popularizing his name and 
referring to themselves as Darwinians. Huxley and even Wallace did associate their work with 
Darwin’s name.586 
Fifth, Darwin’s truly individual contribution to the evolution debate is to be found on the abstraction 
layer of biological knowledge which is accessible to the public. Thus, Darwin was visible far beyond 
biology and, while his model earned him the respect of his fellow-biologists, it was his ingenious 
narrative which reached the masses. The story of variation, selection and evolution seemingly 
rendered complicated biological questions accessible to the laymen. The impact of Darwin’s narrative 
shaped both the public reception and the reception among the broader scientific community. Even 
today, few social scientists, few philosophers, physicists or engineers know anything precise about 
evolutionary biology beyond Darwin’s narrative and, for some, his model. To the uneducated public, 
Darwin might be the only biologist they ever heard of. 
In sum, Darwin was received because his book was available to a wide public, his theory touched 
topics which were already hotly debated, he was championed as the public face of an emerging 
discipline and he formulated the part of the theory of evolution which was best accessible to the 
public. Thus, most of public Darwin’s fame stems from him becoming a figure of popular culture. In 
this, Darwin’s fame resembles the fame of fellow “pop-star scientists” as Einstein, Galileo or Freud.587 
(see below) 
ii. Selective adherence: What did it mean that biologists accepted the Darwinian theory? 
Within biology itself, the picture becomes much more diverse. First, few if any scientists adhered to 
all of components of the Darwinian theory. Even the self-proclaimed Darwinians made partial 
choices: Wallace refused to explain Man’s mental and moral faculties as evolutionary products and 
Huxley considered natural selection as part of the Connector but not as the entire solution. 
Second, as my reception analysis reveals, the more one approaches a specific research field (sub-
discipline) within biology, the less important is Darwin.588 I suppose that a similar quantitative 
analysis of today’s biological journals as I have carried out for the period from 1859 to 1874 would 
reveal similar results with respect to theoretical terminology. Most empirical papers do not mention 
abstract theoretical vocabulary – and those which do usually employ it as mere ornament or political 
statement. Moreover, the work of the large majority of scientists displays no sign of commitment to 
                                                            
585  Remember that it was Richard Owen who had lobbied for an autonomous museum for decades and that he 
became its first superintendent. 
586  Wallace published his own retrospective on the revolution in a tome named ‘Darwinism’, Huxley published 
a collection of papers und the title ‘Darwinia’. 
587  Again, I do not aim to belittle Darwin’s achievements, which are undisputedly remarkable. 
588  This should be true for all empirical disciplines. Such communities share a large part of their objects/events 
of interest and much of their observational/experimental methodology (instruments, boundary conditions 
of measurements). By my non-representative estimate, these communities comprise ca. 150-300 people. 
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the Darwinian theory or the denial of it. This can clearly not be explained by the ignorance of 
scientists for Darwin clearly made the headlines in both science and the public sphere. Rather it is an 
indicator of how much biological theorizing and empirical biology were disconnected. Whether or 
not one referred to the Darwinian theory in one’s empirical work seems not to have mattered much. 
Both, a competing theoretician like Richard Owen or a theory-abhorrent scientist could go through 
the Darwinian revolution unfazed.589 
Thus, Darwin developed a model and an intriguing narrative applicable to most biological sub-
disciplines and flexible enough to adapt to the extensions of biological knowledge throughout the 
19th and 20th century, notably in the modern synthesis. This does not imply, however, that these sub-
disciplines all needed evolution theory to guide their work or make sense of their empirical findings. 
Dobzhansky’s famous word590 that nothing in biology makes sense expect in the light of evolution is 
at least imprecise. One by one, probably most biological regularities can be made sense of without 
evolution. Only if we require a covering explanation for different the fields within biology, Darwin’s is 
the only explanation so far which we deem acceptable. However, for the utmost part of science, no 
such covering explanation is needed. 
iii. Discontinuity in explanations & implications, continuity in description & classification 
Considering the selective adherence to Darwin’s theory and its limited effect on empirical work in 
biology, it is not surprising that the Darwinian revolution did not trigger discontinuous breaks 
throughout the entire body of biological knowledge. 
Darwin had partial success in establishing his explanation and its ontological implications. He 
succeeded in establishing a novel (static) model of the objects of biology, interpreting the 
contemporary animals and plants as descendants of extinct progenitors. This made sense to the 
public and broader scientific community and it allowed biologists to interpret their established 
taxonomic knowledge in a more intuitive way. Darwin’s explanation of the steps which lead from a 
progenitor to its descendent, i.e. his (dynamic) model and its narrative around natural selection, was 
considered part of the solution. However, the narrative’s ontological implications did not comply 
with the Victorian world views and philosophy of science. Additionally, it suffered from Darwin’s 
incapacity to explain the causes of variation. In sum, Darwin achieved a considerable change on the 
upper layers of biological knowledge. 
On level 2 of my model, classification, one might suppose that the acceptance of ‘common descent’ 
as the organizing principle of taxonomic relations and the devaluation of the species concept might 
yield a novel taxonomy, i.e. a reorganization of the taxonomic system established by Linnaeus. 
However, the Darwinian revolution did not lead to any substantial changes here, only further 
specifications; the Linnaean system is still in use today.591 Moreover, the acceptance of evolution 
                                                            
589  Whether the lack of positioning towards the rising theory had any drawbacks would be an interesting 
empirical question. 
590  It is a phrase which biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky (1900-1975) expressed in a 1964 article on evolution 
and employed as the title of a 1973 essay. (Dobzhansky 1964; Dobzhansky 1973) 
591  Ernst Mayr reports that zoological classifications underwent some minor changes but not botanical ones. 
This is not surprising if one considers that similarity, the criterion on which classifications had formerly 
been based, was a pretty good approximation of common descent and Darwin himself had provided few 
empirical criteria for further refinement. (Mayr 1984: 173-7) For a more details on this, see below. 
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theory did not even trigger a debate on taxonomy.592 Lastly there are no traces of an explicit 
dismissal of established knowledge; I cannot find any papers that devaluate previous taxonomic work 
with reference to Darwin. 
There is one remarkable change on this level, however: the dissemination of the concept ‘homology’. 
The concept was introduced by Richard Owen in 1843. Its acceptance as a classificatory term for the 
description of organisms falls right in the analyzed period. Between 1859 and 1874 its use increased 
steadily, moreover, although it stemmed from Richard Owen and was originally introduced together 
with his archetype concept, the concept of homology was employed by Darwinians as T.H. Huxley, 
J.D. Hooker, Asa Gray and by Darwin himself. Once the Darwinian revolution was accomplished, 
there even existed a suggestion to change the name of Owen’s concept, i.e. its connotation.593 (See 
section 2.1.2 i) Yet, no such thing happened; the concept is still in use today under its original name. 
On level 1, one might suppose that Darwin altered the research questions of biology, that it changed 
the way biology would describe their objects and events of interest. Such suppositions are hardest to 
operationalize and therefore hardest to verify or falsify. However, I do not observe any such change. 
Papers from 1859 hardly differ from papers in 1874 and where they do, this change is not linked to 
the concepts of evolution or natural selection. Second, one could suppose that the Darwinian theory 
led to the introduction of novel concepts in the practice of observation and experiments and that, in 
return, these novel concepts would change the manner in which empirics were described. 
Particularly, one could suppose that biologists would stress the influence of the environment and of 
other organisms as selective forces. There are some instances of such influence but they remain 
restricted to a small fraction of papers. 
In sum, the theoretical debate hardly touched the lower layer of biological knowledge: Darwin 
suggested a new interpretation of existing empirics, but no new manner of doing empirics. The 
Darwinian revolution remains a theoretical revolution: it revolutionized theory, i.e. models and their 
ontological implications; it did not revolutionize the description and classification of empirics below 
the models and ontological implications. 
Moreover, as my comparative analysis reveals, some of this discontinuous break should not be dated 
to 1859 or the years past and should not be identified solely with Darwin. Darwin’s Origin was the 
culmination point of developments which had begun in the late 18th century: The rise of 
biogeography and geology and their production of challenging objects slowly led to changes on more 
abstract layers of knowledge, sometimes in discontinuous breaks.594 Such, the first half of the 19th 
century saw important specifications in classifications and, in the 1840s and 1850s, the dissemination 
of Owen’s concept of homology as a device for taxonomic classification. Based on a remarkable 
series of fossil mollusks, Lamarck suggested the first explanation of evolution in 1809 – a visionary 
and somewhat precocious move. The 1820s to 1840s saw important debates on the interpretation of 
the changing classifications, among them Owen’s archetype concept and the famous debate 
between Cuvier and Geoffroy in 1832. In parallel, the public discourse in Britain and Chambers’ 
Vestiges paved the way for deism. Figure 30 provides an overview over these successive breaks. 
                                                            
592  While a number of papers address taxonomic questions none refers to Darwin’s theory for justification.  
593  Remember that Lankester did not intend to change the concept’s denotation, only its connotation. (Rupke 
1994: 217) 
594  The next major theoretical change in biology, the modern synthetis, would also be triggered by empirical, 
not by theoretical work: genetics. 
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Figure 30: Continuity and discontinuity on different layers of biological knowledge in the prelude to the Origin 
iv. Delaying evo-devo? – How the Darwinian revolution overshadowed the work of Geoffroy and 
Owen on structural similarities 
I have argued above that the Darwinian revolution was fueled by empirical regularities from 
paleontology and biogeography. The models of Darwin and Wallace successfully linked these novel 
regularities with the existing body of biological knowledge and integrated several disciplines into a 
unified discipline of biology. However, there were some challenging regularities which Darwin did not 
contribute to the Darwinian revolution and which could not be explained by either Darwin or 
Wallace. 
These regularities encompass, first, the morphological regularities which Owen summed up by the 
term ‘serial homology’ and which were completely ignored by Darwin.595 Thus, Rupke remarks that, 
“In the secondary literature it is unquestioningly assumed that the Darwinian 
incorporation of Owen’s homological work purified and enriched it; and to some 
extent this assumption is true. It should be noted though that the Darwinian 
reinterpretation also impoverished a certain segment of the homological 
programme, notably that concerned with serial homology [i.e. the similarity of 
repeated elements in an individual body, for instance between the ribs of a rib cage]. 
Both, special and general homology, were instantly translatable into phylogenetic 
terms, but not the similarities of an arm to a leg of a left to a right extremity and of 
one vertebra to the next in the same spinal column. Vertical, lateral and serial 
homologies represented morphological similarities which had no direct bearing on 
descent, and seemed to suggest ‘genetic’ rather than an environmental control over 
organic structure.596” (Rupke 1994: 218-9) 
                                                            
595  I know of no publication in which Wallace would have addressed this topic. 
596  Rupke’s quote continues like this: “Mivart [in 1871] lucidly perceived this weakness in the Darwinian 
programme: ‘The facts of serial homology seem to hardly have excited the amount of interest they 
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Today, Owen is considered as an early predecessor by proponents of the research strand 
‘evolutionary developmental biology’ or ‘evolution of development’ or, short, ‘evo-devo’. (Hall 1999: 
73-5, 96; cf. Bowler 2008)597 This research strand studies developmental processes, not only to 
determine the ancestral relationship between them, but also to understand how developmental 
processes evolved. Darwin’s success overshadowed this research program and probably delayed it by 
doing focusing the attention and resources of many biologists to the impact of ecological changes 
and away from developmental processes. In the terminology of an earlier debate, evolutionary 
biology focused on how ‘conditions of existence’ altered structure and moved away from how ‘unity 
of type’ preserved it.598 
Second, Darwin was unable to explain heredity, as he openly admitted. Thus, he provided an 
interpretation for mutations – referring to them as ‘accidental variations’ – but did not attempt to 
explain them. Moreover, the first laws of inheritance were described by Gregor Mendel in 1865 and 
1866, i.e. during the Darwinian revolution, but they were not linked to evolution until the turn of the 
century. 
Third, even his own research program in macrotaxonomy faded relatively soon. While Darwinians 
such as Ernst Haeckel set out to reorganize classifications in the Darwinian sense and reveal ever 
larger parts of Darwin’s and Wallace’s tree, they soon faced disappointment. In most cases, 
similarity, the criterion on which classifications had hitherto been based, was a pretty good 
approximation of common descent and Darwin himself had provided few empirical criteria for 
further refinement.599 Thus, progress in macrotaxonomy was relatively modest and the program lost 
much of its appeal by the turn of the century.600 (Mayr 1984: 175-7) 
In sum, Darwin did not solve all contemporary problems of biology; he merely suggested a solution 
for its most renowned problem. By doing so, he defined a research program which diverted attention 
and resources away from other promising fields. Thus, some strands of biological research profited 
from the Darwinian revolution, others suffered. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
certainly merit.’ […] That Owen and Mivart were on the right track in this surmise was later shown by the 
discovery of chromosomes and genes. Also, the study of the molecular basis of life has led to a renewed 
interest in serial homology and in its early espousal by Owen.” (Rupke 1994: 218-9) 
597  Sometimes, this research program is also referred to as the “extended modern synthesis”, i.e. a developed 
of the modern synthesis of evolution and genetics. 
598  Even one of the Bridgewater treatises discussed it favourably. (Amundson 2007: xix) 
599  This problem was already clear to Darwin’s contemporaries. In a paper at the 15th anniversary of the Origin 
of Species in December 1874, Huxley regretted that “that we have so little real knowledge of the phylogeny 
even of small groups, while of that of the larger groups of animals we are absolutely ignorant.” (Huxley 
1876 [1874]: 200). Brady, Parker and Jones, mentioned the same problem still four years earlier, in 1870. 
(Brady, Parker, and Jones 1871: 198) 
600  As Ernst Mayr reports, at that time, many young biologists were choosing the experimental fields over 
evolutionary biology, for instance zytology, physiology, biochemistry, genetics. By the 1950s, 
macrotaxonomy was somewhat marginalized. (Mayr 1984: 176) 
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5.3 Possible generalizations about scientific theories and theoretical 
revolutions in science 
Much of today’s thought on scientific revolutions remains inspired by a 1960s debate, notably by 
Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). This is unfortunate, at least for two reasons: 
First, Kuhn himself has modified many of his early positions in later work and has taken more 
nuanced and more informed stands. (cf. Hoyningen-Huene 1993; Kuhn 2000) Thus, most of today’s 
reception and criticism of Kuhn as well as the work of many self-proclaimed Kuhnians refer to a short 
period of Kuhn’s work only and do ignore the later work. While one could reasonably assume that 
Kuhn’s later work would never have attracted the attention of Structure, one should at least be 
aware that most of today’s debate on Kuhn focuses on stands which Kuhn himself has long cleared. 
Second, Kuhn’s Structure continues to outshine many more deserving works on the history of science 
– at least outside of the History of Science. Kuhn’s work is an essay of less than 180 pages which 
covers several theoretical revolutions on a couple of pages each and never cites a primary source. 
The debate of the 1960s on has shown that Kuhn’s terminology is sloppy and that his central 
statements vague. In the neutral sense of the word, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is a very 
superficial book. Still, it is cited much more often than more informed and more sophisticated works 
on the history and sociology of science, for instance by Edmonde Perrier (2009 [1884]), Pierre Duhem 
(1962 [1906]), Ludwik Fleck (1980 [1935]), Alvar Ellegård (1958), Karin Knorr-Cetina (1981, 1999), 
Richard Whitley (1984) or Ernst Mayr (1984 ; 1991), to name a few. 
Nonetheless, Kuhn’s book remains a major reference point in the debate on scientific theories. Thus, 
I will address several key claims of the 1960s Kuhn about scientific revolutions and I will demonstrate 
that most of them fail to fit the historic record. (Thus, in the remainder of this book ‘Kuhn’ refers to 
the Kuhn of the Structure of Scientific Revolutions.) 
Obviously, my empirical basis for such criticism is limited. I have analyzed but one scientific 
revolution in detail and there is no guarantee that these results transfer to other revolutions. 
However, two sorts of indicators point towards such transferability. First, I know of no single 
revolution for which the specialists would claim that it fits the Kuhnian account. Significantly, one 
could make that case even for Kuhn’s own study of the Copernican revolution; Kuhn’s account of this 
revolution in the Structure of Scientific Revolutions does not fit the record which he himself had given 
five years earlier.601 (Kuhn 1957; Kuhn 1970 [1962]: 68-9) Thus, it rather seems that the Kuhnian 
claims are plausible with respect to a “general view” of scientific revolutions but fit none in 
particular. Poignantly, the less one knows of actual scientific revolutions, the more plausible appears 
the Kuhnian record.  
Second, this perception asymmetry complies well with a structural problem which I see in the 
Kuhnian record of scientific revolution. Kuhn and many who followed him look at scientific 
revolutions and scientific progress with the eyes of theoreticians; their work focuses on the upper 
layers and the connotative components of my framework: Kuhnian study interpretations, narrative 
                                                            
601  This argument was pursued by Friedel Weinert in his April 2012 talk at the conference on Scientific 
Progress in Tilburg, Netherlands. He pointed out that the 1962 Kuhn identifies the Copernican revolution 
fully with Copernicus while, only five years earlier, he had neatly separated the contribution of Copernicus 
from those by Tycho Brahe or Johannes Kepler. (cf. Weinert 2009: 37-47) 
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explanations and their implications but virtually ignore how these link to dynamic models, static 
models and to descriptions. As a result, they look at scientific revolutions as “outsiders” – in the same 
way the physicists or mathematicians or the public of Victorian Britain looked at the Darwinian 
revolution.602 (see Table 27) Consequently, to Kuhnians, science looks much more homogenous, 
much more theory-driven and much more discontinuous than to closer observers. 
 
Table 27: Perception asymmetry: the perception of scientific change depends on the previous knowledge 
In my study, I believe to have avoided this perception asymmetry by thoroughly studying the 
denotative components of scientific theories and by analyzing theories before the background of the 
empirics which they aim to interpret and explain. Thus, I am confident that many of the following 
considerations apply to more scientific revolutions than one.603 
i. Theory and empirics are only loosely connected: there is no incommensurability, nor normal 
science 
My first and most fundamental dissent with the Kuhnian position concerns his emphasis of the role 
theories for science. My reception analysis indicates that 
 Only a fraction of the scientific literature addresses theoretical questions at all 
 Even were theoretical questions are addressed, these discussions hardly discuss all-encom-
passing theories, but single aspects of theorizing 
 The adherence to novel theories is selective, hardly anyone commits to entire theories604 
 The immediate impact of novel theories on scientific practice is very limited 
                                                            
602  Albeit being a deeper and more thorough study than The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, one can make 
this case for Kuhn’s study of the Copernican Revolution, too.  
603  Contradictory evidence is obviously welcome. Actually, it would be interesting to see to which cases which 
elements of Kuhn’s account do actually apply. 
604  This is not surprising if one identifies the challenge of theoretical scientific innovation as linking the new in 
an original way to the old, to reframe the shared knowledge in an innovative and fruitful manner while, at 
the same time, relating to established beliefs, e.g. through the modification of mental models. 
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 Proponents of competing theories can discuss their different interpretations and 
explanations in the language of description; there is no widespread incommensurability 
Thus, theory seems to matter much less to science than theoreticians like Kuhn may want us to 
believe; both are only loosely connected. This interpretation would be consistent with other results 
of my study, but also with the results findings of important studies in the science studies.  
With respect to epistemic changes, my comparative analysis of biological theories has shown that 
Darwin’s theory did not revolutionize all layers of biological knowledge but selected elements of 
single layers; most elements of his theory were already part of the theoretical debate before the 
publication of the Origin.605 It is, therefore, not to be expected that these partly innovations would 
mainly be discussed in an all-encompassing manner or that they would require adherence to all 
elements of the theory in which they were presented, e.g. Darwins.  
Moreover, Nancy Cartwright has demonstrated how loosely only theories relate to more concrete 
knowledge layers and how little one knows of the body of empirical knowledge if one knows but 
theoretical laws. (Cartwright 1983) She famously and polemically interpreted this relation as the 
theoretical laws of physics “lying” about the world. Before the background of my comparative 
analysis, however, her findings can also be interpreted as an indicator of how loosely empirical 
knowledge is connected to theory.606 
With respect to the impact of theory on scientific practice, sociologist of science Richard Whitley 
analyzed specialization and the emergence of sub-disciplines in science in his The Intellectual and 
Social Organization of the Sciences (1984). His findings demonstrate that sub-disciplines and smaller 
research communities define their problems and agendas autonomously and quite independent from 
overruling theories. Therefore, the existence and persistence of a general theory does not imply that 
less abstract knowledge layers remain unchanged. Instead, for scientists in a discipline with such a 
theory 
“Establishing new sub-fields [is] easier than attempting to radically alter dominant 
perspectives, and so intellectual change in these fields is likely to take the form of 
differentiation and specialization rather than revolutionary overthrows of established 
doctrines.“ (Whitley 1984: 28-9)607 
In turn, the independence of lower levels of theorizing from general theories would concur well with 
my findings on the alleged incommensurability between competing research programs. (Kuhn 1970 
[1962]: 159-165, 198-204) Kuhn claimed that scientists of such competing programs cannot 
                                                            
605  Similar results were found for the revolution in pre-classical mechanics (Galilei) by (Schemmel 2008; 
Büttner, Damerow, and Renn 2001; Büttner et al. 2003; Valleriani 2010) and for the revolution in 
astronomy (Copernicus) by (Weinert 2009: 30-87) 
606  This, in turn, might fit with her account of a dappled world, a patchwork of laws. (Cartwright 1999) (With 
respect to terminology, I would consider laws to denote general statements in my dynamic model.) 
607  Similar conclusions can, for instance, be drawn from Andrew Abbott’s work on sociology: There are no 
overruling subjects and research agendas but specific ones in specific sub-disciplines. Thus, the impact of 
paradigmatic theories for scientific practice and collaboration is very limited. (Abbott 2001) 
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“…resort to a neutral language, which both use in the same way and which is 
adequate to the statement of both their theories or even of both those theories' 
empirical consequences.” (Kuhn 1970 [1962]: 201)608 
I observe no lack of such a neutral language. Proponents of the Darwinian theory and Owen’s theory 
of the archetype did agree on the description of fossils and organisms; I do not find a single case in 
which the descriptions of such fossils or organisms was called in question – particularly in the debate 
on the hippocampus minor. (Section v) In debates on interpretation and explanation, like the 
classification of Man in the hippocampus-debate or the Archaeopteryx the differences in 
interpretation were addressed and the respective merits could be discussed with reference to the 
descriptions of these specimen. 
Moreover, Lankesters’ 1870 suggestion of changing the name of Owen’s concept of homology for its 
Platonic overtones shows that proponents of one theory were very well able to grasp the 
connotations conveyed by concepts of competing research programs and could separate them from 
the denotative part.609 (Rupke 1994: 217; see 4.3.2) 
In sum, it seems that Kuhn, but also Russel Norwood Hanson in his Pattern of Discovery, fell prey to 
the perception asymmetry sketched above. (Hanson 1972 [1958]) Seemingly, they did not know their 
subjects profoundly enough to grasp the denotative meaning of its core concepts; to them, scientific 
concepts were mere metaphors.610 If one takes into account the layer of empirical knowledge which I 
term ‘description’ and distinguishes between connotative and denotative meaning, this problem 
disappears: As long as the communicating scientists share a body of empirical knowledge which they 
know and to which they can refer, the can formulate their differences in interpretation or 
explanation. 
Let me summarize by attempting a metaphor: Complex belief systems like scientific theories are 
ephemeral structures on top of a constantly changing body of knowledge. They may be compared to 
a film of oil on the surface of moving water. The film forms some thicker accumulations of oil on the 
water (peaks of theorizing), large area of thin film (low-level theorizing), but also oil-free parts 
(theory-free areas) and, not to forget, many single oil droplets are mingled in the moving water (ad-
hoc or provisional theoretical ideas). 
ii. There is scientific progress underneath the models: knowledge accumulation despite belief 
reorganizations 
Figure 31 might illustrate the relation of knowledge production and belief production in biology 
around the Darwinian revolution. From bottom to top it displays the production of knowledge and 
beliefs on the four levels of my model of scientific theories. From left to right it depicts the 
                                                            
608  In the postscript to the 1970 edition, Kuhn clarified that he did not intend to say that scientists who work 
under different research programs cannot communicate at all. Rather, he stressed, when discussing 
different research programs, there is no neutral language in which scientists can compare how well their 
theories perform. Thus, there is no fully objective criterion for choosing between theories.( Kuhn 1970 
[1962]: 198-9) I suppose I agree with Kuhn’s latter claim (his vocabulary is typically vague) but not with his 
former on the neutral language. (Criteria for theory choice might still be less arbitrary than he claims, see 
section 5.3 iv) 
609  Remember that Owen’s concept is still in use in modern biology. 
610  While both sometimes vaguely point to the empirical referent of scientific concepts, it is remarkable that 
neither Hanson nor Kuhn cite a single primary source in their books. 
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progression of time with the two highest peaks marking the publication of Lamarck’s and Darwin’s 
theories of evolution, which both received popular reception.611 From the back to the front it displays 
different biological sub-disciplines.  
 
Figure 31: An epistemic landscape – knowledge and belief production in biology around Darwin 
The figure is obviously schematic and much simplifying and many of its data points are not backed up 
by empirical material612, yet, it might illustrate a number of trends and interdependencies in the 
scientific production of knowledge and beliefs. First, there was a remarkable increase in number of 
such disciplines from the times of Buffon and Linnaeus to the turn of the 20th century; thus, biology 
did not only produce new evidence in established fields but tapped fully novel sources of knowledge. 
(level 1) Second, lower-level theorizing like static modeling develops quite constantly and may 
change regularly. (level 2) Novel explanations, i.e. models and narratives, are rare (and many are not 
approved by the community). Still, they remain usually invisible to the public. (level 3) Theories with 
important and controversial ontological implications are solitary events. (level 4) 
Considering the perception asymmetry, this epistemic landscape looks quite differently to different 
recipients. Particularly, with the Kuhnian “outsider” look on science, i.e. the sole consideration of 
higher theoretical layers and connotative meaning, this heterogeneous and multi-layered 
development becomes quite homogeneous and linear. It boils down to some ground-work and the 
unsuccessful theorizing of Lamarck until biology finally transitions to the state of mature science with 
Darwin. His contribution leads to a deep epistemic break and post-Origin biology does not look 
anything like pre-Origin biology. The diverse research strands after the 1860s may then appear as 
post-paradigmatic problem-solving. – If all one knows of science is theories then theoretical change 
makes one believe that all of science is changing. 
                                                            
611  However, only one of them gained public support in Britain; public reception alone does not suffice for a 
revolution. 
612  Particularly on the lower abstraction levels, an exact description of the knowledge and belief production 
would require much better data and much more sophisticated tools than I had at hand. 
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Obviously, to such outside observers, most of the scientific production of knowledge and beliefs 
remains invisible. In my opinion, however, the indicator of scientific progress should be empirical613, 
i.e. science’s capacity614 to describe, predict and produce615. If one does not include the lower levels 
of scientific knowledge in one’s analysis of scientific developments, one simply overlooks the 
progress in science. However, theoretical shifts leave the broad stream of empirical knowledge 
untouched.616 Or, as French biologist Jean Rostand (1894-1977) put it: “Theories pass. The frog 
remains.”617 
iii. Popularity does not equal scientific excellence 
Theoretical revolutions in science are famous for their ontological implications: Darwin and Einstein 
were first-rate modelers618, but they are famous for their story-telling, for what their narrative 
explanations implied about the world. It is for this reason that popular-science accounts of science – 
like the Kuhnian of the 1960s – focuses so much on individuals and so little on collectives and 
underlying structures. It tells science as a sequence of heroic achievements by a few pop-star 
scientists.619 
                                                            
613  Some philosophers fancy the idea of theoretical progress. I know of no such concept which would be 
applicable to the history of science and I do not know whether it makes sense to look for one – once one 
understands how limited the role of large theories is for science. For philosophy of science with a focus on 
empirics and material culture, see e.g. (Rheinberger 1997). 
614  Such orientation towards application is sometimes criticized by defenders of “pure” scientific reasoning. 
However, as Heather Douglas argues, the distinction between applied and pure science is a very recent one 
and also very vague. It obscures that science is and was oriented towards social plus value. (Douglas 2012) 
615  I distinguish the capacity to describe, to predict and to produce. The first one is ex post knowledge, the 
latter two constitute ex ante knowledge. Description comprises the description of single events (e.g. 
lightning), or event sequences (a seaquake leading to a tsunami), object features (length of the bone of a 
fossil) and regularities of such object features (only herbivores bear hooves). Prediction and production 
refer only to event sequences or object features; in prediction we cannot control the outcome, in 
production we can. The three concepts are overlapping: what we can produce, we can predict and what we 
can produce or predict, we can describe. 
616  I find Lakatos’ metaphor of an intact theoretical core of a research program inadequate and I would not 
know how it fits with my results; particularly I do not know how to interpret theory as the core of scientific 
work. (Lakatos 1999 [1978]:48-9) In any case, my model provides a much more detailed framework for the 
distinction of continuous and discontinuous elements in theories. 
617  In return, the focus on empirical knowledge means that science does not progress without losses. Empirical 
knowledge is tied to the objects of inquiry and the instruments by which these are observed. If either one 
vanishes, the knowledge becomes a non-testable report only. Thus, historic reports of extinct races (in 
biology) or rare planetary constellations (in physics) or of political attitudes in the early 20th century (in 
sociology) describe phenomena and objects which are not accessible anymore. Likewise, observations 
which were made on historic instruments are often not reproducible because the instruments are lost and 
cannot (or are not) reproduced. In both cases, one can convincingly argue that the described findings do 
not constitute scientific knowledge anymore because they are not reproducible. Such, science constantly 
loses some of its knowledge and some frogs disappear. In the case of instruments, however, there seems 
to be a consensus that the historic knowledge has been replaced by a superior one, gathered on more 
precise and more powerful instruments and thus more complete and much richer than its predecessor. 
618  In the case of the Copernican revolution, the case is still more complex. Most of the model of planetary 
motions which is today considered Copernican was developed by Kepler. Its philosophical implications, 
however, were still told by others, notably Giordano Bruno. 
619  The case is a different one for achievements in applied science. The names of the great engineers and 
inventors have reached popular culture as well. Overlooked by outside observers seem to be contribution 
to the intermediate layers of science (static modeling, interpretation, dynamic modeling) and the basic 
research which may eventually lead to application. 
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History and philosophy of science, however, should not follow this example. We should not mistake 
popular fame for scientific quality or consider contributions beneath the threshold of popularity as 
inferior, shortsighted or immature. These are no low-hanging fruits! Rather, most excellent and 
influential scientists have never reached popular culture; they remain invisible to the public. This 
does not diminish their role in and for science. With respect to their scientific achievements, the likes 
of Geoffroy, Owen or Cuvier are clearly on par with Darwin or Lamarck. 
iv. Epistemic criteria and theory choices: classifying criteria for the assessment of theories 
With respect to the acceptance or rejection of the Darwinian theory or its elements, my reception 
analysis does not allow for a detailed description or classification of the criteria by which the 
Darwin’s theory has been assessed by its contemporaries (or by later generations). However, the 
perception asymmetry which I identified (see above) as well as the distinction of different levels of 
abstraction within my model provide some clues how such questions may be pursued and allow for a 
classifications of the criteria by which scientific theories may be judged: a classification of epistemic 
criteria. 
In a 1977 book, Kuhn mentioned five major criteria by which theories may be judged and these seem 
to still dominate the philosophical debate. (Kuhn 1977a: 321-2620; Oberheim and Hoyningen-Huene 
2012): 
 Accuracy: the “consequences deducible from a theory should be in demonstrated agreement 
with the results of existing experiments and observations” 
 Scope: “a theory’s consequences should extend far beyond the particular observations, laws, 
or sub-theories it was initially designed to explain” 
 Consistency: a theory should not contradict either itself or other currently accepted theories 
 Simplicity: a theory should bring “order to phenomena that in its absence would be 
individually isolated, and, as a set, confused.” 
 Fruitfulness: a theory should “disclose new phenomena or previously unnoted relationships 
among those already known” 
Based on my model, I suggest specifying and systematizing these criteria, organized according to two 
kinds of distinctions. First, I wish to distinguish the different levels of my model of scientific theories, 
i.e. the abstraction levels which organized my comparative analysis of theories and my reception 
analysis: description, classification, explanation and ontological implications. Second, it is organized 
on what I would call ‘epistemic goals’, i.e. goals which are pursued in the formulation of theories. I 
see three such goals: 
 the organization of empirical evidence (data): theories should order data in a manner which 
allows for easy orientation and navigation 
 the communication of empirical evidence (data): theories should present data in manner 
which allows for efficient procession and dissemination621 
 the inspiration for new research: theories should serve as fruitful heuristics for further 
research, systematically evoking new research problems and fields 
                                                            
620  All quotes in the following two paragraphs and the list are from this book. 
621  This relates closely to the conversational implicatures described by psycholinguistics. (See footnote 80) 
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To these three epistemic goals of theorizing, I add the quality and quantity of the empirical evidence 
(data), which the theory may organize, communicate, or, with respect to which it may inspire new 
research. The opposition of my four levels to these epistemic goals results in a matrix. (See Table 28) 
In this matrix, epistemic goals are not identified with single levels of abstraction, but may apply to 
several such levels.622 Hence, the organization of data (column 2) concerns both levels 2 and 3 and it 
has both a (denotative) logical component: inner consistency, simplicity of static and dynamic 
models, as well as a literary (connotative) one: simplicity of interpretative principles and of 
narratives. For communication (column 3) and a theory’s heuristic function (column 4), the 
connotative elements matter most. It is the interpretation, the narrative and the ontology of a theory 
which allows for its dissemination and procession without complete knowledge of the underlying 
data623, allows for consistency checks with other interpretations, narrative explanations and 
ontologies and for its integration in a world-view. Finally, it is the interpretation, the narrative and 
the ontology of a theory which point out very different kinds of research fields, evoking questions 
about the existence of (directly observable) objects and events (as well as their features), about 
regularities between them and, finally, about abstract entities and relations between such entities. 
Thus, my classification covers all of Kuhn’s criteria and it introduces a number of further distinctions 
which, I believe, supplement and clarify some of them: In column 1, my epistemic criteria correspond 
to accuracy and scope. I would, furthermore, add the ability to predict and produce for we consider a 
theory more powerful if it allows for predicting or influencing future events. (see above) In column 2, 
my distinction of denotative and connotative simplicity specifies the demand for simplicity, namely 
that a theory should bring “order to phenomena that in its absence would be individually isolated, 
and, as a set, confused.”624 Equally, my classification accommodates the first part of consistency, 
namely that a theory should not contradict itself. The second part is accommodated by column 3 
which demands that a theory complies with other theories in order for it to be compatible to existing 
interpretations, narratives and ontologies. Furthermore, column three demands that a theory be 
convincing either in its interpretation, explanation and ontology, thus catering to human intuition 
and providing humans the impression of (better) understanding the data through the interpretations, 
explanations and ontologies provided by the theory. Finally, column 4 specifies what Kuhn calls 
‘fruitfulness’, namely that a theory should “disclose new phenomena or previously unnoted 
relationships among those already known”. It could point out gaps in either, classifications, 
explanations, ontologies or in combinations of them. 
  
                                                            
622  The exceptions are level 1 and column 1 because the other three epistemic goals – organization, 
communication, inspiration – do not add to the quality and quantity of data and because the theoretical 
abstraction levels of my model – classification, explanation, implications – do not apply to level 1. 
623  In this sense, however, knowing a theory’s interpretation, narrative or ontology does not imply that one 
knows the entire theory. Actually, in this sense, knowing the entire theory becomes quite daunting a task. 
624  System theorist and complexity specialist Niklas Luhmann claimed that to organize knowledge is to reduce 
complexity. This corresponds to my impression that a good theory is a like a good file cabinet; it closely 
follows a carefully designed order and employs intuitive and unequivocal labels. 
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Level of 
Abstraction  
Epistemic goals 
Quality & quan-
tity of data 
Organization  
of data 
Communication  
of data 
Inspiration for new 
research (heuristic) 
Level 4: 
Ontological 
Implications 
   Ontological power: 
making sense of 
the world 
 Consistency with 
other Ontologies 
 Gaps in ontologies: 
entities, relations 
between entities 
Level 3: 
Explanation 
  Logical (inner) 
Consistency of 
dynamic models  
 Simplicity of 
dynamic models  
 Simplicity of 
narratives 
 Explanatory power: 
making sense of 
dynamic models 
 Consistency of 
narratives with 
other narratives 
 Gaps in modeled 
processes (laws): 
regularities between 
objects, events 
Level 2: 
Classifi-
cation 
  Logical (Inner) 
Consistency of 
static models 
 Simplicity of 
static models  
 Simplicity of 
interpretative 
principles 
 Interpretative po-
wer: making sense 
of classifications 
 Consistency of 
interpretations 
with other inter-
pretations 
 Gaps in static 
models: objects, 
object features, 
events, event 
features 
Level 1: 
Description 
 Data accuracy  
 Data scope 
 Possibility to 
predict and/or 
produce 
   
Table 28: A categorization of epistemic criteria by abstraction levels and four epistemic goals 
Moreover and interestingly, my classification complies perfectly with what Darwin described as the 
added value of his theory on the last pages of the Origin. In the first paragraph of this lengthy 
passage, he suggests that his theory simplifies static modeling and interpretation (1.1.) as well as 
dynamic modeling625 (1.2.). In the second paragraph, Darwin discusses communicative virtues, 
namely interpretation (2.1.) and narrative explanation (2.2.). Finally, in the third paragraph he 
addresses the heuristic value of his theory: 
„When the views advanced by me in this volume, and by Mr Wallace in the Linnean 
Journal., or when analogous views on the origin of species are generally admitted, we 
can dimly foresee that there will be a considerable revolution in natural history. [1] 
Systematists will be able to pursue their labours as at present; [1.1.] but they will not 
be incessantly haunted by the shadowy doubt whether this or that form be in 
essence a species. This I feel sure, and I speak after experience, will be no slight relief 
                                                            
625  For narration, his text does not support my classification nor does it stand it in conflict it. In any case, I do 
not suppose that Darwin was a aware of the organizational value of a simple narrative, which seems to be 
rather new psycholinguistic insight. 
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The endless disputes whether or not some fifty species of British brambles are true 
species will cease. Systematists will have only to decide (not that this will be easy) 
whether any form be sufficiently constant and distinct from other forms, to be 
capable of definition; and if definable whether the differences be sufficiently 
important to deserve a specific name. This latter point will become a far more 
essential consideration than it is at present; for differences, however slight, between 
any two forms, if not blended by intermediate gradations, are looked at by most 
naturalists as sufficient to raise both forms to the rank of species. [1.2.] Hereafter we 
shall be compelled to acknowledge that the only distinction between species and 
well-marked varieties is, that the latter are known, or believed, to be connected at 
the present day by intermediate gradations, whereas species were formerly thus 
connected. […] In short, we shall have to treat species in the same manner as those 
naturalists treat genera, who admit that genera are merely artificial combinations 
made for convenience. This may not be a cheering prospect; but we shall at least be 
freed from the vain search for the undiscovered and undiscoverable essence of the 
term species.   
[2] The other and more general departments of natural history will rise greatly in 
interest. [2.1.] The terms used by naturalists of affinity, relationship, community of 
type, paternity, morphology, adaptive characters, rudimentary and aborted organs, 
etc., will cease to be metaphorical, and will have a plain signification. When we no 
longer look at an organic being as a savage looks at a ship, as at something wholly 
beyond his comprehension; [2.2.] when we regard every production of nature as one 
which has had a history; when we contemplate every complex structure and instinct 
as the summing up of many contrivances, each useful to the possessor, nearly in the 
same way as when we look at any great mechanical invention as the summing up of 
the labour, the experience, the reason, and even the blunders of numerous 
workmen; when we thus view each organic being, how far more interesting, I speak 
from experience, will the study of natural history become!  
[3] A grand and almost untrodden field of inquiry will be opened, on the causes and 
laws of variation; on correlation of growth, on the effects of use and disuse, on the 
direct action of external conditions, and so forth. The study of domestic productions 
will rise immensely in value. A new variety raised by man will be a more important 
and interesting subject for study than one more species added to the infinitude of 
already recorded species. Our classifications will come to be, as far as they can be so 
made, genealogies; and will then truly give what may be called the plan of creation. 
The rules for classifying will no doubt become simpler when we have a definite object 
in view. We possess no pedigrees or armorial bearings; and we have to discover and 
trace the many diverging lines of descent in our natural genealogies, by characters of 
any kind which have long been inherited. Rudimentary organs will speak infallibly 
with respect to the nature of long-lost structures. Species and groups of species, 
which are called aberrant, and which may fancifully be called living fossils, will aid us 
in forming a picture of the ancient forms of life. Embryology will reveal to us the 
structure, in some degree obscured of the prototypes of each great class.“ (Darwin 
1860: 484-487) 
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In sum, I believe that my classification may clarify to some degree what kinds of epistemic criteria 
one might distinguish, how these criteria relate to different components of scientific theories, to 
different epistemic goals and to each other.626 It also suggests that theory choice might be an even 
more complex matter than Kuhn suggested. It does not imply however, that theory choice is an 
irrational or arbitrary choice. Rather, in the perspective of my earlier arguments that empirics and 
theories are only loosely connected and that adherence to general theories is selective, it suggests 
that elements of different theories might serve different purposes on different occasions. It makes 
no sense to ask whether one theory is better than another, when one does not specify the epistemic 
position of the person supposed to adopt one of them and the communicative situation in which it is 
supposed to be employed, e.g. in modeling, as a heuristic device or in communication and in what 
communicative situation, for instance among colleagues of the same small research community, 
colleagues from the same discipline, scientists from other disciplines, an educated and interested 
public or a general public.627 All these situations demand different theoretical virtues and might thus 
favor elements of different theories. This is particularly true for theoretical structures below general 
theories as models; one model might provide an intuitive explanation, another one an elegant logical 
structure, a third the most accurate representation of data.628 
v. Judging Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions requires more than a plausibility check 
No in-depth study has ever confirmed the Kuhnian claims. Historians and philosophers alike have 
heavily criticized The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and even Kuhn did clear most of his 1960s 
positions in the decades before his death in 1996. (cf. Hoyningen-Huene 1989; Kuhn 2000; Kuhn 
1977b; Kuhn 1977a; Wray 2011; Wray 2012) Yet, why does his account of scientific history continue 
to fascinate? Why do so many scientists and non-scientists find it a plausible and intuitive account of 
science?  
I believe the answer to these questions lies in a point which I have discussed during the presentation 
of my model, in the section on narration (section 2.1.4): Kuhn’s is the case of a narrative fallacy. In 
the Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he tells a story about science which complies with one of the 
most fundamental narrative patterns of human experience: Kuhn tells the story of a white knight, a 
noble and ingenious hero who overcomes extraordinary difficulties by pursuing the right goals and 
who ultimately succeeds. This narrative pattern appears plausible and intuitive because it is 
extremely simple and very familiar.  
However, underneath Kuhn’s narrative lies neither a valid model nor the empirical findings to back 
one up. Table 29 shows that his story, albeit intuitive, clearly does not fit the empirical record. 629 As 
                                                            
626  Therefore, this classification might be useful for the design of empirical studies of theory choices, providing 
an static model within a dynamic model of such choices. 
627  Communicative considerations matter a lot for science politics. Thus, the framing of research questions 
and results is an important marketing tool both within science and with respect to the public. 
628  How such criteria interact as factors of theory, is a question for sociologists. 
629  To be clear, the problem with Kuhn is not that he omits certain aspect of the history of science; any 
theorizing is abstraction and, therefore, omission. Kuhn, however, is founding his argument on such 
omissions. (I do not imply that he consciously did so; I do not know this.) 
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soon as one goes beyond checking whether Kuhn’s story is intuitive one remarks that it is 
inconsistent and empirically wrong.630 
Narrative 
elements 
The Kuhnian story A more realistic account of science (and still a simplified one) 
Scene 
(Where?) 
In a discipline in 
crisis, unable to 
solve problems 
posed by empirics 
(anomalies)… 
Large scientific disciplines are never integrated into a single 
theoretical framework. There are always different sub-
disciplines with particular empirical problems. Crisis is constant 
– or absent. 
Agent 
(Who?) 
…a single hero 
scientist631 with a 
touch of genius… 
The supposed hero scientist is usually part of a network of 
excellent collaborators and competitors and draws on shared 
challenging objects, shared research topics and a shared 
heritage of beliefs about his discipline 
Agency 
(How?) 
…formulates a 
brilliant novel 
theory… 
The novel theory usually shares many elements of competing 
theories and integrates historical shared beliefs. Its brilliance 
consists mostly in the integration of many existing parts in a 
single, consistent framework which conveys controversial 
ontological implications to the public. 
Act 
(What?) 
…which then 
beats out its com-
petitors, becomes 
accepted by the 
scientific comm-
unity and defines 
the new “normal 
science”… 
Theories are not accepted as units; rather scientists accept 
some aspects and dismiss others. Moreover, their effect on 
empirical work is limited; particularly sub-disciplines avoid 
theoretical positioning or employ theory only in 
communication to outsiders. Elements632 of “loser” theories 
are preserved or recycled in new theories. 
Reason 
(Why?) 
…because it best 
solves the existing 
problems. 
There are manifold reasons for accepting or rejecting elements 
of a theory beyond its fit with data. Scientists may accept a 
theory for its ability to organize empirical knowledge, for its 
appeal as a communicative device, or because it promises to 
be a powerful heuristic. Such choices may be momentarily and 
may change with the epistemic position (previous knowledge, 
depth of understanding) and with the purpose for which the 
theory is employed, e.g. the communicative situation in which 
it is employed. 
Table 29: The Kuhnian narrative and its more realistic counterpart 
                                                            
630  Unfortunately, of the three criteria – plausibility, consistency, empirical fit – checking plausibility is the 
easiest and requires the least resources. Therefore, it often is the only criterion by which scientific 
statements are judged – notably in the humanities. 
631  Unlike in later works, Kuhn did not adequately represent the role of collectives in the development of 
theories in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (Kuhn 1970 [1962]) On page 18 of Structure, Kuhn 
mentions the possibility that a group may develop a novel theory. On page 21, he mentions a collective of 
scientists who developed the theoretical foundation for electrics. On page 3, Galileo is mentioned as being 
embedded in a group of scientists, yet, this is not Kuhn’s own statement but a reception. In the remainder 
of the book, he identifies theoretical advances with single scientists, for instance Einstein, Galileo, 
Copernicus, Darwin, Lavoisier. Groups figure predominantly as recipients of theories or as the performers 
of normal science. (cf. Kuhn 1977a: 321) 
632  The program of Historical Epistemology identifies mental models as such preserved/recycled elements. 
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In sum, all the spectacular and incendiary elements of Kuhn’s account of scientific revolutions – the 
elements for which he and his book became famous – turn out to be wrong. He overestimated the 
role of theories for science thus exaggerating the notion of crisis. He focused on individuals and 
neglected the role of collectives633 and the knowledge and beliefs they share. He oversimplified the 
process of reception and theory choice by taking the position of a particular recipient group and 
neglecting that other groups receive the theory to different depths and assess it by different 
standards. Finally, Kuhn overlooked how very selective theories are accepted or rejected; scientists 
and the public deliberately choose single elements of a theory and ignore or dismiss others; the 
received theory is a very different thing from the one which find in a written text like the Origin of 
Species. Thus, Kuhn’s spectacular theoretical scientific revolutions – these seemingly disruptive 
breaks in scientific practice – reorganize the body of scientific knowledge but they do not interrupt 
the accumulation of knowledge. 
5.4 Synthesis 
In this dissertation, I have achieved three projects: (i) I have developed a complex model of scientific 
theories which distinguishes different abstraction levels and two kinds of meaning – logical and literal 
– within theories. It allows for describing scientific knowledge systems in a novel degree of rigor and 
precision. (ii) I have applied this model in a historical-epistemological analysis of the Darwinian 
revolution, thus putting Darwin’s contribution to the debate on evolution in the context of his 
discipline and his predecessors and competitors and identifying his truly individual contribution to 
19th century biology. (iii) I have developed a novel type of reception analysis which distinguishes 
different audiences, in Darwin’s case with biologists, scientists from other disciplines and the public. I 
have demonstrated that these audiences received the theory to different depths and that these 
differences in reception depth influenced the criteria by which they judged the theory as which 
elements of the theory were accepted or rejected. Furthermore, I have carried out the first large-
scale quantitative analysis of the reception of Darwin’s evolution theory among biologists. 
In this work, I see four important contributions to existing research on Darwin, scientific theories and 
scientific revolutions: (i) The model of scientific theories which I have developed promises to be an 
efficient and flexible tool for both historians and philosophers of science. The model allows for 
precise and systematic descriptions and comparisons of different theories as well as the description 
of their transformations. (ii) I developed a novel framework for analyzing the reception of scientific 
theories among heterogeneous audiences, particularly audiences which comprise scientists and non-
scientists. My framework allows for the classification of different reception depths as well as the 
explanation of correlated phenomena like the criteria by which a theory is judged. (iii) I have 
provided a comprehensive description of the transformation of the body of biological knowledge in 
the first half of the 19th century, which is significantly more precise and systematic than existing 
accounts. (iv) I have developed a general framework in which theoretical scientific revolutions can be 
described and explained.  
Finally, my combination of philosophical, historical and sociological methods has revealed an image 
of scientific revolutions which is more precise, more systematic and more realistic than previous 
                                                            
633  I am not even speaking about modern research groups here but about colleagues and competitors with 
independent research agendas who worked on similar problems in different places. 
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accounts. It portrays scientific revolutions as large-scale knowledge reorganizations rather than 
disruptive breaks in the scientific knowledge production and does thus avoid the misrepresentations 
and fallacies of earlier works on the topic. 
 
 
 
THE END   
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6 Annex: Philosophical-systematic appraisal 
of my model of scientific theories 
Similarly as for the generalizations on scientific revolutions, the empirical basis for an appraisal of my 
model is rather slim. I have demonstrated that it holds well for four theories and parts of other 
theories in 19th century biology. Also, I have sketched its application to theories in two other 
disciplines in my description of my model. (See section 2.1) From this, it seems to me that the model 
reveals a number of aspects about specific theories and theories in general which have hitherto gone 
unnoticed or have been mingled. Particularly, it allows for clearly distinguishing the connotative parts 
of a theory from its denotative parts; thus separating a concept from the meaning of its concept 
name, a static model from its interpretation, a dynamic model from its narrative and both from the 
narrative’s ontological implications. In other words, my model separates different kinds of beliefs 
about science from different forms of scientific knowledge. (See Figure 32) Such, it may serve as a 
useful static model (a classification) in future research in both the History and the Philosophy of 
Science.634 
Beyond its usefulness as an analytic tool, my model relates to a couple of problems in 20th century 
philosophy of science, solving635 two, clarifying and attenuating others. 
 
Figure 32: Scientific knowledge (grey shade) vs. beliefs about science (white) in my model of scientific theories 
                                                            
634  Applications, however, should treat my model (or any similar framework) not as an ontology or ideal model 
but as a tool box, an extendable one with it. For instance, it could be enriched by mathematical formulae 
or by more advanced tools for the analysis of metaphors and other stylistic devices. 
635  I consider the solution of a philosophical problem either of these possibilities: (i) clarifying terminology to 
the point that the problem disappears or (ii) clarifying terminology to the point that the problem becomes 
an empirical, i.e. a scientific one. This, however, feels like a minority position in Philosophy of Science. 
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i. Realism with respect to beliefs; empiricism with respect to knowledge 
It is common sense that scientific theories are more than mere aggregations of facts, somehow they 
mingle facts knowledge with hypotheses and it is eminently difficult to separate one from the other. 
Paul Feyerabend, in a sarcastic response to Karl Popper636, famously went to the point of claiming 
that “anything goes” in science, that there was no methodology and that scientific theorizing, 
fundamentally, did not differ from religion or ideology. All were producing beliefs and none was 
more justified than the other. (Feyerabend 1975) By clarifying the line between beliefs and 
knowledge in scientific theories as the line between connotative and denotative meaning, my model 
should demonstrate that science is not just producing beliefs, not just telling stories. Scientific 
knowledge, in its theoretical form, is woven into a network of metaphors, stories and story sketches 
but it is not identical with this network. Its core is the logical aggregation and ordering of descriptions 
of empirical observations.  
Beyond this body of empirical knowledge, however, science offers little more than a clutter of 
beliefs, some explicit and well-formulated, most implicit and in fragments – like mental models. A 
theory like Darwin’s is the rare exception; few succeed in creating a coherent belief system around a 
body of empirical knowledge and fill all four levels of my model: description, interpretation, 
explanation and explicitly addressed philosophical implications. Yet, even these ideal theories are no 
coherent belief system in scientific practice; they are open to interpretation to the point that they 
might mean something different to any two recipients. Moreover, these differences in reception 
grow with the cultural differences. In this, scientific theories are not unlike poems, speeches or films: 
they are different cultural products in different times. 
Like prominent empiricist philosophers, I cannot reasonably refer to this cluttered, subjective and 
constantly shifting network of beliefs as ‘knowledge’; the term637 just seems inappropriate.638 This 
dismissal, however, comes with two important qualifications. First, beliefs can become knowledge 
and connotative meaning can be transformed into denotative meaning. Scientists do this all the time 
when, based on their beliefs about objects or phenomena of inquiry, they make predictions (ex ante) 
or describe novel observations (ex post). Thus, some debates on interpretation, explanation or 
ontology can and could be settled by novel experiments and/or observations.639 The debate on 
evolution is a case in point.  
However, such operationalization of beliefs is never fully possible. At any given moment, theories 
contain beliefs which have not yet been operationalized and may not be operationalizable in the 
foreseeable future. Thus, an important part of the beliefs incorporated in scientific theories remains 
                                                            
636  I am indebted to Paul Hoyningen-Huene for clarifying the historical context of Feyerabend’s book to me. 
637  I am making this meta-argument in the terminology of my model: After aggregating different parts of 
theories in different sets, I am discussing how these different sets should be named. I suppose to name the 
set of connotative elements ‘beliefs’ and the set of denotative elements ‘knowledge’. 
638  One could make a reasonable case that mental models incorporate, to a large part, implicit and practical 
knowledge. This, however, is not the realist argument. 
639  Such operationalizations of beliefs, however, are frequently subject to heated debate. It is not evident, in 
what way one the existence of theoretical entities like agents, or ontological rules of interactions like 
forces can be tested empirically. Also, such operationalizations would have to produce notable differences 
to previous results (at least outside the interval of tolerated deviation) under the same boundary 
conditions, notably on the same instruments. I am not sure, that all cases of famous predictions qualify 
here; therefore, a systematic study of famous predictions might be an interesting historical project. 
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inaccessible to empirical test and thus does not have a determinate truth value. This part can either 
be believed or not believed. 
Second, with respect to such beliefs, scientists seem in a somewhat schizophrenic position, a position 
which should be taken into consideration in philosophical debates. In the context of discovery640, i.e. 
during research, scientists often seem driven by specific beliefs, i.e. specific interpretations, specific 
narratives, specific ontologies. When asked, they might justify their research with reference to these 
beliefs. However, in the context of justification, i.e. when presenting their results to their peers, 
scientists appear much more cautious with respect to these beliefs; they rarely claim to have proven 
their beliefs or even demonstrated that, given the available belief sets, they best fit the data. Holding 
beliefs beyond the established body of empirical knowledge empirics is a different thing than 
pretending these beliefs have been proved! 
In sum, I would side with realist philosophers in that scientific theories do say more about the world 
than the data they accommodate and predict: Indeed, to many scientists and to many others they 
claim the truth of their interpretations, narratives and ontologies.641 However, with respect to the 
truth of this “more”, I would side with empiricist philosophers; we have no means of assessing it and 
therefore cannot consider it to be (intersubjective) knowledge. Therefore, the only possibility of 
settling issues of the realist-antirealist debate seems to be the scientific one: empirical study.642  
ii. Analytic vs. synthetic statements643 in the empirical sciences644: regularities within one set of 
objects/events and regularities between non-overlapping sets of objects/events 
Beyond the distinction of beliefs and knowledge, the logical part of my model allows for solving a pair 
of technical645 problems which have plagued the syntactic (linguistic) view of scientific theories: (i) 
the distinction of analytic and synthetic statements and (ii) the explanation of confirmation holism, 
the so-called Duhem-Quine hypothesis. (see next section) 
Immanuel Kant apparently was the first to explicitly highlight a distinction between analytic and 
synthetic statements. (Kant 1787: B10) He describes the difference as such: 
                                                            
640  The distinction of a context of discovery and a context of justification is sometimes considered old-
fashioned. However, it is often useful in distinguishing different phases of knowledge production and it is 
well operationalizable by distinguishing the work prior to a publication and the debate after a publication. 
641  Theo Kuipers (Kuipers 2000: 9) provides a systematic overview over beliefs held by different kinds of 
realists. For a defense of structural realism, see (Engler 2008). 
642  I do not imply that empirical study may solve all debates about reality. 
643  This section and the following ones are abbreviated and non-formal versions of a forthcoming article on 
analytic and synthetic statements in scientific theories. (Zacharias forthcoming) 
644  I will not discuss natural language examples like “All bachelors are unmarried.”. While such sentences may 
express analytic statements, their terms are not sufficiently specified in terms of truth-values to allow for 
logical analysis. In my opinion, it makes no sense to discuss whether statements are analytic, if the 
predicates of these statements are not clearly defined. – Moreover, I will not discuss the statements of the 
non-empirical sciences (mathematics, geometry, logic) although many of them are analytic. For a 
discussion, see (Zacharias forthcoming). 
645  I will discuss both, analyticity and holism, as logical problems, i.e. in terms of denotative (extensional) 
meaning. While there exist discussions of the problem as one of connotative meaning (e.g. Putnam 1962), 
in the original debate, both problems have been formulated as a logical problems by Willard van Orman 
Quine and Morton G. White: both demanded an extensional (denotative) definition of analyticity. (Quine 
1951; Quine 1961; White 1950) Moreover, I do not see why or how one would discuss a logical problem in 
terms of connotations. As a problem of linguistic intuitions (“All bachelors are unmarried.”), analyticity is a 
topic of linguistics or psychology and I do not see what value philosophers might add to empirical research. 
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(i) “In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought (if I 
only consider affirmative judgments, since the application to negative ones is easy) 
this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the 
subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies entirely 
outside the concept A, though to be sure it stands in connection with it. In the first 
case, I call the judgment analytic, in the second synthetic.”  
(ii) The analytic statement cannot be denied without logical contradiction. 
I read these two conditions as two formulations of the same relation, once in terms of set theory, 
once in terms of logical statements, namely (i) that there exist two sets A and B of which A contains B 
and (ii) that to deny that something satisfies predicate A without claiming that something satisfies 
predicate B leads to a wrong statement.646 Kant calls statements which link A and B in this manner 
‘analytic’ and statements which rather link non-overlapping sets or predicates ‘synthetic’. 
The key to distinguishing analytic and synthetic statements in science is the distinction of two kinds 
of regularities which I have separated throughout my study647: regularities between the same kinds 
of objects and regularities between different kinds of objects or, more generally and more precisely 
formulated, regularities within one set of object or event features and regularities between non-
overlapping sets of such objects or features. Let me illustrate. 
Until the end of the 18th century, biologists produced classificatory knowledge, i.e. they described the 
features of plants and animals and discovered that these descriptions allowed for the systematic 
classifications of organisms in groups of which the members shared certain features. For instance, all 
vertebrates display a spinal cord and, as Cuvier highlighted, all animals with hooves are herbivores. 
Within such classifications, each taxonomic group is defined by a set of features which its members 
share.648 The more general the group, the less features its members share.  
Now, if one describes the relations between a general group and one of its subgroups, one describes 
a relation as described by Kant in statement (i). For instance, the taxonomic group ‘humans’ is a 
subset of the group ‘biped mammals’ as well as the group ‘mammals’. Also the group ‘mammals’ 
contains the group ‘biped mammals’. Therefore, one cannot deny the existence of mammals without 
denying the existence of biped mammals: if there exists one biped mammal there also exists at least 
one mammal.649 This corresponds to Kant’s statement (ii). Hence, statements which clarify the 
                                                            
646  In modern logic, Kant’s statements can be expressed more precisely in a set-theoretical formulation and in 
predicate logic. Be A and Be two sets, each element of set B an element of set A but at least one element of 
B no element of A. (I exclude identity because analyticity is not identity and mixing both may distract from 
the actual problem.) Furthermore, be    and    two predicates, with    denoting „x is an element of the 
set A“ and    denoting „x is an element of the set B“. The statements (i) and (ii) two can then be expressed 
like this: (i’)     and (i’’)          . 
647  Hence, my solution to the problem is simple and low-tech; it is based on an empirical distinction and 
requires no complex formal apparatus. 
648  These relations can be expressed in biconditional statements, e.g.             , with    and    
denoting subsets of   . 
649  In more formal terms, the following three statements cannot be true simultaneously: (i)              
(ii)      (iii)      . Note that this contradiction exists only if there is a definition which defines    as 
implying     As this is not the case in normal language, one cannot discuss analyticity there. (See above) 
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relations of a taxonomic group to a more general group, by specifying elements of the definitions of 
such groups (relations within static models), are analytic.650 
With the advent of biogeography, paleontology and experimental biology, biologists began to 
supplement analytic statements with synthetic ones, i.e. statements which describe relations 
between non-overlapping sets. For instance, certain groups of fossils were restricted to certain 
geological strata (which were interpreted as representing different periods of time), certain groups of 
living organisms were restricted to certain geographical areas, and certain micro-organisms were 
linked to chicken broth which had first been boiled and then left standing open.651 
Such statements do not specify relations within a static model (classification). Instead, they relate 
groups of organisms not to subgroups or more general groups of organisms but to non-overlapping 
groups652 like sets of geological strata or geographical areas or events as boiling.653 It seems to me 
that synthetic statements are rather found in dynamic models, i.e. models which describe changes in 
space and time. Thus, the Input-Output relations of the dynamic models are all synthetic statements. 
iii. Underdetermination of concepts, models, ontologies & confirmation holism 
The distinction of analytic and synthetic statements, in turn, allows for clarifying another problem, 
the so-called (confirmation) holism, the observation that scientific models and theories can be 
immunized against divergent empirical evidence by restricting concepts which figure in the 
explanation of this evidence. (Duhem 1962 [1909]: 187) A case in point is the term ‘perfect market’. 
It denotes the Situation space in which Rational Choice models and much of macroeconomics apply: 
hardly any such regularity applies outside perfect markets. Consequently, when predictions fail, 
macroeconomics can always blame the market and claim that it was not perfect, thus immunizing 
their model from contradictory evidence.654 
The observation of holism has then been developed to the general thesis that theories are 
underdetermined by the evidence they aim to interpret and explain, i.e. that data provides no 
unambiguous criterion for the choice between theories. (Quine 1975)655 Finally, the thesis of 
                                                            
650  Note that this is why such statements are called ‘analytic’; they analyze (dissect) complex definitions. 
Therefore, I find it a trifle misleading to claim that analytic statements represent a priori knowledge, i.e. 
that one knows them beforehand. One only does, if (i) one knows all definitions of a given classification 
and (ii) understands these definitions. This often is not the case. Therefore, analytic statements can be 
informative although they merely specify one part of a (complex) definition. 
651  In the first and second example, objects are linked to objects; in the third events are linked to events. 
However, in models, the objects of the second example were interpreted as displaying the result of events, 
i.e. the emergence of certain species. The same is possible in the first example, the geographical 
distribution could display the result of migrations. 
652  As I did discuss it in section 2.1.2, these objects and events may, themselves, be classified in classifications 
of events or other objects, for instance in geological or geographical correlations. However, such 
classifications would be independent of the classifications of groups of organisms. 
653  In formal terms, such relations can be expressed in statements like the following:             where 
   and    are logically independent predicates (the sets A and C do not overlap). The difference to analytic 
statements is visible in the logical form of the statements already: The universal quantifier of an analytic 
statement binds both the antecedens and the consequens of the conditional in the bracket. Contrarily, in a 
synthetic statement, it binds but the antecedens. 
654  The same is true for the ‘homo oeconomicus’ as a denotative term of the object class; contradictory 
evidence can always be blamed on humans acting irrationally. 
655  A mix of these two statements is also referred to as the Duhem-Quine-hypothesis. 
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underdetermination has been used to challenge the self-image of science as a rational enterprise. 
(Stanford 2009) Before I address the latter two points, let me describe what kinds of 
underdetermination are accommodated by my model and how it specifies accounts of holism and 
underdetermination. 
First, from level 1 to 2 of my model, descriptions of observations are aggregated, denoted, 
hierarchized and interpreted in classifications. These choices are not entirely dictated by the 
evidence and human perception of it; humans differ in them. Thus, any particular classification may 
be underdetermined with respect to the way it aggregates descriptions of observations in sets and 
denotes these sets, hierarchizes sets and provides interpretative principles for these hierarchies. 
A famous example for the aggregation and denotation is Karl Popper’s black swan. In his seminal 
Logik der Forschung, Popper argued that until the discovery of a black swan the statement “All swans 
are white.” was true, yet, with the discovery of the black swan it became falsified. (Popper 
1995[1935]: 3) With respect to science and scientific practice, Popper’s argument is wrong. If one 
assumes that ‘white’ was a defining attribute of the set with the name ‘swan’656, then the animal 
found in Australia was no swan and its inclusion in the set ‘swan’ would have required modifying the 
definition of the set named ‘swan’, namely the dropping of ‘white’ as defining attribute.657 In either 
case, the statement was not falsified. Equally, when Owen described the Archaeopteryx in 1862, he 
classified it as a bird, not as the intermediate between birds and reptiles as which it is classified 
today. Thus, the discovery of the Archaeopteryx did not refute or contradict Owen’s archetypal 
classificatory system; rather, if (and only if) one classified the Archaeopteryx as an intermediate form 
between reptiles and birds, it did not fit Owen’s classificatory system – and this is no refutation or 
logical contradiction, merely a reduction of a model’s scope.658 Moreover, such underdetermination 
exists not with respect to the evidence but also with respect to other models. In the debate on the 
age of the earth (section v), both physicists and geologists identified their respective, non-
overlapping evidence in timescales of quite different magnitudes. To side with one party and not 
with the other was a matter of classificatory choice, not one of evidence or its perception. 
Such choices consist in two options, both of which are closely related to the aforementioned analytic 
statements, i.e. statements which describe relations between sets. One can either restrict a set to 
exclude the aberrant evidence or divide the set in order to integrate it: One can either allow for black 
swans or not consider the black swan a swan. One can either drop the distinctions between 
archetypes or classify the Archaeopteryx as a reptile or a bird – but nothing between. One can either 
accept two different timescales of the age of the earth or dismiss one of them. Each of these choices 
implies modifying the definition of sets and, thus, changing relations within a static model. These 
changes become visible in novel analytic statements, i.e. statements which specify the novel 
attributes in the modified definitions. 
                                                            
656  This seems dubious; colors as defining attributes would probably only be used if they were needed to 
distinguish between organisms which resemble each other in all but their color, for instance black and 
white swans. 
657  My argument does not hold with undefined terms and intuitive concepts, e.g. in natural languages. Thus, 
without a definition of the predicate ‘is a swan’, Popper’s argument is quite intuitive. 
658  Philosophers often argue that a theory logically entails evidence. (cf. Laudan 1990: 269) Aside from the fact 
that linguistic entities can only entail linguistic entities, e.g. theories descriptions of observations, such a 
view works only with respect to denotations, not connotations, e.g. not in natural languages. Connotations 
are no logical entities and do not entail anything logically. 
Sebastian Zacharias: The Darwinian Revolution as a knowledge reorganization 
325 
On level 3, within dynamic models, the phenomenon of underdetermination becomes more 
complex. As I explained in the introduction of my model, dynamic models summarize aggregate 
statements over sets of boundary conditions (in the Situation Types), sets of observed objects (in the 
Object Class), sets of events or object features (in Inputs, Outputs) sets of assignments of events or 
object features (in the Connector). When evidence does not comply with a dynamic model, each of 
these sets may be restricted or divided as on level 2. This renders the empirical test of dynamic 
models such a complex659 matter and it is probably what Pierre Duhem meant in the following 
statement – one simply has to read ‘hypothesis’ as ‘definition’: 
“the physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but only 
a whole group of hypotheses; when the experiment is in disagreement with his 
predictions, what he learns is that at least one of the hypotheses constituting this 
group is unacceptable and ought to be modified; but the experiment does not 
designate which one should be changed.” (Duhem 1962 [1906]: 187) 
It seems to me that scientific disciplines have developed certain traditions with respect to which sets 
of their dynamic models they uphold and which they protect. Such, a physicist would rather doubt 
the existence of a field or vacuum (Situation Types, operationalizable in boundary conditions) than 
doubt the working of the basic physical forces (Connectors). A macroeconomist working on financial 
markets would rather doubt the existence of perfect information at the stock market, i.e. the 
existence of a perfect market (Situation Type), than the ideal of rational decisions (Connector) by 
rational agents (Object Class). Darwin did rather postulate some sort of ecological drift (an unnamed 
Connector) rather than interpreting the fluctuations of polymorphic species as evolution (Output).660 
On level 4, the third and most abstract kind of underdetermination can be found: 
underdetermination of ontologies. It consists of the fact that the available empirical evidence allows 
for telling different narratives about nature and that, in turn, these narratives may convey different 
ontologies of the world, i.e. different tales about which entities do interact how in the world. As the 
discussion of my model highlighted (see 2.1.5) and as the reception analysis as well as my discussion 
above revealed (see 3.1 – 3.5, 5.3.i), these ontologies are only very loosely connected to empirics and 
the subjective interpretation is still more marked in ontologies than in classifications (interpretation, 
denotation) and explanations (narratives). 
                                                            
659  One might grasp the complexity of this operation like: An empirical regularity is a statement with a set of 
properties which may or may not satisfy a specific Situation Type, Object Class, Input, Output. (The 
Connector is but a name for a set of such configurations.) An empirical regularity is covered by a dynamic 
model if it satisfies each of these four elements. (In this case it also satisfies the Connector.) By specifying 
any of the elements one restricts the number of possible statements which may satisfy the dynamic model 
and, usually, the number of statements which do satisfy it. 
One of the problems of modeling in the social sciences is the lack of distinction for its Situation Types and 
Object Classes. By classifying different sets of boundary conditions as different Situation Types, one could 
distinguish different sets of regularities by the Situations in which they apply. If no such distinctions are 
introduced, the regularities either apply to a very large space of situations or very few situations. Usually, 
the latter is the case for few, in any case, empirical regularity apply to large classes of objects and/or 
situations. Thus, the focus single Situation Types and/or single Object Classes, strictly limits the available 
empirical knowledge. 
660  The flip-side of such immunization, however, is a strongly limited scope of their models. Therefore, rather 
than focusing on perfect markets or perfectly rational agents, economists might wish to study actual 
behavior in actual situations and develop more complex concepts of both, its Object Class and Situation 
Type. (See (North 1977) for a similar point and (Callon 1998) for an argument against such increased 
complexity which is based but on ontological considerations.) 
Sebastian Zacharias: The Darwinian Revolution as a knowledge reorganization 
 
326 
As ontologies are attempts to describe the reality behind the observed reality, they are not 
surprising; the access to such a reality is a highly subjective matter. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
many of the most controversial topics in science are ontological ones. When concept names like 
Natural Selection, electricity or gravity, the homo oeconomicus or the age of the earth are not 
considered mere metaphors or useful scientific fictions but as having true existence beyond the 
observable (in the realist sense), then they become questions of world-view and therefore highly 
debatable.661 
I believe that it is this underdetermination of ontologies which Quine described when he discussed 
whether “systems of the world” are underdetermined by the totality of known evidence. (Quine 
1975) Thus, “empirically equivalent” models or theories are underdetermined with respect to their 
narratives and ontological implications. However, unlike Duhem’s, Quine’s underdetermination is no 
logical phenomenon. As my analysis has shown, neither narratives nor their implications are 
denotative entities; they exist only in the realm of connotations, i.e. outside the reach of logic. 
Therefore, empirically equivalent theories do not contradict one another in the logical sense of 
‘contradiction’. Rather, their narratives and ontologies might be judged as intuitively incompatible by 
a specific subjective recipient from a specific cultural context.662 Such judgments and their criteria, 
however, are no topic of logical but of psychology or sociology. 663 
With respect to all these three forms of underdetermination, it makes no sense to ask whether a 
theory is true: A theory does not model, interpret, or tell evidence in the single true way but in one 
of several ways, forming different sets, naming them differently, arranging these concepts in 
                                                            
661  Moreover, they strongly depend on cultural context; philosophical implications can fade over time or 
increase in importance. For instance, today, the mention of God’s in the Origin, would rather be read 
before the background of a debate between atheists and believers than between deists and theists as in 
the Darwinian time. 
662  Thus, Quine’s question whether a “reconstrual of predicates” would transform one empirical theory into 
the other in terms of truth values (Quine 1975: 327) can be answered in the affirmative: Quinean 
underdetermination is no logical phenomenon and empirically equivalent theories do not contradict each 
other logically. Changing the concepts and concept names, transforms one theory into the other in terms 
of truth values. However, such reconstrual would erase all connotative meaning of the concerned theory 
and thus the interpretative, explanatory and ontological component of a theory. (Feyerabend 1962: 28-9) 
expresses the same point, with less distinctions: “a complete replacement of the ontology (and perhaps 
even of the formalism [dynamic model]) of T' by the ontology (and the formalism) of T and a corresponding 
change of the meanings of the descriptive elements [classification] of the formalism of T' (provided these 
elements and this formalism are still used).“ 
663  This may explain why the reduction of scientific theories to descriptions of evidence is such an unappealing 
idea: it deprives a theory of its sense. (cf. Bridgman 1927; Bridgman 1951a; Bridgman 1951c; Bridgman 
1951b)  
I do not support the idea of theory-reduction between different theories, notably theories from different 
disciplines. Kenneth Schaffner identifies Nagel (1947, 1961) as the standard view on such theory reduction 
and characterizes it like that: “Nagel envisaged reduction as a relation between theories in science. A 
theory in biology, say, was reducibly to a theory in chemistry, if and only if (1) all the non-logical terms 
appearing in the biological theory were connectable with those in the chemical theory, e.g., gene had to be 
connected with DNA, and (2) with the aid of these connectability assumptions, the biological theory could 
be derived, essentially as in the Hempelian explanation …, from the chemical theory (with the additional 
aid of general logical principles).” (Schaffner 1996: 31) – To me, the idea of such a theory-reduction is 
absurd. One may seek to unify theories in connotative terms, within a single and coherent terminology, 
although this can be daunting linguistic task. However, one cannot deduce denotations from different 
denotations, for instance the observations of biology from those of physics. Such ideas make sense only if 
one ignores the empirical content (the referents) of scientific theories and reduces them to systems of 
metaphors. 
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different narrative structures, conveying different ontologies.664 None of these ways is wrong; rather 
they represent specific manners of humans making sense of scientific knowledge. 
iv. The theory-ladenness of observations and incommensurability 
Like the debate on holism and the analytic-synthetic distinction, the debate on theory-ladenness and 
incommensurability was a reaction to the logical empiricist project of the Vienna Circle, and its 
attempt to model scientific theories as logical-linguistic entities. Part of this project had been the 
postulation of some basic kind of objective observation statements which could be distinguished 
from theoretical statements and would thus form an undisputed basis for theorizing. In the late 
1950s and in the 1960s this assumption was attacked by Norwood Russel Hanson, Paul Feyerabend 
and Thomas S. Kuhn, among others. (Hanson 1972 [1958]: 4-30, Feyerabend 1962; Kuhn 1970 [1962]: 
149-165, 198-200) These philosophers claimed that any observation implies theorizing and that, 
therefore, any description of observations has at least some theoretical component. From this 
alleged theory-ladenness they concluded that there exists no undisputable basis for theorizing and 
that, therefore, no common measure by which to compare two theories: theories are 
“incommensurable”. 
I have not worked on acts of observation and cannot speak about whether they are theory-laden or 
in what way. However, based on my model, I can say something about the relation between 
descriptions of observations and different kinds theorizing, i.e. classification, explanation, ontological 
implications. My model as well as my study suggest that accounts of theory-ladenness and 
incommensurability are exaggerated and/or without empirical basis. 
First, if descriptions of observations are supposed to be theory-laden, then one has to demonstrate 
this theory-ladenness on these descriptions and not on interpretations, explanations or ontologies of 
such descriptions. The original proponents of the thesis of theory-ladenness have failed to do so; 
their demonstrations of theory-ladenness are limited to what in my model are interpretations, 
explanations or ontologies.665 They do thus fall prey to the same perception asymmetry as Kuhn in 
his analysis of scientific revolutions (see above); they analyze science from the perspective of 
outsiders and draw conclusions which are biased by this perspective. 
Second, identifying theory-ladenness requires more than pointing out single terms in descriptions 
and claiming that they might be interpreted in some theoretical context, particularly from a different 
historical context or from outside science.666 Instead, one would have to demonstrate that terms in 
descriptions are systematically linked to a theory which covers these very descriptions in a specific 
                                                            
664  Thus, underdetermination is not only a logical problem, it consists of denotative (logical) and connotative 
(literary) choices. 
665  Neither (Feyerabend 1962) nor Kuhn (1970 [1962]) nor (Hanson 1972 [1958]) cite a primary source. Their 
presentation of scientific theories is sketchy and limited to models and their narratives, sometimes 
classifications are mentioned. Moreover, most discussions of theory-ladenness focus on the textbooks or 
theoretical overviews, not on the descriptive part of empirical papers, as they should. 
666  Thus, it is not sufficient to claim theory-ladenness in a general understanding of theory, in the sense of 
some more or less specific world-view. Moreover, when identifying supposedly theoretical terms, one has 
to pay close attention whether these terms where in use as theoretical terms in the historical context in 
which they were employed. The use and the reference of terms (their denotative and connotative 
meaning) is subject to profound changes. 
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historical context of science. (Otherwise, the alleged theory-ladenness remains but an a posteriori 
projection.) I know of no empirical study which would thus support claims of theory-ladenness. 
Third, even if such systematic relations were identified, one still would have to demonstrate their 
impact on scientific practice, particularly on research methodologies or the assessment of new 
models or theories. I do not know any such demonstration.667 
As far as I see, none of these conditions is fulfilled. Furthermore, my study of theoretical 
developments in 19th century biology suggests that descriptions of observations, while probably not 
theory-free, are theory-neutral668, i.e. compatible with different, possibly opposing theories. Hence, 
Proponents of the Darwinian theory and Owen’s theory of the archetype build their theories on the 
same set of descriptions, many of which had been produced by Owen. I do not find a single case in 
which such descriptions were called in question – not even in the debate on the hippocampus minor. 
Instead, the heated debates on classifications, explanations and ontologies were led before the 
background of and with reference to a common and undisputed body of scientific knowledge, these 
namely descriptions of observations.669 
Moreover, this common body of descriptions allowed for discussing different components of the 
competing theories and for assessing how they performed with respect to this body. Thus, the 
majority of biologists accepted Darwin’s classification but held reservations with respect to his 
explanation and its ontological implications; they accepted some elements of his theory and 
dismissed others.670 This selective adherence suggests that scientists were able to assess theories 
from without these theories and make their judgments without adhering to any alternative. They 
were able to assess what theory added to empirical descriptions and, in return, what these 
descriptions where independently from their theories. 
A point in case is Lankesters’ 1870 suggestion of changing the name of Owen’s concept of homology 
because it still held Platonic overtones. (Rupke 1994: 217; see section 4.3.3) While his suggestion was 
not adopted671, it shows that proponents of one theory were very well able to grasp the connotations 
conveyed by theoretical concepts and could separate them from the denotative part. In other words, 
they could make judgments about theories in which they separated descriptions of observations 
from their theoretical superstructure, i.e. classification, explanation and ontological implications. 
In my understanding, this clearly contradicts accounts of theory-ladenness and it suggests that 
criteria for theory choice can very well be explicated from without theories in question. This does not 
imply, however, that such choices are evident or objective. As I have sketched above, criteria for 
theory-choice are manifold and non-exclusive. Thus, it may be possible to assess that one theory 
fares better in area X while the other does better in area Y without it being clear which theory one 
should choose. One might still lack a “common measure” by which to choose between them. 
However, unless the existence of theory-ladenness is demonstrated with respect to the three 
                                                            
667  I do not doubt here, that scientists hold ontologies which influence their research agendas and theoretical 
choices. Yet, theory-ladenness should be observable in the writings of scientists, namely in their 
descriptions of observations, and not in their opinions or verbal statements. 
668  I owe this term to Fynn Ole Engler and Hans Jürgen Wendel from the Institute of Philosophy at the 
University of Rostock. 
669  This does not imply that this body of knowledge may not grow or be corrected. However, such growth or 
corrections are justified with respect to observations or experiments, not from theoretical justifications. 
670  This again underlines that theories are not accepted in their entirety and should not be treated thus. 
671  Remember that Owen’s concept is still in use in modern biology. 
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conditions above, this lack of a common measure cannot be read in the sense of traditional claims of 
“incommensurability”. 
v. A new approach to scientific explanations? 672 
Since Carl Gustav Hempel’s first ambitious model of scientific explanations, the covering law-model 
or deductive nomological model (D-N model), several alternatives or complements have been 
advanced for explanations in the natural sciences. (cf. Salmon 1989) In a recent article, Heather 
Douglas distinguished four influential contemporary views: covering law explanations (D-N-
explanations), causal explanations, explanations through unification and mechanistic explanations.673 
(Douglas 2009: 455-6) Outside the natural sciences, one may add teleological explanations, i.e. 
explanations which do not answer why something happened or emerged but what for.674 
In discussing these different types of explanations, there seem two philosophically relevant 
questions, a normative and a descriptive one. On one hand, one may ask which of them qualify as 
good explanations and what characterizes a good scientific explanation. On the other hand, one may 
ask what distinguishes these different kinds of explanations, how they may be described and 
compared. My model provides clues to both questions. 
First, one may discuss the epistemic value of different explanations and define what a good 
explanation should provide. I agree with Douglas that good explanations should be more than good 
stories (narratives); they should also be adequate dynamic models of empirically observed 
regularities.675 This reflects the three criteria for theory-assessment which I identified in the 
reception analysis (section 0): (i) empirical adequacy: a good explanation should allow for describing, 
predicting676 and/or producing empirical regularities677, (ii) consistency: it should model these 
                                                            
672  I do not discuss classifications here although they might be regarded as ‘explanatory’ in a larger sense of 
the word. 
673  For the classic account of covering law explanations, i.e. deductive-nomological (D-N) explanations, see 
(Hempel and Oppenheim 1948) and (Hempel 1962). For causal explanations, see for instance (Salmon 
1998). For explanation through unification, see (Kitcher 1981). For mechanistic explanations with a focus 
on biology, see (Schaffner 1996) or, with reference to “laws” instead of ‘mechanisms’, (Mitchell 2000). 
674  Teleological explanations are frequent in the social sciences and humanities, although there exist other 
forms of explanation. Many social scientists interpret events as human actions and explain them as results 
of human decisions, for instance rational decisions. In the humanities, many scholars explain objects (text, 
film, artefacts) or events (theater pieces, interactions) as products of intentional decisions. Such 
explanations might be mixed with causal or mechanistic explanations, though. (One might also speak of 
products of mindful acts which relates to the German term Geisteswissenschaften for the humanities; 
Geisteswissenschaften study products of human minds.) 
675  However, unlike Douglas, I do not see a “philosophical relationship” between prediction and explanation. 
(Douglas 2009: 450) I simply believe that a good explanation should comprise both elements of level 3 of 
my model of scientific theories, i.e. a dynamic model and a narrative. 
676  Douglas mentions an explanation’s ability to produce novel predictions, too. Her understanding of the term 
‘prediction’, however, is rather loose and mixes two epistemic functions of an explanation: organization 
and inspiration (heuristic value). (For the distinction of epistemic functions, see Table 28) Thus, Douglas’s 
notion of ‘prediction’ covers not only precise predictions of specific events – for instance predictions of the 
tides or projections of economic growth – but the general idea that explanations may yield novel and 
interesting results when applied outside their original domain or to formerly unknown objects or events in 
this domain. (A case in point for prediction in this large sense would be the discovery of Neptune. Before 
the planet had been observed, it had been predicted by French astronomer and mathematician Urbain Le 
Verrier (1811-1877) from theoretical reasoning. Another one is Kurt Lewin’s application of physical models 
to psychology which resulted in a number of empirical breakthroughs. (See Perlina forthcoming) 
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regularities in a logically consistent manner, (iii) plausibility: it should provide a compelling narrative 
which makes sense of the described observations and experiments. 
Logically, this requirement results in a more detailed version of the D-N-scheme, i.e. the demand that 
explanations comprise empirically adequate dynamic models as described by level three of my model 
of scientific theories. (This should be the necessary condition for a scientific explanation.) Beyond 
logic, however, my model allows for a pluralism of explanations and also for the selective use of 
explanations which can be observed in scientific practice. (This is the sufficient condition.) One 
explanation may provide the best organization of data, another might be more useful as a 
communicative tool in teaching, a third one might turn out to be the most fruitful heuristic. 
Moreover, scientists in the same field may pursue different narratives in their research all the while 
accepting the same model or two logically equivalent models of the established body of 
knowledge.678 Thus, cooperation is possible and fruitful even where scientists disagrees about what is 
an acceptable explanation, i.e. one they consider “intuitively” explanatory. (Kitcher 1981: 508) 
Second, by specifying the logical form of static and dynamic models (denotative meaning) and by 
distinguishing them from interpretations and narratives (connotative meaning), my model provides 
analytic tools for the analysis of different types of explanations. For instance, it clarifies that the 
covering law model (D-N-model) and unification focus on logical aspects of explanation, while causal, 
mechanistic and teleological explanations focus, first and foremost, on narrative aspects. 
Thus, covering law explanations are statements which link an Input to and Output in a general 
statement, possibly via a Connector. Unification might apply to all elements of a dynamic model: one 
might unify Situation Types, Object Classes, Inputs, Outputs and Connectors; the most relevant 
elements for explanations are probably the latter three.679 For instance, Darwin unifies the 
phenomena of paleontology, biogeography, anatomy and morphology under a single Output named 
‘evolution’. Newton unifies different phenomena of the physical world – celestial motions, the tides, 
falls of bodies on earth – under the term ‘motion’, which figures in both his Input and Output. 
Rational Choice summarizes numerous sets of empirical regularities under a single Connector: 
‘rational decisions’. Consequently, most covering law-explanations involve some degree of 
unification, too. In causal explanations, the terms for the Input or the Connector of a dynamic model 
are employed as Agents in the narrative explanation. For instance, a moving body (Object, Input) may 
alter (Agency) the motion (Output) of another body (Object) because gravitational forces act 
between them (Reason). Compared to full-fledged causal explanations, mechanistic explanations are 
narrative sketches only. They focus on the Connector, too, but present it as an Agency (means) rather 
than an Agent (cause), thus providing no reason/purpose for the process they describe. For instance, 
an effect (Input, Output) is achieved via a Mechanism (Connector), although the underlying cause 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Thus, prediction in this large sense includes what I would call the heuristic dimension of a narrative. This, 
however, like its communicative function, is nothing I would tie to dynamic models in explanations. A 
narrative might be a useful narrative tool or a good heuristics although it is not linked to a good dynamic 
model and, therefore, not part of a good explanation. Therefore, the symmetry thesis, i.e. the idea that 
prediction and explanation are mutually depended, is wrong in both ways. There exist good scientific 
explanations which yield no interesting predictions and bad or un-scientific explanations which turn out 
great heuristics. 
677  When predictable and/or controllable, such regularities are often called ‘effects’. 
678  I am aware that such clear cut cases do probably not occur in practice. 
679  Generally, Kitcher’s unification account focuses on what I call ‘static modeling’. It addresses level 2 of my 
model, not level 3. Thus, one could argue that it addresses a prerequisite of scientific explanations rather 
than scientific explanations themselves. 
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(Agent) is still unknown. In teleological explanations in the social sciences, the members of the 
Object Class are interpreted as Agents which are motivated by the term for the Input, e.g. 
preferences, and pursue (Purpose) the Output (Act) via the Connector (Agency), e.g. rational 
decisions. 
As the latter three modes – causal, mechanistic, teleological explanations – specify narrative aspects 
of explanations and the former two – covering law and unifying explanations – describe logical 
aspects, they are not mutually exclusive. Rather, an explanation which satisfies one of the narrative 
modes may also satisfy one or both of the logical modes and an explanation which satisfies one of 
the logical modes may also fulfill one of the narratives modes.680 Thus, a causal explanation based on 
an empirically adequate dynamic model fulfills the conditions of a dynamic model and, indeed, most 
causal explanations in the natural sciences are covering law explanation as well. Moreover, causal 
explanations unify Connectors, i.e. the names of covering laws (sets of regularities under general 
statements). Mechanistic explanations do the same but to a lesser degree; compared to causal 
explanations, their Connector unifies smaller sets of empirical regularities. These sets of regularities, 
in turn, often fulfill the conditions of covering law-explanations such that the Mechanism (Connector) 
of a mechanistic explanation equally is the name of a covering law. The case of teleological 
explanations is equivalent: A Connector like ‘rational decision’ does the same for sociological 
explanations as a Mechanism does for a biological explanation. Likewise, the elements of a 
prototypical Rational Choice explanation unify large sets of possible Inputs, Outputs and Connectors; 
thus, ‘rational decision’ denotes an entire set of empirical regularities in the social sciences.681 
I cannot go beyond sketching possible applications of my model here. Still, I am confident that the 
distinction between the logical and the literary component of explanations as well as the four levels 
of my model might allow for more informed and more informative comparisons of explanatory 
practice and traditions in different branches of science.682 Possibly, it might also allow for more 
theoretical pluralism, i.e. the acceptance of different, competing interpretations, narratives and 
ontologies over the same (similar) data sets.683 
vi. Criticizing models, theories & modeling and theoretical choices for the right reasons 
Such pluralism could go hand in hand with more specific criteria for the assessment of theories and 
models. My impression684 is that such assessments are often quite one-dimensional and focus too 
                                                            
680  Covering law-explanations and unifying explanations are not mutually exclusive either. However, the three 
narrative modes seem to exclude each other in that the same explanation is never perceived as both 
teleological and causal or causal and mechanistic or mechanistic and teleological. 
681  Therefore, there are explanations in the humanities and social sciences which fulfill the same logical 
criteria as explanations in the natural sciences – although their narrative form differs. Danto 1965 and 
Frings 2008 describe such explanations in History. 
682  An interesting case is Darwin himself: In his explanation, Darwin made the move from putting the main 
explanatory metaphor on the Connector instead of the input. Thus, he switched from the explanatory 
mode of the humanities to the mode of physics. 
683  Moreover, it might allow for developing operational criteria for narratives in scientific explanations. One 
might specify what aspects should the underlying model or the studied objects and event need to 
exemplify for a narrative to be applicable. 
684  Naturally, I might be falling prey to the aforementioned perception asymmetry in that I am aware only of 
the prominent (popular) critical accounts, i.e. those which focus on levels 3 and 4 of my model. 
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much on the upper levels of my model, i.e. ontologies, narratives.685 Modeling choices are less often 
addressed, questions of empirical scope and data accuracy686 still less. 
This trend shows very markedly in economics where the criticism of the Rational Choice theory 
focuses mostly on the world-views of the theory, i.e. what it implies about humans and their 
behavior.687 Laymen critics argue that economists would not take into account the entirety of human 
motives; for instance they would ignore morals and altruism in human decisions. Psychologists like 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman or Gerd Gigerenzer focus on decision-making processes and 
argue that empirical evidence in psychology goes counter to Rational Choice ontologies of how 
humans decide. (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Gigerenzer and Todd 1999; Gigerenzer 2001; 
Gigerenzer 2008; Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009)688 
While it is a perfectly legitimate ambition to criticize the ontology of a theory, I cannot avoid the 
impression that such criticism diverts the attention from what seem to be the more urgent problems 
of macroeconomics, for instance the lack of empirical foundation for much of economic forecasting 
or the lack of distinctions in its Situation Type and Object Class (see footnote 659) or the question 
whether the organization of economic regularities in the form of fundamental laws reminiscent of 
physics does actually increase the heuristic value of these models. 
Therefore, I would argue for multi-dimensional criteria for theory choice and a stronger focus on the 
empirical merit of theories and models. Table 28 (page 313) specifies a list of possible criteria, 
organized by abstraction level and epistemic goals. 
vii. Demarcating science from non-science and explaining the success of science 
According to my model, scientific theorizing implies description and modeling but also interpretation, 
narration and the explication of ontological implications; in other words, it implies logical aggregation 
and organization of scientific knowledge as well as attempts to make sense of this knowledge, to 
relate it to views of the world. The sheer existence of such sense-making led Paul Feyerabend to the 
conclusion that science is in no privileged epistemic position towards ideology, religion or myth. 
According to him, science tells stories and constructs worldviews (ontologies) just like its 
competitors; it merely happens to enjoy more social prestige than them. (Feyerabend 1986[1975]: 
385-97) 
My distinction of denotative (logical) and connotative (literary) meaning within scientific theories 
clarifies the fallacy by which Feyerabend and his successors are taken in: While scientific theories do 
                                                            
685  The focus on narratives and ontologies might partly stem from on narrative traditions. Generally speaking, 
natural scientists regard their objects as unintentional – outside of biology and medicine even as inanimate 
– and explain events as results of natural laws. Social scientists construct their objects of study, humans, as 
intentional and conscious agents. In the humanities, many researchers, attempt to explain their objects of 
study – film, text, images, artifacts – as products of intentional actions. 
686  I am not speaking of single case studies, here, but of systematic studies of the empirical record of a specific 
model or theory: how much does it describe, predict, produce. 
687  The debate on Kuhn is another example in that Kuhn could have and should have been criticized for 
suggesting a crudely misrepresenting model, which lacked any substantial empirical support. However, 
most of the debate focused on the ontological implications of his work, i.e. what it implied about scientists 
and science. 
688  Gigerenzer and his colleagues studied decision making processes and demonstrated that humans usually 
do not make conscious decisions but subconsciously follow “fast and frugal heuristics”. 
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contain literary (connotative, rhetorical) elements, they cannot be reduced to them. The (much) 
larger part of the scientific work consists in empirical descriptions as well as in static and dynamic 
modeling, both of which are non-metaphorical and non-narrative enterprises.689 
Moreover, the descriptive and logical work clearly and unequivocally distinguishes science from 
other ontology-/world-view-producing systems like ideologies, religions or myths. Hence, it appears 
that it provides as a simple and clear criterion for distinguishing science from non-science: science 
requires empirical descriptions690 and their logical aggregation while non-science does not.691 
Finally, it provides a simple explanation for the (empirical) success of science, i.e. the ability to 
describe, predict and produce. 692 Precise descriptions and their aggregation in semi-formal languages 
(definitions, nomenclatures) allow, first, for efficient organization and communication of empirical 
knowledge and, second, an effective division of cognitive labor between independent research 
groups. (Kitcher 1990) Thus, they allow for modern science as we know it: a network of loosely 
connected research groups which discover empirical facts and regularities, describe them, model 
them and make sense of them through interpretation, narration and their respective ontological 
implications. 
 
  
                                                            
689  I have a hard time attributing Feyerabend’s fallacy to the perception asymmetry which I identified in 
Kuhn’s argument on scientific revolutions. Feyerabend’s complete ignorance of the denotative part of 
science is just absurd. 
690  First, if one wishes to include the non-empirical disciplines, i.e. mathematics and logic, only logical 
aggregations (transformations) are required. Second, according to this definition not all disciplines at 
contemporary universities are sciences. This does not imply that these disciplines may not be worth 
academic activities. 
691  Note that, within the empirical science, both conditions need to be fulfilled. Particularly, it is not sufficient 
for a model to be logically consistent in order to be considered scientific; it has to be empirically adequate 
as well. (This relates to the three criteria for the assessment of theories which I have identified in the 
reception analysis, i.e. plausibility, consistency and empirical adequacy. (see section 0) Non-scientific 
explanations/interpretations/models/theories can pass for science only if one does not check for all three 
of them.) The so-called “Intelligent Design” model is an example of a model which is logically consistent but 
does not comply with empirics; it merely pretends to do. (For a discussion, see Zacharias and Schulz 
forthcoming.) 
692  In compliance with my understanding of scientific progress as empirical progress, I do not include 
theorizing in this success, although it is a relevant part of scientific practice. However, I do not know 
whether science is superior to other systems in its interpretation and explanation or with respect to the 
ontologies it conveys. Thus, I seek to explain “less” success than realists like (Engler 2008). 
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